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ABSTRACT
For as long as learning is considered to include a  cognitive element, then questions
about how, and indeed, why, we think, remain crucial considerations for stakeholders
in education, learning, and professional development. This study explores thinking in
the specific context of on-the-job learning, or in other words, the essential nature of
on-the-job thinking. Research generally portrays on-the-job learning, and the thinking
assumed to take  place  therein,  as  an  increasingly  complex and poorly  understood
process.  Beginning  from  a  position  rooted  in  health  and  fitness  sector-specific
research, and subsequently venturing into the wider landscape of fundamental theories
in education and learning, a review of literature identifies the tendency for on-the-job
learning to occur predominantly  tacitly, as a main contributing factor to an evident
impasse in our attempts to understand or study it further. The review subsequently
traces this tacit-ness problem to its roots in cognitive science, or more specifically, in
dual process theories which depict thinking as an action that is either conscious or
unconscious  (tacit).  Despite  a  clear  juxtaposition  of  doing and  thinking,  and  the
apportioning of comparative importance to the two, theories and models in education
and learning seeking to expound the learning process, typically rely on definitions of
thinking  that  are  unclear  or  inconsistent,  and  fundamental  concepts,  typically
originating from cognitive science, that are obscure and/or paradoxical. It is argued,
therefore, that in order to further our understanding of on-the-job learning, a clearer
and  more  robust  definition  of  thinking  is  warranted,  as  an  alternative  theoretical
foundation  for  modern  education  and  learning  theories,  based  not  solely  on
explanations derived from cognitive science, but also on descriptions derived from
more  philosophical  endeavours,  namely,  phenomenology.  Following  a  deep  and
reflective phenomenological analysis of personal fitness trainers' accounts of their on-
the-job thinking, using modern as well as classical phenomenological methods, the
study aims to, first, uncover a re-conceptualised and less problematic description of
on-the-job  thinking,  and second,  to  evaluate  the  actual  implications  of  such a  re-
conceptualisation. The description that results, which is also presented in the text as
an analogy, casts light on the centrality of feelings, as well as concepts either general
or pertaining to self, as key influential factors guiding on-the-job learning outcomes,
portrays on-the-job thinking as an integrated activity that is not isolated or separated
from interaction  with  self,  other,  or  the  world,  and  finally,  challenges  traditional
conceptualisations  of  thinking  in  light  of  the  challenging  notions  of  conscious
awareness and volition. In so doing, the results of this study provide an alternative
view of thinking in the context of on-the-job learning by personal fitness trainers, or
indeed  other  professionals,  from  a  conceptual/theoretical  standpoint,  while  also
revealing  specific  features  of the phenomenon with immediate  and more practical
applications  as  prospective  constituents  of  existing  initiatives  or  interventions
designed to facilitate and enhance on-the-job learning in the health and fitness sector,
and perhaps further afield.
Keywords: On-the-job learning, Experiential learning, On-the-job thinking, 
Thinking in action
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Chapter one: Introduction
1.1 Preamble  
How do cognitive acts manifest in the continuous day-to-day qualitative experience of
thinking with which we are so familiar? Why do such acts even possess this distinctive
qualitative  characteristic  in  the  first  place?  If  modern  computers  are  capable  of
processing substantial amounts of information, are they, or will they ever be, capable of
thinking, at least in the way human beings qualitatively define it? How, for that matter,
might we define thinking, exactly? And how would we know, if they, or indeed any
life-form other than our own, experienced the same palpable qualities that we do when
we think?    
To speak about thinking, or ask such philosophical questions, is to suggest that it is a
thing, and therefore, simply must have some kind of essential and describable nature of
its own that makes it so. But the notion of a distinctive thing being able to truly relate
to, or directly see, itself, is paradoxical for almost any thing other than thinking. While
we  entertain  the  apparently  real  capability  of  thinking  about  thinking,  its  essence
remains  precariously  difficult  to  directly  capture  or  define,  like  an  object  in  the
darkness that can be viewed only indirectly,  by looking slightly above, below, or to
either side of it, only to disappear the moment it is directly attended to by the human
eye. To even deliberate or entertain such a capability, of a thing like thinking being able
to cast itself in plain sight, is, precisely, to think about thinking about thinking, a pursuit
of  the  ever-receding kind,  chasing  the  shadows of  thought  acts,  rendering  thinking
itself, and its true essential nature, evermore elusive and obscure.
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To the education and learning theorist, the pursuit of personal growth and wisdom, and
the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  represent  central  features  of  human  experience
necessarily  inclusive  of  this  pervasive  phenomenon  we call  thinking.  According  to
Palmer, Socrates famously denied being a teacher, based on the assertion that he, in
fact, knew nothing. By negating the possession of knowledge, and instead favouring the
process of asking questions, Socrates cast light on the notion of the idea of a process, a
way, or a  method, of “reasoning things out” (2003, 6). In this view, experience itself
may be conceptualised as a sort of grand teacher, or as fertile land for those intent on
harvesting the abundance of learning opportunities presented by day-to-day situations
and  episodes,  if,  like  Socrates,  they  can  only  ask  the  right  questions,  assuming  of
course, there is such a thing as the right question. Experience, in this sense, is like an
arena,  where  the  elusive  phenomenon  of  thinking,  both  overt  and  covert,  and  the
unfolding  events  and  interactions  between  people  and  objects  in  the  world,  meet,
engage with, and react to, one another. Education and learning theorists typically look
on, surveying this confluence, examining the new skills, knowledge, attitudes, or beliefs
emitted,  striving  to  understand  the  precise  mechanisms  that  must  underlie  their
emergence.  A  quote  by  Gilbert  and  Trudel  (2006),  on  the  notion  of  experience,
represents a fitting point of departure here, and was particularly resonant with the early
interests and philosophical musings leading up to the undertaking of this study;
“Ten years  of  coaching  without  reflection,  is  simply  one  year  of  coaching  
repeated ten times.” (Gilbert and Trudel, 2006, 114)
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Brookfield (1998, cited in Cromley, 2000, 108), made the earlier more general assertion
that  some  adults  may  have  “one  year  repeated  40  times,  rather  than  40  years
experience.”  The  notion  of  professional  experience,  or  rather,  the  considerable
ambiguity  it  denotes  upon  any  closer  evaluation  of  its  meaning,  combined  with  a
persistent curiosity about the essential  nature of thinking, represented early, yet still
relatively indistinct, research interests. The convergence of these interests into a more
distinctive,  coherent,  and  workable  research  topic,  is  chartered  throughout  the
remainder of this introductory narrative. 
In further more inquisitive consideration of Gilbert and Trudel's assertion, the claim by
a professional to have ten years of experience, is, upon closer examination, inherently
problematic.  Indeed,  such a  claim made by any two professionals  in  a  given field,
offered up as a form of credential,  might actually represent quite disparate orders of
proficiency,  competency or  expertise.  Both a  successful  as  well  as  an unsuccessful
professional, regardless of how one might choose to define their success, can both make
valid claims about the amount of experience they possess. Making valid claims about
the  value of such experience, however, is a different and substantially more difficult
matter altogether. Did each year represent a progression of knowledge and/or ability
compared  to  that  preceding  it?  Did  each  year  represent  merely  a  maintenance  of
knowledge and/or ability, or worse, a regression? How, still, would one even clearly
determine progression, maintenance or regression in this sense?
The claim to any amount of experience implies an accrual of knowledge and/or ability
arising from repeated exposure to related occurrences, situations and episodes within a
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defined workplace context. Such accrual can only take place if, at given stages between
successive  episodes  or  situations,  a  professional  either  knows,  or  is  able  to  do,
something different. Change to knowledge and/or ability in turn implies a change in
competence or efficacy where similar situations and episodes are likely to re-occur.
While  accrual of knowledge and ability,  or,  change in competence,  would represent
gross oversimplifications of the phenomenon of learning from experience, should they
be posited as proper definitions, they certainly allude to at least some of its essential
features. The initial desire to uncover just such essential features, and understand the
nature of  experience,  or  more  specifically,  the  nature  of  the  learning  that
facilitates/accompanies  it,  constituted  a  tangible  genesis  that  served  to  ground  the
research effort, and prompt the initial stages of a review of literature.
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1.2 Context
The earliest  readings carried out, along with some of the insights and problems that
began to emerge, are chartered in the first part of chapter two. The readings were, at
this stage, grounded in the specific context of the health and fitness sector. The health
and fitness sector comprises health clubs, fitness centres, and indeed any organisations
offering services which are, broadly speaking, designed to improve consumers’ general
health, fitness, and lifestyle. In 2016, the European health and fitness sector served over
52 million consumers, employed approximately 650,000 people, and generated over 26
billion Euro in revenues (EuropeActive, 2016). Considered to operate at the “front line”
of this  sector  in terms of human resources (Maguire,  2001;  De Lyon and Cushion,
2013), personal fitness trainers (PFTs) design and deliver personalised physical training
and healthy  lifestyle  interventions  for  individual  clients,  or  small  groups of  clients,
according  to  a  wide  range  of  health  and  fitness  goals.  PFTs  generally  work  on  a
freelance, self-employed, basis, or are affiliated with health clubs or fitness centres in
accordance  with  various  contractual  agreements.  Their  job  role  is  considered  to  be
multifaceted,  combining  the  need  for  specialised  knowledge  and  skill-based
competences,  in  a  professional  landscape  of  ever-evolving  trends  (Maguire,  2001;
Rosado  et  al.,  2014).  The  accommodation  of  a  multifaceted  role,  and  the  need  to
continuously adapt in a rapidly evolving sector, renders PFTs an enticing population for
exploring professional development and learning. Following a 14-year career working
as a PFT, or alongside other PFTs, the context in which this research is conceived, is
discerned  in  Annex  1,  in  a  detailed  exposition  of  researcher  positionality  and
reflexivity.
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Chapter two proceeds by highlighting some of the problems and limitations associated
with sector-specific research on the acquisition of knowledge by fitness professionals.
In view of the pertinent  gaps identified,  a central  argument  is  made,  that efforts  to
maximise on-going learning by PFTs, should be based on a deeper understanding of the
essential nature of on-going learning from experience, permitting the delineation of an
increasingly concise set of research aims. 
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1.3 Aims
In the sector-specific literature, knowledge acquisition and translation (into practice) by
fitness  professionals  was  portrayed  as  increasingly  precarious,  and  a  significant
knowledge gap revealed precisely by the lack of scholarly work aimed at discerning its
fundamental  nature.  A key paper  by De Lyon and Cushion (2013) was particularly
influential at this stage of the review, in establishing the centrality and importance of
on-going professional  learning in  the  health  and fitness  sector.  With  respect  to  the
developing interest  in professional experience and the learning comprised therein,  a
more specific mode of learning was delineated and defined more succinctly as on-the-
job learning (OJL). Justification for the selection of this specific term, which is used
throughout the remainder of the thesis, is also elaborated in the initial stages of chapter
two. Following the identification of an evident impasse in the further study of OJL,
mainly due to the problem of it being predominantly tacit (hidden), a crucial reduction
was carried out,  representing  an important  and further  converging research interest,
towards the yet more specific problem of tacit on-the-job thinking. 
The  theoretical  roots  of  the  tacit  thinking  problem  represented  an  engaging  and
increasingly refined topic throughout the ensuing review, eventually resulting in the
sourcing of literature from a further three main bodies, in an attempt to discern what is
currently known about its fundamental and essential nature. The three additional bodies
included  literature  on,  fundamental  theories  of  education  and  learning,  cognitive
science, and philosophy of mind/phenomenology. The term thinking is used here in its
generic sense, to avoid other more specific locutions carrying alternative connotations
in the context of existing research. Thinking, in this respect, is intended to include any
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activities associated with what we call the mind, involving, but not necessarily limited
to,  considering,  reasoning,  or  otherwise  processing  ideas,  perceptions,  and  other
internal representations of self and the world, with an affective influence on ensuing
mental or otherwise subjective states, behaviours or outcomes. 
By invoking Auguste Rodin’s The Thinker, a sculpture which depicts Dante (in Dante
Alighieri’s  Divine Comedy) seated on a pedestal at the gates of hell, thinking, Greeno
(1997, 118) presents some compelling insight regarding general perceptions and beliefs
about the notion of thinking in Western culture. The sculpture portrays  The Thinker
engaged in an activity that appears solitary, detached, and perhaps, given his location at
the gates of hell, even painful. The solitary and detached aspects of Rodin’s depiction,
according to Greeno, are echoed in more modern conceptualisations of thinking based
on the behaviourist and cognitivist paradigms, which are discussed in more depth in the
third body of chapter two. 
The theoretical roots of current conceptualisations of thinking are used throughout the
ensuing thesis,  as a basis  for questioning its  fundamental  and essential  nature.  It  is
argued  that  such  theoretical  roots  have  resulted  in  misleading  or  obscure  ideas
pervading modern research, and in turn led to additional problems in more specialised
fields, like OJL, that are principally dependent on a clear understanding of thinking as a
phenomenon. Brown (1988, 6) similarly highlighted the “misleading” and pervasive
theoretical separation in modern assumptions about thinking, as alluded to by Greeno in
his artistic interpretation of Rodin's The Thinker, between knowledge as “self-contained
and  discreet”,  isolated,  and  essentially  distinctive  from,  practical  contexts.  This
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theoretical separation requires, therefore, that the primary entities (knowledge/theory on
the one hand, and practice on the other), as a result of their fundamental disconnection,
be somehow bridged. The problem of having to subsequently discern the mechanisms
by  which  knowledge/theories  must  cross  that  bridge,  or  be  made  transferable (or
translatable),  to practice, becomes palpable as an academic endeavour, a challenging
enterprise  exacerbated  precisely  by  the  problematically  conceptualised  tenets  upon
which it rests. 
Throughout the review of literature, it became clearly evident that the phenomenon of
on-the-job thinking is considered, in the modern research context, to be substantially
complex, and poorly understood (Eraut, 2004). The efforts of traditional academic and
scientific disciplines in discerning its nature have meanwhile resulted in obscurities,
problems, paradoxes, and philosophical quandaries. More disconcerting at this juncture,
was  the  evident  rooting  of  modern  education  and  learning  theories  specifically
pertaining  to  OJL,  in  just  such  problematic  foundations.  A  discussion  on  the
underpinnings of the thinking aspects of learning from, or through, experience remains
a prominent theme throughout chapter  two, in which David Kolb (1984; 1999) and
Michael  Eraut  (2004) stand out  as  particularly  influential  and key proponents.  The
central argument is made, in favour of a warranted re-conceptualisation of on-the-job
thinking, along with the articulation of clearer and less problematic definitions of the
phenomenon, as a more robust underpinning for modern theories of learning pertaining
to OJL. 
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In framing this argument, some basic assumptions underlying prevailing contemporary
approaches  to  understanding OJL are  challenged  in  the  latter  parts  of  chapter  two,
setting the stage for the development of a tangible philosophical and methodological
position. Questioning the  value of bodies of experience, or the  validity of experience
claims,  for  instance,  requires  the  formulation  of  judgements  made  on  empirical
grounds.  The  attribution  of  value,  as  a  designated  property  of  accrued  experience
depends on such a property being objectively (and empirically) measurable. In other
words, judgements about the value of knowledge and ability arising from professional
experience can only be made from a standpoint based on  objectivity, by identifying,
comparing  and  correlating  objectified  criteria.  While  traditional  objective  learning
outcomes, by definition, indeed represent workable criteria against which the relevance
of knowledge and ability can be measured or assessed, the ensuing discourse on OJL
throughout the development of this thesis, exposes some limitations of this view. 
Objective assessment of set learning outcomes does not necessarily capture the totality
of  actual learning  outcomes  resulting  from  a  particular,  or  series  of,  learning
experience/s. Assessing the achievement of various specific learning outcomes from an
external  objective  viewpoint,  is an altogether different venture from establishing the
learning outcomes that are actually achieved, from the internal viewpoint of the subject.
The  relevance  and  value  of  the  actual  learning  outcomes  achieved  in  this  respect,
become increasingly problematic to measure objectively, since they are dependent on
various factors that are challenging to ascertain, such as personal attitudes, beliefs, and
motivation, as well as individual conceptualisations of what it means to be a good or
successful  PFT.  A qualitative  philosophical  and  methodological  position  is  thereby
established, rooted, broadly speaking, not in objectivity, but in subjectivity. 
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Understanding  the  essential  nature  of  on-the-job  thinking,  from  the  subjective
viewpoint of PFTs, is presented, throughout the latter part of chapter two, as a worthy
research aim, and an important fundamental step towards developing or refining any
means of  potentially  maximising  or  otherwise enhancing the  wider  phenomenon of
OJL.  The  emerging  arguments  at  this  stage  were  influenced  by  key  insights  from
Osman (2004),  Logie  (2004),  and Dennett  and Kinsbourne (1992),  in  a  critique  of
traditional  objective  science  approaches  to  conceptualising  the  phenomenon  of
thinking.  Ekebergh  (2007)  and  Carruthers  (2014;  2017)  subsequently  assume
prominence in yielding alternative and original perspectives on the emerging problems.
An explication of the fundamental essential nature of on-the-job thinking by PFTs is
consequently established as the principal aim of the study, with a discussion on the
practical applicability of such insights with respect to enhancing OJL throughout the
career span, its secondary and contingent aim. In conclusion of chapter two, these main
research aims are consolidated into a set of two research questions. 
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1.4 Methods
Following the articulation of two main questions in the conclusion of chapter two, a
philosophical and methodological position of the study is clearly discerned in chapter
three.  Based  on  its  ontological  and  epistemological  implications  in  the  context  of
modern research, phenomenology is established as the main philosophical paradigm.
Three  perspectives  were  assumed  in  the  development  and  elaboration  of
phenomenology  into  a  systematic  research  method,  duly  equipped  to  explore  the
essential  nature  of  on-the-job  thinking  based  on  the  subjective  interview-sourced
accounts  of  fitness  professionals.  First,  a  qualitative  interpretation  of  a  universal
scientific method was synthesised as its foundation. Second, the methods of classical
phenomenology in the style of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Martin Heidegger (1889-
1976),  and  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty  (1908-1961)  were  affirmed  as  its  fundamental
components.  And  third,  the  practical  systems  and  tools  used  by  modern
phenomenological researchers were incorporated into its architecture, drawing on the
central ideas of  Smith and Osborn (2008) and Giorgi et al. (2017). In relation to the
main philosophical assumptions and research questions, therefore, a five-step research
method based on a deep phenomenological analysis participants’ accounts of their on-
the-job thinking is duly presented. 
Following the implementation of a pilot study to test and refine the research method, its
application, with a main sample of ten PFTs, is detailed in the remainder of chapter
three. Given the qualitative phenomenological stance of the researcher, the findings in
this  study  were  considered  as  co-produced  by  the  both  the  participants  and  the
researcher.  In  this  respect,  prior  to  an  exposition  of  the  findings  in  chapter  four,
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disclosures of the researcher’s position and background, as well as the backgrounds of
each  of  the  participants,  are  included  in  Annexes  1  and  3  respectively.  Basic
information  about  each  participant  is  outlined  in  Annex  3,  including  years  of
experience, area/s of expertise, and a brief overview of the main points discussed in
each interview. 
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1.5 Contribution to knowledge
The  emergence  of  interpreted  annotations,  themes,  superordinate  themes,  and  final
themes are transparently explicated in chapter four to reveal the main activities and
decisions carried out by the researcher at important phases of the data collection and
analysis phases. The narrative at this stage is rich in participants’ accounts, adopting
key terms and phrases, in their own words, as a basis for the final composite summary
of the essential nature of their on-the-job thinking, presented in conclusion of chapter
four. In accordance with the five-step research method, however, the final composite
summary  was  considered  only  as  an  initial eidetic  description,  representing  only  a
completion of steps one to three among the total five. 
Chapter five subsequently proceeds with a continuing and deep evaluation of the initial
eidetic description, representing an execution of step four of the research method, in the
development and articulation of a  final eidetic description. The method terminates at
step five, by framing the results in relation to the first research question, constituting the
first part of the researcher’s original contribution to knowledge, via the presentation of
the final eidetic description itself, and accompanying analogy.
In chapter two, the theoretically problematic nature of OJL was attributed to obscurities
in the most fundamental concepts underpinning the thinking aspects of education and
learning theories  pertaining to OJL, predominantly  rooted in  cognitive  science.  The
final eidetic  description of PFTs’ subjective accounts of their  on-the-job thinking is
therefore presented with a view to addressing some of these obscurities, and positing an
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alternative philosophical underpinning for education and learning theories pertaining to
OJL.  In  other  words,  a  phenomenological  description  is  posited  as  an  additional
prospective component for the basis of theories pertaining to OJL, as an alternative to
their current reliance on explanations derived primarily from cognitive science. Next, in
addressing  the  second  research  question,  the  practical  implications  of  a
phenomenological description of on-the-job thinking are discussed in chapter five, with
a  view  to  facilitating  a  revival  of  research  and  development  in  the  field  of  OJL,
representing the second part of the researcher’s original contribution to knowledge. 
Conclusions and applicability of the findings are finally consolidated in the sixth and
final chapter, drawing specifically on important and original aspects of the findings. It
is intended, through the provision of a re-conceptualisation of on-the-job thinking, and
a  prospective  revival  of  research  and  development  in  the  wider  field  of  OJL,  in
accordance with the primary implied motives underlying such research in the health and
fitness  sector  and  perhaps  beyond,  that  stakeholders  be  furnished  with  new  and
innovative  means  of  maximising  and  enhancing  learning,  furthering  professional
knowledge and abilities, raising standards, and ultimately assisting learners themselves
in accomplishing their personal and professional goals. 
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Chapter two: Review of literature
2.1 Preamble
This chapter presents a review of four main bodies of literature, selected according to
their  relevance  with  respect  to  the  initial  research  interests  outlined  briefly  in  the
previous chapter which were based, first and foremost, on the desire to more deeply
understand the essential nature of PFTs’ on-going learning, following the cessation of
formal education and training. Literature was initially appropriated for inclusion based
on its potential contribution to a systematic and theoretically sound discernment of what
is  currently  known about  OJL in  the  health  and  fitness  context.  The  sourcing  and
selection of relevant books, articles, and other materials thereafter was a sequential and
adaptive process, departing from the sector-specific literature, and evolving according
to emerging problems, issues, and gaps. An exposition of the nature of this adaptation is
interwoven in the narrative, with explanations of, and justifications for, the inclusion of
relevant works presented at key points throughout the chapter.   
The first body collates research undertaken in the exercise and fitness sector, to explore
existing knowledge about OJL, in the specific learning contexts encountered by PFTs in
practice.  While  various  foci  were  noted  in  the  sector-specific  literature,  a  special
emphasis was placed on scholarly work dedicated to the  acquisition of knowledge by
fitness professionals. This yielded some insight into the nature and prevalence of OJL
in the field, but more importantly, flagged some important clues about the hindrances
that  have  thus  far  limited  our  understanding  of  such learning,  effectively  rebuffing
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further research efforts that might have illuminated its underlying factors and essential
features. 
A further  probe  into  the  more  specific  thinking aspects  of  OJL later  warranted  an
investigation of deeper and more fundamental theories of learning and education, with a
particular  focus  on  learning  from  experience  and  in  environments  not  typically
structured for learning. Such learning is generally described in the literature in various
ways, including the commonly cited term,  informal learning. Use of terminology is
clarified and discussed in relation to this study, including the adoption of OJL as a key
term, throughout the narrative. This second body of literature apprised more specific
scrutiny on the phenomenon of thinking, attempting to delineate it  from, as well  as
locate it within, the wider context of OJL. Robust definitions of acts of thinking, as well
as a dissolution of the problems preventing the extrication of such definitions, remained
elusive  from  the  theoretical  perspectives  rooted  in  learning  and  education  theory,
engendering  the  appropriation  of  a  third  body  of  literature  based  on  thinking  and
cognition theory. 
A review of thinking and cognition literature duly permitted a further reduction of the
problematic nature of tacit  learning (and the tacit  thinking assumed to exist therein)
identified in the previous two bodies, to the yet more specific notion of consciousness,
and common pervading conceptualisations of thinking and learning in terms simply of
its absence or presence. A general impetus was acknowledged throughout the review,
most  notably  via  its  prevalence  in  both  the  second  and  third  bodies,  towards
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conceptualising thinking and learning in terms of what they potentially could or should
be, rather than what they actually are. 
The centrality of the subsequent problem of indiscernible consciousness, as well as the
insufficiency  of  prevailing  approaches  in  sector-specific  learning,  education,  and
cognition  theory  in  expounding  the  nature  of  thinking  as  it  actually  occurs  in  the
context  of OJL,  warranted review of a fourth and final  body of literature  based on
consciousness and phenomenology. The problematic nature of thinking and OJL was
finally  considered at  a  deep-rooted level,  and promising methodological  approaches
elucidated  for  further  prospective  research  efforts,  aspiring  to  explicate  their
fundamental  nature.  In  the  conclusion  of  this  chapter,  insights,  observations,  and
relevant  approaches  sourced  from all  four  bodies  of  literature  reviewed  are  finally
collated and developed into a set of two main research questions.
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2.2 Body one: Sector-specific research
2.2.1 Prevalence and importance of on-the-job learning
Through their exploration of the “acquisition and development” of knowledge among a
sample of 11 fitness trainers in the UK, De Lyon and Cushion (2013) presented a key
paper and a compelling point of departure for this review. In a qualitative interview-
based study, the researchers aimed to study knowledge acquisition and development
with a specific emphasis on applied practice. After reinforcing a sector-wide need for
suitably-qualified  fitness  professionals  as  an  important  priority,  they  suggested  that
research had failed to demonstrate how modern fitness professionals accommodated the
complex and “multifaceted” nature of their role with relevant knowledge acquisition
(2013,  1407).  Furthermore,  according  to  De  Lyon  and  Cushion,  existing  formal
channels had failed to suitably equip fitness professionals with sufficient or suitable
knowledge for “real-world” contexts (2013, 1408). 
The learning experiences described by the participants were classified according to a
framework of formal, non-formal, and informal learning (Coombs and Ahmed, 1974,
cited  in  De  Lyon  and Cushion,  2013,  1411).  In  the  education  literature,  the  terms
‘formal’,  ‘non-formal’,  and  ‘informal’  are  typically  used  to  define  degrees  of
organisation, structure, intent, and recognition in various articulations of learning, with
each variable  applicable  in  ever-decreasing  value  when shifting  from the  formal  to
informal  ends of the implied theoretical  spectrum. In other  words,  according to  the
European centre for the development of vocational training (Cedefop), while formal
learning  is  organised,  structured,  intentional,  leads  to  certification,  and  is  typically
associated  with  academic  settings,  informal  learning  is  unplanned,  unstructured,
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unintentional, does not lead to certification, and is typically associated with practical or
work-based  contexts  (Tissot,  2004).  In  a  key  paper  addressed  to  the  European
Parliament, Mason described informal learning in particular, as “intimately related” to
job performance, accounting for “a good deal of the learning arising out of interactions
with colleagues, ad hoc personal studies, and experience of work itself” (2002, 8).  
With respect to the implied formal-informal dialectic, therefore, De Lyon and Cushion
concluded that  the  formal learning mechanisms available  to the participants  did not
suitably prepare them for practice as fitness trainers, and, in corroboration of Mason’s
(2002) view, that  the majority  of relevant  and applicable  learning actually  occurred
after its completion, in a more informal way. They defined this latter form of learning
as  a  “dynamic,  social  and  on-going  endeavour”   (2013,  1417).  According  to  the
majority of the participants themselves, “on-the-job” learning was explicitly cited as
the  “most  important  way  of  developing  knowledge”  (2013,  1413),  a  position
incidentally corroborated by management personnel in an earlier study by Melton et al.,
who similarly accredited “most of their practical skills” to such “on-the-job” learning
(2010, 3178).
Fitness trainers  and managers  appeared to  intuitively  differentiate  learning that  was
formal, preparatory and set in an educational context, from that which was informal,
on-going and set in a practical work-based context (Melton et al., 2010; De Lyon and
Cushion, 2013). While we know that fitness professionals do in fact generally value the
technical and scientific knowledge associated with the profession normally sourced via
formal  channels  (Rosado et  al.,  2014, 29),  they also understand the prevalence  and
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importance of on-going informal learning in an industry characterized by a constant
state of flux (De Lyon and Cushion, 2013, 1416; Rosado et al., 2014, 28).
Some of the prevailing learning activities described by fitness trainers in the sector-
specific literature include the performance of additional research following episodes at
work using a variety of information sources, and interaction with others (Stacey et al.,
2010, 4; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013, 1414). Such activities ostensibly include varying
degrees of planning, structure, and intent, which are the main criteria used by Cedefop
(Tissot, 2004) in differentiating formal and informal learning. Activities cited by fitness
professionals also conform with those frequently described in research on work-based
learning (WBL) which has similarly been defined as, “learning for work, learning at
work, and learning through work” (Jedaar et al., 2009, 477). As a term, WBL, which is
discussed in further detail  later  on in this  chapter,  is  generally  associated with,  and
therefore  latently  connotes,  the  exploration  of  formal,  structured,  and  supervised
interventions  designed to enhance learning for, at,  or through work, and not with a
dedicated and rigorous exploration of its essential  nature as a phenomenon. Another
popular term in the field,  problem-based learning (PBL), which has been posited as a
new alternative  to direct  instruction in  higher  education,  particularly in the medical
field, similarly connotes methodical, step-based interventions and initiatives, as well as
associated research studies designed to test its efficacy (Winarno et al., 2018). In other
words,  PBL is  characterised more specifically  as a method, rather  than a branch of
learning and education theory, (as might be expected bearing in mind the aims of this
study) aimed at discerning the essential nature of some uniquely recognisable form of
learning occurring during episodes and situations with a problem-solving characteristic.
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For the purpose of disambiguation at this stage, therefore, use of the terms  informal
learning or  WBL were considered inappropriate in the specific context of this study.
Instead,  the  term  on-the-job  learning (OJL),  as  articulated  by  fitness  professionals
themselves in their own words (Melton et al. 2010; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013), was
considered to be a more appropriate locution for all learning resulting from, or inspired
by,  single  or  multiple  related  episodes  and  situations  occurring  at  work  either
independently  of  intermittently  across  varying  periods  of  time  (including  isolated
incidents  or  indeed an entire  career  span),  and representative  of various  degrees  of
planning,  structure,  and  intent  (which  may  include  activities  associated  with  both
formal or informal learning). The term was also selected, in its distinction from other
popular  terms  cited  in  the  literature,  to  avoid  connotation  with  research  aimed  at
anything other than a dedicated exploration of essential nature. 
2.2.2 An outcome-based approach to on-the-job learning
Provided that the assertions that OJL comprises the majority of effective learning by
fitness professionals  (Melton et  al.,  2010;  De Lyon and Cushion, 2013),  and yet  is
poorly understood (De Lyon and Cushion, 2013, 1413), are valid, then an intriguing
knowledge gap is revealed. Just as the desire to understand how children learn at school
has inspired research in mainstream education to maximise the efforts  of educators,
teachers and administrators, the desire to understand how fitness professionals learn at
work may be expected to have similarly inspired sector-specific research informing the
efforts of tutors, trainers, and managers in health and fitness. The literature, however,
does  not  appear  to  manifest  any such direction,  and instead  reveals  discord among
researchers and scholars regarding the very validity of OJL itself.   
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Malek et al. (2002) investigated exercise science knowledge among a sample of 115
personal fitness trainers in the US, whose results in a purpose-built knowledge test were
correlated with both years of experience and formal qualification levels. The results
showed  that  years  of  experience  had  no  significant  effect  on  exercise  science
knowledge,  whereas formal  qualification levels did. If years of experience could be
considered reflective of the amount of OJL undergone, or at least, room in which for it
to occur, then OJL was not positively correlated with knowledge of exercise science. In
his doctoral research, based on questionnaires obtained from 48 fitness professionals in
the  central  Florida  area  on  the  other  hand,  Akerson  (2014)  found  that  years  of
experience  was  the  most  influential  factor  affecting  financial  income.  These  two
particular studies illustrate how OJL can be both championed, as well as disparaged, by
scholars in terms of its validity, efficacy, and function. 
Determining the true validity of OJL in either case, however, is necessarily dependent
on which of the two variables (exercise science knowledge or financial income) is to be
considered  the  more  desirable  outcome  for  fitness  professionals.  The  selection  of
relevant variable/s is challenging, precisely due to the “multifaceted” nature of the role
of modern fitness  professionals (De Lyon and Cushion,  2013, 1415),  as well  as an
expected  variance  among  individuals’  conceptualisations  of  what  it  means  to  be  a
competent  or  successful  fitness  professional  (Rosado  et  al.,  2014).  Some  of  the
additional  desirable  outcomes  presented  in  the  sector-specific  literature  include
pedagogical/andragogical skills (Craig and Eickhoff-Shemek, 2009), transformation or
transfer (of knowledge into practice) skills (Craig and Eickhoff-Shemek, 2009; Stacey
et  al.,  2010),  communication/interpersonal/relationship  management  skills  (Maguire,
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2001), and lifelong learning skills (Akerson, 2014). Without some agreement about the
desirability of such outcomes, outcome-based research seeking to make claims about
the validity of any form of learning in the field appears to be inherently problematic. 
Indeed,  the  lack  of  a  universal  set  of  desirable  learning  outcomes  that  suitably
exemplify the role of the modern fitness professional has been of primary influence on
sector-specific research over the past two decades. Some of the prevalent themes in the
sector-specific  literature  include:  defining  the  precise  role  and scope of  practice  of
fitness professionals (Maguire, 2001; Craig and Eickhoff-Shemek, 2009; Rosado et al.,
2014); identifying the knowledge and competences that should suitably underpin the
role (Maguire, 2001; Malek et al., 2002; Craig and Eickhoff-Shemek, 2009; Melton et
al., 2010; Akerson, 2014); as well as the general efficacy and robustness of structures
currently in place to regulate qualification and certification (Akerson, 2014; Rosado et
al., 2014). 
2.2.3 A process-based approach to on-the-job learning
While the validity of OJL is difficult to establish on the grounds of the attainment of
specific, agreed, and desirable learning outcomes, some of the sector-specific research
attention has instead been directed at its  process. A systematic review of literature by
Stacey et al. (2010) was undertaken to investigate where fitness professionals obtained
their  knowledge,  and  how  they  subsequently  incorporated  (or  “translated”,  or
transferred)  it  into  practice.  Their  review  uncovered  studies  nominating  common
sources  of  information  used  by fitness  professionals,  but  none exploring  how such
knowledge was actually translated into practice, showing a distinct paucity of sector-
24
specific research on the subtleties of OJL from a process-oriented perspective, given
that OJL, according to Stacey et al., is typically characterised not only by knowledge
acquisition  in  an  abstract  sense,  but  more  importantly  in  an  applied,  practical,  or
transferable sense  (even  though  this  very  statement  betrays  the  sort  of  latent
assumptions alluded to in chapter one).
De Lyon and Cushion (2013) provide a valuable clue at this juncture by attributing the
paucity of research to a single main problem. Despite finding that OJL represented the
majority  of  effective  learning  undergone  by  fitness  professionals,  they  explicitly
cautioned  educators  and  trainers  against  purposively  considering  it  as  an  on-going
process, precisely due to its tendency to occur predominantly tacitly. Hidden learning,
they contended, involves the risk of uncritical acceptance of existing practices that are
potentially  ineffective  or  unsafe  (2013,  1413).  This  contention  appears  to  rebuff
outright  the  prospect  of  further  scholarly  efforts  directed  at  deciphering  what  has
already been established as  the  dominant  form of  learning by fitness  professionals,
following the cessation of their formal training and certification.  So in other words,
while OJL is the “most important way” (De Lyon and Cushion, 2013, 1413) fitness
professionals learn, it would seem its process cannot be explored further, mainly due to
the tacit-ness problem. 
Whatever attention  is directed at exploring the process of OJL must contend with the
significant  methodological  challenges  associated  with studying a process that  is  not
only  often  hidden,  but  yields  outcomes  that  may  also  be  hidden,  or  are  at  best
questionable,  due  to  the  general  lack  of  agreement  about  what  learning  outcomes
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should  underpin  the  role  of  the  modern  fitness  professional.  Further  to  Mason’s
assertion  that  informal  learning  is  “intimately  related”  to  job  performance,  and
prevalent during everyday work activities (2002, 8), additional insights about the nature
of OJL for fitness professionals, were not evident in the appropriated sector-specific
research, rendering any deeper survey of its inherent thinking aspects specifically, even
less likely, in this first body of literature.  
2.2.4 Reflection as an influential factor
While  acknowledging  the  tacit  and  theoretically  enigmatic  nature  of  OJL,  relevant
literature beyond the scope of exercise and fitness, yet still focused on practical and
applied contexts, was sourced to help further facilitate a continuing exposition of the
phenomenon.  Di  Stefano  et  al.  (2014)  presented  a  compelling  piece  of  research
differentiating  between  the  “accumulation”  of  experience  normally  associated  with
passive,  unconscious  or  implicit  OJL  on  the  one  hand,  and  “articulation  and
codification” (2014, 3) of experience through conscious and explicit reflection on the
other. Using a mixed methods approach combining laboratory and field experiments,
they  showed that  where  prior  experience  existed,  additional  time  spent  engaged  in
reflecting had a more positive effect on future performance than additional time spent
engaged in doing. In other words, in the exercise and fitness context, hypothetically, if
after  having already delivered a given number of exercise sessions to clients,  when
faced with the choice of either delivering more, or instead reflecting on those already
delivered, the PFT would be more likely to improve by choosing the latter (reflecting).
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Through  their  onus  on  reflection,  Di  Stefano  et  al.  (2014)  essentially  juxtaposed
thinking and doing,  bestowing comparable  levels  of  importance  on simply  thinking
about an on-the-job episode or situation on the one hand, and actually being engaged in
it on the other. In terms of their contribution to the prevailing research aims in this
study, apart from apportioning heightened relevance to the phenomenon of thinking in
the context of OJL, Di Stefano et al. do not necessarily resolve the tacit-ness problem.
Reflection has been defined elsewhere as a means of bringing inherent tacit knowledge
“to the surface” (Raelin, 1996, 563), or as a tool for the transformation of “incidental”
learning in the workplace (Marsick et al., 2006), implying a relatively simplistic view
of  a  clean  and direct  transformation  of  knowledge  from implicit  to  explicit  forms.
While showing how conscious/explicit learning is increased, however, Di Stefano et al.
(2014)  do  not  show  how  unconscious/implicit  learning  (along  with  its  associated
outcomes)  is  otherwise  affected.  In  other  words,  while  overall  learning  may  be
promoted, due to an increase in the quantity of explicit knowledge acquired, the amount
of implicit knowledge also acquired is indeterminate, sustaining the unwanted risk of
“uncritical acceptance of practices,” highlighted by De Lyon and Cushion (2013, 1413).
So, if overall learning is increased, the possibility of the amount of unconscious/implicit
learning (along with its associated outcomes) also increasing cannot be excluded. The
problems associated  with  tacit  learning  (of  which  OJL is  said  to  be  predominantly
constituted) are, therefore, not in fact reduced or addressed. 
In  short,  while  deliberative  reflection  may  enhance  conscious/explicit learning  (Di
Stefano et al., 2014), if OJL is predominantly constituted by  tacit learning, then any
additional factors influencing it such as any assumed form of non-deliberative or non-
reflective  thinking,  remain  largely  unexplored,  rendering  thinking  at  this  stage,  a
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problematic  and  poorly  understood  phenomenon.  A  second  body  of  literature  was
therefore  sourced  in  an  attempt  to  explore  this  knowledge  gap,  using  broader
perspectives rooted in fundamental theories of learning and education.  
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2.3 Body two: Learning and education theory 
2.3.1 Kolb’s experiential learning theory
The process of on-going learning outside formal channels and in applied settings may
be referred to in both scholarly and vernacular terms as learning “from experience”,
which is credited in the education literature with constituting the majority of learning
taking place  in  the  workplace  context,  accounting  for,  according  to  Marsick  et  al.,
between 62% and 70% of what employees “need to know” (2006, 798). A seminal
theory  seeking  to  expound this  very  process  (and by default  any  inherent  thinking
contained therein),  is  David Kolb’s experiential  learning theory (KELT).  KELT has
been  credited  as  a  key  model  underpinning  the  “catch-all  phrase”  of  “experiential
learning” in organisational  contexts since the 1970s and 1980s (Cunningham, 1994,
134-135), of, according to Beard and Wilson,  “extraordinary and far-reaching” scope
(2015, 17). Additional models influenced by KELT, drawing on its fundamental tenets,
have been similarly presented in the literature surrounding WBL, including  Raelin’s
“Model of work-based learning” (Raelin, 1996), and Marsick and Watkins’ “Informal
and incidental learning model” (Marsick and Watkins, 1990), which present compatible
and interchangeable  depictions  of  the  learning  process.  If  learning  from experience
contains any thinking aspects at all, then key models seeking to expound it may also be
similarly expected to expound the thinking aspects at least partially constituting it. This
reasoning prompted a  subsequent  and thorough review of  KELT and its  theoretical
underpinnings. 
Kolb himself defined KELT as a “holistic model” (Kolb et al., 1999, 1) of learning, and
a process whereby “knowledge is created,” through the, “grasping and transforming of
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experience” (Kolb, 1984, 41). Grasping, according to Kolb, occurs either by undergoing
a concrete experience, or abstractly conceptualising. The transformation of experience
into  new  knowledge  takes  place  either  via  reflective  observation  or  active
experimentation. In KELT, these four modalities are also arranged in a cyclical model
illustrating  how  concrete  experiences  are  followed  by  reflection  and  abstract
conceptualisation,  paving the  way for  active  experimentation  and the  onset  of  new
concrete  experiences.  Honey  and  Mumford  (1992)  presented  their  version  of  the
learning cycle based on the same fundamental stages of having an experience (concrete
experience),  reviewing  or  reflecting  on  it  (reflection),  drawing  conclusions,  and
planning for future experiences (abstract conceptualisation). 
Among the four modalities, “reflective” observation and abstract “conceptualisation”
are direct and explicit references to acts of thinking, supporting the position of KELT as
a promising theoretical landscape from which to discern the nuances of thinking and its
relationship with learning in the context of this study. Further to the juxtaposition and
bestowal of comparable importance on thinking and doing by Di Stefano et al. (2014),
closer  evaluation  of  the  two  established  modalities  of  both  grasping  (concrete
experience and  abstract conceptualisation) and transforming (active experimentation
and  reflective observation) in KELT also effectively places thinking and doing on an
equal  footing,  substantiating  the  significance  of  thinking  within  the  overall
phenomenon  of  experiential  learning.  In  other  words,  thinking  about  (or
“conceptualising”)  an  episode  is  considered  an  equally  valid  means  of  grasping
experience as actually being immersed in it (in a “concrete” way). Similarly, the two
modalities  of  transforming  experience  into  new  knowledge  also  place  thinking  (or
“reflecting”) on an equal footing with doing (or “actively experimenting”).
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According to Marsick et al., learning models are created and informed by underlying
theoretical  perspectives  (2017, 32).  Kolb specifically  references  John Dewey (1859-
1952), Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) and Jean Piaget (1896-1980) (Kolb 1984, 20; Kolb et
al.,  1999, 2) as underlying theoretical  perspectives,  and key contributing proponents
influential  to  the  development  of  KELT.  Marsick et  al.  (2006,  795)  similarly  cited
Dewey and Lewin as key sources upon which the Marsick and Watkins (1990) informal
and incidental learning model was based, corroborating the importance of the theorists
cited by Kolb. All three theorists have presented seminal works on the phenomenon of
thinking. Given the apparent importance it awards to thinking, therefore, KELT (and by
default the compatible models influenced by it) was subsequently reviewed through the
veil  of  its  theoretical  underpinnings  to  further  explore  and more  clearly  define  the
thinking-based  terms  (abstract  “conceptualising”  and  “reflective”  observation)  that
essentially  constitute  half  of  the  overall  experiential  learning  process  it  seeks  to
expound.
2.3.2 Lewin’s action research and Dewey’s reflection
If the learning process is to occur truly from experience then the experience itself must
necessarily  be  its  fundamental  constituent,  and  the  “concrete  experience”  is  thus
afforded  due  importance  and  centrality  in  KELT.  Indeed,  in  terms  of  modelling
architecture, it is depicted in the KELT cycle as the uppermost central node initiating
the learning process. This focus on hands-on “action” clearly shows the influence of
Lewin (1952), who placed doing and experiencing at the heart of his “action research”
process, often summarised as, “planning, executing, and fact-finding” (1952, 462-463).
31
The emphasis on doing and experimenting,  followed by evaluating and updating,  is
evident in KELT, with execution encompassing the nodes of active experimentation
and concrete  experience,  and  fact-finding/planning  encompassing  the  reflection  and
abstract  conceptualisation  nodes.  With  regard  to  the  actual  nature  of  these  acts  of
thinking, Dewey (1910) presented further insight in his capacity as one of Kolb’s three
nominated proponents. His initial discourse on thinking opened with a discussion of its
fleeting and random nature, and the seemingly unimportant topics and endeavours to
which it often attends, characteristics which are, according to Dewey, inconsonant with
the process of effective thinking and learning (1910, 1-14). 
By  diagnosing  such  flaws,  Dewey  essentially  problematised  the  phenomenon  of
thinking, and proceeded with the task of prescribing means of improving its efficacy
and usefulness, establishing a prominent and pervasive trend in subsequent literature.
The thinking/reflecting  process  espoused by Dewey throughout  his  (1910) narrative
posits that “suggestion” triggers the formulation of hypotheses and mental elaboration
(theoretically  consistent  with  undergoing  a  concrete  experience,  reflecting,  and
abstractly  conceptualising),  followed  by  hypothesis  testing  (experimentation).  The
themes of reflection, logic, “mental training”, and the “scientific method” as theorised
by  Dewey  are  also  clearly  evident  in  more  recent  works  on  critical  thinking  and
reflective practice, which are discussed later in this review in the third body dedicated
to  more  specific  literature  on  thinking  and  cognition.  Also,  his  identification  of
reflection  as  a  potential  differential  factor  separating  conscious  from  unconscious
learning as later investigated by Di Stefano et al. (2014) further attests to the seminal
nature of his work.
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Overall, the experimental approach to learning as portrayed by Lewin (1952), combined
with  the  importance  of  “observation”  and  the  differentiated  notions  of  “concrete”
experience and “abstract” thinking presented by Dewey (1910), are consistent with the
fundamental tenets of the KELT cycle.  Apart from establishing the interchangeability
of  key  terms  and  locating  the  acts  of  thinking  they  describe  within  a  conceptual
framework,  this  consistency  however,  does  not  necessarily  assist  in  furthering  our
understanding of the essential nature of such acts, or in establishing robust definitions
for the thinking terms cited in KELT. In his model of the WBL process, which draws
heavily on KELT, Raelin provided some needed clarification in this regard, by defining
reflection as the ability to “uncover and make explicit to oneself what one has planned,
observed  or  achieved  in  practice”  (1996,  567),  and  conceptualisation as  a  way  of
perceiving  “standard problems in a  new light”,  giving learners  a means of  tackling
“new and different problems in different contexts” (1996, 565). Closer evaluation of
these definitions  reveal  a  common and indeed crucial  feature  in  KELT and similar
models, as well as their theoretical underpinnings. Reflection and conceptualisation in
the manner they are cited in KELT, and in Raelin’s model of WBL, are not so much
defined  as  they  are  predefined.  The  Deweyesque  tradition  of  problematising  the
phenomenon of thinking, combined with a general and natural desire to maximise the
efficacy of the learning process, has led to the  teleological tendency (Dewey, 1910;
Lewin,  1952;  Kolb,  1984;  Watkins  and  Marsick,  1992)  to  model  learning  (and  its
inherent  thinking  aspects)  as  processes  in  terms  of  the  purposes  they  have  been
designated to serve. In other words, it has led to a tendency to model learning in terms
of what it ideally is, rather than what it actually is. 
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The term teleology is cited here, because modelling thinking and learning in terms of
what it is ideally, implies the presumption of it being ideal for something, in this case
desirable outcomes. Acts described therein are, therefore, defined by the outcome they
have been included to serve. Aggregating acts of thinking into the various nodes of a
given model, means that the terms used to describe such acts are defined more by their
nodular  relevance  rather  than by the  essential  nature  of  those acts  themselves.  The
terms “fact-finding” (Lewin, 1952), “hypothesising”, “mentally elaborating” (Dewey,
1910), “observing”, “conceptualising” (Kolb, 1984), “reflecting” (Dewey, 1910; Kolb,
1984),  “interpreting”,  and  “examining”  (Marsick  and  Watkins,  1990),  have  been
gleaned  from  procedural  outcome-based  models.  They  describe  aggregated  acts  of
thinking collated into terms that are not necessarily based on a rigorous understanding
of the phenomenon of thinking, but instead on their assumed usefulness. Similarly, they
do not  yield  insight  into how professionals  actually  carry out  such thinking acts  in
applied contexts,  or if  they even do at all.  In search of a more robust definition of
Kolb’s thinking-based terms, therefore, and motivated primarily by a disclosure of the
actual  nature  of  the  thinking  acts  they  describe,  Kolb’s  third  nominated  proponent
(Kolb 1984, 20; Kolb et al., 1999, 2) was reviewed in the light of Piaget’s (1936) work
on cognitive development. 
2.3.3 Piaget’s cognitive development theory
Jean Piaget’s cognitive development theory (PCDT) primarily seeks to describe how
cognitive development  occurs in  children,  and depicts  thinking as a continuous and
adaptive process occurring in response to environmental input. Piaget (1936) proposed
that  abstract/generalised  mental  representations  are  the  basic  building  blocks  of
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knowledge. In PCDT, all input from the external environment is processed, organised
and interpreted according to these frameworks of mental representations Piaget termed
“schemata”.  During “assimilation”,  environmental  input is interpreted and processed
via  existing  schemata.  During  “accommodation”,  environmental  input  cannot  be
interpreted and processed via existing schemata, and a feeling of frustration prompts
changes to the existing schemata. The process of “equilibration” governs the repeated
interplay between accommodation and return to assimilation, ultimately resulting in on-
going cognitive “adaptation”. 
PCDT presents a compelling description of how thinking occurs, bearing some striking
resemblances to Hans Selye’s general adaptation syndrome (GAS) theory of the same
era. Selye (1950) proposed a description of the process of physiological responses by
organisms to stressors  in  the  environment.  In  GAS, the  physiology of  an organism
remains unchanged where stressors from the environment are minimal. Where stressors
of  sufficient  magnitude  are  imposed  by  the  environment,  metabolic  and  hormonal
responses  affect  changes  to  the  organism.  The  process  of  maintaining  biochemical
equilibrium or “homeostasis” governs or regulates metabolic and hormonal responses,
ultimately resulting in on-going physiological “adaptation”.
PCDT and GAS both involve the active preservation of a homeostatic point via change
to cognitive or physiological structures. Considering the seminal nature of GAS theory
in the field of medical research (Szabo et al., 2012) from the physiological perspective,
PCDT  might  be  expected  to  exert  comparable  influence  on  domains  rich  in
cognitive/thinking  aspects,  such  as  learning.  Given  Kolb’s  assertion  of  Piaget’s
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influence on the intellectual origins of his theory, KELT thereby represents a promising
field  in  which  to  probe  any distinctive  traces  of  PCDT,  thereby  substantiating  any
prospective theoretical relevance or applicability it may hold in further understanding
OJL.
Such  traces,  however,  are  not  evident  in  the  literature  surrounding  KELT.  To  the
contrary, ensuing research on Kolb’s learning style inventory (LSI) (Kolb et al., 1999,
11-12), actually diverges from PCDT in its use of terminology. The LSI categorises
learners according to the various KELT modalities they favour, where “assimilators”
are  learners  who  favour  the  modalities  of  reflective  observation  and  abstract
conceptualisation,  while  “accommodators”  favour  active  experimentation  and
immersion in concrete experiences. These semantics are not consistent with the notions
of assimilation and accommodation presented by Piaget (1936).
2.3.4 Eraut’s informal learning in the workplace and thinking in action
While KELT was sourced as a prospective theory in which to probe deeper insight
about the nature of thinking acts in the context of OJL, a closer review has shown that
robust definitions remain problematic to ascertain. Ambiguity in terminology, as noted
in the theoretical relationship between KELT and PCDT, meanwhile constitute a key
theme in the compelling work of Michael Eraut, who has presented a substantial body
of research on informal learning in the workplace (Eraut 1995; 2000; 2002, cited in
Eraut, 2004). He asserted that informal learning in the workplace had been thus far
under-researched,  and  its  complexity  largely  unacknowledged  (2004,  256).  As
corroborated by Marsick et al. (2006), Melton et al. (2010), and De Lyon and Cushion
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(2013), Eraut also posited that the majority of learning by professionals, technicians and
managers  predominantly  comprises  learning  from experience  or  from other  people,
informally, and in a workplace setting (2004, 248). In one of his later, and particularly
comprehensive  works,  Eraut  (2004)  set  out  to  explore  the  theoretical  frameworks
underpinning informal learning in the workplace,  and “deconstruct” some of its key
concepts  (2004,  247),  including  those  presented  in  KELT.  In  view  of  the
inconsistencies revealed in the theoretical foundations of KELT in the context of this
study, Eraut’s work was reviewed in search of clarification and further insight. 
According to Eraut, KELT does not, for instance, clearly define an observation as either
an idea, or a process of visual sensory reception. He similarly argues that Kolb's cycle
does not clearly define experience as a single episode, or as the accumulated learning
resulting from a series of episodes, thereby challenging the very foundations of KELT
itself, through its use of the term “experience”. While a review of Kolb’s work does not
resolve  this  latter  question  specifically,  use  of  the  term  “experience”  was  in  fact
discussed by Kolb (1984; 1999). In Kolb et al. (1999, 2), the authors use the term to
differentiate  KELT in  its  conceptualisation  of  learning  from theories  rooted  in  the
cognitive or behaviorist  traditions,  by emphasising its  subjective nature as a human
experience.  In other words, instead of conceptualising learning in terms of uniform,
operationalised and descriptive models of internal processes as cognitivists might, or
purely in context of the measurable outcomes it yields as would behaviourists, Kolb,
through the use of the term “experience” or “experiential”, acknowledges that learning
has a distinctly personal and subjective nature. 
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To  further  clarify  the  influence  of  the  behaviourist  and  cognitivist  paradigms,
throughout  his  narrative  on  thinking  as  a  learned  skill,  Greeno  (1997)  cites  three
paradigmatic perspectives informing insights in educational psychology on thinking as
a  process,  namely  behaviourist (associationist),  cognitivist (domain-structural),  and
situative.  The situative perspective emphasises “participation in practices of inquiry,
sense-making of communities, and development of individual identities as thinkers and
learners” (1997, 87).  With respect  to  the latter  perspective,  Brown (1988) similarly
asserted that knowledge is “inextricably situated in the physical and social context of its
acquisition”,  and  cannot  be  “extracted”  without  being  “irretrievably  transformed”
(1988, 6). Thinking is determined, according to the situative perspective, by sustained
participation  in  communities  of  practice.  This  perspective,  according  to  Greeno,
constitutes a framework that includes behaviourism and cognitivism, gesturing towards
the  holistic  and  encompassing  nature  of  perspectives  emphasising  the  personal
subjectivity  involved  in  individual  sense-making  and  development  of  individual
identities within wider communities. In light of its focus on action, sense-making, and
subjectivity,  KELT appears  increasingly  theoretically  aligned  with  Greeno’s  (1997)
situative perspective, establishing a theoretical link between experiential learning and
situated learning. Liou further emphasised the subjective nature of learning by defining
it  as  “qualitative  change”  in  learners,  further  suggesting that  personal  experience  is
precisely what makes learning significant to learners as subjects (2018, 77). 
In a landscape where OJL is considered prevalent (Eraut, 2004;  Marsick et al., 2006;
Melton et  al.,  2010; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013),  yet under-researched and poorly
understood (Eraut,  2004),  Kolb et  al.  (1999,  2),  in  clarifying  their  use of  the  term
experiential,  thereby assumed a promising philosophical  position uniquely poised to
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uncover some its fundamental essential qualities, including its thinking-based aspects.
This line of enquiry however, was not a subsequent focus in KELT research, which was
instead, as argued previously, primarily directed at the development and validation of
the LSI (Kolb et al., 1999, 11-12). Kolb proceeded with the development of a generally
prescriptive (even diagnostic) approach, as opposed to a more descriptive one. Indeed,
the aforementioned “promising” position from which later works on KELT diverge can
only  be  deemed  promising  if  the  prevailing  aim  is  precisely  a  disclosure  of  what
learning  (including  its  thinking  aspects)  actually  is,  rather  than  what  it  potentially
should or could be, and not the diagnosis or categorisation of learners according to
distinctive learning styles.  
If the principal aim is to first seek a more rigorous understanding of learning (and its
thinking aspects) before objectifying or operationalising it as a process, then the LSI
and indeed the entire quadripartite structure of the KELT learning cycle itself, present
an additional  problem,  the  resolution  of  which  engenders  a  return to  the clarifying
insights  offered  by  Eraut  (2004).  According  to  Kolb  et  al.  (1999,  3),  learners
“continually choose” between the four KELT modalities, and possess predispositions to
favour certain modalities over others. The claim that learners not only have a choice
about  what  approach  to  use,  but  are  actually  “continually”  engaged  in  this  act  of
choosing suggests the existence of an entirely additional layer of cognitive activity that
must be preceding execution of any of the four modalities that constitute the KELT
cycle. By later stating that both past experience and present environment are factors
influential to the development of a “preferred way” of choosing, Kolb et al. (1999, 3)
allude to the prospective nature of such a layer, but do not elaborate further. Closer
evaluation  of  KELT  therefore  endows  yet  further  importance  on  the  need  to  first
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achieve a deeper and clearer understanding of the thinking aspects of learning, before
attempting to operationalise thinking and learning processes. 
At  this  juncture,  Eraut  (2004,  248)  affords  thinking  commensurate  importance  by
specifically citing the determination of how people think “in action” as an additional
cogent focus guiding his research. Eraut nominated “intention” as the primary factor
determining his own typology of informal learning in the workplace (Eraut, 2000, cited
in  Eraut,  2004,  250),  which  is  organised  according  to  learning  that  is,  “implicit,
reactive,  or  deliberative”.  The  typology  essentially  differentiates  learning  that  is
unintended, tacit, and autonomous where time is limited, from that which is intended,
explicit,  and  conscious  where  sufficient  time  permits.  By  conceptualising  informal
learning in the workplace in the context of time-constrained episodes, Eraut essentially
elucidates  and  prioritises  the  thinking  in-action that  must  be  taking  place  therein.
Examples of quick-thinking associated with the autonomous and unintended end of the
typology’s implied spectrum include accessing memories like a “series of film clips”,
or  the  use  of  mental  “pictures”  of  children  by  teachers  to  inform quick  classroom
decisions (Eraut,  2004, 254). These latter  descriptions gleaned from the accounts of
participants in Eraut’s research are fascinating inasmuch as they allude to the “distinctly
personal  and  subjective  nature”  already  ascribed  to  the  process  of  learning  from
experience by Kolb et al. (1999, 2). 
Continuing his evaluation of thinking in action,  Eraut developed an additional  five-
stage  model  to  account  for  transfer  of  knowledge  (from  education  to  workplace
settings),  based  on  the  extraction  and  re-situating  of  knowledge,  according  to  its
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relevance  in  particular  situations  (2004,  256).  Eraut’s  evaluation  of  this  model,
however, impelled his own subsequent admission that tacit knowledge acquisition and
application must be even more complex than was previously thought. Conceptualising
learning  and  its  thinking  aspects  in  terms  of  procedural  models  engenders  the
requirement  for  substantial  additional  cognitive  loads  in  both  Kolb  and  Eraut’s
conceptualisations  of experiential  learning in the workplace,  that  are  challenging to
theoretically  accommodate  within the constraints  of objectified  nodes inside models
attempting to represent, what has ultimately already been acknowledged by Eraut, as a
complex and poorly understood phenomenon. According to Marsick et al., “models can
attempt to conceptualise the dynamic complexity of learning” on various “planes” that
may not  “adequately  capture  what  learning  is  and how it  emerges  from within the
relationships  within  the  system  over  time”  (2017,  32),  effectively  revealing  the
limitations of procedural models in explicating the true essential nature of learning. 
2.3.5 Thinking in action as antecedent to learning
Nevertheless, Eraut provides valuable guidance at this juncture. By framing learning
episodes in time-bound, situational, and essentially task-based contexts, Eraut (2004,
247)  reveals  a  compelling  and insightful  observation  concerning  the  structured  and
unstructured nature of “work”, and provides an important clue in the on-going effort to
discern thinking in action. Work is generally a term used to describe tasks and actions
in various settings including those associated with the workplace or classroom. When
we refer to structured and unstructured learning as we often do when conceptualising
the process in terms of the formal/informal dialectic (Tissot, 2004), it is actually the
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work,  according  to  Eraut,  that  was  either  structured  or  unstructured,  with  learning
simply being either an intended or unintended outcome. 
By establishing learning as an outcome of work, the latter phenomenon is presented by
Eraut as primary and causal. From this particular viewpoint, if thinking is considered
central to the performance of work, further to Greeno’s (1997) situative participation-
based perspective for conceptualising thinking in educational psychology, then learning
can be equivalently conceptualised as resulting from work-based (on-the-job) thinking.
In other words, the explicit and implicit thinking occurring during the performance of
work,  is  primary  and  causal  to  any  resulting,  intended  or  unintended,  changes  to
existing knowledge.  The nature  of thinking in action  is  thus apportioned additional
significance as a research focus by Eraut,  despite its  current  status as being largely
unexplored as a phenomenon.
Any  exposition  of  the  essential  nature  of  thinking,  or  suppositions  concerning  its
relationship with the wider phenomenon of (predominantly tacit) OJL for that matter,
must  take  into  account  the  known  tacit-ness  problem  (Eraut  2004,  De  Lyon  and
Cushion, 2013; Di Stefano et al., 2014) that has riddled its further investigation. Eraut
further  qualifies  the  tacit-ness  problem  in  his  articulation  of  a  paradox,  whereby
professionals are able to, “refer to codified, scientific knowledge in clear explicit terms,
yet  use  that  knowledge  in  ways  that  are  largely  tacit”  (2004,  256).  The  necessary
underlying processes needed to use that knowledge, just like the processes involved in
continuously choosing learning modalities and styles (Kolb et al., 1999, 2), appear to
constitute a substantial load of tacit cognitive activity that render the phenomenon of
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on-the-job thinking in action even more complex than previously thought (Eraut, 2004,
256), and in pressing need of clarification. An important reduction is hereby made from
the problem of tacit learning, to the more specific problem of tacit thinking. 
Throughout the ensuing narrative and subsequent review of a third body of literature,
therefore, the thinking integral to the performance of work as a focus was reduced from
the  wider  phenomenon  of  OJL,  and  considered  antecedent  to  resulting  changes  in
knowledge (learning).  In  the tradition  of  Eraut,  therefore,  who originally  set  out to
“disclose” the different “phenomena” (2004, 247) embraced by the terms used in the
education literature, in an effort to further explore thinking more specifically, a third
body of literature based on pure thinking and cognition theory was sourced. 
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2.4 Body three: Thinking and cognition theory
Literature searches for what eventually  constituted a third body were carried out in
August 2016 using EBSCOHost via the University of Lincoln library.  To obtain an
overall picture of prevalent academic and professional interest in thinking at large, the
straightforward keyword “thinking” was used. This generated results most relevant to
OJL in the context of this study converging on four main areas; mindfulness, critical
thinking,  creative  thinking  (including  lateral  thinking)  and  reflective  thinking  (or
“reflective practice”). The grounds upon which such areas were deemed relevant are
discussed further throughout the following sections. 
2.4.1 Mindfulness, critical thinking, and lateral thinking
Definitions of mindfulness typically agree that it involves an ability to attend to the
present moment without judgement or emotional interference (Goldberg et al., 2014,
491). For those seeking to maximise effective learning input, the potential benefits of
such  an  approach  are  compelling,  and  theoretical  links  between  mindfulness  and
learning  have,  indeed,  already  been  established.  “Socio-cognitive”  mindfulness  was
defined  by  Kolb  and  Yeganeh  (2009,  8)  as  a  state  of  heightened  contextual  and
situational  awareness,  as  contrasted  with  mindlessness,  characterised  by  lowered
awareness and autonomy of actions. It has been credited with enhancing “contextual
learning”,  and  in  states  of  heightened  awareness,  mindful  thinkers  are  theorised  to
employ broader sets of “cognitive categories” (2009, 9). Using broader categories of
mental representations while interpreting input from the environment, mindful thinkers,
according  to  Kolb  and  Yeganeh,  are  less  likely  to  subscribe  to  the  inaccurate  or
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incorrect judgements which would otherwise result from the use of fewer or narrower
categories. 
A reduction in biased judgements is akin to the sort of cognitive filter described by
Wallace and Jefferson in their  definition of critical  thinking as “consciously quality
controlled  thinking”  (2013,  248).  While  critical  thinking  has  garnered  substantial
research interest  as evidenced by literature  searches,  precise  definitions  of  the term
vary. According to Moon (2008), “critical  thinking” typically describes the use of a
methodical  approach  to  thinking  that  is  also  evaluative,  directed,  purposeful,  and
evidence-based. It may also be described as “convergent” (Guilford, 1967) in nature,
ultimately intended to narrow-down breadth of input, and arrive at accuracy or truth.
A survey of the research interests uncovered by the search term “thinking” promptly
mirrored  a  trend  noted  in  the  previous  two  bodies  of  literature,  namely  the
conceptualisation of thinking in terms of how people potentially should, or could, think
in terms of some assumed outcome, rather than the way they actually do. The approach
is tempting,  because a prospective ‘think to learn’ model based on the definition of
learning as “grasping and transforming” of experience (Kolb, 1984), or more succinctly
as “input-output” (Eraut, 2004, 257), could coherently accommodate mindfulness and
critical thinking, since both serve the purpose of maximising grasping or input. 
“Divergent” (Guilford, 1967) thinking styles may similarly constitute theoretically valid
constituents of a general ‘think to learn’ model in the  transforming or  output phase.
“Lateral  thinking” for instance, is a popular method of creative thinking intended to
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uncover the multiple  possibilities  of what might  or could be (De Bono, 1990).  The
thinking tools and techniques associated with all three systems (Mindfulness, critical
thinking and lateral thinking) could also be integrated with the stages of Kolb’s (1984)
learning  cycle,  theoretically  embellishing  it  with  convergent  thinking  tools  in  the
reflective  observation  phase,  and  divergent  thinking  tools  in  the  abstract
conceptualisation phase. In the previous section, however, it was argued that a more
rigorous understanding of thinking should precede objectifying or operationalising it as
nodes of a learning model. From this perspective, such a ‘think to learn’ model would
still reside on tenuous theoretical foundations, and pending testing and validation in the
field, would also remain of questionable scope. Indeed, the general relevance of models
and tools is discussed in greater depth later (in section 2.4.3). Any discussion of the
results returned by a generic literature search based on the term  thinking meanwhile,
would not be complete without a specific review of reflective thinking or  reflective
practice, and in particular, the influential work of Donald Schön (1930-1997), to whom
the popular term reflecting “in action” is typically attributed. 
2.4.2 Reflective thinking
Schön (1983)  observed professionals  at  work  in  a  range  of  contexts,  including
architectural  design,  management,  psychotherapy,  and  (improvised)  musical
performance.  These  work-based  contexts,  according  to  Schön,  require  thinking
processes  with  a  distinctive  problem-solving characteristic.  The professionals  under
Schön’s observation revealed a form of intuitive knowledge through their spontaneous
problem-solving actions and judgements, which he termed, “knowing in action”. This
knowledge was typically readily available for use during novel unfolding situations,
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even if  professionals were unaware of how they acquired it,  exhibiting the thinking
process Eraut (2004, 256) articulated in his paradox, discussed previously (in section
2.3.5), and corroborating the existence of the sort of affective tacit cognitive activity
also discussed previously (in  sections  2.3.4 and 2.3.5).  During  action,  according to
Schön, professionals are able to note and reflect on such previously tacit thoughts, as
and when they arise.  Tacit  knowledge is  presented  by  Schön, in  this  sense,  not  as
problematic, but rather as a natural, and indeed desirable, commodity, one that could,
and should, be enriched by reflecting both during (in) the action itself, or after (on) the
action in  a  more deliberative  fashion.  Schön likened the process of  problem-driven
thinking  in action, to application of the “scientific method” (Dewey 1910). Just as a
scientist  might  apply the scientific  method in a more theoretical  sense,  the modern
problem-solving professional would apply it in a practical sense in the workplace, as
“research in practice”.  Reflecting in action enables the construction of new theories,
which are subjected to immediate testing in a form of “active experimentation” (Kolb,
1984).
After the cessation of action, retrospective and evaluative reflection may subsequently
be carried out, considering context and outcome. This latter form of reflecting on action
serves  to  actively  update  existing  knowledge,  tacit  or  otherwise,  shaping  new
approaches for use in future situations. The application of both forms of reflection  in
and on the important and central role of action by a professional, according to Schön,
would  eventually  lead  to  their  development  as  a  “reflective  practitioner”.  Should
thinking be carried out persistently in the absence of action on the other hand,  Schön
recognised the danger of becoming locked in an infinite loop of ineffective reflection,
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ultimately portraying reflection as a process applicable by professionals with various
degrees of efficacy.  
A shift from the initial exploratory and descriptive approach in  Schön’s work to the
development of a more prescriptive and operational method of reflective practice again
mirrors the general impetus noted in the literature towards the development of efficacy-
enhancing  models  and  tools.  The  prospect  of  becoming  an  effective  reflective
practitioner as opposed to an ineffective one, as highlighted by  Schön, constitutes a
form of  self-evident  justification  for  the  shift.  The  initial  orientation  of  his  work,
combined with the position established by Kolb et al. (1999, 2) in their assertion that
learning  has  a  distinctly  personal  and  subjective  nature,  provides  an  important
methodological clue for a further non-teleological exploration of the nature of on-the-
job thinking in the context of this study. Schön’s influence, however, as evidenced by
the later volume of work in which he is frequently cited, is instead largely characterised
by  a  substantial  body  of  research  on  reflective  practice  as  a  method  or  skill,  and
associated reflection tools. Just as research on KELT proceeded with the LSI as its
primary focus, research inspired by Schön similarly diverges from an initial promising
position (in the context  of the aims of this  study),  in favour of the development  of
models and tools.  
2.4.3 Thinking and reflecting tools
In a precursor to Eraut’s (2004) thinking in-action model discussed previously, Griffiths
and Tann (1991) posited a temporally-defined five-stage model of reflective practice,
adding more scholarly credence to Schön’s influential notion of becoming a reflective
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practitioner.  Their  model was based on rapid reaction,  repair,  review, research, and
reformulation,  spanning  a  continuum of  instinctive  and  immediate  thinking  on  the
initial end, and more deliberative, abstract and systematic thinking on the concluding
end.  The  model  provides  individuals  intent  on  maximising  their  learning,  with  a
systematic guide to becoming more effective reflective practitioners. Reflection tools
like those famously presented by Borton (1970) and Gibbs (1988), additionally serve to
shape,  guide  and  ultimately  improve  the  more  deliberative  aspects  of  reflecting  as
presented by Schön (1983) and Griffiths and Tann (1991), typically through the use of
such strategically selected self-directed questions as, “What sense can you make of the
situation?”  and,  “If  it  happened  again,  what  would  you  do  differently?”  In  his
comprehensive work on language and its development in children,  Vygotsky affirmed
the value of inner speech characteristic of such models, by portraying it as a means of
reconsolidating thoughts. According to Vygotsky, thoughts are “completed in the word”
(1987, 252), rendering guided inner speech a suitable means for enhancing thinking
processes. Again, such self-directed questions, could from a modelling perspective, be
merged with any or all of the thinking tools discussed so far, and a general ‘think to
learn’ model augmented with relevant self-questions at each stage be constructed to
guide professionals engaged in on-the-job episodes through the processes of mindful,
critical, lateral, and reflective thinking, encompassing all the main areas uncovered by
generic literature searches based on the term thinking. 
In  section  2.4.1,  it  was  argued that  such a  ‘think  to  learn’  model  would  reside  on
tenuous theoretical foundations, and pending testing and validation in the field, would
remain of questionable scope. Indeed, Cromley challenged the scope of thinking tools
in  the  context  of  learning,  on  the  grounds  of  their  generic  nature,  by  designating
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thinking as  a  “field-specific  skill,  with  poor  transference  to  multiple  subject  areas”
(2000, 17). If a job role, such as that of PFTs, is “multifaceted” (De Lyon and Cushion,
2013, 1415),  then thinking tools must accommodate a multiplicity  of situations  and
episodes (akin  to multiple subject areas) in which professionals are required to think.
The problem of having to discern the mechanisms by which knowledge/theories must
‘cross the bridge’, or be made transferable, to practice, as cited in chapter one (section
1.2), is revealed here, corroborated by Eraut’s acknowledgement of the considerable
complexity involved in the “extraction and re-situating of knowledge, according to its
relevance in particular situations” (2004, 256).  Brown similarly challenged the notion
of “abstracting” knowledge with a view to transferring it to alternative contexts as an
“impoverished  and  misleading  view  of  knowledge”,  maintaining  that  knowing  is
instead  “inextricably  situated”  in  the  “physical  and  social  contexts”  in  which  it  is
acquired (1988, 6).
Research  in  health  care,  nursing  and  midwifery  (Ekebergh,  2007;  Sian  Nicol  and
Dosser, 2016), and education (Noormohammadi, 2014), has attempted to explore the
use of generic thinking/reflecting models and tools for fostering continuing learning
and  professional  development  in  practical  workplace  contexts.  Ascertaining  the
applicability  and  efficacy  of  such  models  in  practice,  however,  has  been  an
inconclusive undertaking thus far.  While  professionals have been shown to develop
deeper insights about their own practice through the use of reflection tools, empirical
evidence  confirming  any  additional  favourable  outcomes  has  been  indeterminate
(Staniforth and Harland, 2006; Noormohammadi, 2014). Like nurses, midwives, and
other  health  care  professionals,  PFTs  are  engaged  in  “service  work”,  classified  as
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“emotional  labour”  (Maguire,  2001, 380),  making research in the field particularly
interesting in the context of health and fitness. 
The usefulness of existing reflection tools, therefore, cannot currently be substantiated
without further research into their efficacy in terms of measurable outcomes (Mann, et
al., 2004; Bell and Mladenovic, 2013). While Di Stefano et al. (2014) showed that a
simple form of general reflection had a role in maximising learning in a battery of
laboratory and field-based tests, it did not specifically test any known reflection tool.
So, while creating or augmenting models and tools might at face value appear to be a
worthy scholarly pursuit, such models and tools would still exist in the scope of theory,
and lack relevance pending validation and proof of their efficacy in practice. Indeed,
any additional theoretical complexity or levels of abstraction applied to such models
and tools by theorists would only further compound prospective efforts towards their
validation. Furthermore, as shown in the previous review of exercise and fitness sector-
specific  literature,  validation  would  also  necessarily  depend  on the  existence  of  an
agreed  set  of  desirable  outcomes  relevant  to  the  specific  contexts  in  which  their
application  is  intended.  As  argued  previously  (in  section  2.2.2),  agreement  on  a
universal set of such outcomes in the health and fitness sector, has yet to be ascertained.
At this  juncture the appropriation of literature was guided by the pursuit  of a more
robust and descriptive understanding of the phenomenon of thinking (in the context of
OJL), that was not rooted in the tradition of creating or augmenting models and tools.
In his  attempts  to “disclose” the phenomenon of “thinking in action”,  Eraut (2004)
evoked  known  theory  on  procedural  and  declarative  memory  (Tulving,  1972),
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providing another important clue for the sourcing of additional literature. With respect
to the similarly promising insights provided by Piaget (1936) and PCDT in discerning
the intellectual origins informing the thinking aspects of KELT (Kolb 1984, 20; Kolb et
al., 1999, 2), a review of pure cognition theory, rooted in the cognitivist as opposed to
behaviourist paradigm in educational psychology terms, was undertaken in continuing
pursuit of a deeper understanding of the essential nature of thinking. Cromley (2000)
provided additional support for a review of the cognitivist approach at this stage, by
asserting its suitability as a basis for education and learning theory, and beneficence in
guiding the efforts of educators and trainers intent on maximising/enhancing learning.  
2.4.4 Cognitive theories of memory
The  specialised  science  of  cognition  (cognitive  science),  is  based  on  the  primary
assumptions  that mental  representations  and processes do exist,  and can be studied.
Behavioural, as opposed to cognitive, science as a dominant paradigm had represented
an excessive shift of emphasis in the study of thinking, onto observable and relatively
superficial  evidence,  and  away  from the  deeper  underlying  principles  and  abstract
mental structures underlying it (Chomsky, 2006, 57). According to Kretchmar (2013),
the  cognitivist  approach  duly  emerged  from  a  growing  dissatisfaction  with  the
limitations associated with behaviourist explanations of the more complex aspects of
human thought, which tended to be based primarily on the basic notion of stimulus-
response. The general field of  cognitive science has grown to encompass approaches
from  various  academic  and  scientific  disciplines  including  cognitive  psychology,
neuroscience, linguistics, and computer science (information processing and artificial
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intelligence), tackling such areas of interest as attention, perception, memory, language
comprehension, and problem-solving (Haberlandt, 1997; Ashcraft, 2001). 
Mental representations refer to concepts, ideas, and information that are stored in the
mind  as  long-term memory,  and further  categorised  according  to  “procedural”  and
“declarative” knowledge (Tulving, 1972). Processes refer to the ways in which mental
representations  are  stored  and  retrieved  by  the  mind  during  interactions  with  the
environment,  and are typically  attributed  to  the operations  of (short-term) “working
memory” (Baddeley, 1990). 
Tulving  (1972)  suggested  that  (long-term)  procedural memory  records  “condition-
action  pairings”  responsible  for  guiding  the  performance  of  routinised  skills  and
sequences. He subdivided the storage of  declarative knowledge into “semantic” and
“episodic”  memory.  Semantic  memory  is  defined  as  a  record  of  perceptions  and
thoughts, and is primarily symbolic in nature. Episodic memory is defined as a record
of one’s experiences, and is primarily sensory in nature. 
In terms of mental processes, the influence of computer science on cognition theory is
evident in Baddeley’s (1990) work on what he termed the “multi-component” model of
(short-term)  working  memory.  He  theorised  that  the  working  memory  system was
structured  around  a  “central  executive”  serving  a  similar  function  to  a  computer
processor, in conjunction with such additional periphery or “slave” components as the
“phonological  loop”  and  “visuospatial  sketchpad”,  responsible  for  language
comprehension and the manipulation of visual and spatial information respectively. 
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The  multi-component  model  of  working  memory  would  constitute  and  support  a
majority  of  the  on-going  cognitive  activities  undergone  in  applied  settings,  largely
accounting  for such processes  as perception,  memory,  language comprehension and
problem-solving. Of particular significance to education theorists, the models presented
by Tulving (1972) and Baddeley (1990) also collectively appear to present an overall
architecture  of  structures  useful  for  explaining  pathways  of  knowledge  acquisition
(learning).  The “multi-stage” model of sensorimotor  learning presented by Fitts  and
Posner (1967) for instance, may be conceptualised and explained using the theory of
memory (Tulving, 1972; Baddeley, 1990).
The multi-component model of sensorimotor learning (Fitts and Posner, 1967) is based
on the progression of learners through cognitive, associative, and autonomous stages.
Autonomous procedural knowledge represents the principal desirable outcome of the
model, depicting tacit knowledge as the highest stage of learning, applicable in the case
of skills like, for instance, riding a bike. Using a Tulving (1972) and Baddeley (1990)
collective framework of memory to explain the Fitts and Posner (1967) approach to
learning how to ride a bike, the central executive would initially recruit  the visuospatial
sketchpad in the execution of deliberate efforts to perform specialised actions during
the cognitive phase. Somebody learning to ride a bike would deliberatively “think their
way  through”  the  performance  of  the  required  movements  during  this  stage,  like
actively keeping the handle bars straight, and applying downward pressure with each
foot on the respective pedals at the right moments to produce forward motion. Familiar
aspects of the action already stored in procedural memory would then need to work in
concert with the visuospatial sketchpad in rehearsing and fine-tuning actions during the
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associative phase, consolidating and reinforcing relevant neural pathways. A bicycle
rider  during  this  stage  would  not  need  to  think  about  the  action  of  pedalling  for
instance, and could focus instead on honing balance and maintaining overall direction.
Following  sufficient  rehearsal,  performance  of  the  action  would  be  possible  via
procedural memory alone, without occupation of the precious and limited resources of
the  central  executive,  resulting  in  the  desired  autonomy  of  action  during  the
autonomous phase. A bicycle rider during this phase would be able to ride quite safely
while thinking about something else entirely. 
While learning via the Fitts and Posner (1967) multi-stage model can be systematically
explained using theorised memory structures, it is directed at sensorimotor learning and
skill  acquisition,  rather  than  abstract/symbolic  non-sensory  learning.  Attempts  by
scholars to explain the more complex process of knowledge acquisition and retrieval in
the  specific  context  of  OJL  using  the  same  memory  structures,  have  been  less
successful. Eraut suggested that long-term and working memory fail to account for tacit
knowledge acquisition and retrieval in a way that satisfactorily resolves his paradox
(2004,  256)  regarding  the  largely  tacit  use  of  otherwise  codified  and  explicit
knowledge,  and  the  tendency  for  overall  efficacy  and  competence  to  actually  be
determined by such implicit processing. Furthermore, procedural knowledge does not
account for the nuances of various distinctive types of knowledge, such as intuitively
understanding a complex unfolding workplace  situation  as opposed to say,  riding a
bike.  Logie  similarly  argued that  the  central  executive  is  a  “conceptual  ragbag” or
“placeholder”  (2016,  2094) used to  conveniently  accommodate  a  complex  range of
cognitive functions and processes that are otherwise difficult to understand or explain,
effectively undermining its relevance in explaining the thinking aspects of OJL. Indeed,
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a common critique of both working and long-term memory models maintains that they
are of excessively abstract  and conceptual  nature,  and poorly correlated with actual
physiological  processes  in  the  brain  during  the  onset  of  thinking  acts  they  seek  to
explain.  Neuroscience  has,  in  fact,  identified  multiple  regions  of the  brain to be in
operation during the various activities associated with distinctive components of the
traditional models of memory (Cromley, 2000, 74). 
2.4.5 Dual-process theories of thinking 
Exacerbating the considerable challenge of understanding knowledge acquisition and
retrieval in context, Reber (1989) made additional observations in his study of “implicit
memory” to yet further compound the tacit-ness problem. Reber’s subjects were able to
acquire abstract knowledge of the structure of their environment unconsciously, and,
indeed, do so more efficiently than via conscious deliberative efforts to acquire that
same  knowledge.  This  knowledge  could  in  turn  be  retrieved  and  applied  entirely
implicitly to solve problems and make decisions, corroborating Eraut’s paradox (2004,
256)  which  implied  that  the  overall  efficacy  and  competence  of  professionals  was
actually predominantly dependent on implicit, rather than explicit, processing. Raelin
similarly  referred  to  the  predominance  of  implicit  functioning  as  a  foundation  for
learning from experience, and its propensity in workplace contexts to “make reasonable
decisions about novel situations” (1996, 563). Marsick et al. also drew close parallels
between implicit and incidental learning (2006, 796) in their model of WBL. Additional
studies  in  the  field  of  unconscious  cognition  have  further  suggested  that  while
acquisition and retrieval via explicit memory was adversely affected by age and drug-
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induced amnesia,  implicit  memory was not (Haberlandt, 1997, 261), further affirming
an emerging suppositious pre-eminence of tacit thinking.
A profound example of unconscious cognition and its perplexing nature is epitomised
by the  phenomenon  of  blind  sight.  Weiskrantz  (2002)  first  showed  in  1986 that  a
visually blind patient  was somehow able to negotiate  physical  obstacles  in his path
without  being able  to  see or otherwise consciously perceive  them,  while  exhibiting
some  of  the  same  neural  brain  activity  as  fully-sighted  subjects.  Over  a  decade
following  his  original  study,  Weiskrantz  reported  that  the  same  patient  had  also
developed the ability to experience and describe conscious “after images” (2002, 568)
resulting from stimuli received entirely unconsciously. After images are defined in the
case of fully-sighted individuals as those images that continue to appear in vision, even
after  exposure  to  the  original  image  has  ended.  Research  in  cognitive  science  has
therefore corroborated an increasingly mysterious and poorly understood dimension to
tacit  thinking,  exacerbating  scholarly  attempts  to  discern  its  fundamental  nature.
Marsick et  al.  stated that the “controversy” surrounding the nature and existence of
implicit learning is, “not likely to be resolved soon” (2006, 798).
While appearing increasingly problematic, the notion of entirely unconscious cognition,
by its very nature, elucidates the dualistic theoretical position from which it, as well as
the term  tacit learning itself, fundamentally arise. The differentiation of dialectically
opposed unconscious and conscious conceptualisations of cognition is rooted in “dual
process”  theories  of  thinking.  Some  of  the  terms  used  to  characterise  “type  one”
thinking  include  unconscious,  fast,  implicit,  automatic,  and  intuitive.  This  type  of
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thinking is considered to bypass working memory and exclusively employ long-term
memory. Terms used to characterise “type two” thinking conversely include conscious,
slow, explicit,  controlled,  and reflective.  This type of thinking employs a concerted
interplay between the long-term and working memory systems, and is thought to be
more common in humans than in animals (Evans and Stanovich, 2013), correlating it
with later evolutionary development of the brain (Rakic, 2004).
In the context of learning, the existence of types of thinking that are hidden, automatic,
and uncontrolled, as implied by dual process theories, is understandably problematic,
since the learning process is traditionally something stakeholders including educators,
trainers, and learners themselves would prefer to direct at desirable outcomes. Given
that  OJL  happens  to  occur  in  environments  that  are  typically  not  structured  with
learning in mind (Eraut, 2004), the type one thinking that predominates therein (Eraut,
2004; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013),  renders it  a spectre of which stakeholders and
researchers  are  ultimately  cautious.  Indeed,  De  Lyon  and  Cushion  (2013)  actively
cautioned educators and trainers against purposively privileging OJL as an on-going
process, precisely due to the tendency of the tacit cognitive processing predominating
therein to occur “uncritically” (Eraut, 2004, 253; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013, 1413).
The  categorical  dualistic  perspective,  therefore,  does  not  appear  to  support  the
development of further understanding of thinking in the context of OJL, or even the
advocacy of further research in the area. Just as tacit thinking was reduced from the
wider phenomenon of tacit learning, at this stage, a further reduction to the problematic
role of consciousness (or unconsciousness) has led to another impasse in the context of
cognitive science approaches to understanding the phenomenon of thinking. 
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2.4.6 Single-system theories of thinking
Further  to  the  necessity  to  “continuously  choose”  between  the  KELT  modalities
highlighted by Kolb et al. (1999, 3), the existence of two distinctive thinking systems
similarly predicates the necessity for some deeper aspect of any such thinking system to
“choose”  between the  two at  any given time,  leading  to  the  additional  problem of
having to further understand the mechanisms and processes governing this selection.
Baddeley (1990) suggested that the selection might be dependent on a natural tendency
towards unconscious cognition in order to free-up (conscious) working memory, while
Eraut (2004) suggested the selection was dependent on the availability of time. While
both views explain how various types of thinking might be prioritised, they ultimately
depict  any prospective mechanisms governing the choice between thinking types  or
learning modalities as increasingly tacit in nature, further augmenting the sheer volume
of  unconscious  cognition  that  must  be  taking  place  at  any  given  time.  Conscious
cognition  is  thereby  relegated  to  a  position  whereby  its  evocation  is  essentially
determined by an increasingly dominant yet poorly understood unconscious cognition
system. Raelin posits  implicit  learning as the “base for conscious operation” (1997,
566). Cognitive science,  must account,  therefore,  for the mechanisms constituted by
such a base that determine interplay between the two types of thinking, if it is to be
truly explanatory or predictive as a valid scientific discipline. 
Logie (2016) challenged the implications of established cognition theory by criticising
the  notion  of  a  central  executive  controlling  working  memory  like  a  computer
processor,  raising  the  question  about  what  in  turn  might  be  controlling  the  central
executive. This reasoning promptly results in what Dennett and Kinsbourne described
as  an  “infinite  regress”,  where  the  brain  is  portrayed  as  a  “Cartesian  theatre”,
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somewhere  inside  which  a  conscious  homunculus  (small  person)  must  reside,
constituting  the  ultimate  perceiver  and  decision-maker  (1992,  185).  William  James
(1842-1910) referred  to  a  similar  notion  in  his  “psychologist’s  fallacy”,  where  a
psychologist stands outside the mental state she observes. When she sees a thought she
actually sees the thought itself as an object, plus the object itself (James, 2017, 180). Of
course the viewpoint of the psychologist, in its disconnection from the thought itself,
and, inclusive of a realisation that  one is  now thinking of an observer of thoughts,
promptly and similarly, becomes an infinite regress.  
In  an  attempt  to  deconstruct  some  of  the  problematic  implications  of  established
cognition  theory,  Osman  (2004)  later  argued  in  favour  of  a  unified  single-system
framework for expounding complex human reasoning, and against its fragmentation.
She stated that in any case, the fragmentary approach would actually have to yield more
than just two systems as implied by dual-process theories, and that a single framework
defined by the “graded” properties of relevant representations and levels of conscious
awareness, was more useful in furthering our understanding of the complex nature of
thinking. Evans and Stanovich (2013, 230) acknowledged this critique, and confirmed
that  the types  and conditions  differentiating  type one and two thinking respectively
need not necessarily be dialectically opposed, and may be conceptualised as occurring
along a continuum, thus gesturing to a more holistic account of the phenomenon of
thinking. 
In his commentary on the formal-informal learning dialectic imbued in the education
literature  meanwhile,  Eraut  (2004, 250) indicated his  disapproval  of dichotomies  as
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indicators  of  “lazy  thinking”,  essentially  supporting  an  appraisal  of  pre-eminent
approaches in theorising thinking and learning, and a deconstruction of the polarised
concepts pervading them. Tulving (1972, 381) also critiqued the dominant approaches
in  cognitive  science,  specifically,  by  stating  that  the  numerous  terms  used  in  the
literature to describe various conceptualisations of memory types had led to ambiguity,
itself  a sign of an “immature  science”.  Noting these critiques,  in order  to avoid an
exploration of the thinking aspects of (predominantly tacit)  OJL amounting  to little
more  than  an  “immature  science”,  therefore,  it  may  become necessary  to  argue  in
favour of a more holistic (non-fragmented) account of thinking that is not rooted in
dichotomies.
To this effect, the existence of distinctive thinking systems has also been challenged
from  an  evolutionary  perspective  by  Carruthers  (2014).  The  complex  thinking
capabilities we categorise as  system two are typically associated with the neocortical
structures of the brain, which are considered later evolutionary developments in humans
(Rakic,  2009).  Carruthers  (2014) argued in  favour  of  an  apparently  more  plausible
proposition, that the processes associated with what we now conceptualise as type one
thinking,  simply  evolved  in  complexity  to  facilitate  the  capabilities  we  now
(unnecessarily) associate with an entirely separate (type two) system. A comprehensive
non-fragmented  single-system  framework,  as  espoused  by  Osman  (2004),  could
therefore  consist  of  graded  properties  occurring  along  a  continuum  (Evans  and
Stanovich, 2013), with consciousness itself representing one such graded property.
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Further to Logie’s (2004) criticism of the notion of a central executive, Dennett and
Kinsbourne (1992) used a theatre analogy to argue against the existence of an ultimate
and  central  perceiving/decision-making  entity  in  the  brain.  In  “Global  workspace”
theory (Baars and Franklin, 2007), the theatre analogy is again used to conceptualise
thinking  in  a  difference  configuration  altogether.  It  depicts  the  audience,  actors,
stagehands,  and  numerous  other  technicians,  as  abundant  on-going  unconscious
cognitive processes, with consciousness being akin to the spotlight, illuminating only a
narrow field of consciously perceived experience.  According to Baars and Franklin,
their thesis is supported by research on electrical brain activity revealing synchronous
oscillatory  EEG (electroencephalography)  frequencies  in  various  areas  of  the  brain
corresponding with  specific  perceptual  experiences  of  which  a  subject  is  conscious
(2007,  960).  Global  workspace  theory  ultimately  seeks  to  uncover  the  role  of
consciousness itself within a less problematic conceptualisation of thinking as a single
holistic system.
In her  research on reflection  in  the nursing sector,  Ekebergh (2007) also argued in
favour of a more holistic perspective, and against cognitive approaches all together in
attempting to conceptualise thinking. Reflection, which according to Ekebergh has been
poorly distinguished as a concept from thinking in general, is an intrinsic feature of
learning,  and  should  not  be  objectified  or  reduced  into  separate  procedural  tools
designed to enhance it. In view of the lack of conclusive evidence attesting the efficacy
of  such  models  and  tools  designed  to  enhance  thinking  and  learning  processes
(Staniforth  and  Harland,  2006;  Mann,  et  al.,  2004;  Bell  and  Mladenovic,  2013;
Noormohammadi,  2014),  the  assumption  can  be  made  that  a  more  robust  and
descriptive understanding of the phenomenon of thinking (in the context of OJL) rooted
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in the actual nature of thinking as opposed to its potential nature, should be primary as
a research focus. 
Pertinent  literature  on  cognitive  theory  indicates  that  holistic  non-fragmented
approaches may more suitably underpin such a contextual understanding of thinking
(Osman, 2004; Carruthers, 2014), and that the role of consciousness be explored as a
graded  property  (Osman,  2004;  Baars  and  Franklin,  2007),  rather  than  one  that  is
simply absent or present. Indeed, Ekebergh further argued that thinking in the context
of learning should not be understood as a cognitive or intellectual activity at all (2007,
336), but instead as a subjective phenomenon, using a holistic “lifeworld” approach
(2007, 341), supporting the initial intentions of Kolb et al. (1999, 2) to conceptualise
learning (and, by default, its inherent thinking-based aspects) as a human experience
with  a  distinctly  personal  and  subjective  nature.  In  light  of  the  prospect  of  a  less
problematic depiction of thinking, therefore, a fourth and final body of literature was
sourced  to  explore,  using  this  latter  perspective,  how  and  why  we  find  ourselves
engaged in experiencing acts of thinking during OJL episodes and situations, focusing
on consciousness and its role within a holistic single-system account of thinking. 
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2.5 Body four: Consciousness and phenomenology 
2.5.1 Philosophy of mind and consciousness
As argued in the previous sections, the influence of dual process theories appears to be
in part responsible for the conceptualisation of learning in education theory, in terms of
whether it’s occurrence is either unconscious (tacit) or conscious. The proposition that
OJL  is  predominantly  constituted  by  the  notion  of  tacit  learning,  has  essentially
hampered  prospective  research  efforts  aimed  at  exploring  it  further.  Eraut  (2004)
proposed that the performance of work should be considered primary, with learning as
either  an  intended  or  unintended  result  of  such work.  If  learning is  defined as  the
acquisition of new knowledge and considered primarily a cognitive enterprise, then it is
the cognitive processes (thinking) associated with the performance of work that must
precede resulting learning, and hence represent a worthy research focus in addressing
the current impasse in further exploring OJL and its thinking aspects. In the previous
sections, the problem of tacit learning was reduced more specifically to the substantial
tacit thinking that must be taking place therein, and thinking was conceptualised as tacit
precisely in terms of the presence or absence of consciousness (Evans and Stanovich,
2013), or more practically, in terms of consciousness as a graded and variable property
of thinking (Osman, 2004). In its focus on the central role of consciousness however,
this  approach  engenders  the  consequent  and  considerable  challenge  of  defining
consciousness itself. 
Chalmers explicitly stated that consciousness has thus far “stubbornly resisted” (1995,
200) scientific explanation. According to Merleau-Ponty (1962, 69), consciousness as
an object of study presents the “peculiarity” of not being “analysable”, even “naively”,
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without carrying us beyond “common sense postulates”. Vygotsky elegantly affirmed
the conspicuous yet elusive nature of consciousness by suggesting it is “reflected in the
world  like  the  sun  is  reflected  in  a  droplet  of  water”  (1987,  284).  In  philosophy,
specifically its branch dedicated towards understanding the human mind (philosophy of
mind), competing views about the nature of the mind, and consciousness itself, have
assumed  a  number  of  different  perspectives  in  on-going  attempts  to  expound  the
problem. A monistic view depicts either the physical world as an illusion conjured by
the conscious mind (idealism),  or the conscious mind as an illusion conjured by the
physical brain (physicalism). In terms of the mind/body problem, therefore, only one of
the two entities can exist ontologically according to the monistic view. In portraying the
mind  as  an  illusory  projection  by  the  brain,  physicalism  in  particular  posits  that
consciousness is nothing more than, or distinctive from, the relevant brain processes
giving rise to it. A  dualistic view on the other hand depicts mind and body each as
ontologically distinct. Consciousness in this case is distinctive from, yet just as real as,
and  correlated  with,  the  relevant  brain  processes  accompanying  it.  Attempts  by
philosophers and scientists to affirm any of these propositions as true have resulted in
another impasse (Holman, 2008).
In a particularly influential essay, Nagel (1974) articulated a problem associated with
consciousness by positing the question, “What is it like to be a bat?” He suggested that
no matter how much we know about how bats “see” their surroundings via the emission
and reception of sound waves (echolocation), a human being could never really know
what it  is like to perceive her surrounding environment in this  way, or more to the
point, what it is in fact like, to actually be a bat. The question is intended to illustrate
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that objective facts do not necessarily suffice in accounting for the “extra ingredient”
(Chalmers, 1995) represented by pure subjectivity. 
Further  explicating  the ontologically  distinctive  nature  of pure subjectivity,  Jackson
(1982) similarly presented the hypothetical case of “Mary”, an expert who knew every
objective fact there was to know about colour and the process of colour perception, yet
lived in a strange environment completely devoid of the colour red. Jackson argued that
if Mary suddenly stepped out of her colourless environment and saw the colour red for
the very first time, she would have a “red experience” and learn something entirely
new.  What  exactly  would  she  have  learned,  however,  if  she  already  possessed  all
objective knowledge about the colour red? The new “knowledge” or “extra ingredient”,
according  to  Jackson,  would  have  to  be  representative  of  a  kind  of  pure  and
ontologically distinct subjectivity. 
The difference between objectivity and subjectivity in this sense has come to be known
as the “explanatory gap”, and is referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness, as
opposed to comparatively easier problems associated with understanding consciousness
that are theoretically discernible in computational or cognitive science terms (Chalmers,
1995). Questions concerning what consciousness is, or indeed where or how it  first
emerged  in  what  we  consider  to  be  conscious beings,  have  persistently  eluded
traditional branches of philosophy. James described consciousness as an “illegitimate
birth  in  any  philosophy  that  starts  without  it”,  citing  the  difficulties  in  tracing  its
evolutionary origins, as an additional  problem in our efforts to understand it  (2017,
137). Considering the form of pure subjectivity alluded to by Nagel (1974) and Jackson
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(1982), a new branch of philosophy emerged in the early 20th century dedicated to its
investigation via an early form of phenomenology.
2.5.2 Phenomenology
Early attempts to develop a systematic approach in the study of pure subjectivity are
attributed  to  Franz  Brentano  (1838-1917)  and  his  influence  on  the  later  seminal
development of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, employing methodology one could
aptly  describe  as  “human  science,”  as  opposed  to  the  more  familiar  positivist  and
empirically-based “natural science”. Positivist science has been criticised for presenting
an insufficient and objectified view of reality, which is actually, in the words of Van
Der Steen, more often “messy and ambiguous” (2017, 106). 
Brentano  sets  an  important  precedent  for  the  systematic  study  of  subjectivity,  by
positing it as “prior to” (1995, 8) objective science, as a secure and “non-speculative”
foundation for it.  Only through a thorough and clear discernment  of pure, or  inner,
psychology, can one proceed to construct a robust “genetic”, or outer, psychology that
seeks to make claims about  the physiological  basis  of psychical  acts.  In this  sense,
Brentano  compared  pure  psychology (which  he  termed  “psychognosy”)  with
mathematics, and genetic psychology with meteorology, since the latter could never be
precise in its predictions (1995, 5). Here, Brentano lays the foundation for Husserl’s
(1960, 4) later assertion that objective science inevitably leads to “obscurities” in its
foundations,  discussed  in  greater  depth  in  chapter  three,  and  that  true  scientific
precision must originate from a preceding systematic study of subjectivity.
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Phenomenology concerns itself less with the nature of external objective reality, and
more  with  internal  subjective  experience,  exploring  precisely  the  “experiencing”  of
objects  by  subjects,  often  characterised  by  such  questions  as  articulated  by  Nagel
(1974),  concerning  what  it  is  like to  experience  given  phenomena.  The
phenomenological position essentially reduces all of one’s experienced “lifeworld” to
pure  phenomena,  and  therefore,  pure  subjectivity  (Husserl,  1970).  Where  the
experiencing  of  a  given  phenomenon  by  a  subject  has  a  characteristic  what-it-is-
likeness, a specific conceptualisation of consciousness is implied. In others words, for
an experienced phenomena to be phenomenally conscious, there must be a,  what it is
like character  to  it.  By  situating  the  act  of  thinking  in  the  context  of  OJL,  a
phenomenological  perspective  would  therefore  ask,  “What  it  is  like to  experience
thinking while engaged in OJL?” 
Dual  process  theories  state  that  thinking  can  be  fast,  slow,  automatic,  controlled,
intuitive, or reflective (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). The argument may be proposed
from a phenomenological perspective, therefore, that in an on-the-job context, all these
types of thinking can have a distinctive phenomenally conscious character, or what-it-
is-likeness,  regardless  of  whether  they  are  traditionally  defined  as  unconscious  or
conscious  in  dual-process  terms.  In  other  words,  while  some of  the  thinking  types
deliberately  conflated  in  the  afore-cited  sequence  (fast,  slow,  automatic,  controlled,
intuitive,  reflective)  are  categorised  as  unconscious,  they  are  in  fact  phenomenally
conscious.  So  regardless  of  how  thinking  types  are  categorised  according  to  dual
process  theories,  an  assumption  can  be  made  that  professionals  at  work  are
phenomenally conscious of experiencing/entertaining thoughts or sequences of thoughts
that occur in quick succession as well as slow, that occur automatically as well as in a
68
more controlled  or  deliberative  fashion,  or  have  an  intuitive  as  well  as  rational  or
reflective feel. 
Carruthers  (2017)  posited  that,  according  to  traditional  conceptualisations  of
consciousness,  we  are,  in  fact,  not  conscious  of  any  of  our  thoughts  whatsoever.
Knowledge  of  our  own  thoughts  he  argued,  is  not  direct.  It  appears  rather  to  be
interpretive in nature, employing the same mental processes involved in interpreting the
thoughts of others. So while our thought processes are “unconscious”, our interpretation
of them is not, and is thus accessible to us as subjects via phenomenal consciousness.
Carruthers suggested that we ultimately experience ourselves as entertaining various
thoughts, without consciously causing or directly experiencing them. Husserl similarly
portrayed thinking as something to be attended to by phenomenal consciousness in his
statement that, “the thought processes which I really perform are given to me insofar as
I reflect upon them, receive them, and set them up in a pure seeing” (1973, 23). 
The relationship between thinking and consciousness is a prevalent theme in Husserl’s
work.  “Every mental process, while being enacted can be made the object of a ‘pure
seeing’ and understanding, and is something absolutely given in the  seeing”. Husserl
thus  presents  cognition,  and  consciousness  of  it,  as  central  to  the  very  data
phenomenology ultimately seeks to uncover via its methods. The perception itself, the
pure seeing, is for as long as it lasts, “something absolute, something that in itself, is
what it is.” It is “data in the imagination” to be seen (1973, 24). Of course Husserl
questions whether cognition itself can really accord with “things as they exist”, that it
can really “get at  them” (1973, 1), alluding to the famous dictum with which he is
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commonly  attributed,  back  to  the  things  themselves.  Through  phenomenology,
according to Husserl, cognition may be turned inwards, and used to question itself, to
uncover its own essence in a way objective science approaches fail. Using traditional
natural thinking (associated with the natural/objective science approach), cognition is
essentially  unable  to  find  a  scientific  understanding  of  itself  (1973,  22).
Phenomenological thinking on the other hand does not seek to explain a psychology of
cognition in a natural science sense, but rather to cast light upon the nature or essence
of cognition (1973, 25). Husserl refers to phenomenology as a “doctrine of essences”
(1973, 1).  The methodological  aspects of Husserl’s  phenomenology are explored in
more  detail  in  chapter  three,  however  no  discussion  on  phenomenal  consciousness
could  be  considered  complete  without  closer  evaluation  of  Husserl’s  specific
phenomenological reflections on the essential nature of cognition.
Despite being attributed with the seemingly empirical venture of getting at  the things
themselves, Husserl posited that objects of experience are progressively constituted in
and by acts of cognition (1973, 11). Such objects,  “exist for me, and for me are what
they  are,  only  as  objects  of  actual  and  possible  consciousness”  (1960,  65).
Phenomenology  however  departs  from  an  apparent  form  of  radical  constructivism
(which would suggest that reality is entirely  constructed subjectively by the mind), in
its exclusive focus on the pure seeing aspect of experience. The activity of cognitions
relating to themselves gives them “intentionality”, the “relating to” an object that, as an
activity, exists even if the object itself does not. It is the “relatedness” (1973, 43) that
belongs to all cognition that represents the central focus of Husserlian phenomenology.
Only phenomena are truly given to the cognising subject. From the phenomenological
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perspective,  therefore,  processes of  consciousness are  retained with the “acceptance
modification” that they are “mere phenomena” (1960, 20).
2.5.3 Cognitive phenomenology
In cognitive phenomenology, philosophers have further speculated as to which types of
thoughts can or cannot in themselves be subjectively experienced, revealing alternative
conceptualisations of thinking to those presented by cognitive science. While it is given
that thoughts based on all sensory input or recall, emotional states, moods, and inner-
speech, can indeed be experienced, less agreement exists about whether pure cognition,
in terms of abstract non-sensory rational/logical thoughts, can be experienced, or even
whether such thoughts can exist at all independently of sensory qualities (Bayne and
Montague,  2011).  In  this  sense,  cognitive  phenomenology concerns  itself  with how
non-sensory abstract thoughts that are not easily correlated with sensory processes, are
able to manifest as experiences of which subjects are phenomenally conscious. 
Regardless  of  the  sensory/non-sensory  character  of  thoughts  debated  in  cognitive
phenomenology,  however,  a  theoretical  perspective  based  on  phenomenal
consciousness of  thoughts (whatever  their  form or character)  as defined in classical
Husserlian phenomenology,  appears to evade some of the more restrictive problems
incurred  by  cognitive  science,  dual  process,  or  even  cognitive  phenomenology
approaches to conceptualising thinking in the specific context of OJL. Ekebergh (2007)
argued in favour of a “lifeworld theory” approach to investigating and understanding
reflection  and  its  role  in  professional  learning,  which  is  itself  rooted  in  classical
Husserlian phenomenology.  The person,  the world,  and all  perception  and meaning
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arising from their confluence combine to form a unity, cumulatively constituting the
“lifeworld” as it is defined in phenomenological terms (Husserl, 1970).
2.5.4 Lifeworld approach 
In  the  lifeworld,  person,  objects  and  associated  perceptions  and  meanings  are
experienced as a non-reductive whole. Merleau-Ponty (1962) defines the lifeworld as a
“phenomenal field”, a conceptualisation discussed in further detail in chapter three. The
very existence of perceptions and meanings in the lifeworld affirms the impossibility of
experiencing  objects  in  their  absence,  supporting  Carruthers’  (2007)  view  that  no
objects, including thoughts, can be experienced directly, but only indirectly through a
veil of perception, through acts of experiencing. This form of personal experience exists
within the realm of pure subjectivity that phenomenology seeks to expound, supporting
the potential  of  Husserlian  phenomenology and its  dedication  to  pure essence,  as a
position  capable  of  shedding  light  on  the  difficult  problem  of  understanding  the
essential nature of on-the-job thinking. 
Ekebergh (2007) stressed that  reflection  is  not  an isolated tool  or technique,  but  is
rather an irreducible part of the lived process of thinking and learning. She holds that
considering reflection, which has been poorly delineated from thinking in general, as a
tool  or  technique  constitutes  an insufficient  view,  and thus  argues  in  favour  of  the
lifeworld  approach.  Kolb  et  al.  (1999)  similarly,  yet  indirectly,  alluded  to  such  an
approach  by  acknowledging  the  personal  subjective  nature  of  learning,  which  was
discussed  previously (in  section  2.3.4),  as  a  promising position  congruous with the
main  research  interests  guiding  this  study.  While  research  on  KELT  subsequently
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departed in pursuit of development and validation of the LSI (Kolb et al., 1999, 11-12),
Ekebergh proceeded to make specific and practical suggestions about how the lifeworld
approach may be used to cultivate effective professional reflective practice in nursing
and  nursing  education.  She  defined  prospective  interventions  designed  to  foster  a
reflective attitude among nursing professionals,  including reflective supervision,  and
drama or role-play exercises (2007, 338-341). 
Prior to applying any conceptualisation of the phenomenon of thinking in context, and
using it to develop practical interventions (like those presented in the latter  parts of
Ekebergh’s work), methods, tools or techniques however, it has already been argued (in
sections  2.3.2,  2.4.6,  and 2.4.3)  that  an  intermediary  stage  aimed  at  more  robustly
defining  such  a  conceptualisation  is  warranted.  The  phenomenological  lifeworld
approach espoused by Ekebergh (2007), as well as initially and indirectly alluded to by
Kolb et al. (1999), may be directed at developing a more robust understanding of how,
why, and what it is actually like to experience thinking by professionals in the context
of OJL, before further attempts are made to develop practical interventions, methods,
tools,  or  techniques  ultimately  requiring  yet  further  research  efforts  to  validate.
Ekebergh’s  (2007)  insights  are  therefore  cited  here  primarily  with  respect  to  their
philosophical and methodological implications. Using a phenomenological approach to
explore and more robustly define on-the-job thinking (while resisting the temptation to
develop or augment models and tools) may serve to avoid methodological pitfalls, such
as  reliance  on  dichotomies  considered  by  Eraut  to  be  indicators  of  “lazy  thinking”
(2004, 250), or the profusion of ambiguous terminology considered by Tulving to be
indicators  of  an  “immature  science”  (1972,  381).  Phenomenology  implies  that  for
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science to be truly complete, it should concern itself not only with the systematic study
of objectivity, but also with the systematic study of subjectivity (Husserl, 1970). 
Such an approach may serve to address the paucity in research on OJL that has resulted
from  considering  it  in  terms  of  the  tacit-ness  problem,  and  the  elusive  nature  of
traditional conceptualisations of consciousness, permeating the education and cognitive
science  literature.  Chomsky  asserted  the  value  of  seeking  fresh  direction  in
contemporary research, by turning to classical questions and issues, using approaches
with a “distinctly traditional flavour to them” (2006, 5). The literature to this effect
reveals a gap,  in that  an approach rooted in classical  phenomenology, has not been
effectively utilised in discerning the nature of thinking in the context of OJL in terms of
what it actually is, rather than what it should potentially be. At this juncture, following
persistent  reflections  on the four bodies of literature  reviewed,  attention  was turned
towards the articulation of a clear and coherent set of research questions. 
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2.6 Research questions
In  the  sector-specific  literature,  formal learning  mechanisms  available  to  fitness
professionals were deemed insufficient, with  informal learning instead constituting a
majority of relevant and applicable knowledge acquisition.  Fitness professionals and
managers cited OJL as the most important way of learning (Eraut, 2004; Marsick et al.,
2006;  Melton et al., 2010; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013), yet further research into the
phenomenon  has  been  duly  impeded  by  various  problems,  including  the  lack  of  a
universally agreed set of learning outcomes against which its validity can be measured,
as well as the tendency for it to occur predominantly tacitly and unpredictably (Eraut,
2004; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013).
Reflection (a form of thinking) was presented by Di Stefano et al. (2014) as a means of
maximising OJL via an increase in conscious explicit learning, although its effects on
unconscious  implicit learning remain indeterminate. Kolb (1984) similarly alluded to
the importance of thinking as an important aspect of learning, by presenting thinking
and doing on an equal footing in KELT. Closer evaluation  of KELT and the main
proponents influential to its “intellectual origins” (Kolb et al., 1999, p. 2), however, did
not  provide  suitably  robust  definitions  for  the  thinking-based  terms  used  by  Kolb
(1984).
One of Kolb’s three nominated proponents (Dewey, 1910), offered initial musings on
the fleeting nature of thinking, and proceeded to establish a persistent trend that has
permeated  the  literature  ever  since,  of  operationalising  thinking  into  procedural
outcome-based models  and tools designed to enhance its  efficacy  and usefulness in
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teleological  terms  of  what  it  should  or  could  be,  rather  than  what  it  actually  is.
Aggregated  acts  of thinking collated  into terms based on their  assumed prospective
usefulness, rather than on a rigorous understanding of the underlying phenomenon of
thinking, were considered insufficient for expounding the true nature of thinking in the
context of OJL for the purpose of this study. 
In  search  of  a  deeper  philosophical  perspective  on this  problem,  uncertainty  in  the
modern literature with regard to the nature of on-the-job thinking appears to be rooted
at a fundamental level in the actuality-potentiality dialectic. This dialectic may in itself
result from the influential nature Aristotle’s “four causes” in metaphysical inquiry on
modern approaches to philosophical problems. The objectification of thinking in the
context of learning, has defined the perspective of scholars towards it, in the same way
as  one might  perceive  or  understand an object  in  the Aristotelian  sense.  While  the
material, efficient and formal causes refer to the essential constituents, nature, and inner
workings of an object, the final cause refers to its function or purpose (Todd, 1976,
319). This latter cause is strongly reflected in modern perspectives in conceptualising
complex phenomena. This study, therefore, in terms of classical Aristotelian thought, is
aimed at uncovering all but the final cause with respect to the phenomenon in question.
In other words, it seeks to explore the essential nature of on-the-job thinking not in light
of,  or  according to,  its  function or  purpose.  The knowledge gap resulting  from the
hindrances preventing further study of OJL and its inherent thinking aspects, as well as
the  observations  of  Eraut  (2004)  that  on-the-job  thinking  in  action  is  riddled  with
significant  yet  unacknowledged  complexity,  warranted  a  foray  into  literature
surrounding cognitive science and philosophy of mind, where the problematic nature of
tacit learning was finally reduced to the role of consciousness in cognition. 
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Holistic  non-fragmented  approaches  were found to most  suitably underpin a deeper
understanding of thinking in context (Osman, 2004; Carruthers, 2014), together with a
consideration of the role of consciousness as graded property (Osman, 2004; Baars and
Franklin, 2007), rather than one that is simple absent or present as implied by dual
process theories (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). Ekebergh (2007) argued that thinking in
the  context  of  learning  should  not  be  understood  objectively  as  a  cognitive  or
intellectual  activity  at  all,  but  instead  subjectively  as  an  experienced  phenomenon,
using a holistic “lifeworld” approach rooted in Husserl’s phenomenology, affirming the
initial  intentions  of  Kolb  to  conceptualise  learning  (and its  inherent  thinking-based
aspects) as a human experience with a distinctly personal and subjective nature (Kolb et
al., 1999, 2). 
Using a phenomenological approach to explore thinking in the context of OJL appears
to  curb  the  reliance  on  dichotomies,  and  the  profusion  of  ambiguous  terminology
associated with “immature science” (Tulving, 1972, 381). Phenomenology implies that
for science to be truly complete, it should concern itself not only with the systematic
study of objectivity, but also with the systematic study of subjectivity (Husserl, 1970).
Furthermore, a theoretical perspective based on phenomenal consciousness of thoughts,
or  their  what-it-is-likeness (Nagel,  1974),  evades  some  of  the  problems  posed  by
traditional  conceptualisations  of  consciousness  arising  from cognitive  science,  dual
process,  or  even  cognitive  phenomenology  approaches  that  have  permeated  the
education  and  learning  literature,  hampering  further  study  of  what  is  ultimately,
according to De Lyon and Cushion, “the most important  way” (2013, 1413) fitness
professionals  learn.  Given  the  insights,  gaps,  problems,  as  well  as  prospective
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approaches reviewed and presented in all four bodies of literature, the following set of
two research questions was formulated;
1) According to the subjective experience of PFTs, what is the essential nature of
thinking in the context of on-the-job learning?
2) How might conceptualisations of thinking as a subjective experience contribute
to the advancement of research and development in OJL?
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Chapter three: Methodology
3.1 Preamble
In the previous chapter, it was argued that modern theories of education and learning
pertaining  to  OJL  should  be  underpinned  by  a  more  robust  understanding  of  the
thinking  taking  place  therein.  The  discernment  of  the  nature  of  such  thinking  by
researchers  has  thus  far  been  hampered,  particularly  by  the  tacit-ness  problem,  an
impasse  resulting,  in  part,  from  traditional  conceptualisations  of  thinking  as  a
fragmented  system.  A  phenomenological  “lifeworld”  approach  as  espoused  by
Ekebergh (2007), combined with a conceptualisation of thinking as a single, holistic,
and non-fragmented system, from a standpoint based on subjectivity, were presented as
viable means for the facilitation of a deeper understanding of thinking in the context of
OJL. This central argument is developed throughout the ensuing chapter, with the aim
of crafting a coherent research design suitably positioned to address the main research
questions outlined in the previous chapter.
Fundamental approaches to research and interpretations of a general scientific method
are considered first, as a foundation to the emerging design. Classical phenomenology
is  then  considered,  not  only  in  terms  of  its  methodological  aspects  as  fundamental
components of the research method, but also in its capacity as a general philosophical
orientation  underpinning  the  study  as  a  whole.  The  main  principles  and  tools  of
phenomenology  are  thoroughly  discerned  and  augmented  with  more  modern
phenomenological  research  techniques,  in  the  articulation  of  a  coherent  five-step
research  method.  In  the  second  part  of  this  chapter,  a  detailed  description  of  the
application of the five-step method in, first, a pilot study, and second, the main study, is
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given. An outline of the researcher’s position, as well as an introduction to each of the
ten PFTs participating in the main study are presented in Annexes 1 and 3.      
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3.2 Fundamental approaches
Literature on research methodology typically defines two fundamental and archetypal
approaches  to  academic  inquiry,  namely  those  broadly  termed  quantitative and
qualitative.  Hammersley  succinctly  proposed  the  single  unitary  goal  for  both
approaches simply as, the “production of knowledge” (1998, 140). Any methodological
aspirations  to  this  effect  should,  according  to  Robson,  emanate  from  a  “scientific
attitude”,  which involves  working “systematically,  sceptically,  and ethically”  (2004,
18).  The  development  of  a  “complete  science”  unequivocally  faithful  to  such  an
attitude, remains a compelling philosophical endeavour, and represents a key theme in
the influential works of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, as discussed extensively
throughout this chapter. Scholars have regularly attempted to systematically define a
universal “scientific  method”, the essential  features of which, according to Creswell
(2002, 8), are evident in prevailing modern step-based approaches to research. 
3.2.1 The scientific method
In  various  articulations  of  a  prospective  universal  scientific  method,  experiencing,
observing, and hypothesising about phenomena in the world are typically followed by
measuring,  experimenting,  classifying,  or  quantifying,  which  in  turn  give  way  to
correlating  or  generalising,  and finally,  building explanatory  and predictive  theories
(Mouly, 1978; Cohen et al., 2007). How such a method ultimately manifests itself in
specific research cases is necessarily dependent on the nature of the questions under
investigation, which, according to Cohen at al. (2007, 7), can vary according to their
pertinence to either inanimate natural phenomena, or animate personal phenomena. In
other  words,  whether  the  knowledge  being  produced  primarily  concerns  objects or
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subjects, represents at least one conceptualisation of the distinction between the two
main paradigms, and will influence how the scientific method is actually implemented
in  practice  by  researchers  engaged  in  problems  involving  an  objective-subjective
dichotomous characteristic. 
According to Flick, while quantitative research seeks to “measure and quantify” objects
by  “isolating  cause  and  effect”  (2002,  2),  qualitative  research  actively  attends  to
subject-object influences that are not clearly reducible to quantifiable cause and effect
(2002, 5). In other words, while quantitative research actively “eliminates” (2002, 3)
the subjectivity  of  researcher  and participant  influence,  qualitative  research  actively
emphasises interactions between the researcher, participants, and the “field” (2002, 6).
The  philosophical  dialectic  concerning  objectivity  and  subjectivity  revealed  in  the
previous  chapter,  which  represents  an  important  feature  of  the  main  research  aims
underpinning this study, thus emerges methodologically. The quantitative approach, in
this  sense,  broadly  encompasses  articulations  of  the  scientific  method  aimed at  the
study of  objectivity, while the qualitative approach broadly encompasses articulations
of the scientific method aimed at the study of subjectivity. 
Mouly (1978) and Cohen et al. (2008) presented procedural step-based articulations of
the scientific  method resonant  with objective inquiry and the  quantitative approach,
based on acts of classifying, quantifying, and correlating before approximating to the
truth  or  theorising.  Miles  and  Huberman  (1994)  similarly  articulated  a  step-based
scientific method resonant with subjective inquiry and the qualitative approach, based
on  commonalities  observed  across  a  range  of  modern  qualitative  studies,  where
quantifying and correlating are substituted by reflecting, and identifying relationships,
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patterns  and  themes.  A  synthesised  scientific  method  faithful  to  all  three  accounts
(Mouly, 1978; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Cohen et al., 2008) invariably comprises
acts of; (1) observing or experiencing, (2) classifying or organising, (3) analysing or
explicating,  (4) testing or validating,  followed by (5) theorising or generalising,  and
finally, doing so “systematically, sceptically, and ethically” (Robson, 2004, 18). In each
step of the sequence cited above, the first and second action verbs cited, are intended to
reflect the quantitative and qualitative approaches respectively. 
As suggested by Cohen at al. (2007, 7) the objective-subjective dialectic is precisely
where the two archetypal approaches diverge in their methodological application with
respect  to the context  of this  study. The qualitative  approach actively considers  the
subjective and interpretive aspects associated with personal and natural phenomena as
valid  research  foci,  while  the quantitative  approach does  not.  Indeed,  Marshall  and
Rossman  use  the  terms  “qualitative”  and  “interpretive”  interchangeably  (1999,  2).
Robson further underlines this philosophical distinction by presenting relativism, which
depicts reality as subjectively constructed, as the main antithesis to  positivism, which
depicts reality as objectively constructed, thereby associating the two concepts with the
qualitative  and  quantitative  paradigms  respectively  (2004,  22).  While  all  research
efforts  will  generally  proceed  systematically  and  rigorously  in  congruity  with  the
scientific  attitude,  the  methods  employed must  ultimately  depend on the archetypal
approach  most  suited  to  the  research  problem  in  question,  and  its  associated
philosophical implications.
 
The main research aims presented in the previous chapter in respect to the first question
specifically,  were based  primarily  on essence,  namely  the  development  of  a  robust
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definition of the essential nature of thinking as it occurs in subjects engaged in OJL
contexts, and to describe this essence employing a systematic research approach that is
faithful  to  the  scientific  attitude.  The  emphasis  on  clarification  and  explication  as
opposed  to  quantification  and  analysis  predisposes  a  qualitative  approach  towards
addressing the essentially “non-experimental” (Salkind, 2003, 221) questions driving
this study.
3.2.2 Philosophical assumptions
The  origins  of  qualitative  research  can  be  traced  back  to  academic  interest  in
understanding foreign cultures in the US during the early 20th century, culminating in
the modern sciences of ethnography (Flick, 2002, 7), and anthropology, as popularised
by the prominent, publicly acclaimed, academic work of Maragaret Mead (Jarvie, 2016,
360).  It  has since become an important  mode of inquiry in areas with a distinctive
human element, such as education, psychology, sociology, social work, health care, and
management  (Miles  and  Huberman,  1994;  Boyatzis,  1998;  Marshall  and  Rossman,
1999).  Salkind  posited  qualitative  research  as  a  “non-experimental”  method  to
“rigorously  explore  academic  questions”,  and  explain  various  phenomena  where
“additional context” is needed, in a way that quantitative research would “miss” (2003,
221).  Marshall  and Rossman similarly proposed its  major  purposes are to  “explore,
explain, or describe a phenomenon of interest” (1999, 33).
While  quantitative  research  is  typically  based  on  the  positivist  perspective,
philosophical assumptions, or “general philosophical orientations” (Creswell, 2014, 35)
underpinning  qualitative  research  typically  include  relativism  (Robson,  2004,  23),
interpretivism (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 8), symbolic interactionism (Flick, 2002,
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16), constructivism (Creswell, 2014, 37), and Husserl’s transcendental idealism (1960,
86). Collectively, all these assumptions broadly characterise the notion of subjectivity
and its  role  in  constructing  or  shaping individual  and collective  experiences  of  the
world. In his definition of relativism specifically, Robson emphasised the position that
no  external  reality  exists  independently  of  consciousness,  inasmuch  as  some
phenomena are considered to exist not “out there”, but “in the minds of people and their
interpretations”  (2004,  23).  While  Husserl’s  (1960)  transcendental  idealism,  strictly
speaking,  advances  and  essentially  diverges  from  this  position,  Robson’s  (2004)
relativism represents  a  basic  antithesis  to  positivism that  clearly  and fundamentally
differentiates the qualitative philosophical orientation from that of quantitative ideas.
Flick adds to the qualitative conceptual philosophical framework by positing further
structuralist and psychoanalytical assumptions, which encompass the notion of deep,
underlying, or unconscious phenomena also influencing the construction of individual
and collective experiences (2002, 16). While the qualitative approach has become more
formalised since its inception, however, it is nevertheless not considered to be based on
any  one  single  unified  theoretical  or  methodological  concept  (Flick,  2002,  7),
engendering the need for qualitative researchers  to clearly  discern the philosophical
orientation,  or  “theoretical  lens”  (Creswell,  2014,  98)  assumed  in  their  particular
approaches to research problem/s in question. A specific and distinctive philosophical
lens, therefore, is hereby argued, summarily; 
Following a review of four bodies of literature, an impasse in the study of OJL was
previously  delineated,  based  on  its  tendency  to  occur  predominantly  tacitly.  The
problem of tacit learning, was then reduced more specifically to the tacit thinking that
must be taking place therein. The experiential subjective approach was discussed as a
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prospective means of resolving the impasse and potentially facilitating renewed efforts
by researchers to explore OJL as a worthy focus, given that it has already been credited
with yielding the majority  of professional  learning following the cessation of initial
formal  education  and  training.  Ekebergh’s  (2007)  proposed  “lifeworld”  approach
towards conceptualising thinking and reflecting in a less problematic way, reveals the
Husserlian phenomenology in which it is rooted, as a uniquely positioned theoretical
lens  for  the  continuing  development  of  this  thesis  both  philosophically  and
methodologically. Throughout the following sections, the adequacy of phenomenology
(and  by  default,  Husserl’s  transcendental  idealism),  as  both  a  theoretical  lens  and
methodological tool, therefore, is elucidated in depth. 
86
3.3 Phenomenology as a philosophical paradigm
In the previous chapter, Nagel’s (1974) reflections on what it is like to be a bat yielded
a  discussion  of  the  notion  of  a  form of  ontologically  distinctive  pure  subjectivity,
supported  by Jackson’s  (1982) narrative  deliberating  the  colour  expert  Mary’s  “red
experience” upon seeing the colour red for the first time. Husserl similarly asserted that
for the blind, theories of colour, “give no seeing clarity about the meaning of colour as
those with eyesight have it” (1973, 4), as indeed it is for the deaf, for whom objective
knowledge of sound and music give no seeing or comprehension of how such sounds
ultimately translate to the experience of hearing music (1973, 30-31). Nagel, Jackson,
and Husserl posit subjectivity as central to furthering our understanding of personal as
well as natural phenomena, particularly where scientific or academic investigation has
been limited exclusively to the consideration of objective facts alone, as appears to be
the case in the evident basis of education and learning theory in cognitive-science-based
approaches to explaining thinking and consciousness. 
Epistemologically  speaking,  therefore,  through  its  focus  on  pure  subjectivity,
phenomenology  collapses  the  internal  and  external  character  of  inner conceptual
knowledge of an outer world, with the mediating experiencing of objects by subjects as
its  primary  focus.  Phenomenology  refutes  the  necessary  existence  of  subjects  and
objects, and affirms only a mediating pure seeing as actually real. From an ontological
perspective, such a focus does not therefore seek to make claims about the existence of
the subjects or objects implied by the pure subjectivity of experience mediating them.
This  distinction  specifically  marks  the  afore  cited  divergence  of  Husserl’s  (1960)
transcendental  idealism,  from Robson’s  (2004) relativism,  since,  by questioning the
existence of the mind, the possibility  of anything existing “inside” it,  must also by
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default be simultaneously questioned. As a philosophical discipline, phenomenology is
considered distinctive from the branches of epistemology and ontology, precisely in its
focus not on knowledge or existence, or for that matter on an ontologically distinctive
pure subjectivity (due to a direct reference to ontology) as implied by Nagel (1974) and
Chalmers  (1982),  but  rather,  exclusively,  on  pure  seeing,  as  nothing  other  than  a
phenomenon,  to  which considerations  of  a  strictly  ontological  nature simply do not
apply. It is also considered for that matter, as related to, but similarly distinct from, the
other major philosophical branches of metaphysics, logic, and ethics (Woodruff Smith,
2003).  
3.3.1 The science of subjectivity
As a valid research methodology applicable in modern contexts, the scientific merits of
phenomenology, as emphasised by Creswell (2014, 98), must also be clearly discerned
by  qualitative  researchers  with  respect  to  their  main  research  aims.  Further  to  the
universal  scientific  method  discussed  earlier  (in  section  3.2.1),  the  basic  tenets  of
phenomenology  as  a  valid  science  of  subjectivity,  suitably  poised  to  discern  the
essential  nature  of  on-the-job  thinking,  are  therefore  discussed  in  this  section  with
respect to key insights provided by the classical phenomenologists in their pursuit of a
truly complete science. 
The  “scientific  concept”  is,  according  to  Merleau-Ponty,  based  on  “fixing  and
objectifying phenomena” (1962, 63). Husserl referred to such traditional  objectifying
positive sciences as “naively constituted objectivity” (1960, 147), and while having led
to “brilliant development throughout modernity”, are now hampered by “obscurities” in
their fundamental concepts and methods (1960, 4). In his compelling narrative based on
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interpretations of key contributions to science by Charles Darwin (1809-1882), Isaac
Newton  (1643-1727),  and  René Descartes  (1596-1650),  Noam  Chomsky  (2006)
provides  additional  context  for some of the problems arising  from the centrality  of
objective natural science in modern research. Despite postulating a set of fundamental
laws of mechanics (including gravitational forces and motion), that have served as a
profound  catalyst  for  the  advancement  of  modern  natural  science,  according  to
Chomsky, Newton struggled with the mysterious notion of a hidden force acting at a
distance between objects separated by empty space, citing it as an “occult quality” of
matter. 
Newton’s  failure  to  discern  the  essential  nature  of  gravity,  despite  being  able  to
accurately explain and predict its effects mathematically (outcomes constituting nothing
less than a revolutionary impact on general scientific and technological progress), was a
source of dissatisfaction to the eminent scientist. Darwin later asked rhetorically why
thought, as a “secretion of the brain”, should be considered any “more wonderful than
gravity”, itself similarly an emergent property of matter (Chomsky, 2006, ix). An occult
quality of matter like gravity in this regard, as alluded to by Darwin, is inseparable from
the Cartesian notion of mind as an occult quality of the physical body. The mysterious
nature  of  gravity  that  eluded  Newton  (like  the  mysterious  nature  of  the  mind  that
similarly eludes us), which a complete science should indeed be expected to describe,
remains  elusive  even  today,  given  the  current  capabilities  of  prevailing  scientific
approaches. The “brilliant development” (Husserl, 1960, 4) later resulting from what
Newton  himself  might  have  considered  an  incomplete science  (implied  by  his
dissatisfaction,  as  noted  by  Chomsky),  has  nevertheless  validated  modern  natural
science  as  a  dominant  method,  and sidelined  the  scientific  enterprise  of  discerning
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fundamental concepts. According to Chomsky, discernment of essence has effectively
been “abandoned” in favour of a “more general scientific attitude” (2006, 7), fit for the
specific  purposes  marginally  construed  as  scientific  development  today,  although
riddled by  “obscurities” in its fundamental concepts, as predicted by Husserl (1960, 4).
According to Brentano, objectifying phenomena for the purposes of quantification and
correlation leads to paradoxes in objective science, that are linked to long-debated, and
as yet unresolved, philosophical problems. However many points are superimposed on
a continuous line, for instance, and however many measurements we are able to make
between the positional differences of such points, the line itself, according to Brentano,
judged only on the merits of its fundamental nature, represents a continuous line and a
unity with no gaps anywhere (1995, 112). The notion Brentano alludes to here, may be
further clarified and illustrated by his thoughts on the substantial  and long-standing
philosophical problem of how, “out of nothingness, something can come into being.”
According to Brentano, it cannot be shown how something can come into being out of
nothing, however,  it  can be explained how “plurality  can arise  out  of unities,  even
though no unity is a plurality” (1995, 113), as implied by his example of the continuous
line,  whose  plurality  of  objectified  gaps  are  not  part  of  its  essential  nature.  The
mathematics of gravity in this respect, are not part of, nor do they cast light upon, its
essential  nature,  accounting  for  Newton’s  dissatisfaction  (Chomsky,  2006)  with  his
scientific achievement.
Objective science is a science of “references” inasmuch as it  refers to the objects it
studies,  while  subjective  science  is  a  science  of  “self-givenness”,  inasmuch  as  it
reduces phenomena to those fundamental essences that are “self-given” (Husserl, 1973,
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46). Accordingly, it is a reduction to the most basic constituents of meaning, such that
objective science can only begin, therefore, where subjective science ends. According
to Brentano, there can be no “perfect” science, or even perfect language for that matter,
without a perfect “psychognosy” (1995, 72), which he defined as a pure psychology,
that clearly “determines the elements of consciousness” (1995, 13), and hence also, the
most fundamental elements of natural phenomena. The fundamental elements of natural
phenomena are thus  determined,  because they can ultimately  only be considered as
existent by us, individually and collectively, via their presentation to, or concordance
with, fundamental and agreed elements of consciousness. 
Only by constructing basic (and agreed) judgements of essence, argued Husserl, can we
attain the secure objectivity that a truly complete science demands (1973, 55). Argued
as such, the obscurities currently hampering further investigation of OJL resulting from
traditional  conceptualisations  of  thinking,  which  are  rooted  in  objective  scientific
approaches, warrant an alternative approach, through the use of subjective scientific
approaches, in pursuit of a more robust underpinning to modern theories of learning.
Indeed, phenomenology has been used, as a subjective science approach, in attempts to
discern  some  of  the  most  challenging  of  all  obscurities  in  science.  Seminal
phenomenological works on fundamental scientific problems include Husserl’s (1960)
own critique of cognition, ego, spatio-temporality, and consciousness itself, Merleau-
Ponty’s (1962) critique of perception, space, temporality, and freedom, and Heidegger’s
(1982)  critique  of  “being”  and  temporality.  Phenomenology  is  thus  presented  not
merely as an alternative to natural, positive, and objective science for the exploration of
only specific questions in marginal domains, but rather, as wholly fundamental to it, as
its underlying basis. In this regard, the second research question asks how traditional
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and  fundamental  theories  in  education  and  learning  might  benefit  from  re-
conceptualisation  based  on  a  more  “complete”  (Husserl,  1973,  55)  scientific
perspective. 
Husserl precludes the scope of phenomenology from entertaining any efforts to “deduce
or  calculate”  (1973,  5),  and  continues  to  establish  the  practicalities  of  its  core
methodological tenets. It does not “theorise or carry out mathematical operations”, but
rather proceeds by, “seeing, clarifying, and distinguishing meanings” (1973, 46). It is
based not on the “pure logic” (1973, 14) typically associated with objective science, or
as Husserl put it, “natural thinking” arising from “natural science”. Rather, it is based
on  a  form  of  philosophical  thinking  arising  from  “pre-epistomological  reflections”
(1973, 18), in the tradition of Descartes (1908) who similarly endeavoured, like Husserl
himself, towards basing all sciences on an absolute foundation via fundamental insights
behind  which  “one  cannot  go  back  any  further”  (Husserl,  1960,  1).  It  is
phenomenological  analysis,  which,  according  to  Merleau-Ponty,  “endows  scientific
operations with meaning” (1962, 68). Using natural thinking, or the “natural attitude”,
given evidence is compared with other evidence, weighed, and accepted or rejected.
Such  “natural”  cognition  need  not  question  itself,  but  philosophical  thinking  does
(Husserl, 1973, 15). Husserl accordingly developed a form of philosophical reduction
initially in accordance with the method of Cartesian doubt, based on a refusal to accept
anything  as  existent  unless  it  is  “secured  against  every  conceivable  possibility  of
becoming doubtful” (1960, 3).
Ultimately,  the  thematic  “object”  (intended here as  target or  that  which  is  focused
upon)  of  Husserl’s  reductive  pre-epistomological  reflections  could exist  even if  the
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world itself (as implied by natural positive science), does not (1960, 30). It is in this
sense,  that  Merleau-Ponty  asserts  how conscious  reflection  (philosophical  thinking)
essentially “breaks” the world (1962, 42). If the world does not exist, then neither can
the senses, since they are rooted in physicality. By abstaining from using the senses,
however, the very act of abstaining surely exists and, “is what it is”, within a  stream of
“flowing subjective  processes” (Husserl,  1960,  42)  called  the “lifestream” (Husserl,
1960, 20). In other words, if everything is doubtful, then the very cognition that makes
such  a  judgement,  must  be  certain  (Husserl,  1973,  23).  At  this  precise  juncture,
Cartesian thought and Husserl’s phenomenology, begin to depart. 
Descartes’  cogito  (or  that  which  is  left  after  everything  doubtful  has  been
philosophically discarded, or the thinking mind as an entity distinct from the physical
body, illustrated by the famous Cartesian notion of, I think therefore I am), following a
complete application of the method of Cartesian doubt, must exist if all else does not.
Husserl’s phenomenology departs here by denying the cogito as ontologically distinct,
because such a distinctive entity would have to be responsible for the mind-body divide
as implied by Cartesian dualism. The objects of phenomenology, therefore (in this case
the cogito that must be yet further examined), are not objects in the ontological sense,
but instead exist in the “lifeworld”, itself a “phenomenon of being, instead of something
that is” (1960, 19). Phenomenology is thus presented as a “science of pure phenomena”
(1973,  36),  and  a  tool  fit  for  the  further  dissemination  of  Descartes’  cogito  (an
application discussed in further detail in the following sections). According to Husserl,
anything belonging to the world, only “exists for me, in that I experience it, perceive it,
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remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like” (1960,
21). 
The application of phenomenology as a valid scientific method, to a discernment of the
essential  nature  of on-the-job thinking in  a  practical  research context,  at  this  stage,
requires  a  further  discussion  of  its  fundamental  principles.  Despite  the  various
particular expressions phenomenology has assumed in modern research contexts, the
aim of  the  next  section  is  to  review  its  main,  fundamental,  or  core,  principles,  in
relation to the context and aims of this study. 
3.3.2 Principles of phenomenology
Husserl  (1960)  demonstrated  the  practical  application  of  phenomenology  in  his
meditations  on the nature of,  among other phenomena,  cognition  itself,  and indeed,
Descartes’ cogito. These meditations, in particular, reveal the tools of phenomenology
in  exquisite  detail.  Further  to  Brentano’s  (1995,  31)  original  commitment  towards
creating a method for the development of a complete pure psychology (psychognosy) to
suitably underpin objective science, Husserl proceeds earnestly with the development
of  a  complete  method  of  phenomenology.  From  an  empirical  natural  scientific
standpoint, Vygotsky stated unequivocally that, “one cannot study the relationship of a
thing to itself” (1987, 42). Rather than explain cognition in a “natural science sense”,
therefore, as would be the case with approaches rooted in modern psychology, Husserl
attempts to, “cast light upon the nature or essence of cognition” (1973, 25). In doing so,
the  nature  and  capabilities  of  what  has  come  to  be  known  as  transcendental
phenomenology, are revealed in Husserl’s work. As discussed in the previous chapter,
traditional conceptualisations of the nature or essence of cognition (thinking), appear to
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have fallen  victim to  the  types  of  “obscurities”  Husserl  professed as  the  inevitable
consequences of objective science (1960, 4). In order to discern the nature of cognition
in a way that might more robustly underpin modern theories of education and learning,
congruous  with  the  underlying  aims  of  this  study,  a  “seeing,  clarifying,  and
distinguishing (of) meanings” (1973, 46), is called for, and Husserl’s phenomenological
meditations  on  cognition  thereby  represent  a  promising  methodological  point  of
departure.  According to Husserl,  acts  of cognition have no “objective meaning” but
rather,  “subjective  truth”  (1973,  36).  They are personal,  and go on immanently,  or
“wholly within (oneself)” (1960, 82). When cognition reaches beyond itself,  or past
what  is  “immanent”  to  what  is  beyond,  or  “transcendent”,  it  is  said  to  be
“transcendental”  (1973, 3).  Transcendence  is  the idea of  reaching an object.  It  is  a
central  tenet  of  phenomenology,  and accounts  for  common references  to  Husserl’s
phenomenology as being transcendental. 
The  activity  of  cognitions  both  reaching and  relating  themselves to  objects  (again,
objects in the sense of  targets,  or what is focused upon) gives them “intentionality”.
The  relating  to an  object  as  an  activity  exists  even  if  the  object  itself  does  not.
Intentionality is a key concept in Husserl’s phenomenology and can be defined as the
“relatedness” that belongs to all cognition (1973, 43). Such intentionality exists in the
constitution of all objectivities, given prior even to the acts of cognition themselves,
rendering intentionality  a truly fundamental  idea in the phenomenological  approach,
through which the constitution of all subjective processes as “real natural objects in the
objective  spatio-temporal  world”  (1960,  80),  are  made  understandable.  Englander
(2016, 4) cites this concept as the crucial distinctive factor driving phenomenological
inquiry as a subjective science, namely its consideration of intentionality as opposed to
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causality (as  in  the  case  of  objective  science  investigating  relationships  between
objects). Husserl’s ideas on intentionality reveal a conspicuous influence by Brentano,
who made the earlier assertion that every psychical act is  directed upon an object, a
directedness  of consciousness that constitutes  the object  as an  intentional object.  In
other words, according to Brentano, the intentional object exists for the thinker, “as
long as the thinker has it as his intentional object” (1995, 26). 
If the world itself to which cognition thus relates is constituted transcendentally in each
person, then it must also be constituted among  all those who carry out such acts of
cognition. Transcendental “inter-subjectivity”, according to Husserl, is what effectively
constitutes an “objective world”, that has “made itself objectively actual” (1960, 107),
as a “world of men and things” (1960, 129). It is disclosed to us in the full concreteness
with which it is incessantly the “life-world for us all” (1960, 136). Husserl also refers to
the world as an “idea”, or the, “ideal correlate of an inter-subjective (inter-subjectively
communalised)  experience,  which  ideally  can  be,  and  is,  carried  on  as  constantly
harmonious” (1960, 107). Merleau-Ponty later conceptualised existence in the lifeworld
as a “phenomenal field”, based on the ideas of classical or quantum field theories in
physics, and inspired by their application in Gestalt psychology. While a magnetic or
gravitational  field  will  mediate  the  interactions  between  physical  objects,  the
phenomenal  field  mediates  interactions  between  subjective  experience,  body,  and
objects in the world. The phenomenal field is not an “inner world”, and phenomena are
not  “mental  facts”  or  “states  of  consciousness”  located  inside subjects,  but  rather,
subject,  body and world are  inseparable  as  wholly  interacting  features  of  existence
(1962,  66).  The  constitution  of  phenomenal  experience  is  the  primary  emergent
property resulting from interactions between subjective experience, body, and the world
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in the phenomenal field, just as gravity is considered the primary emergent property
resulting  from  interactions  of  objects  in  a  gravitational  field.  Everything  that  is
transcendentally  constituted  as  phenomenally  conscious  experience,  according  to
Husserl,  is  inseparable  from  “transcendental  inter-subjectivity”,  which  in  turn
“constitutes actuality of being and sense” (1960, 64). The possibility of a reduction to
inter-subjective  insights  behind  which  one  cannot  go  back  any  further,  that  are
representative of a fundamental and shared essence of the phenomena they describe,
makes phenomenology possible as not only a philosophical idea, but also as a scientific
method. Uncovering fundamental and shared essence of the phenomenon of thinking in
the  context  of  OJL,  therefore,  through  the  use  of  phenomenology,  is  intended,  in
accordance with the first research question, as a prospective basis for re-conceptualising
some of the problematic foundations upon which education and learning theories are
based. 
3.3.3 Descriptive and interpretive phenomenology
Lopez and Willis warned that implementation of any method by researchers without
examining its philosophical basis effectively undermines the “purpose, structure, and
findings”  of  their  work  (2004,  726).  Englander  further  stressed  the  importance  of
phenomenological researchers,  in  particular,  building  their  methodology  on  “solid
philosophical grounds” (2016, 2). Since “assumptions drive methodological decisions”
(Lopez and Willis, 2004, 726), the main philosophical position underpinning this study
is thereby further situated through this section and the next, in relation to the two main
prevailing styles of phenomenology prevalent in the modern research context; namely
those denoted  descriptive and  interpretive. According to Giorgi et al., the “division”
between the two remains “unresolved” (2017, 179).
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The descriptive approach is typically attributed to the methods developed and employed
by Edmund Husserl, while the interpretive approach is attributed to the later work of
Martin  Heidegger.  These  two styles  have also  been differentiated  in  the context  of
modern  phenomenological  research  as  “transcendental”,  and  “hermeneutic”
phenomenology in the case of Husserl or Heidegger respectively. A third style is also
commonly cited, namely, “existential” phenomenology, which is attributed to the works
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980), and is discussed in the
next section as an additional component of classical phenomenology (Eddles-Hirsch,
2015, 252), since it is not directly associated with the descriptive-interpretive dialectic. 
As  proponents  of  the  descriptive  approach,  Giorgi  et  al.  (2017)  emphasise  the
Husserlian  idea  of  targeting  pure  intentionality,  reaching  those  truly  immanent  and
fundamental insights that are unencumbered by anything transcendentally posited. As
proponents of the interpretive approach, on the other hand, Smith and Osborn (2008)
emphasise the Heideggerian idea that  being is inseparable from context, and that the
phenomenological attitude is always pervaded by preconceptions, culture, and history.
While the two approaches are indeed widely presented as dialectically opposed, it is
worth  noting  that  both  Heidegger  and Husserl  acknowledged  an  interpretive  or
constructive aspect of phenomenological methodology, as well as a descriptive one, in
their  attempts  to  ultimately  discern  the  pure  essence  of  given  phenomena.  Husserl
argued  that  the  “secure  objectivity  science  demands  can  be  attained  only  by
constructing basic  judgements of  essence” (1973, 55), a methodological  observation
corroborating  Heidegger’s  (1982,  21)  notion  of  constructed narrative.  Any  final
exposition  by  researchers  concerning  essence  will,  therefore,  invariably  contain
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interpretations  and  judgements.  Creswell  similarly  asserts  that  modern  qualitative
phenomenological methods are intended to “build the essence of experience  from the
participants” (2014, 100), emphasising the inescapable role of the modern researcher in
both constructing the essence, and making interpretive methodological decisions about
how to proceed with acquired data.
Before  building  or  constructing  narratives,  therefore,  phenomenological  researchers
begin  with  data  comprising  various  configurations  of  participant/researcher,
descriptive/interpretive  elements  that,  faithful  to  the  qualitative  tradition,  actively
consider interactions between the “researcher, participants, and the field” (Flick, 2002,
6).  In  practical  terms,  the  main  distinction  between  descriptive  and  interpretive
approaches in modern phenomenological research, in this view, is primarily evident, in
the initial phase of analysis, with regard to the nature of the emerging data to which the
phenomenological method is applied. 
The descriptive Giorgi et al. (2017, 182) method initially focuses on delineating and
describing the units of meaning expressed by research participants. The final composite
description is then constructed using themes derived directly from those meaning units.
The  interpretive  Smith  and  Osborn  (2008,  67-69)  method  does  not  require  the
delineation of units of meaning in the text, but rather, annotation by the researcher of
reflective observations corresponding to specific meaning-rich passages in the text. The
final  composite  description  is  then  constructed  using  themes  derived  from  the
annotations themselves. Final composite narratives by phenomenological researchers,
therefore,  are  constructed  either  directly  from  participant  descriptions  in  the  first
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(descriptive)  instance,  or  indirectly  from  researcher  interpretations  of  participant
descriptions in the second (interpretive). 
The interpretive  style  is  particularly  relevant  in  cases  where  the  research  questions
require  researchers  to  probe  hidden or  deeper  aspects  of  the  phenomenon,  actively
asking critical questions of the text, about things that “leak out”, of which participants
themselves  may not  necessarily  even be aware (Smith and Osborn,  2008,  53).  Van
Manen defined the “ambition” of interpretive phenomenology as an exploration of, “the
many possible  ways in  which we may experience  and meaningfully  understand our
world” (1996, 47).
The  selection  between  modern  descriptive  or  interpretive  methods  in  the  modern
phenomenological research context, therefore, must depend primarily on the nature of
the  phenomenon  in  question,  and  the  specific  research  question/s  posited  by  the
researcher.  In  the  context  of  the  specific  research  questions  guiding this  study,  the
descriptive-interpretive dialectic is relevant most specifically to the initial treatment of
data, which, as argued in this section, is only later increasingly subjected to the main, or
fundamental,  principles  and  tools  of  phenomenological  analysis.  In  other  words,  a
reflective  phenomenological  research  design  suitably  positioned  to  “systematically,
sceptically, and ethically” (Robson, 2004, 18) explore the phenomenon of on-the-job
thinking, that is not defined exclusively in terms of either the descriptive or interpretive
style, is construed in detail in the following sections, drawing on various relevant tools
(be they associated with either the modern descriptive or interpretive styles) for the
initial  phases  of  data  collection  and  sorting,  to  then  proceed  with  an  in  depth
phenomenological analysis faithful to the fundamental tenets of pure phenomenology in
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the classical style, that are essentially free or unencumbered by modern dichotomous
conceptualisations of the method as either distinctively descriptive or interpretive. An
evaluation of each of the tools and analytical techniques incorporated into the design, is
presented in the following sections. 
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3.4 Phenomenology as a research design
Creswell (2014, 41) nominates phenomenology as one of five major research designs in
modern qualitative research. It is considered a “popular” approach in “social and health
sciences” (2014, 236), comprising various methods and instruments for the “rigorous
and systematic” exploration of “individual lived experiences” (Marshall and Rossman,
1999,  3).  Some  examples  of  the  lived  experiences  explored  by  modern
phenomenological  researchers  include,  for  instance,  caring  for  dementia  patients  by
spouses at home (Hye-Young and Myungsun, 2017), stress and burnout among licensed
alcohol and drug counsellors (Crim, 2017), and being a career-professional woman and
Mormon mother (Greenfield et al., 2016).
Dawson  conceptualised  the  qualitative  paradigm  as  a  continuum,  with  a  “highly
qualitative”  end  where  data  is  analysed  reflectively,  and  an  opposing  end  where
qualitative data is treated in a more quantitative  way, by counting and coding (2013,
116).  Positioned at  the “highly qualitative” end of this  spectrum,  phenomenological
research  is  heavily  dependent  on  a  “reflective  turn  of  mind”  on  the  part  of  the
researcher (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 9). The reflective analysis must be systematic
and rigorous,  while  retaining  flexibility  and adaptability  depending on the  research
questions  (Dawson,  2013,  119).  In  this  section,  some of  the  core  principles  of  the
phenomenological  method,  as  it  is  expressed  in  both  modern  (descriptive  and
interpretive) and classical contexts, as well as their practical implications in light of the
underlying philosophical assumptions and specific research questions underpinning this
study,  are  explored.  Maintaining  methodological  flexibility  and  adaptability,  the
rationale for a rigorous phenomenological research process is presented, culminating in
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a clearly defined five-step method. Three main perspectives are therefore interwoven in
the ensuing narrative to elucidate the construction of this method. 
The first,  is  based on a  general  overview of  paradigmatic  research  approaches  and
modes of academic inquiry (Mouly, 1978; Miles and Huberman; 1994, Flick; 2002;
Salkind,  2003;  Robson,  2004;  Cohen,  2007),  and a  qualitative  interpretation  of  the
synthesised scientific method discussed earlier  (in section 3.2.1), summarised as, (1)
experiencing, (2) organising, (3) explicating, (4) testing/validating, and (5) generalising.
The second perspective is based on classical phenomenology, and draws on the main
principles and methods of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty,  organised  according  to  the  phases  of  reduction,  construction,
deconstruction/eidetic analysis, and description. 
The third is based on more modern phenomenological research methods involving tools
and  techniques  typically  associated  with  the  descriptive  or  interpretive  approaches.
According to Van Manen, while phenomenology was previously the “sole reserve” of
philosophers,  it  has  since  also  been  “taken  up”  by  “non-philosophers”,  namely,
“scholars in education, pedagogy, psychology, psychiatry, and other health sciences”.
This has led to a “struggle” to determine which methods are “most appropriate” for the
study of human phenomena (2002, 24). The third perspective, therefore, draws on the
main  phenomenological  methods  used  to  explore  human  phenomena  in  modern
research  contexts  (Moustakas,  1994;  Van  Manen,  1996;  Smith  and  Osborn;  2008,
Giorgi et al., 2017). A complete phenomenological method is thereby sought, that is
faithful  to  the  fundamental  tenets  of  phenomenology,  while  embracing  its  various
expressions, and tailored according to the unique requirements of the research questions
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posited  in  the  previous  chapter.  In  the  following  sections  (3.4.1  and  3.4.2),
phenomenological reduction and eidetic analysis are specifically presented as the main
tools of phenomenology, and discussed with respect to their application to data sourced
via modern data  collection  and sorting techniques  relevant  to  an exploration  of the
phenomenon of on-the-job thinking, as it is experienced from the subjective viewpoint
of PFTs.
3.4.1 Phenomenological reduction
At  the  heart  of  the  phenomenological  method  lies  the  notion  of  transcendence.
Experience is based on the internal or immanent givenness, constituted by a reaching
out towards  something  that  is  external  or  transcendent.  Understanding  what  is
transcendent, as opposed to what is immanent, enables use of the “chief distinguishing
tool”  of  phenomenology  (1960,  32);  the  “phenomenological  reduction”,  which
according to Husserl, is accomplished by excluding all that is transcendentally posited
(1973, 4). It has already been said, that the thematic object of Husserl’s reductive pre-
epistomological reflections could exist even if the world itself (as implied by objective
science) does not (1960, 30). What is left, therefore, with traditional conceptualisations
of the world thus held in abeyance, constitutes the kind of unobscure basis for science
that Husserlian phenomenology aims to uncover. 
The act  of  phenomenological  reduction  requires  the  phenomenologist  to  employ an
attitude  Husserl  termed  “free  epoché”,  which  involves  inhibiting  acceptance  of  the
objective world as existent,  along with all the facts  of objective science,  effectively
excluding them from the field of judgement (1960, 25). Brentano originally asserted
that, “something can be a phenomenon without being a thing in itself” (1995, 137),
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emphasising that objects, in this sense, do not have to exist, because only the intentional
judgement  of  them  does  (1995,  91).  The  intentional  judgement,  or  rather,  the
directedness contained within the intentional judgement (intentionality itself), is what
phenomenology strives to bring into focus. There is an immanence of cognition that is
given, a “givenness in the absolute sense” (Husserl, 1960, 27), that becomes thereby
accessible  by  excluding  all  that  is  transcendent.  Pure  givenness or  relatedness of
experience  are  described by Husserl  as  the  “intentional  constituents”  (1960,  79)  of
experienced  phenomena,  which  are  set  up  in  a  “pure  seeing”  (1973,  23)  via
phenomenological  reduction,  or  in  other  words,  a  stripping-away  of the  layers  that
obscure pure intentionality. Sartre (1989) emphasised the purity of the intentionality of
consciousness  as  absolute,  non-personal,  and  distinctive  from  the  concepts  and
constructs in the world to which it attends.
Reduction  is  a  process  of  unveiling,  involving  a  tracing  back  of  the  history  of
“intentional references”, uncovering them, and making them knowable as “formations
subsequent to other antecedent formations” (1960, 79). Husserl maintained that such
formations  are  “concretely”  open  and  accessible  to  investigation,  so  the  reflective
process inherent in phenomenological reduction must strive, step by step, towards an
ever-deeper uncovering of an “explication” or “unfolding” or “becoming distinct” of
what is meant, in search of the fundamental intentional constituents themselves (1960,
46). Merleau-Ponty described the experience of phenomena as occurring in a reality
that is accessible  to us via a “methodological  bridge” or “intentional  analysis”,  that
“makes explicit” or “brings to light” the “pre-scientific life of consciousness” (1962,
68). Sartre similarly refers to a “pre-reflective cogito” as the “primary consciousness”
(1989,  34) which  phenomenology  pursues.  The  approach,  or  “phenomenological
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attitude”, termed “epoché” (Husserl, 1960, 25) needed to execute the reduction process,
is similarly defined by Giorgi et al. as the perspective whereby “all knowledge derived
from sources other than what is directly given to consciousness has to be  bracketed”
(2017, 178). According to Husserl, with all else thus “bracketed” (1973, 34), that which
is reduced ultimately represents “absolutely immanent data” (1973, 33), whereby the
essence of the phenomenon, or “eidos” (1960, 70), “comes into view” (1960, 25). In
short,  the  phenomenological  reduction,  as  the  principal  tool  of  phenomenology,  is
affected  by  employing  the  attitude  of  epoché,  involving  a  bracketing (holding  in
abeyance) of all that is transcendentally posited, including all facts of objective science,
and all judgements of the world as existent in the way natural thinking presents it.  
The qualitative interpretation of the synthesised universal scientific method discussed
earlier (in section 3.2.1), comprised five steps, namely, (1) experiencing, (2) organising,
(3) explicating, (4) testing/validating, and (5) generalising. Phenomenological reduction
represents the second and third steps inasmuch as it involves transforming the original
data/concepts  obtained  in  step  one  (experiencing),  through  an  intuitive/reflective
bracketing process (organising), into an initial version of an uncovered inter-subjective
composite  depiction  (explicating)  in steps two and three.  Aagard clarified  the main
difference  between  Husserlian  (classical)  phenomenology  and  modern
phenomenological research, at this stage, as precisely the origin of the experiential data.
The phenomenological  method  in  the  latter  case  is  applied  to  detailed  accounts  of
experience  sourced  from  others,  usually  via  interviews,  and  not  directly  from  the
reflecting phenomenologist (2017, 521). The “in-depth” interview transcript, according
to Eddles-Hirsch, is what “forms the basis of the data” in phenomenological studies
(2015, 254). In the case of classical phenomenology,  examples of “data” originating
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directly from the reflecting phenomenologist, would include deep conceptual problems,
like those explored in the classical sense by the likes of Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre (being, consciousness, spatio-temporality, etc.). So, at stage
three  in  a  practical  phenomenological  study set  in  the  modern  context  intended  to
explore the subjective experiences of a designated sample population, the “data” will
constitute  a  “correlate  of  an  inter-subjective  (inter-subjectively  communalised)
experience” (Husserl, 1960, 107), shared by participants. 
Throughout  the  early  stages  of  analysis,  therefore  (steps  one  to  three),  modern
phenomenological researchers employ various techniques in working towards an initial
inter-subjective  description,  initiated  by  fully  familiarising  themselves  with  the
interview transcripts by “reading and rereading” them (Smith and Osborn, 2008, 67;
Giorgi  et  al.,  2017,  182).  Phenomenological  researchers  then  proceed  by  either
delineating  units  of  meaning  from  each  transcript  (Giorgi  et  al.,  2017,  182),  or
annotating  what  is  “interesting  or  significant”  (Smith  and Osborn,  2008,  67)  about
various aspects of the transcript.  Miles and Huberman define this latter method as the
“formulation of reflections and remarks” (1994, 9). In both cases, expressions intended
to  highlight  the  meaning  of  the  lived  experience  (Giorgi  et  al.,  2017,  182)  are
articulated by the researcher, all the while maintaining the phenomenological epoché
that  is  essential  to  the  reduction  process.  These  two  initial  approaches  to  the  data
represent  the  descriptive  and  interpretive  styles  discussed  earlier  (3.3.3),  and  their
selection will depend on the nature of the phenomenon and the question/s posited by the
researcher. At this particular stage, in this study, as clearly discerned later (in section
3.5.2),  the  research  method  designed  to  explore  the  essential  nature  of  on-the-job
thinking aligns itself distinctly with the interpretive style, through the construction of
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annotated  expressions  focused  on  what  is  “interesting  or  significant”  (Smith  and
Osborn, 2008, 67) about the participants’ accounts. 
In both cases (descriptive or interpretive), such expressions become themes, which are
then “clustered” according to their mutual compatibility, or in other words, subjected to
“sorting  and  sifting  based  on  similarities,  differences,  relationships,  patterns,  or
sequences” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 9).  The clusters themselves are then given
names  to  form  “superordinate  themes”  (Smith  and  Osborn,  2008,  72).  Moustakas
(1994, 181) advocates the articulation of “textural and structural” descriptions for each
individual interview at this stage, the relevance of which, once again, must depend on
the nature of the phenomenon in question. In Smith and Osborn’s (interpretive) method,
a  final  pooling  of  superordinate  themes  is  carried  out  to  identify  cross-sample
commonalities, culminating in a further abstracted set of final themes, or according to
Moustakas (1994, 182), a complete “composite textural and structural description”. A
narrative account may then ultimately be constructed (Smith and Osborn, 2008, 76),
constituting an eidetic description. In pursuit of a complete phenomenological method,
the  articulation  of  an  inter-subjective  composite  at  this  juncture  was  considered
insufficient for the purposes of this study, and is therefore referred to only as the initial
eidetic description (comprising only up to step three in the qualitative interpretation of
the synthesised universal scientific method), requiring yet further analysis according to
the fundamental tenets of classical phenomenology.
3.4.2 Eidetic analysis 
Throughout his own execution of the reduction process, Husserl admitted to his use of
expressions and descriptions which contained a priori concepts (1960, 71). For a truly
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rigorous  application  of  the  phenomenological  method,  therefore,  such  concepts,  in
themselves, must be further clarified and delimited to arrive at true essence, employing
deeper “eidetic intuition”, which together with the phenomenological reduction itself,
determines  the  “sense”  of  transcendental  phenomenology  (1960,  72).  According  to
Heidegger (1982), phenomenological reduction is only one of three basic components
of the phenomenological method. In the development of an initial eidetic description,
the  articulation  of  themes  involves  “projecting  antecedently  given  being  and  its
structures”,  a  process  he  termed  “phenomenological  construction”  (1982,  22)
representing the second component of his phenomenological method. Since forms vary
according to the mode, circumstance, and domain in which they occur (such as nature,
space,  and time),  according to Heidegger, they are essentially predetermined or pre-
characterised.  Merleau-Ponty, in fact,  posits interpretation as the basis of perception
itself  (1962,  42),  maintaining  that  the  constitution  of  conscious  perceptions  are  not
directly  apprehended  (1962,  46),  but  rather  indirectly  interpreted.  For  the
phenomenologist, even the most radical efforts to “begin all over again” are pervaded
by  traditional  “concepts,  angles,  and  horizons”  (Heidegger,  1982,  21).  The  initial
eidetic description,  therefore, is, to a certain degree, as Heidegger professed, always
interpretively constructed. 
The ultimate aim of the phenomenologist is to reach a universal idea or pure “eidos”
perception,  whose  ideal  extension  is  made  up  of  “all  ideally  possible  perceptions”
(Husserl,  1960, 71), engendering the need for further reflective analysis.  It is worth
noting  at  this  juncture,  that  Husserl  (1960,  29)  in  fact  proposed  two  stages  for
transcendental phenomenology as a science,  which are theoretically compatible with
Heidegger’s three components, and ensure the commonalities between phenomenology
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and  the  synthesised  universal  scientific  method  do  not  end  at  step  three  in  the
articulation  of  an  initial  eidetic  description  (inter-subjective  composite  account).
Husserl’s  first  stage  is  characterised  by  an  exploration  of  the  realm  accessible  to
transcendental  self-experience  with  “simple  devotion  to  the  evident  inherent  in  the
harmonious  flow  of  such  experience”,  with  additional  questions  set  aside  (thus
encompassing Heidegger’s first and second components, and steps one to three of the
qualitative  synthesised  scientific  method),  and  the  second,  by  a  criticism  of
transcendental  experience  and  all  transcendental  cognition.  In  other  words,  while
Husserl’s first stage culminates in an inexact/constructed initial eidetic description, the
second involves a further critique of it, resonant with the validation expected at step
four of the synthesised universal scientific process. For the purpose of disambiguation
here, the term “validation” is used to represent the process portrayed by Cohen et al.
(2008) and Miles and Huberman (1994) in general research terms, involving a return to
the field by the researcher, where preliminary analyses are re-tested prior to making
generalisations in both quantitative and qualitative research. 
Since  the  initial  eidetic  description  is,  according  to  Heidegger  (1982,  23)  always
“constructed”,  the concepts contained therein must be “de-constructed” down to the
“sources  from which  they  were  drawn”,  via  a  critical  and essentially  “destructive”
process  (Husserl’s  second  stage).  In  this  way  Heidegger  seeks  a  more  “genuine
character” to the phenomenological method, and termed his third (and final) component
of  the  phenomenological  method;  “phenomenological  destruction”.  Stage  four
validation according to the synthesised universal scientific method may, therefore, be
fulfilled  via  a  continuing  reductive/destructive  analysis  through  continuing  use  of
epoché and  eidetic  intuition  (Husserl’s  second  stage/Heidegger’s  third  component).
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Analyses of perceptions in the phenomenological context at this stage are “essential” or
“eidetic” analyses. 
We become conscious  of  something universal  by imagining all  variations  (Husserl,
1960, 71), of those essences encapsulated in the initial eidetic description. Using such
“free  imaginative  variation”  (Aagard,  2017,  521;  Giorgi  et  al.,  2017,  182)  the
phenomenologist  reflects  on  aspects  of  the  holistic  description,  to  differentiate
“incidental  from  essential”  features  (Aagard,  2017,  521).  If  the  phenomenon
“collapses” when a feature is  imaginatively removed, then the feature is  considered
essential,  and thus  retained.  Incidental  features  are  thereby removed  (Giorgi,  2017,
178),  to  reveal  the  “eidos”,  the  “beheld  universal”  of  what  is  essential  for  “every
formable  form”  in  this  free  variation.  It  is  the  “pure  essence”,  it  is  “prior  to  all
concepts”  (Husserl,  1960,  71).  Eddles-Hirsch defines  “imaginative  variation”  in  the
context  of  modern  phenomenological  research  more  simply  as,  “seeing”  the
phenomenon from a variety of perspectives, to “understand the essence of participants’
experiences” (2015, 252). She actively defines  essence precisely as the  essential and
invariant structure of the phenomenon (2015, 259) that must remain intact in retention
of  fundamental  meaning.  Through  imaginative  variation,  therefore,  the  final
phenomenal eidos is revealed,  representing the fifth and final step of the qualitative
synthesised universal scientific method. 
The phenomenological research method applied in this study, therefore, can be hereby
summarised,  taking  into  account  Husserlian  and  Heideggerian  (classical)
phenomenology,  modern  phenomenological  research  methods,  and  the  qualitative
synthesised universal scientific method, in the following steps:
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1) Experiencing via collection of data 
 Interviewing and transcribing
2) Organising via phenomenological reduction
 Reading, rereading, reflecting, and annotating 
3) Explicating via construction of an initial eidetic description
 Expressing themes, clustering, and articulating superordinate themes
4) Validating via destruction/eidetic analysis
 De-constructing main concepts, and differentiating incidental and essential
features 
5) Generalising via the final eidetic description
 Revealing the pure essence of the phenomenon
In the following sections, the application of this five-step research method with a view
to addressing the two main research questions guiding the study, is comprehensively
elucidated. In section 3.5.3, a thorough exposition of criteria designed to enhance rigour
throughout its implementation, are also presented.  
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3.5 Application of methods
3.5.1 Data collection
Instrumentation
The data collection instrument used to source initial descriptions of the experience of
on-the-job thinking was “face-to-face” (Creswell, 2014, 239) participant interviewing.
Interviewing is considered the main,  or “exemplary” (Smith and Osborn, 2008, 57),
data collection procedure for “qualitative human scientific research” (Englander, 2012,
13). It was selected to facilitate deep, rich, and varied discussion on any aspects of the
phenomenon  of  thinking  participants  deemed  relevant  in  the  context  of  their  OJL.
According to Leedy and Omrod, qualitative interviewers must remain alert for “subtle
yet meaningful cues” in participants’ “expressions, questions and occasional sidetracks”
(2010,  141).  Such  cues,  expressions  and  side-tracks  were  noted  and  recorded
throughout the course of the interviews, so as not to interrupt the flow of participants’
narratives, enabling further discussion of otherwise noteworthy cues or sidetracks later
on. 
The interview style was “episodic” (Flick, 2002, 106) and “semi-structured” (Robson,
2004, 270), inasmuch as specific episodes were used as a basis for a relatively free-
flowing subsequent  discussion.  In  his  phenomenological  study on alcohol  and drug
counsellors cited earlier (in section 3.3.3), Crim (2017, 37) explored the phenomenon of
interest (stress and burnout) using an episodic interview style, by asking participants to
share  “stories”  from their  work experiences.  The sharing  of  stories  based  on PFTs
experiences at work was similarly deemed particularly relevant in the context of this
study,  inasmuch  as  memorable  stories  would  contain  ample  opportunity  to  explore
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deeper  aspects  of  participants’  affective  and  reactive  thought-processes  contained
therein, or otherwise surrounding such episodes and/or situations.  According to Smith
and Osborn,  phenomenological  interviews  should be  guided by the schedule,  rather
than  dictated by it (2008, 58). The schedule was, therefore, based on an initial open-
ended question, followed by additional probes. In order to situate the phenomenon of
thinking in the context of OJL, participants were asked to focus on on-the-job episodes
that  were  memorable  and  formative,  inasmuch  as  they  left  an  impression,  and
preferably  changed  some  aspect  of  their  practice.  Multiple  additional  episodes  or
sidetracks were welcomed throughout the interviews, with a main focus always retained
on pertinent thoughts and thinking processes. 
Englander  suggested  that,  in  order  to  yield  the  kind  of  meaning-rich  descriptions
required for phenomenological analysis, questions initiating episodic phenomenological
interviews should be based on the wording, “Can you please describe, in as much detail
as  possible,  a  situation  in  which  you...”  (2012,  26).  With  regard  to  OJL episodes,
therefore, participants were asked the following open-ended question at the start of their
interviews;
“Can  you  describe,  in  as  much  detail  as  possible,  any  significant
experiences,  situations  or  episodes  arising  throughout  the  course  of
your work, that are particularly memorable, and influenced you in some
formative way?”
The initial question was then followed by the main probes, “What were your thoughts?
What  went  on  in  your  mind?  Why  do  you  think  you  thought  that?”  To  elicit
descriptions about the nature of such thinking, further probes and prompts were used,
such as, “How did that thought present itself to you? Did it pop into your head? Was
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there a train of thought, and if so, can you describe it?” Additional temporal probes
were also used, such as, “Did you think about the episode afterwards? Did any thoughts
you had prior to the episode influence you in any way? Did you have any thoughts at
any time in between (in the case of a series of related episodes)? Is this occurring to you
just now?” Additional contextual aspects were also probed, using such questions as,
“Were there any other factors guiding your thoughts or influencing you in any way?” A
collated set of probes and prompts used throughout the interviews is presented in the
interview schedule in Annex 4.
Approximately one week prior to the scheduled interview date, each participant was
contacted  by  phone.  The  general  scope  of  the  interview  was  discussed,  with  an
immediate  follow-up by email,  containing  the consent  form (included in Annex 2),
general  information  about  the  study,  and  main  questions  re-iterated.  Englander
suggested such preparatory communication prior to the main interview may help to
enhance the richness of the accounts participants are able to provide. In some cases
however,  it  may  compromise  the  interview’s  “raw,  spontaneous  and  pre-reflective
signature” (2012, 27). While participants were asked to think of episodes for discussion
prior to the interview, such episodes tended to serve merely as a starting point, and
quickly led on to other points of discussion for which they had not prepared, ensuring
the interviews contained both reflective and pre-reflective signatures. 
Each interview lasted between one, and one and a half, hours. According to Robson
(2004, 273), interview durations of under half an hour are unlikely to yield valuable
insights, while durations in excess of an hour might place “unreasonable demands” on
busy participants. The duration of the interviews was, therefore, intended to probe the
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upper limits of this threshold, to maximise the breadth of data yielded, and fit inside the
typical  time  slots  expected  of  a  PFTs’  schedule  (given  that  sessions  with  clients
generally last between 40 to 50 minutes and can therefore be accommodated within
one-hour intervals).  Participants  were asked to nominate  their  preferences  regarding
convenient times for arranging the interviews, which, taking into account the freelance
and personalised nature of PFTs’ schedules, were always accommodated.  Interviews
were also conducted in venues selected by the participant, preferably where they met
their own clients for initial consultations and health assessments, in a bid to assist their
recall of work-based episodes and associated thoughts. This was also done to promote a
sense  of  comfort  and familiarity  for  the  participants.  Once again,  due to  the  small
distances  involved in  traveling  around the island of  Malta,  where  the research  was
carried out,  participants’  location  selections  were always accommodated.  Subject  to
permission, interviews were recorded using an audio recording device (Olympus VN-
722 dedicated recorder and Samsung J120F mobile phone audio recorder as backup) for
later transcription.  
Sampling
Englander cited “representativeness” (2012, 34) as a key concept guiding the reflecting
and  planning  process  for  sampling  in  phenomenological  research.  Further  to  the
personal positionality and reflexivity of the researcher (outlined in section 3.6.1), this
study was originally conceived based on observations and reflections concerning OJL
in the health and fitness sector specifically. Throughout the review of four bodies of
pertinent literature, the main research problem was also initially situated in the context
of PFTs’ OJL, rendering PFTs themselves, ideal candidates for the constitution of a
representative  sample.  Like  many  other  roles,  the  health  and  fitness  profession
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exemplifies  certain  cultures,  schools  of  thought,  jargon,  equipment,  well-known
personalities,  popular  media  sources,  and  common  practices  or  procedures.  Role-
specific jargon in any sector would require explicit clarification for interviewers whose
expertise happens to exist outside the sector in question. While impartiality in this sense
might, in itself, provide valid data in relation to certain research foci, the main focus in
this  study  was  based  on  phenomena  underlying,  yet  accessible  only  through,  the
comparatively  superficial  semantics  and  references  contained  within  participants’
descriptions of on-the-job episodes or situations. In other words, the researcher, being
familiar  with the context  of participants’  experiences,  was able  to  “go beneath” the
“immediate  experience”  (Aagard,  2017,  523),  and  attempt  to  access  the  deeper
underlying nature of their thinking. Participants used terms like ‘induction’, ‘functional
training’, ‘compound movements’, ‘cutting’, ‘referrals’, ‘cardio’, ‘super-sets’, ‘planks’,
‘metabolism’, ‘spinning’, ‘circuits’, ‘tri-sets’, ‘primal flow’, ‘burpees’, ‘rep-max lifts’,
‘olympic lifts’, ‘metcon’, ‘peak pose’, and ‘leg extensions’ throughout the course of the
interviews, in ways that were central to the context and meaning of the various episodes
or situations being described. When such terms were used, there was no need for the
researcher to stop and clarify their meanings. Misunderstanding thereof on the part of
the interviewer would have impeded efforts to continuously probe deeper, thus keeping
the main research interest on thinking in focus. In short, considering the position and
prior expertise of the researcher, as well as the nature of the original research interests
leading up to the undertaking of the study, PFTs represented the ideal sample for a
rigorous exploration of on-the-job thinking. 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994, 27), qualitative research typically involves
purposive rather than random sampling. To purposively select participants, Englander
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posited various questions designed to assist qualitative researchers, namely, “Does the
subject belong to the population that I am sampling?” (2012, 18), or, “Do (they) have
the experience that I am looking for?” (2012, 19). In their study on the experience of
caring for a spouse with dementia at home, cited earlier (in section 3.3.3), Hye-Young
and  Myungsun  (2017),  for  instance,  proceeded  with  the  straight-forward  sampling
criteria predetermined by the nature of the experience they sought to study, recruiting
the spouses themselves as the primary source of experiential data, on the grounds that
they had, in fact, cared for a spouse with dementia at home. The role of modern fitness
professionals has been described as “multifaceted” (De Lyon and Cushion, 2013, 1415),
requiring specialist technical knowledge (Malek et al., 2002), with PFTs in particular,
considered  to  be  at  the  “front  line”  of  fitness  service  provision  among  the  wider
population of other fitness professionals operating in the sector  (Maguire,  2001; De
Lyon  and  Cushion,  2013).  Furthermore,  De  Lyon  and  Cushion  found  that  OJL
represents  the  “most  important  way” (2013,  1413)  fitness  professionals  acquire  the
knowledge and skills required to meet these challenging requirements of their role, in
an industry characterised by a constant state of flux (De Lyon and Cushion, 2013, 1416;
Rosado et al., 2014, 28). PFTs, therefore, in view of their central position in health and
fitness  service  provision,  the  challenging  nature  of  their  role,  and  the  continuous
pressure  to  recruit  clients  and  get  results,  represented  an  enticing  population  for  a
sourcing of varied learning-rich episodes, situations, and experiences.
While  purposive  samples  in  qualitative  research  are  typically  small  (Miles  and
Huberman,  1994,  27),  Englander  (2012,  13)  stressed  that  sampling  in
phenomenological  research  should  not  depend  on  essentially  quantitative  questions
such  as,  “How  many?”  Representativeness  in  qualitative  research  depends
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predominantly on the  quality of data participants are able to provide, and not on the
quantity of  participants  constituting  the  sample.  Depending  on  the  nature  of  the
phenomenon  and  research  questions  posited,  actual  sample  sizes  in  qualitative
phenomenological studies, according to both Englander (2012, 13) and Creswell (2014,
239),  generally  consist  of  at  least  three  participants  who  are  representative  of  the
phenomenon  in  question,  with  Creswell  further  stipulating  an  upper  limit  of  ten
participants. 
In  accordance  with  qualitative  methodological  thinking,  any  additional  sampling
criteria should similarly depend on the prospective quality of the acquired data. In his
phenomenological study on stress and burnout among drug and alcohol counsellors, for
instance,  Crim  (2017,  37)  included  additional  criteria  by  recruiting  counsellors
representative of, first, a range of experience levels and career stages, and second, with
a  minimum of  one  year  of  experience.  For  this  study,  therefore,  further  to  Crim’s
sampling  strategy,  in  order  to  achieve  maximal  representativeness  and  quality,
interviews were carried out with ten PFTs, representing the upper limit of Creswell’s
(2014, 239) guideline on sample size, at various formal qualification levels, areas of
expertise,  and  ages,  of  male  and  female  genders,  and  with  various  amounts  of
professional industry experience (with a lower limit of at least two years, although this
eventually ranged from a minimum of four years to over ten).
A shortlist of ten well-known PFTs who were active in the industry at the time (2016-
2017) was drawn up, and contact with each made via phone, on line chat applications,
or email. While all PFTs who were contacted initially agreed to participate in the study,
at  least  three  were  difficult  to  confirm appointments  with,  and either  postponed or
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eventually cancelled their interview appointments. For one of the prospective PFTs, this
happened numerous times over the course of two months. The “snowball” (Miles and
Huberman, 1994, 27) sampling method was used to find replacements in these cases, as
participants themselves, following the conclusion of their own interviews, knowing the
nature  of  the  experiences  being  sought,  made  various  suggestions  as  to  who  they
believed  could  also  yield  valuable  insights.  PFT08,  PFT09,  and  PFT10  were  all
recruited in this way. The interviews eventually yielded ten transcripts  totalling 151
pages  (79,247  words)  of  data.  Table  1  below  collates  basic  information  about  the
participants, valid at the time of their respective interviews.  
Pseudonym Gender Age(Years) Area/s of Expertise
Industry
Experience
(Years)
Formal
Qualification
Level (EQF) 
Transcribed
Pages
PFT03 Male 31 Figure, physiqueand bodybuilding 9 4 17
PFT04 Male 27 Referrals andspecial populations 7 6 14
PFT05 Male 26 Weight loss andlifestyle change 6 4 13
PFT06 Female 42 General Population 17 3 16
PFT07 Male 30 General Population 10 3 14
PFT08 Male 26 Weight loss 9 4 13
PFT09 Female 35 Muscle growth 5 3 15
PFT10 Female 26 Weight loss 6 4 20
PFT11 Female 39 Yoga 5 4 14
PFT12 Male 23 Body and lifestyletransformation 4 4 15
Table 1: Collated information on participants 
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Ethics
An  informed  consent  form  was  issued,  discussed,  and  signed  on  the  day  of  the
interview. The research was considered to pose little risk of emotional or physical harm
to  participants.  While  the  sensitivity  of  the  topics  discussed  in  the  interviews  was
considered to be minimal,  three ethical  considerations were nonetheless made when
planning the study, prior to contacting the participants. 
The  first  issue  concerned  the  notion  of  sharing  insider  professional  knowledge  or
practices,  or  what  participants  might  consider  to  be  their  trade  secrets.  The
competitiveness  of  the  local  sector  may  have  resulted  in  a  reluctance  to  share
information, based on the fear that competitors may use it to their own advantage and
own  professional  development,  thus  constituting  greater  business  threats.  Second,
qualification level may have represented sensitive information some of the participants
might have been reluctant to share, given the view some PFTs may have of certain
specific and dedicated PFT qualifications as a right of passage in the sector, given the
controversy reported by Rosado et al. (2014) among fitness professionals’ perceptions
of  various  qualifications.  Four  of  the  participants  were  actively  working  towards
additional qualifications at the time of their interviews, and may not have wanted to
divulge such information, and some possessed existing formal certification that might
not typically be fully associated with the role. 
And third, personal or sensitive information about clients involved in the episodes or
situations discussed throughout the interviews, might be divulged. With a population of
under half a million, many people in the close-knit communities of Malta tend to know
who  works  where,  and  in  which  positions.  There  was  an  ever-present  risk,  that
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participants  and their  clients  may be  easily  identified  through deductive  disclosure.
Over  and above the credible  promise of confidentiality,  therefore,  participants  were
assured that where applicable, every effort to confidentialise the data, providing limited
specific details when describing their background and experience, would be made.
Several key points were thus stressed to the participants before the commencement of
each interview as part  of the process of ensuring informed consent.  First,  that  their
participation was strictly confidential, and every effort would be made to conceal their
identity and the identity of their clients. Second, that the primary focus of the interview
was to answer the research questions, and not to reveal or expose specific aspects of
their  professional practice.  Third,  that the transcripts  would be returned to them for
verification before being used in the study. And fourth,  that  a write-up of the final
research findings would be provided in order to share any knowledge gained, that might
prove beneficial to them.
3.5.2 Data analysis
Step one; Transcription
Each interview was transcribed in detail directly from the audio recording device, and
input  into  an open-source  word processor  application  (LibreOffice  Writer)  on a  net
book (Asus Eee PC  running a Linux Lubuntu  operating system). The transcribed text
included pauses, incomplete sentences terminated mid-flow by the participants, as well
as  gestures  or  non-verbal  cues  included  in  parentheses.  For  the  main  sample,  each
transcript  was  named  according  to  the  participants  “PFT03”  through  to  “PFT12”.
According to Miles and Huberman, qualitative analysis begins with data in the form of
words, typically sourced from observations or interview transcripts (1994, 9), which
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form the “basis of the data” in phenomenological studies (Eddles-Hirsch, 2015, 254).
The transcripts were printed and filed in soft plastic files. With all ten transcripts in
hand, the data analysis phases according to the planned step-based research method
outlined in the previous section was initiated at step two. A complete sample of an
interview transcript is included in Annex 5.
Step two; Reduction
Each transcript was “read and reread” (Smith and Osborn, 2008, 67; Giorgi et al., 2017,
182),  to  develop  familiarity  with  the  text.  During  these  first  readings,  the
phenomenological attitude of epoché was initiated and cultivated, fostering sensitivity
to the immanent aspects of what was meant by the participants, and every attempt made
to  suspend  judgements  based  on  objective  facts.  Smith  and  Osborn’s  approach  to
interpretive  phenomenological  analysis  was  employed,  by  annotating  interesting  or
significant  aspects  of  the  text  (2008,  67),  that  were  revelatory  of  the  essence  of
participants’ thoughts. This was done by hand-writing annotations in the margins of the
printed transcripts themselves. Since phenomenological reduction is a “tracing back”
process,  the  annotations  were  intended  to  uncover  “intentional  references”  as
“formations  subsequent  to  other  antecedent  formations”  (Husserl,  1960,  79).
Annotations were,  therefore,  intended to be a first stage of the tracing-back process
towards  the  essence  of  the  participants’  experience  of  on-the-job  thinking.  Some
annotations were designed to capture basic essence, while others resulted from more of
an  interpretive  and  “reflective  turn  of  mind”  (Miles  and  Huberman,  1994,  9).  For
instance, the following transcribed excerpt describing how PFT10 often found herself
replaying thoughts about a session in her mind, was highlighted and annotated simply
as, “Reflections as replays in the mind, likened to a broken record.”
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“I guess maybe it just keeps replaying in my mind, so whatever it is. I
mean I’ll probably do the same with this now. (laughs) This is the
way it is for me. I don't know I guess it's kind of like a broken record
sometimes.” (PFT10)
The  annotation  in  this  case  simply  expressed  the  basic  sense  of  the  thoughts  she
experienced, without much need for an interpretive turn. The following excerpt from
PFT06 was similarly annotated simply as, “Split-second reaction resulting from quick
thinking.”
“But the thought of... those split seconds of seeing her legs literally
move into going... moving and then complete still, they went still and
she went down on the treadmill... she just  stopped moving, and her
body was still up so when she was coming back I said, ‘She's coming
back she's coming back, what's she doing?’ And that was like just a
quick reaction to grab her arm.” (PFT06)
In  some  instances,  however,  more  interpretive  annotations  were  made,  suspending
incidental features as well as any judgments of truth, as was the case with the following
excerpt from PFT03’s interview transcript, concerning his conceptualisation of a prior
confrontation with a client.
“The manager was put in a very bad position because one of his good
instructors had a case with a client, and the client was… you know,
reporting to the managers and the owners, and he was put in a bad
position. And unfortunately, to not look bad, he had to give something
to the client.” (PFT03)
The  excerpt  was  annotated  as,  “Making  assumptions  about  the  position/motives  of
others, based on own sense of self.” Reference to “others” in this annotation represents
the manager, while “sense of self” represents the PFT03’s view of himself as “one of
(the manager’s) good instructors.” In constructing the annotation,  the  validity of the
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assumptions made, or of the sense of self held by the participant, did not alter the basic
essence  of  the  particular  retrospective  thought  on  the  matter  the  participant  had
experienced  and  was  describing.  The  incidental or  more  superficial  features  were
thereby considered to have been removed, in favour of an annotation based instead on
the essential, or underlying, features of the thought. 
In the following excerpt, PFT07 described his reaction to a situation that surprised him.
The empathy  he  felt  towards  his  clients’  parents  was  annotated  previously,  so  this
particular excerpt was instead noted due to the precise way he described his experience
of the thought at that particular moment in time, by articulating a question to himself. 
“And I'm like, ‘Oh my God her parents have sent her here to train
and, you know... and how many other things are there... how many
things that can take her mind off training are here?’” (PFT07)
The  excerpt  was  annotated  as,  “Self-questioning  triggered  by  surprise.”  While  the
expression attempts to describe the underlying essence of the thought, it also contains
interpretive elements, inasmuch as the concept of self-questioning or self-talk, is in fact
constructed,  and  previously  held  by  the  researcher  in  a  way  that  influenced  the
observation made. In other words, other researchers may have observed and noted an
entirely different aspect of the same excerpt, using different conceptual constructs, not
in fact based on self-questioning or self-talk. Smith and Osborn’s (2008) interpretive
style  of  phenomenological  analysis,  therefore,  was clearly  influential  at  this  crucial
stage of the analysis, thus in turn influencing all subsequent stages. The four excerpts
cited in this section are intended to give an overview of the types annotations made, and
to what extent subjective interpretation on the part of the researcher was invested in
their identification and articulation. Throughout chapter four, numerous excerpts from
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the participants are interwoven in the narrative, to elucidate precisely how annotations
emerged from the  transcripts  during this  initial  phase of  data  analysis.  A complete
sample of annotations for one of the interviews (with PFT07) is included in Annex 6. 
Step three; Construction
In the next stage of analysis, the hand-written annotations themselves were extrapolated
from the printed transcripts and entered into separate word processing files for each
participant.  During  the  process  of  extrapolation  and  transfer,  the  annotations  were
edited and worded more succinctly, and thereby “transformed into themes” (Smith and
Osborn, 2008, 69). At this stage, the analysis was increasingly based on a  “reflective
turn of mind” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 9).  Commonalities between the sense of
each theme were reflected upon, and compatible themes cut and pasted to form clusters.
Smith and Osborn suggested phenomenological researchers at this stage, “imagine a
magnet with some of the themes pulling others in and helping to make sense of them”
(2008,  70).  The clustering  process  was an  intensive  and key stage  of  the  analysis,
highly  reflective,  and  carried  out  with  continuous  regard  for  the  phenomenological
attitude  of  epoché.  Of  the  160  themes  extrapolated  from  PFT07’s  transcript,  for
instance, one of the clusters that formed at this stage, was based on the common theme
of self-talk or self-questioning, and consisted of the following 21 themes; 
Self-questioning triggered by surprise
Self-talk/self-questioning after an episode
Self-talk as one of the processes of the “compass”
Self-talk as a very personal and private process
Self-talk as an ability arising from self-awareness
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Self-talk and reflection not possible when busy and distracted
Self-talk as a means of evaluating behaviour from a young age
Self-talk as an important and valued process
Self-talk as a "guiding voice"
Self-talk as a comforting ability
Self-talk as a natural process not needing controlling
Inner voice offering restraint and insight in times of need, not needing to be
controlled
Inner voice as part of self, acting as other
Presence of inner voice a reassuring sign of good health
Absence of self-talk as a sign of excessive stress
Self-talk absent when stressed or overwhelmed
Knowledge of others' self-talk or lack thereof
Concern of sounding crazy when talking about self-talk and inner voice
Suspicion that self-talk could become unhealthy in excess
Internal voice jokingly considered as other person
Noticing self-talk in others
Additional more succinct expressions to describe each cluster were then articulated to
form “superordinate themes” (Smith and Osborn, 2008, 72), for each cluster throughout
all  ten  transcripts  in  turn.  The  above  cluster  for  instance,  was  expressed  as  a
superordinate theme via the expression, “Communicating with self”. 
Throughout this process, super-ordinate themes duly emerged consistently across the
ten transcripts. Based on their commonalities, and continuing reflective analysis, a final
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set  of  eight  main  super-ordinate  themes  was  abstracted  from  all  ten  interviews,
representing  an  emerging  “invariant  structure”  (Aagaard,  2017,  521),  or  “structural
synthesis” (Marshall and Rossman, 1999, 113), of the “inter-subjectively communalised
experience” (Husserl, 1960, 107) of participants’ thinking in the context of OJL. The
above cluster from PFT07’s transcript, for instance, originally entitled “Communicating
with self”, was combined with other clusters based on thinking while communicating, to
eventually  read,  “Thinking  while  communicating  (with  self  or  other)”,  as  a
superordinate theme among the invariant final eight. 
Any attempts by the researcher to construct a detailed final narrative at this stage based
on the eight superordinate themes, thus concluding the analysis, would have constituted
an  incomplete  view  (the  initial eidetic  description),  from  the  classical
phenomenological perspective. According to the five-step research method developed
for  this  study,  which  also  draws  directly  on  classical  Husserlian  and  Heideggerian
approaches  to  phenomenology,  further  reflective  analysis  was  required  before
attempting to articulate  a purer essence of thinking in the context  of OJL (the  final
eidetic description). 
Step four; De-construction
Initial  eidetic descriptions, according to Heidegger (1982, 23), contain concepts that
must be “de-constructed” down to the “sources from which they were drawn”, via a
continuing critical and essentially “destructive” process. The invariant super-ordinate
themes,  which  in  themselves  constituted  an  initial  eidetic  description  of  the
phenomenon in question, were subjected to another stage of phenomenological analysis
to  uncover  the  “intentional  references”  (Husserl,  1960,  79)  contained  within  them.
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According to Husserl, analyses of perceptions at this stage are “essential” or “eidetic”
analyses,  during  which  the  reflecting  phenomenologist  strives  towards  “something
universal”,  by  “imagining  all  variations”  (1960,  71).  “Free  imaginative  variation”
(Giorgi  et  al.,  2017,  182)  was thereby carried out  by a  continued differentiation  of
“incidental from essential” features (Aagard, 2017, 521). If the essence of on-the-job
thinking “collapsed” when a feature was imaginatively removed, then the feature was
considered essential, and thus retained (Giorgi, 2017, 178). 
At  this  stage,  the eight  superordinate  themes  were listed,  and imaginative  variation
carried out through intensive reflection, and the sketching of various diagrams and flow
charts,  to  visualise  possible  structural  configurations.  An  sample  of  such  a  sketch,
photographed during this period, is included in Annex 7. Which essences were integral
to  others,  or  where  themes  might  share  underlying  essence,  were  important
considerations  during  these  reflections.  Each  conceptualised  configuration  was
considered  in  terms  of  whether  it  could  work  as  a  description  of “pure  essence”
(Husserl, 1960, 71) of the phenomenon of on-the-job thinking, without causing it to
“collapse” (Giorgi, 2017, 178). For instance, the “Thinking while communicating (with
self or other)” theme, was eventually combined with other forms of interaction with
self, others, or the environment, and eventually constituted as one of four final themes
of essence that read, “On-the-job thinking as interaction”. Finally, these main themes
were traced back through the entire  analytical  process to  the source transcripts  and
participants’ own descriptions to determine their overall relevance and fit. Chapter four
illustrates the emergence of all themes, superordinate themes, and final main themes as
they relate  back to the transcripts  in the words of the participants  themselves.  It  is
organised according to the main themes as headings, and superordinate themes as sub-
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headings. The chapter is then concluded via a narrative based solely on the four main
themes as an inter-subjective explication of the phenomenon of thinking in the context
of OJL, constituting an initial eidetic description. 
Step five; Description
Following  reduction,  construction,  de-construction,  eidetic  analysis,  and
conceptualisation  of  four  main  essential  themes,  further  reflection  was  carried  out,
situating the main themes in the context of existing research as revealed in the earlier
review of literature, as well as deeper philosophical ideas and problems. These in-depth
reflections are elucidated in chapter five, and eventually constituted the  final eidetic
description of the phenomenon of on-the-job thinking. 
3.5.3 Rigour
While  qualitative  researchers  seek  “quality”  data  for  their  analyses,  and  “quality”
findings,  then  the  associated  analytical  process  bridging  the  two,  must  naturally
facilitate the preservation, and indeed  promotion, of maximal quality. Salkind’s basic
proposition  that  qualitative  research  constitutes  a  “non-experimental”  method  to
“rigorously  explore  academic  questions”  (2003,  221),  carries  some  important
implications with regard to determining such quality in qualitative research. First, that
non-experimental questions, by their very design, do not conform with the notion of
testing  or  re-testing  findings  experimentally.  And,  following  from  this  point,  that
without experimental validation, the notions of “rigour” and “quality” must be defined
specifically  and  uniquely  in  the  context  of  essentially  non-experimental qualitative
methodology. In its attempts to answer non-experimental questions, qualitative research
leads to different kinds of “knowledge claims” (Morrow, 2005, 252) from quantitative
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research,  and qualitative validity  is,  therefore,  not the same as quantitative  validity.
Indeed, in qualitative terms,  validity is typically described using altogether different
terminology  like,  “credibility,  transferability,  dependability,  and  confirmability”
(Amankwaa, 2016, 121). 
According to Morrow, however, such locutions essentially amount to “parallel criteria”,
which are still based primarily on “quantitative” or “positivist” ideas (2005, 252). The
very terms “non-experimental” or “different knowledge claims”,  in fact immediately
predispose a latent rooting of definitions used in qualitative research, in terms of their
relationship to apparently more central and pervasive quantitative concepts. Credibility,
for  instance,  which  is  considered  a  largely  qualitative  term,  may  be  defined  as
“confidence  in  the  truth”  of  the  findings  (Amankwaa,  2016,  121),  but  Morrow
challenges the extent to which participants can be considered “knowers of the truth”
(2005, 252), given its use in the phrase, which implies an absolute, or objective, truth.
This is particularly significant when considering that the very notion of truth, from a
phenomenological perspective, is itself in doubt. The goal of transcendental reduction is
in  fact  an  explication  of,  “subjective truth”  (Husserl,  1973,  36).  What’s  more,  if
qualitative research seeks to “actively emphasise interactions between the researcher,
participants,  and the field”  (Flick,  2002, 6),  with researchers  as “co-constructors  of
meaning” (Morrow, 2005, 252), then participants and researchers by this definition of
credibility would be equally required to be “knowers of the truth”,  undermining the
very scope or need for truly qualitative methods in the first place. The truth sought by
qualitative research in this sense is not  absolute truth, but rather, the faithfulness of
articulations  as  representations  of the meaning  intended by participants,  and indeed
similarly by researchers themselves. 
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Transferability and dependability are pegged to the notion of repeatability of results, as
implied  by  the  quantitative  notion  of  reliability.  Morrow  highlights  the  apparent
underlying focus on causality (between objects in the world), evident in such criteria
(2005, 251), when phenomenological inquiry is, in fact, fundamentally distinctive in its
focus  on  intentionality as  opposed  to  causality (Englander,  2016,  4).  Similarly,
confirmability in qualitative research has been defined as a measure of neutrality, or the
extent to which the findings are shaped by researcher bias (Amankwaa, 2016, 121).
This, however, presents the considerable (or in phenomenological terms, perhaps even
impossible)  challenge  of  systematically  discerning  each  interpretive  aspect  of
qualitative findings, and differentiating it from researcher bias. Husserl wrote that the
“secure  objectivity  science  demands  can  be  attained  only  by  constructing basic
judgements of essence” (1973, 55), using a phenomenological attitude that, according to
Heidegger,  is  always pervaded  by  preconceptions,  culture,  and  history  (1982,  21),
representing a fine and perhaps indiscernible line between interpretation and bias.
Rigour in constructivist or interpretive research must depend on criteria unique to, and
based on, distinctly qualitative concepts, and not merely criteria parallel to quantitative
concepts. According to Morrow, a shift in focus is warranted, away from adequacy of
data, towards “adequacy of  interpretation” (2005, 251) in matters of rigour. She cites
various “authenticity criteria” which, together with De Witt and Ploeg’s “framework of
expressions  of  rigour”  (2006,  215)  in  phenomenological  research,  serve  as  a  more
relevant guide to researchers looking to preserve the integrity of interpretive research,
and support their methods on more sturdy “pillars” of “relevance and rigour” (Pereira,
2012, 16).
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Interpretations  should  be  fair,  inasmuch  as  alternative  positions,  interpretations  or
theoretical  constructs  should  be  considered  (Morrow,  2005,  252).  Demonstrating
sensitivity  to  this  criteria  requires  “openness”  in  the  elucidation  of  interpretive
judgements  made  by  the  researcher,  particularly  during  the  crucial  initial  phase  of
annotating “interesting or significant aspects of the text” (Smith and Osborn, 2008, 67).
In this study, such elucidation is integrated into the next chapter, via an explication of
themes in a way that is traceable back to the original transcribed accounts, in the words
of participants  themselves.  By exposing the original  text  upon which all  significant
interpretive decisions were made, it is intended that the reader be able to follow the
reflective  interpretations,  decisions,  and  judgements  made  by  the  researcher,  or
“researcher reflexivity” (Morrow, 2005, 253) in each instance. A complete set of an
interview transcript together with the annotations made in its regard, is also included in
Annexes 3 and 4. De Witt and Ploeg term this notion, “openness”, and further defined it
as a “systematic  and explicit  accounting  for  researcher  decisions” (2006, 224).  The
personal position of the researcher (discussed in section 3.6.1) and review of literature
chapter  are  intended  to  expose  the  theoretical  influences  informing  the  main
interpretive stance assumed during the analysis phase, itself divulged explicitly in this
methodology chapter. Thorough and detailed exposition of methodology is, according
to Creswell (2014, 139), an important means of establishing the credibility (interpreted
here as implied, rigour, or more broadly, as quality) of qualitative findings. Researchers
should “own” the perspective they assume by clearly specifying personal, theoretical,
and methodological orientations, values, and assumptions (Morrow, 2005, 257).
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“Methodological congruence” via rigorous and appropriate procedures must, according
to Pereira, cohere with experiential concerns regarding the plausibility of findings and
provision of illumination about the phenomenon in question (2012, 19). De Witt and
Ploeg further nominate the criteria of “balanced integration” (2006, 225) in the final
presentation of phenomenological research findings, where philosophical concepts and
participants’  own words are awarded commensurate  exposition in a suitably  “thick”
description (Morrow, 2005, 255). Morrow further develops this theme in her discussion
of “ontological” and “educative” authenticity (2005, 252), wherein researcher, as well
as participant interpretive constructs, are to receive suitable maturation and elaboration
in the presentation of phenomenological research findings. Rigour also applies to the
quality of findings in phenomenological research in terms of “resonance, concreteness,
and actualisation” (De Witt and Ploeg, 2006, 226). Respectively, these criteria consider
the immediate experience of the reader, as well as the the usefulness and potential for
future affirmation of the findings. Morrow similarly asserts, in this latter regard, that
findings  should  “stimulate  action”,  an  outcome  she  termed  “catalytic  authenticity”
(2005, 252). 
In  this  study,  the  discussion  chapter  is,  therefore,  designed in  accordance  with  the
principles  of  rigour  outlined  in  this  section,  first,  to  encompass  the  notion  of
interpretive fairness in discerning the final eidetic description. Second, to balance the
ontologically  and  educatively  matured  and  elaborated  interpretations  with  existing
philosophical  concepts,  theoretical  constructs  sourced  from  pertinent  academic
literature, as well as the transcribed accounts of the participants themselves. And third,
to  present  resulting  insights  in  a  way that  resonates  with  readers,  is  applicable,  or
contains the seeds of applicability in the event of resonance or affirmation in the future. 
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 The  main  specific  criteria  considered  for  the  conservation  of  rigour  throughout  the
study  were,  interpretive  fairness,  openness,  balanced  integration,  and  catalytic
authenticity  in  the  planning,  implementation  and  exposition  of  methodological
considerations  and  presentation  of  findings.  To  further  ensure  the  pervasiveness  of
these criteria, “auditing” (Amankwaa, 2016, 126) was sought throughout the research
process.  A  peer  reviewer  and  external  auditor  were  formally  enlisted  during  the
planning, implementation, and consolidation phases respectively. 
Mr Renzo Kerr Cumbo (BEd/MSc), a colleague at the Malta College of Arts, Science
and  Technology  (MCAST),  and  fellow doctoral  student  researching  sport  coaching
pedagogy, using a constructivist philosophical approach and qualitative methodology,
was  formally  enlisted  in  a  reciprocal  academic  relationship  as  peer  reviewer.
Philosophical  assumptions and methodological  issues were regularly and thoroughly
discussed throughout the entire study period between 2015 and 2018, and represented a
significant influence on the structure and outcome of the thesis. It is worth noting at this
juncture, that being employed in a higher education institution also permitted numerous
discussions  with  additional  academic  colleagues  concerning  approaches  and  issues
throughout  the  research  process,  which,  although  for  the  most  part  incidental  and
sporadic, also represented valuable insights, and exerted yet further influence on quality
and structure. Though mostly informally, numerous discussions on the psychological
aspects  of  the  study  were  also  had  with  Ms  Elaine  Atkins  (BPsych/PGDipVET),
lecturer  in  developmental  psychology  at  MCAST,  who  provided  valuable  input
particularly during the interviewing and interpretive analysis phases. 
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Dr Dorianne Caruana Bonnici (Bed/MSc/PhD), another MCAST colleague and post-
doctoral researcher well versed in mixed-methods approaches, was formally enlisted as
external auditor during the concluding phase of the study, a practice which, according
to Creswell (2014, 252), adds to the “validity (implied, rigour or quality) of qualitative
research”. She was not previously familiar with the research project, and was therefore
able to provide a fresh, detached, and wholly impartial view in her review of the final
manuscript. Her suggestions were duly implemented in a final edit. No proof-readers or
editors were enlisted in the development of the final manuscript. 
3.5.4 Pilot study
A pilot  study was carried  out  to  test  every aspect  of the five-step research method
before  implementing  it  in  the  main  study,  retaining  focus  on  the  development  of
methodological robustness and rigour, rather than on the emerging themes and findings
themselves. The interviews served as a valuable opportunity to test the clarity of the
questions posited, address concerns such as leading the participants, and generally carry
out a full rehearsal of the interview process. The relevance of the interview questions
could also be evaluated based on the data they eventually yielded, considered on the
basis of whether the main research questions were in fact being addressed. Possible
omissions from the schedule were also considered with hindsight, upon reviewing these
emerging  themes,  to  fill  in  any  gaps  identified.  The  duration  of  interviews  was
evaluated in terms of depth and saturation attained. From a practical standpoint, the use
of  equipment  was  also  placed  under  scrutiny  throughout  the  audio  recording  and
transcription  processes.  Finally  with  the  pilot  study  data  in  hand,  the  reduction,
construction and de-construction/eidetic analysis methods were practiced. 
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Two participants were selected for the pilot study. PFT01 was 35 years of age at the
time of her interview. She had recently completed a personal training diploma course,
and was in the process of changing her career from that of a drama teacher to a PFT.
While she did work with individual clients on a personalised basis, the majority of her
work consisted of leading group fitness classes with up to 20 clients at a time. Her
interview was carried on the 28th of December, 2016, in the administration office of her
drama school, where the facilities doubled as a fitness studio. PFT02 was 28 years of
age at  the time of his interview. He had also recently completed the same personal
training diploma course as PFT01, albeit in a different cohort. He did possess, however,
additional  prior qualifications  in  sport  and fitness,  and practiced  as a keen amateur
athlete  in  the  disciplines  of  olympic  weightlifting  and  indoor  rowing.  As  an  army
officer serving in a combat unit, physical fitness represented a significant influence on
him both professionally  and personally.  His interview was carried out  on the 7th of
January, 2017, in a relaxation area outside the “Crossfit box” (specialised “Crossfit”
gym)  where  he  coached  part-time.  Both  participants  were  instructed  prior  to  the
interview to think about situations and episodes that were memorable and formative,
and issued with the consent form (included in Annex 2) by email. 
While the participants had indeed thought about prior episodes as instructed, and turned
up  ready  to  discuss  them,  it  became  quickly  apparent  that  such  episodes  did  not
exclusively  constitute  the  basis  for  the  majority  of  the  ensuing  discussions.  Other
incidents of interest quickly arose throughout the interviews, and indeed yielded telling
insights of their own. Such incidents or episodes were presented and discussed without
the possibility for substantial foresight or preparation on the part of the participant. This
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feature was therefore retained, and indeed encouraged, in the main study, during which
more free-flowing discussions occurred. 
Both  interviews  quickly  attained  substantial  depth.  The  first  interview  with  PFT01
lasted a total of 90 minutes. Concentration and focus markedly faded, however, at the
60-minute mark, at which stage saturation was also evident. This was duly taken into
account  during  the  second  interview,  where  the  deepest  probing  questions  were
earmarked for use at approximately 45 minutes in, with the aim of achieving saturation
within  60  minutes.  The second interview eventually  lasted  70 minutes.  It  was  also
noted, that duration and saturation depended largely on the participant, on factors such
as talking speed, and willingness or ability to discuss various aspects of their thinking.
In the second interview with PFT02, for instance, it was noted that he struggled to focus
on  specific  episodes,  and  instead  preferred  to  discuss  his  thinking  “in  general”,
describing  in  detail  various  set  systems  and  general  approaches  prevalent  in  his
methods. The opportunity was taken, therefore, to actively explore these systems and
approaches, how they were constructed, what they were influenced by, and how they
performed and played out in practical or even hypothetical terms. Despite this initially
generic  approach,  PFT02 was nonetheless  still  eventually  able  to  provide numerous
examples of anecdotal yet concrete episodes and situations. This rendered discussion of
participants’  thinking  “in  general”  an  additional  worthy  focus  for  the  main  sample
interviews. 
The  ability  of  participants  to  recall  their  thinking  had  been  an  original  concern
regarding the  suitability  of  episodic  interviews,  however  it  quickly  became evident
during the pilot study, that this was not in fact problematic. It was originally suspected
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that participants’ ability to accurately recall the thinking that actually took place during
past episodes may directly affect the quality of the data. Participants’ recollections may
have been altered with hindsight, following retrospective reflections and efforts to make
sense  of  the  episode/s.  Hindsight,  reflection,  and  sense-making,  however,  were  all
noteworthy features during the annotation process and considered wholly relevant to
the overall phenomenon of on-the-job thinking. The thoughts participants entertained
and described during the interview itself eventually provided ample raw and descriptive
data  with  regard  to  their  on-the-job  thinking,  regardless  of  temporality.  Any
perspectives or angles assumed by the participants, such was the case with the noted
difference between PFT01 and PFT02 in the way they described their thoughts, was
considered relevant and of interest to the research. 
Upon  listening  to  the  interview  recordings,  it  became  apparent  that  more  leading
questions were evident in the interviews than was deemed appropriate. During periods
of silence, the interviewer had proceeded with probes and prompts too hastily. It was
decided that  periods  of  silence  should not  be  interrupted  too  soon during  the main
study,  giving  participants  more  time  to  think  and  describe  whatever  they  deemed
relevant,  thus enhancing the authenticity of the data.  What’s more, where probes or
prompts were actually  needed, shorter  less leading versions would be sought in the
main  study,  such  as  simple  and  open  “why?”,  “how?”  and  “what  then?”  probes.
Following the interview with PFT02, it was also decided that additional angles could be
used to initiate discussion on participants’ thinking where the recollection of specific
episodes did not produce the desired effect. Participants could also be asked to describe
something unique about their particular approach to their work, with the aim of yielding
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descriptions of anecdotal, yet still  concrete,  episodes and situations, as was the case
with PFT02.
Following the interviews, various open-source transcription applications (Transcriber
and GitHub) were experimented with, however they were found to be rather slow and
cumbersome. The faster method appeared to be starting and stopping the audio recorder
directly,  and,  using  a  set  of  headphones  in  a  quiet  environment,  entering  the  data
directly into the open-source word processor application on a net book. Initially, the
transcripts  were  read  on-screen,  with  the  intention  of  using  a  qualitative  analysis
software application for the development of annotations. On-screen reading, however,
was not considered sufficiently comfortable for suitably in-depth reflective reading of
the transcripts, as was required in this study. The transcripts were, therefore, eventually
printed out on A4 paper and filed in soft plastic files, and each re-read several times
before  the  annotation  process  was  initiated.  Hand-written  annotations  were  made
directly in the margins of the printed transcripts. 
It was noted that the expression of annotations in the first transcription appeared to
influence the identification of similar themes in the second, although new themes still
emerged. As a result, the decision was made, that in the main study, reading, re-reading,
reflecting and annotating (step two) would be carried out with each transcript in turn,
before  progressing  to  expressing  themes,  clustering,  and  articulating  superordinate
themes (step three). At both steps two and three, previous transcripts were re-checked
to ensure that themes identified later were not missed, to ensure the findings would be
truly representative  of  the entire  sample,  and did not  favour  later  or  indeed earlier
interviews. In other words, a more truly inter-subjective essence of the data could be
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uncovered by performing each step across all transcripts in turn, before moving on to
more  in-depth  interpretations  and  reflections,  rendering  the  final  inter-subjective
narrative increasingly representative of all ten transcripts.  
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Chapter four: Findings
4.1 Preamble
This chapter articulates a narrative based on the development of themes throughout the
first  stages  of  phenomenological  analysis  (steps  two  and  three),  showing  how  the
subthemes, superordinate themes and final main themes ultimately emerged from, and
relate  back  to,  the  accounts  of  participants  themselves.  The  findings  are  organised
according to the four final main themes as headings, which were: (1) prominence and
influence of concept of self, (2) reciprocity of conceptualising and feeling in on-the-job
thinking and learning, (3) on-the-job thinking by interaction, and (4) autonomy of on-
the-job  thinking.  In  the  final  section,  the  four  final  main  themes  are  focused  on
exclusively in more depth, to reveal an initial eidetic description of the phenomenon of
thinking in the context of OJL.
The narrative is constructed around keywords sourced from participants' own accounts.
Double quotation marks are used where text is initially quoted from the transcripts,
while single quotation marks subsequently indicate that the participants’ term has been
adopted  as  a  significant  keyword  or  key  phrase  for  continuing  use  throughout  the
articulation  of  the  initial  eidetic  description.  The use  of  keywords  and key phrases
ensures the narrative  remains  true  to  the participants  accounts  and,  while  involving
interpretive elements in its construction, still represents an exposition of the essential
nature of the pheneomenon, based on their own accounts.
In accordance with the five-step research method described in the previous chapter, a
final  pool  of  eight  inter-subjective  superordinate  themes  was  consolidated  as  a
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precursor  to  the  final  four  outlined  above.  These  were;  (1)  learning  outcomes,  (2)
conceptualising,  (3)  sensing,  (4)  projecting,  (5)  concept  of  self,  (6)  feelings,  (7)
thinking while communicating (with self and other), and (8) automatic/quick thinking.
Illustration 1 (below) indicates some of the perceived interrelationships between the
two  levels  of  abstraction,  emerging  throughout  a  reflective  analysis  of  the  eight
superordinate themes, and articulation of the final four.  
The first theme presents the prominence and influence of concepts of self. Preference or
aversion was shown in the selection of various self-concepts, which acted as guides or
blueprints to the thoughts and behaviours of PFTs, and also showed a propensity for
change through learning. The second theme is based primarily on the notion of general
concepts and the thinking activities aimed at their formation, selection, modification
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Thinking as interaction
Automatic/quick thinking
Prominence/influence of concept of self
Reciprocity of conceptualising/feeling
Illustration 1: Emergence of main themes
and application. There was an apparent deep reciprocity between conceptualising, and
the experience of various feelings. 
The third theme of on-the-job thinking by interaction explores the notion that thinking
arose from streams of interactions occurring on a number of levels; internally in the
mind  between  perceptions  and  preconceptions,  internally  at  an  intermediary  level
between subjects  and themselves  via  self-talk,  as  well  as externally  in  a situational
context  between  subjects,  others,  and  the  environment.  The fourth  and final  theme
explores the apparent autonomy of thinking, and based on the accounts of participants’
experiences of their thoughts, raised deeper questions about subjectivity, awareness and
volition, which are addressed in more detail in chapter five. 
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4.2 Theme one: Prominence and influence of concept of self in on-the-
job thinking
Annotated  themes  related  to  self-identity,  self-image,  and  statements  about  being  a
particular  sort  or  type  of  person  were  prevalent  throughout  the  transcripts.  All  the
participants  at  some stage  or  other  described  various  generic  conceptualisations  of
themselves,  describing  what  or  who  they  considered  themselves  to  be.  Such
conceptualisations were often cited by participants as justification for their thinking and
associated behaviours. 
4.2.1 Self-concepts and associated outcomes
Concepts of self  initially  stood out most clearly  when PFTs explicitly  used various
generalised  labels  to  describe  themselves,  followed  by  direct  associations  between
those labels and the resulting outcomes in terms of behaviour, thoughts or series of
thoughts. 
“I'm  an  introvert  so  I  don't  really  engage  in  first
conversations.” (PFT08)
The premise of a concept of self in this brief and straight-forward statement by PFT08
is used as a justification for the conclusion that follows. PFT08 essentially suggested
that he was justified in carrying out the behaviour of abstaining from first conversations
based on the precept that such behaviour is normal for an introvert.  Where specific
labels were not used, behaviours were instead attributed to, and justified by, being a
particular sort or type of person. 
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“I'm more like the sort of a person who is more focused
on the  application  side  of  stuff.  So the more technical
things are, the more I tend to be put off...” (PFT05)
“... But at the same time I was always that sort of person
who wouldn't give in without doing research and all that
stuff.” (PFT05)
“But I am a person that I like to read a lot. I like to read
a  lot  of  books  that  involve  a  lot  of  psychology  about
training  and  how  to  win  clients  and  successful
strategies.” (PFT04)
“Yes I can specifically say, I'm a person that likes to be
part  of  the  leadership  team,  rather  than  being  led.”
(PFT03)
While the participants could have simply stated that they often engage in certain types
of behaviour, they instead associated themselves with a particular third-person concept
of self, the necessity of which is arguable in the case of a first-person thinker. Sets of
expectations  were  additionally  associated  with  each  self-concept,  like  a  guide  or
blueprint. PFT03 considered himself to be a perfectionist, and proceeded to describe a
series of expected behaviours he associated with the guide or blueprint implied by that
particular self-concept.   
“I'm a perfectionist. That's one of the main reasons, I'm a
perfectionist.  I'm there to  help you get  results.  I'm not
your  father  or  your  mother.  I  had  that  perception.  It
doesn't matter if you have to lift pink weights or you have
to lift 100kgs. I'm going to get you doing it the right way,
the  perfect  way,  as  long  as  we  get  results  and  win,  I
always was that kind of trainer.” (PFT03)
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Being able to possibly assume the role of a mother or father when one is obviously not
actually a mother or father in the context in question, similarly shows how certain roles
possess such an abstract and conceptual nature. PFT10 similarly described the roles of
friend and teacher as concepts with their own expected and insinuated behaviours. 
“Well you kind of need to be a friend but at the same time
you need to be a teacher.” (PFT10)
In terms of their structure, concepts of self ranged from simple apparently singular units
to  more  complex  structures.  PFTs  showed  that  they  were  able  to  combine  various
aspects of different roles into a unified model guiding their thoughts and behaviours.
This guiding model could then be applied in given contexts either temporarily in the
case  of  role,  or  more  persistently  in  the  case  of  personality  or  character.  PFT04
described the role of a PFT as a composite of aspects of many different roles associated
with other professionals, which together formed a useful composite guide to thought
and behaviour.
“So I realised that a personal trainer over the years has
to play many different roles. To what sense? First of all a
coach, that is a very important part of it, but in all facts,
for example we have to be a good listener, we have to be
a good speaker, we have to be advisor...” (PFT04)
More persistent approaches and behaviours like determination and the desire to help
others were likewise attributed to more lasting concepts of self, in this case described
by PFT04 as character. 
“I'm  a  person  who  doesn't  like  failure.  I  don't  like  to
achieve failure. And everything I want I will do my best
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to achieve it,  but if  I  fail,  if  someone tells me that I've
failed or I've done a mistake, I take it very personally. I
take it very badly. That is my character.” (PFT04)
“What I  do believe  about  my character  is  that  I  am a
good listener and I like listening to people. Because I'm a
person that  I  love  to  help  people,  and make  their  life
better.  I  like  to  make lives  better.  I  like  to  see  people
happy.” (PFT04)
PFT03 described the integration and adoption of various aspects of sub-ordinate role-
based  self-concepts  typically  used  in  temporary  contexts,  into  a  more  persistent
composite higher-order self-concept, essentially illustrating a transferability of concepts
aggregating role and personality. 
“For me I learned a lot and transmitted it to my real life,
and those key elements that I mentioned, motivator, good
listener and so on and so forth, it helped me to become a
better person. So it's become a passion, it's become my
job, yet again it developed me as a person.” (PFT03)
4.2.2 Selection of self-concepts
PFTs were motivated to achieve certain self-concepts and equally reluctant to adopt or
be  associated  with  others.  PFT12  described  two  versions  of  oneself  existing
simultaneously inside each person, one a “coward” and the other both responsible and
successful.  He  eloquently  referred  to  these  abstractions  as  “echoes”  inside  oneself,
stating that people were responsible for choosing which to “follow”.
“At the moment they are inside you at the same time. But
I think... in past experiences you face these two echoes in
yourself, and you choose which one to follow. And when
you choose to follow the one of responsibility, you know
it's going to be worth it...” (PFT12)
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While considering himself  an introvert,  PFT08 illustrated  the aspects  of choice and
preference in ‘following’ various prospective self-concepts by recognising and actively
aspiring towards the thoughts and behaviours associated with the opposite self-concept;
that of an extrovert. 
“So one thing what  I've  learned is  I  need to  be much
more of an extrovert in the sense that I need to come up
with subjects and topics for me to know the client better,
for me to engage with the client even better.” (PFT08)
PFTs were similarly able to clearly describe concepts of self and associated behaviours
to which they most definitely did not aspire. Several participants explicitly stated which
types  of  trainer  they  did  not  want  to  be,  attributing  qualities  such  as  passivity  or
excessive discipline to the unwanted self-concepts.
“Forget it, I'm not the type of trainer that I'm going to tell
you, “Oh, OK you're right, you're too weak to do that.”
I'm not going to be... I'm not that kind of person. I'm not
that kind of trainer.” (PFT03)
“I'm very disciplined about my training but I'm not the
Sergeant type person that I would shout in your face to
do  an  extra  two  repetitions.  I  will  encourage  and
motivate but I will not force you to do things that you're
not supposed to do. ” (PFT04)
“I can deal with such people now, but no I don't want to
be the kind of extrovert that says everything and spills the
secrets and everyone knows everything about my life...”
(PFT08)
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As the interviews progressed, the emergence of self-concepts as an influential theme
was evident, and the opportunity taken to probe deeper. Some of the participants were
indeed  able  to  clearly  articulate  certain  self-concepts.  When  PFT07  used  the  term
“macho” for instance, he clearly defined some of the qualities he associated with the
abstraction when duly probed. 
“More masculine, more reliable. More... laid back in a
sense, not necessarily relaxed but, like... more observant,
like with a brighter view on the situation, more capable
to  make  a  decision,  more  capable  in  a  situation  to
evaluate  as many factors  as possible,  more capable to
react,  fast  and  proper,  and  not  really  emotional.”
(PFT07)
After establishing the basic tenets of the concept of being “macho”, PFT07 was further
probed about the usefulness of 'following' such a self-concept. He provided a similarly
detailed  account  concerning  the  relevance  of  “macho”  and  more  “feminine”  self-
concepts in various situations. 
“I mean it's not a standard in life, we're not at war, we're
not in the woods. I say it very generally and the answer
I'm going to give you is going to be very general as well.
I  don't  know  if  it  actually  answers  your  question.  In
different situations you can be, and I believe you should
be, much more gentle and much more understanding, and
much more aware of people. And then in other situations
you have to be much more self-driven, and much more
masculine, and much more... instead of evaluating others,
suppressing others in a way,  or overcoming others,  or
putting yourself first. And so this is what I call a bit more
of  a  macho  generalised  bahaviour.  And  different
situations require a different response. It's not just black
and white, you can't be... ‘Oh I want to be in contact with
my feminine side...’ Sometimes it's needed but sometimes
it's  needed  to  be  more  in  contact  with  your  male  and
masculine side.” (PFT07)
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The tendency of participants to attribute patterns of expected behaviours to generalised
self-concepts  occurred  both in  their  descriptions  of  themselves,  as  well  as  of  other
people. PFT03 labelled one of his clients as an “immature boy,” and was not surprised
when the expected reactions and behaviours associated with such a self-concept were
subsequently exhibited by the client in question. 
“... He was a very still immature boy, he had still to make
that gap from a boy to a man. He had difficulty hearing
what he needed to hear. If you confronted him with what
he was doing wrong rather than being independent and
responsible, he would be offended.” (PFT03)
PFT07 also made a direct reference to the existence of a concept of self and its essential
nature,  in  his  description  of  a particular  gym member,  creatively  describing it  as  a
“drawing” in the mind. 
“...  I  kind of  figured him out  in my mind. I  mean you
never know who is in front of you or against you, fully,
but basically I had a drawing of him in my mind, I know
what a creature I have in front of me.” (PFT07)
If  'followed'  self-concepts  acted  as  blueprints  or  guides,  causing  recruitment  of
additional  sub-ordinate  concepts  and cascades  of expected thoughts and behaviours,
then according to participants' accounts, such a system appeared to govern expectations
of thoughts and behaviours during interactions between multiple persons. This resulted
in the quick and efficient formation of boundaries or terms and conditions governing
such ensuing interactions.  PFT04 described a relationship with a client  that had, up
until  that  point in  time,  been considered “normal”  because it  had conformed to the
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relevant expectations, boundaries, or terms and conditions implied by the conceptually
typical relationship, in this case, between a client and a trainer. 
“And there were no feelings  in particular  towards this
client, it was just a client and person I would say, client
and trainer, she was just a very normal client.” (PFT04)
In other words, expectations and boundaries enabled the recognition of acceptable or
unacceptable  behaviours.  Indeed,  the  expectations  arising  from interaction  between
specific  self-concepts  in  a  given  context  were  used  by  PFTs  to  justify  certain
behaviours. During one of his described episodes, PFT03 felt somewhat let down by his
manager.  The  manager's  actions  however  were  deemed  acceptable  only  when
considering the self-concepts being 'followed' by each stakeholder at the time and their
associated implications, because any manager could hypothetically be expected to carry
out that same behaviour in the same context.   
“... My manager, even though I was right, he had to warn
me, because the client put pressure on him.” (PFT03)  
Due to the manager's commitment to his role-determined self-concept and associated
expected behaviours, his actions were thereby justified,  and should not have caused
offense, as indeed they did not when PFT03 conceptualised the interaction in this way.
He reinforced the importance that these roles should, throughout the course of a PFT's
work, be kept “in mind”.
“I  thought  he  was  going  to  come  to  me  and  tell  me,
‘Listen [PFT03], we know who this person is, and I know
you  wouldn't  do  that,  don't  worry.’  I  was  expecting
something like that,  because this  person knows me, he
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used to work with me all the time. But when it comes to
business I learned my lesson. It's not about friendship, it's
not about anything, it's about manager and instructor, or
a personal trainer and a client. You have to keep that in
mind.” (PFT03)
Knowledge  of  which  self-concept  and  associated  behaviours  or  “approaches”  to
‘follow’  at  any  given  time  was  actually  considered  by  the  participants  to  be  an
important ability for PFTs. PFT05 discussed the importance of knowing which sets of
behaviours to 'follow' based on the self-concept attributed to those with whom they
were interacting, shaped in this particular statement by background and profession. 
“...  Even the  type  of  professionals  who come in,  I  get
students and I get lawyers, once I had a magistrate, so
the kind of approach has to change a bit.” (PFT05)
PFT04 clearly described his ability to slip in and out of such roles at will, showing how
‘approaches’ can be quickly modified with relative flexibility when 'following' concepts
of self as guides. 
“... When I move into that studio there's that fine silver
line when I just move in, and I switch. I mean inside work
it becomes different, I'm always the trainer, and there's
always the client. So I don't go personal on anything, it's
always been like that. ” (PFT04)
Choice among self-concepts was also influenced by how PFTs wanted others to see
them.  PFT04  explicitly  stated  how his  ‘approaches’  with  clients  were  selected  and
motivated in part by a desire for others to regard him as a good and honest person,
despite this sometimes resulting in certain practices he knew to be flawed. 
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“So that I feel that I'm OK, he's a good guy, you know?
He understands. He's the understanding type, rather than
he's  the  greedy  type.  I  always  wanted  to  look  for  the
understanding rather than the greedy. And I do know that
I am not greedy, but when it comes to business I sort of
suffer on these little things, because, again, this is where
I let off many cancellations.” (PFT04)
4.2.3 Self-concepts and change
The  self-concepts  that  PFTs  were  able  to  choose  and  apply  were  not  fixed  or
immutable.  According  to  the  participants’  descriptions,  conceptualising included
thinking  activities  aimed  at  updating  or  changing  these  concepts,  showing  the
propensity for change through learning.  PFT04 described a gradual evolution of his
understanding of the role of a PFT over time. 
“I used to look at a personal trainer as someone you're
going to go to if he wants to get fit, he wants to get in
shape, and the personal trainer is going to deliver that.
Over the years it changed. I started to see that personal
training is not just a product, you don't deliver a product,
you are giving a service. But the service is a very vast
service.” (PFT04)
The thought activities involved in creating, modifying, selecting, and otherwise using or
applying concepts, both generic as well as pertaining to self, were seen to occur in a
reciprocal fashion with another prominent emerging theme; that of feelings and feeling
states. The relationship between conceptualising and feeling according to participants'
accounts is presented in theme two. 
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4.3.4 Summary of theme One
One of the most prominent themes emerging from the transcripts was the concept of
self,  which  was  used  as  a  form  of  blueprint  guiding  thoughts,  behaviours,  and
‘approaches’. Specific concepts of self, to which PFTs actively demonstrated aspiration
or  aversion,  also  involved  the  recruitment  of  additional  sub-ordinate  concepts  and
associated expectations from self and others in various contexts and situations. 
Self-concepts  were  'followed'  transitorily  when  fulfilling  temporary  roles,  or  more
persistently  in  the case of  personality  or  character.  Self-concepts  were not  fixed or
immutable, and showed a propensity for change through learning.
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4.3 Theme two: Reciprocity of conceptualising and feeling in on-the-job
contexts
The  first  stage  of  explication  had  yielded  numerous  annotated  themes  related  to
thinking  activities  describable,  in  the  tradition  of  Bloom’s  (1975)  taxonomy  for
describing  learning  outcomes,  using  action  verbs,  which  transpired  to  be  inter-
subjectively consistent. PFTs repeatedly described similar instances, applications, and
examples of their on-the-job thinking, resulting in super-ordinate themes dedicated to
thinking activities describable using action verbs, which eventually yielded three of the
final set of eight, designated conceptualising, sensing, and projecting respectively.  
Conceptualising was the largest of the three, and is presented first due to its apparent
centrality in participants' descriptions of their thinking. The constituents of this specific
cluster  included  such  thought  activities  annotated  as  generalising,  categorising,
contextualising,  and  any  other  operations  dedicated  towards  forming,  adapting,
updating  or  otherwise  applying  general  concepts  (including  concepts  of  self),  as
discussed in the previous section. 
4.3.1 Conceptualising
Singular  or  clustered  combinations  of  general  concepts  initially  emerged  from the
transcripts when PFTs made repeated references to set beliefs, systems, approaches, and
schools of thought. General concepts, including those related to self, were useful for
PFTs in their capacity to facilitate the quick and efficient selection and application of
plans and approaches in multiple situations with various clients. The ability to do this
was indeed specifically nominated by PFT04 as a crucial part of a PFT's role.
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“That  person  who  walks  in  the  door  [the  PFT]  must
understand what  he's  coming from, where he's  coming
from, the social class, how he should be treated, even the
fact  if  they  have  a  simple  condition,  whether  they're
obese, whether they're overweight or they have a certain
condition, you've got to treat them with a certain care.”
(PFT04)
Established  schools  of  thought  and  training  styles  constituted  useful  ready-made
‘approaches’  for  PFTs  in  multiple  contexts,  representing  preconceived  models  into
which various perceived variables related to the client  could essentially  be plugged.
PFT03 affirmed his preference for 'following' “functional” training specifically, which
represented a blueprint for the selection of certain types of exercises when planning
sessions and programmes, namely the inclusion of exercises based on movements most
relevant in the context of daily life or sport.   
“We all know the benefits of free-weights over resistance
machines,  and  we  all  know  of  the  importance  of
compounds  (movements  recruiting  more  than  one
joint/set  of  joints).  Now I was always obviously a firm
believer in compounds, and functional training and how
it benefits into posture and so on and so forth...” (PFT03)
PFT10 also indicated  her preference  towards  this  same style  of  training.  Within its
framework, she included a further set of three categories of exercises when planning her
sessions or programmes, defined according to their mechanics or metabolic effects. A
general concept, therefore, was combined in this case with additional concepts, creating
a more complex clustered pattern that included concepts of a “tri-set” (combining three
exercises  together  with  no  rest  between),  pushing  exercises,  pulling  exercises,  and
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“pulse-raisers” intended to increase heart  rate and produce a cardiovascular  training
effect.  
“Well I like to work with functional training mainly. I do
a lot of... I wouldn't call it tri-set... I would usually...  I
like  working  with  three  movements,  one  of  three
movements;  pushing,  pulling  and  some  sort  of  pulse-
raiser, and swap them around depending on the person,
and  I  just  like  to  work  with  different...  full-body
exercises...” (PFT10)
She later described this system as existing “in (her) head,” and described her ability to,
“play around” with it in order to generate different combinations as required. PFT11
similarly  described her  use of  a  relatively  complex arrangements  of concepts  when
planning yoga sessions,  involving “themes”  applicable  to  the various  phases  of  the
session, and drawing on a “library” of poses or movements. These concepts essentially
provided  the  preconceived  tools  needed  to  construct  individual  sessions  and
programmes without the need for considerable time or effort spent planning. 
 
“There are  certain  themes  that  you need to  include  to
make it a holistic class. So with that there is a library of
poses that you can do within beginning, middle, and end
part. And if for example you're working towards a peak
pose  of  a  challenging  arm  balance  or  something  that
requires a lot  of  opening through your hamstring then
you do a lot of poses to prepare for that.” (PFT11)
PFT07 made direct reference to the general concept as a guide by defining it as a “main
idea.” He continued to explain that with a suitable 'main idea' in place, thoughts and
behaviours  would  naturally  follow,  typically  proceeding  to  “fit  in”  like  a  “chain
reaction” according to whatever “guiding principles” were used.  
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“Everything else for me just follows. Meaning, it's just in
the  background,  just  follows  the  main  idea.  If  I  teach
them to follow basic principles,  even when it  comes to
nutrition and moving and training,  everything else just
fits in like a chain reaction. That's how I see it.” (PFT07)
The  term 'chain  reaction'  elucidates  the  interactions  PFT07  visualised  between  the
concepts  comprising  given  clusters  or  configurations  associated  with  selected
‘approaches’. Such ‘chain reactions’ were also evident in the participants’ descriptions
of selection and application of various temporary and more persistent configurations of
self-concepts.  'Basic  principles',  therefore,  were  not  only  limited  to  exercise
prescription in the technical sense, but governed thoughts and behaviours on a more
overarching level. PFT03 attributed his tendency to engage in specific types of more
persistent behaviours to a selection of general guiding principles and values which were
also influential to his concept of self.
“I always liked to help everyone as good as I can, but
that was a principle of mine. And growing up, whatever I
did I  always wanted to transmit that.  It's  a principle  I
keep nowadays, and it's irrelevant of the client who it is,
hard client, easy client, an athlete or what not, I try to
give them the best service that I can. And I hate cheating.
I  hate  cheating.  And  I  hate  injustice,  and  that  is
something, part of my character, part of my principles.”
(PFT03)
PFT07 similarly discussed the notion of values as general concepts guiding his thoughts
and  behaviours  by  explaining  how  he  would  attempt  to  observe  the  “method”
underpinning certain behaviours in others. Over time these ‘methods’ could eventually
be incorporated into a personal guiding value system.
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“I see good examples and good behaviour and proper, if
I  can  use  the  word,  behaviour,  and I  try  to  learn  the
method,  the  ways  behind  that  behaviour.  But,  it's  a
mixture, how did I start valuing these? It's a mixture of
what  you've  seen  while  you  were  building  up  your
values.” (PFT07)
PFT07 further developed the notion of 'chain reactions' of interlinked configurations or
clusters of concepts when he used the term “moral compass,” and was immediately
asked by the interviewer to clarify its meaning. He made a comparison between the two
general concepts  of the 'moral compass'  on the one hand, and “metabolism” on the
other.  Metabolism  is  a  commonly-used  term  by  PFTs  that  broadly  describes  the
chemistry of energy-flow through living systems. The two terms are only similar in this
context, inasmuch as they both involve a number of different “processes” interacting
with each other in a relatively complex way. The 'moral compass' was presented by
PFT07 as a general concept significant in its influence over his ‘followed approaches’,
consisting of many other sub-ordinate concepts interacting in a way that resembled a
'chain reaction'. 
“Well I believe everyone has one of these. It's affected by,
you know, the values society has, the values the family
has, if there was a family. It's affected by experiences. It's
affected  by  social  circles,  and  it's  a  bit  like  basal
metabolic rate, right? A lot of trainers like to say, 'We
will speed up your metabolism...' as if metabolism is one
thing. Metabolism and metabolic rate is a whole… you
know... it's not one thing, one creature, it's a combination
of  so many events  and so many processes,  and this  is
pretty much it. The compass is not one thing it's not one
object, it's a unification of so many processes.” (PFT07)
By  means  of  this  narrative,  PFT07  essentially  elucidates  a  discernment  between
standalone concepts and clustered combinations of concepts,  be they fractal  or non-
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hierarchical in the manner in which they are sequentially or simultaneously recruited.
Incidentally, given that the issue of metabolism was raised, any system to which only a
finite  amount  of  energy  is  made  available  at  any  given  time  could  reasonably  be
assumed  to  benefit  from  a  tendency  towards  efficiency.  The  tendency  of  general
concepts to guide ‘approaches’, facilitating action without the need for excessive time
or energy invested in deliberating action plans that have previously been worked out in
similar  contexts,  is  indeed characteristic  of  an  efficient  system.  Implications  of  the
tendency to generalise by conceptualising are discussed further in chapter five.
While the ability to act quickly and efficiently might be generally desirable in many
contexts however, other situations might otherwise benefit from further deliberation. If
general concepts are, therefore,  influential  to thoughts, behaviours and ‘approaches’,
and efficiency is a factor influencing their selection, then inappropriate or undesirable
actions may very well result in situations where further deliberation would have in fact
been  more  beneficial.  If  efficiency  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  the  most  desirable
outcomes, then questionable outcomes could also reasonably be expected from PFTs’
descriptions of their on-the-job thinking and learning. 
“I learned that the client sometimes does these things to
get  attention,  or  maybe  wants  a  free  membership  or
maybe he wants to get something for free, which I think
was the case at this point in time.” (PFT03)
In this  statement,  PFT03 described an  outcome arising  from a  memorable  learning
episode which, regardless of the validity of the conclusion drawn, led to the formation
of  the  generalised  concept  that  clients  sometimes  complain  for  dubious  reasons.
Subsequent  quick and efficient  selection  and use of  this  concept  and its  associated
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suspicions of clients' intentions in future cases could result where such intentions were
in fact genuine, also possibly adversely affecting further resulting learning outcomes.
PFT10  presented  the  general  concept  that  male  clients  sometimes  “look  down”  on
female trainers, and showed how this may have been influential to her perception of a
particular client during an episode which itself ended up further reinforcing the concept,
regardless of its actual validity.   
“And basically I found it hard even to just talk to him,
because he seemed to look down on me, he was older
than I was. Maybe because I was a female and he was a
male, it's usually the issue... (laughs)” (PFT10)
Factors  influencing  on-the-job  thinking  and  its  outcomes,  be  they  desirable  or
otherwise,  were  prevalent  in  participants’  accounts.  In  this  respect,  a  particularly
significant  superordinate  theme  emerging  from  the  transcripts  inferred  a  deep
reciprocity to the act of conceptualising, namely that of feeling and feeling states.
4.3.2 Feelings
The  interviews  conducted  for  this  study  were  based  initially  on  discussions  of
memorable learning episodes, and principally sought to elicit participants' descriptions
of  their  thinking,  specifically.  Despite  the  primary  emphasis  being  placed  on
descriptions of  thinking,  participants consistently described how they  felt.  Given the
semi-structured nature of the interviews, participants were afforded freedom to discuss
whatever  aspects of their  thinking they deemed important.  When largely unsolicited
descriptions  of  feelings  eventually  comprised  a  prominent  super-ordinate  theme,
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therefore,  feelings  were  considered  to  be  a  significant  factor  in  PFTs’  described
experiences of thinking. 
To establish a working definition of feelings, and to clarify the stance assumed by the
researcher in the explication of this theme, the cluster included annotations based on
instances  of  participants'  awareness  of  the  experience  of  a  specifically  defined
sensation.  This  awareness on the part  of the participants  could also attend to  more
generally defined affective and influential states of consciousness not directly arising
from cognition or volition, such as happiness, fear, anxiety, or embarrassment, among
others. Baron similarly defined “emotion” as a “state that is subjectively experienced”
(2008,  67).  For  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  these  specific  and general  states  are
cumulatively and broadly summarised and termed simply as, feelings (or feeling states).
Feelings  initially  stood  out  most  clearly  in  PFTs'  descriptions  of  high-stakes  or
emergency situations. During her interview, PFT06 described several emergency high-
stakes situations, the first of which occurred in a clinical environment when a client
with health challenges lost consciousness and collapsed while walking on a treadmill
machine. Following the incident, which was resolved when medical staff arrived on the
scene and revived the client, PFT06 offered a detailed and feeling-rich description of
her  reactions,  including  references  to  both  physiological  and  non-physiological
phenomena.  
“The state of adrenaline that you're in that tense state, so
I was in that the whole time, and once she left that's when
I sort of sat on the treadmill and I was, 'Oh I can't believe
that just happened,' cried that I was relieved she was OK
and relieved that I helped her, and relieved that I didn't
do anything wrong.” (PFT06)
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“It was terrible, I felt terrible as well, I felt really bad for
her. I felt bad that this happened, I felt bad that she's got
this  condition.  That  was  while  I  was  sitting  on  the
treadmill I felt so sorry for her. My heart went out to her.
I felt so much empathy for her, definitely. I felt so sorry
for her. Because she was in that state, she was like that...”
(PFT06)
PFT10 also mentioned some very specific physiological characteristics of a particular
feeling  she  had  experienced.  When  asked  to  elaborate  on  her  reference  to  feeling
“insecure”,  she  also  introduced  the  notion  that  feelings  occurred  in  “grades”  of
magnitude or intensity.  
“Like  I'm  hungry?  (laughs)  You  know  when  you're
hungry  and  you  get  like,  this  feeling,  there?  (gestures
towards abdomen) Like I'm nervous but I'm anxious at
the same time. Like a combination of both. I have it now.
(laughs)” 
“It's not always that bad. There's different grades of it,
right? So there's just a small awkward thing...” (PFT10)
In terms of magnitude, various other high-'grade' feelings were definitively reported by
PFTs. PFT04 explained how a female client had sought support from him after claiming
to have sustained domestic abuse by her husband. After following up on such a plea,
and  duly  receiving  a  direct  phone  call  from  the  husband,  PFT04  described  such
high-'grade' feelings, and stressed the degree to which the experience had constituted a
strong or vivid memory. 
“And I felt, I felt these palpitations, and he's like, 'Listen
don't text a married woman at this time of the night, it's
not professional...'  And I'm like, 'OK I was speaking to
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(the client)  not to you...'  And the phone just ended, the
phone was just cut. And I remember the feeling as if it
were today, I remember I felt a lot of palpitations, I was
very  scared,  because  I  knew  that  this  guy  knew  me.”
(PFT04)
PFT05 described similarly high 'grade' feelings in response to being informed of his
impending receipt of official  written communication demanding that he ceased from
various  public  activities  and  engagements  due  to  his  lack  of  membership  with  a
particular  organisation  that  held  various  legislative  powers.  He  also  described  how
vividly he was able to recall the exact moment in particular detail.
“I  still  remember the day,  the date,  everything  like...  I
was shell-shocked, I was like... OK but let me wait for the
letter, let me see the letter. First you are anxious like, you
can't wait for the email to arrive.” (PFT05)
Feeling with a high ‘grade’ of magnitude in these cases occurred simultaneously with
the  formation  of  strong and vivid  memories.  In  terms  of  dimension,  in  addition  to
magnitude,  feelings  were  also  experienced  temporally  by  PFTs,  who  described  the
tendency of some feelings and lasting feeling states to persist over extended periods of
time. Following the phone call from his client's husband, PFT04 reported feelings of
fear remaining “stuck to (his) head” for up to three months. 
“So I think it stuck to my head for at least three months. I
was terrified for the first  week,  but then I  kept  saying,
'This will come to me, this will come to me...'” (PFT04)
PFT05 similarly described feelings of anxiety, resentment, and bitterness lasting for a
period of up to a “couple” of months, constituting an overall “painful” experience.   
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“And for the next couple of months I literally... this issue
literally  took over my life  I  was looking at what  other
people were doing and complaining that he is also doing
that why don't  you also pick up on him? Why can this
sports person post this particular post and this person do
this job? And it got so complicated and I got so anxious
about  it  that  literally  it  was  a  painful  experience.”
(PFT05)
PFT03  also  explained  how  a  particular  episode  which  had  resulted  in  an  official
warning from his superiors had resulted in residual feelings of anger that persisted for
up to a week. 
“Well at that moment I was young and it was a case of
anger  management  because  I  needed  to  control  my
anger, because obviously I was angry as well.  It lasted
quite  a  lot  because  I  had  the  warning.  I  wouldn't
remember how much specifically as a time-frame but let's
say a week maybe.” (PFT03)
The experience of feelings of high-'grade' magnitude or persistence was associated with
the  consolidation  of  vivid  memories,  but  also  with  prompting  a  drive  to  learn  and
change. For PFT05, a very negative experience involving intense feelings of anxiety
and even terror, served as a prompt to make fundamental changes in his approach to his
work. 
“And back then I was like, terrified, because you're like
OK so this is where my career stops, I need to change
things...” (PFT05)
“It  made me feel  like,  anxious, angry, and at the same
time motivated to say listen, there must be a way, these
people  must  be  doing  something  that  in  some  way  or
another is getting them out of trouble, or is getting them
good business all the same.” (PFT05)
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PFT03  nominated  the  feeling  of  being  disrespected  as  an  active  prompt  during  a
situation  he  had  originally  selected  for  discussion  as  one  of  his  most  memorable
learning  experiences,  and  from  which  he  explicitly  cited  various  specific  learning
outcomes.  A relationship thereby appeared between feelings  and learning outcomes,
both questionable and sound. 
“OK...  my  first  thoughts  and  feelings...  to  be  honest  I
was... well... you know... you're in front of all the people
and she's  talking  to  you that  way.  I  felt  disrespected.
That's my first reaction. How could she talk to me this
way? In front of all these people...” (PFT03)
Of increased significance, therefore, was the potential of PFTs to manage such feelings.
Through  his  reference  to  “anger  management,”  PFT03  essentially  expounded  the
enterprise  of  feeling-management.  PFT05  similarly  described  his  experiences  with
managing feelings of anxiety. He described such feelings as “rainstorms”, together with
a practical strategy he used for effectively dealing with them. 
“So basically  when this  thought  goes  through,  it's  just
like at the moment it's raining, I'll just wait for the rain to
stop, once it passes, it's done. I won't be going outside
trying to wave my umbrella in order to remove the clouds
and all that stuff, I'll just wait for the rain to pass and I'll
just move on from there. And that one trick, the simplest
of tricks ever, I think has been the most beneficial part of
getting out of that.” (PFT05)
PFT10 explained how she would manage negative feeling states she would happen to
be  experiencing  before  the  delivery  of  scheduled  exercise  sessions.  Her  feeling-
management strategy was based on immersing herself in a particular routine, helping
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her to enter a preferable feeling state more conducive with effective delivery of the
session. 
“I distract myself from that feeling, so I try to just get into
the...  if  I'm  downstairs  (gestures  towards  the  studio
located on a lower floor) I just start to write the workout
down, put the music on, and do anything to stop thinking
about that particular thing that's making me feel crap at
that moment.” (PFT10)
Feelings and feeling states were also seen to affect the outcomes of on-the-job thinking
in the context  of small  to large-scale  decision-making. PFT11 described feelings  of
trust that served to validate her large-scale choices in her career and life. 
“I feel very trusting to life, or that I'm at the right time
doing the right thing. Yes, I just feel very trusting to what
I'm doing and where I'm at.” (PFT11)
PFT03 explicitly  stated that  while  being a PFT might  not  be considered a  sensible
choice in terms of prospective financial prosperity, social status, or indeed other factors
one might consider during a rational or logical decision-making process with regards to
career, he nevertheless chose the profession based on his feelings. 
“...  Society  tells  you,  be  a  lawyer,  be  a  doctor,  be  a
whatever... They never tell you be a personal trainer. But
me being a person of leadership skills, I don't do what
people tell me to do. I do what I feel, and I always loved
this  industry,  and  I  always  loved  sports  and  I  always
loved helping people.” (PFT03) 
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With respect to financial viability, PFT05 admitted to having started out in the industry
under  conditions  that  were  untenable.  He  nevertheless  persevered  because  he  was
motivated exclusively by a feeling he termed “passion”.  
“So I was literally going round the country working just
through passion (laughs)... because the few money that I
used to make used to be spent on petrol and all that stuff,
so it wasn't that worth it.” (PFT05)
If feelings occurred in ‘grades’ of magnitude and persistence,  and influenced PFTs’
thinking in a number of ways, including during decision-making processes, then the
latter  instance  shows  how  participants  directed  their  feelings  towards  concepts  in
themselves. This was further noted in their described acts of upholding or defending
certain  beliefs,  and  their  faithful  commitment  to  certain  schools  or  thought.  Such
directedness  of feeling and loyalty resembled approaches one might  expect  towards
tangible objects or even people. Three of the ten participants reported attachment or
subscription to concepts or sets of concepts sufficently great to warrant changing jobs,
directly citing differences in ideas, beliefs, and approaches as the reason for not being
able  to  work  with  certain  other  professionals.  PFT04  described  starting  work  at  a
particular personal training company, only to leave shortly after due to a difference of
ideas.  
“I did start off a few sessions with him but I couldn't... we
didn't share the same idea, the same concept. So it was
like, I thought one way, and he thought another way. So
we sort of, 'Listen (head trainer) it's best if we just...' you
know? It was a very short while, I spent about a month
with  him  max,  and  then  I  started  doing  something  by
myself ... So I said, 'Listen (head trainer), I'm taking my
clients, I'm just going to leave...'” (PFT04) 
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PFT07 similarly described how upon identifying a particular system in operation at a
studio he started to work at, he decided to move on, citing a difference in “philosophy”
as his motivation. 
“I  wasn't  really  happy with  the  way  things  were  done
there so it was a very short experience. Still it taught me
about personal training, but I wasn't really happy with
the philosophy of the company...” (PFT07)
The tendency of participants to 'follow' and exhibit attachment towards concepts was
most prominent of all in their descriptions of self-concepts specifically. PFTs described
numerous  examples  of  upholding  their  ideas  about  who  they  thought  they  were.
Following the incident where PFT03 felt disrespected by a club member, he exhibited
concern that his 'followed' concept of self was under threat. 
“...  That put me in a place where it jeapordised the way
people  look  at  me,  my  image  in  the  fitness  centre.”
(PFT03)
Incidentally,  PFT03  also  exhibited  concept-attachment  via  a  conflicting  philosophy
with that of his superiors. He showed a desire to uphold, and a commitment towards,
both his 'followed' concepts governing exercise prescription, as well as that of self. The
prescriptions he actually proceeded to make, incorporated conflicted ideas with those of
his  superior,  and essentially  conformed to  his  self-based concept  of  being  a  “good
trainer”.
“Perhaps  at  that  moment  in  time  I  didn't  think  about
perhaps the manager wouldn't be happy with me and I
might be fired, but I looked at myself as a good trainer.”
(PFT03)
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PFT05 also described an instance of his concept of self under threat, and the associated
feelings this generated when he was ordered to stop carrying out a particular aspect of
his role. He described how feelings of self-confidence had been invested in that aspect
of his role, and that feelings of anxiety resulted from having it taken away. 
“So  basically  what  happened  was,  I  felt  so  bad  like
someone was stealing the thing I love the most in my life.
And  apart  from that  they  were  like,  putting  me under
this... disqualifying me, if I use this word, for what I'm
doing because they were like, 'Listen in order to do this
and do that, you need to be a registered (role omitted for
confidentiality),'  and they were like,  'Listen you cannot
do that because you are not qualified to do it.' So even
your  self-confidence  and  your  self-esteem  takes  a  big
knock,  and you start  acting very anxiously,  even in my
work...” (PFT05)
The directedness of such feelings towards abstract concepts showed the pervasiveness
of  feelings  as  integral  to  the  process  of  conceptualising  itself.  The  experience  of
thinking described by the participants was difficult to reduce solely to rational thinking
in  a  pure  or  isolated  sense.  It  included  rather  a  more  subtle  and  underpinning
contribution  of  feelings  at  a  fundamental  and  embedded  level  in  the  selection,
modification, and ultimate use of concepts. PFT08 admitted how he felt comfortable
with what was familiar to him, and uncomfortable with that which was unfamiliar, in
terms of the clients he favoured.  
“I never used to speak to the women. Because I used to be
really shy. So even if it was an 18 year old or a 60 year
old, I never used to speak to the women because I was
really shy. So it was always the men I kind of, went to,
because maybe I felt more comfortable.” (PFT08)
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When perceptions of behaviours and outcomes proceeded according to expectations,
essentially  matching and validating  preconceptions,  resulting feelings  of confidence,
happiness, or even amusement  were reported.  PFT07 explained his reaction when a
member behaved in a way that matched the self-concept he had attributed to him. While
observing the person carrying out the bahaviour in question, the instant a match took
place between the perception and ascribed concept of self was experienced specifically
as a feeling of amusement. He went on to further state that he would have most likely
experienced a feeling of surprise had a mismatch instead occurred.  
“I  see one  of  the  bodybuilders  in  the  gym, one  of  the
biggest  and  most,  you  know,  with  highest  self-esteem
guys in the gym, he goes and he starts chatting up with
her, OK? And I didn't say anything, I actually found it
funny.”
“I do like the guy, but I see him as the guy he is. I don't
mind him,  I  mean I  would  actually  be  surprised  if  he
didn't  approach  the  client.  I  assumed  in  advance,
although  I  don't  like  assuming,  it's  like  again,  an
educated guess, you can put it as an educated guess that
he  would  actually,  yes,  approach  her  at  one  stage  or
another.” (PFT07)
PFT05 described a distinctive feeling of “déjà vu” upon making the match between
practical  observations,  and  concepts  he  had  previously  learned  theoretically  in  his
studies.  The  description  he  gave  of  this  particular  accenting  feeling  indicated  his
experience of it was a positive one.  
“Especially  when you learn something like that  then it
likes, flashes (snaps fingers), like a déjà vu, 'Ah I heard
this  somewhere!  I  studied  this,  why  he  does  this  like
that...' (laughs)” (PFT05)
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Where on the other hand perceptions contradicted existing concepts, resulting feelings
of  surprise,  shock,  or  confusion  were  reported.  This  mismatch  of  perception  with
preconception, and the associated feelings accenting it, also occurred in tangent with
the formation of relatively vivid memories,  allowing the participant  to recall  recent
episodes exemplifying it. PFT08 described a feeling of surprise and uncertainty when
his client made a seemingly forward or overly friendly comment, that did not fit with
the  conceptual  implications  and  expectations  governing  the  particular  situation  and
relationship.
“I  would  say  not  shocked,  but  surprised  that  she  said
such a thing. I mean it's not the sort of thing that you
would say to someone, to your coach, really. Even though
you build a rapport over maybe two or three months, I
don't think it's the sort of thing you say to someone, no?”
(PFT08)
PFT07 described more  diverse  interactions  between perceptions  and preconceptions
following a particular member behaving expectedly, thus causing a match and resulting
in a feeling of amusement, only to be followed by another “type” of male repeating the
same behaviour in question with another “type” of female, this time causing a mismatch
resulting in a feeling of surprise. What's more, the feeling of surprise was of sufficient
magnitude  to  facilitate  the  formation  of  a  relatively  vivid  memory,  ultimately
permitting him to recall the episode for the purpose of the interview. 
“...  The first  guy was a bit  of  a,  you know a bit  of  a
macho guy, a bit of a... you know, a high self-esteem and
show-off type of guy, and the first girl was much more,
attractive  than the second girl.  So I  figured,  alright,  I
guess this  is how...  I  guess this  is normal for her,  you
know? I guess this is how it happens. But then when it
happened  to  the  second  girl  as  well,  it  was  like,  a
different type of guy and it was a different type of girl,
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and I just figured, just as long as you're a girl... (laughs)
there  will  be  a  guy  in  the  gym  trying  to  bug  you...”
(PFT07)
PFT07 further developed the theme of mismatching perceptions and preconceptions in
particular,  by  describing  unfamiliar  phenomena  as  “scary”.  He  later  discussed
preference to the familiar and aversion to the unfamiliar by means of a more generic
issue, in this case, racism. 
“So  everything  that  is  out  of  the  box  and  out  of  the
ordinary tends to scare off a lot of people. I'm not saying
it is going to scare you in particular, but it tends to scare
the mass.” (PFT07)
“Why a lot of Western Europe are afraid of the refugees
now? I know it's away from the subject but why are they
afraid  of  them,  why  do  they  see  them  as  a  threat?
Because  it's  something  you  don't  know  about,  it's
something  you have  a  blurred  image of  and it's...  you
compare. You know your neighbour who is much closer
to you, much similar to you, and you don't know this one
who is different, who is in your eyes much less reliable,
who is much less civilised in your eyes. We compare, we
do compare all the time. I'm happy with my comparisons
I believe they do me more good than harm. I compare a
lot,  people,  training  methods,  training  techniques,
everything.” (PFT07)
The unfamiliar was referred to by PFT07 as something of which one has a “blurred
image”, highlighting not only the imagistic nature of the experience of certain concepts,
but also the notion that  such images  can exist  with varying degrees  of clarity.  The
mismatch between perception and preconception, therefore, may be the result not only
of absence or difference of an existing concept, but also to its lack of clarity. 
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PFT04 portrayed his experience of the mismatch between perception and preconception
together with the associated resulting feelings, as a prompt to learn and change. When
something  went  “completely  against”  his  opinion,  he  described  how  he  would  be
prompted to reflect, with a view to updating his preconceptions, and ultimately learn. 
“I  believe that if  I  made a choice it's  the right choice,
because it felt that it was right. If I give an opinion I feel
that  it  was  a  very  strong  opinion  as  well.  So  when
something goes completely against it I feel like I'm just
shutting down out of the system. And then I sit down and
analyse, what have I done wrong? I analyse and then I
say OK that is where I went wrong. So I apologise if I did
something wrong or, listen,  that's where I start saying,
OK I made a mistake, now it's time to analyse and try to
bring things outright.” (PFT04)
While negative feelings accented mismatches of perception and preconception, positive
feelings accented the matches, reinforcing and encouraging the PFT to actively seek out
and facilitate such matches. In other words, if matches were pleasurable, then subjects
could reasonably be expected to be driven to facilitating experiences of them. While
familiar  preconceptions  were  selected  based  on  their  similarity  to  perceived
experiences,  therefore,  PFTs also predictably described instances of actively seeking
out and selecting those experiences and associated perceptions that represented the best
fit  for  their  prominent  preconceptions,  explaining  participants'  preference  for  the
familiar. PFT07 clearly described his tendency towards clients who represented the best
fit with his existing and readily available preferred general concepts, describing this as
“natural”. 
“I'm actually feeling more comfortable training men with
similar goals to mine, similar body composition, similar
even experience to mine. I guess it's just natural, these
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who are closest to me, my goals and my way of training,
these I find them the easiest.” (PFT07) 
PFT05 described positive feelings associated with the success of an applied concept,
serving as further validation of that concept, and in turn generating additional match-
based  positive  feelings.  This  positive  feedback  loop  involving  feelings  of
encouragement and trust eventually led to the concept, “sinking in”.
“It  influences  me a lot  because I  think when you trust
someone about what they're saying and they ask you to
try something out and it works, you're encouraged. You
get that feeling like truly this has worked, this must work,
this  must continue to  work,  and the more you get  that
feeling that listen,  this is working, on a long period of
time, it just sinks in that listen, this is a good method I'm
using.” (PFT05)
The notion of concepts 'sinking in' to various degrees would enable an efficient thinking
system  to  prioritise  certain  concepts  over  others  during  the  process  of  comparing
perceptions with preconceptions, depending on the degree to which they have 'sunken
in'. Such a system would thereby be dependent on the experience of feelings, which in
themselves can be experienced in various 'grades' of magnitude and persistence. 
A  thinking  system  that  seeks  to  make  “connections”  between  perceptions  and
preconceptions, and does so using a feedback loop based on 'sunken in' concepts in turn
influenced  by  feelings  with  high  'grades'  of  magnitude,  would  enable  thinking  to
become predisposed towards the preference of certain specific concepts or clusters of
concepts over others. This tendency or ability was referred to by PFT11 as “pattern
recognition,” which could also be described as a general stance predisposed to attempt
to seek familiar patterns. She encapsulated this tendency in a simple statement. 
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“The  longer  you  do  something  the  more  you  can
recognise different patterns.” (PFT11)
  
The continuing tendency to actively seek out matches to, and 'follow' those patterns of
concepts  that  have  'sunk  in'  the  deepest,  resulted  in  what  PFT12  described  as  the
“comfort  zone”.  He defined this  as  the  state  in  which  one  persistently  favours  the
familiar and fears the unfamiliar, thereby repeating and validating the same thoughts
and behaviours, ultimately comprising a state not necessarily conducive with improving
and achieving one's goals. Indeed, once new challenges had been mastered or 'sunk in'
sufficiently they shifted towards familiarity, thus becoming part of a new and updated
'comfort zone'. After he used the term several times PFT12 was asked to elaborate on
its meaning. 
“The  things  that  you  are  already  capable  of  doing.
Maybe they were difficult the first time, but now since you
overcame that hard situation, for example if we're talking
about training you have a particular lift, the first time it
was hard even to learn the technique, but now you start
to  increase  and  increase  your  lift  and  let's  say  it's  a
hundred-kilo lift, once it was challenging, but when you
keep  doing  the  hundred  kilos,  there  is  your  comfort
zone... it becomes your comfort zone. You can adapt that
scenario in everything else in life, I think.” (PFT12)
PFT12  essentially  presented  a  model  that  accurately  described  the  physiological
adaptability  of  the  body  to  varying  intensities  of  training  stimuli.  By  alluding  to
psychological connotations and explicitly stating that such a model could be adapted to
many other “scenarios” in life, he also indirectly explicates the possibility of the same
model governing an efficient thinking system, facilitating the movement of concepts
into a 'comfort zone,' thereby increasing their availability and thereby greater thinking
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efficiency. The prospective nature of such a system is dicussed in more detail in chapter
five. 
This  section  has  sought  to  explicate  the  apparent  pervasiveness  of  feelings  in  the
thinking  processes  described  by  the  participants.  Feelings  were  interpreted  to  be
essentially  embedded  in  the  acts  of  matching,  mismatching,  updating,  and  forming
general concepts, serving as catalysts triggering or otherwise accenting, encouraging or
facilitating these processes. The reciprocity of feeling and conceptualising in on-the-job
thinking is directly alluded to via the following excerpt from PFT11’s interview. When
she used the term “intuition” and was duly asked to elaborate, her response presented
thinking and feeling as inseparable and virtually indistinguishable experiences.
“Interviewer: How would you define intuition? 
PFT11: It's a gut feeling. (laughs) 
Interviewer: What does the gut feeling feel like? 
PFT11: It's a yes or a no in your belly. 
Interviewer: So you feel it in your belly physically? 
PFT11:  Yes.  It's  the  trigger  that  makes  me  make
decisions and makes me... Yes, take action. 
Interviewer: So you trust this gut feeling then?
PFT11: Yes. 
Interviewer:  Can  you  tell  me  any  more  about  what  it
actually feels like? 
PFT11:  It's  a  feeling  in  the  belly,  so  when  you  ask
yourself a question, if it's a fluttery feeling it's a yes, if it's
dark kind of anxious feeling it's a no.” 
4.3.3 Summary of theme two
The accounts of PFTs of their on-the-job thinking revealed prominent use of general
concepts in the form of beliefs, ideas, schools of thought, philosophies, or 'main ideas'.
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Other additional concepts followed on from the main idea like 'chain reactions' ensuring
concepts and arrangements of multiple concepts could span from simple to complex,
and serve as useful ready-made guides for thoughts and behaviours. Participants were
able to select or 'follow' given concepts in various contexts and situations. 
The  use  of  general  concepts  in  multiple  situations  resembles  an  efficient  system,
avoiding the need for excessive time and energy spent deliberating anew in situations
similar to those previously encountered. Where deliberating anew would have in fact
been  beneficial,  questionable  conceptualising  and  hence  questionable  learning
outcomes may initially be considered to result from such 'chain reactions'. 
Conceptualising  and  other  thought  activities  employing  general  concepts  did  not
happen in isolation, but were reciprocal to feelings according to the descriptions of the
PFTs. Despite being asked to describe their thinking, participants often described their
feelings instead. Feelings could be experienced in 'grades' of magnitude or persistance,
promote memory storage and recall, influence decisions, and act as triggers to thinking
and learning of outcomes both questionable and apparently sound. 
Feelings could be directed towards concepts as though these were tangible objects or
people, showing degrees of attachment of PFTs to particular concepts. There was some
indication  that  participants  successfully  used  strategies  to  'manage'  their  feelings,
particularly in the case of negative feelings. Feelings were also integral to the process
of  conceptualising  inasmuch  as  they  served  to  accent  the  match  or  mistmatch  of
perceptions with preconceptions, and favour the use of familiar concepts in favour of
greater efficiency. This eventually led to concepts 'sinking in,' making the PFT more
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able  to  recognise  and  perceive  those  particular  patterns,  eventually  comprising  a
'comfort zone'.
Thinking  as  described  by  the  participants  was  difficult  to  reduce  to  pure  rational
thoughts alone, with feelings exhibiting a deep pervasiveness, explicating an apparent
connectivity and reciprocity between thinking and feeling.
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4.4 Theme three: On-the-job thinking by interaction
The  tendency  of  conceptual  thoughts  to  be  'triggered'  implies  the  existence  and
presence of a trigger. PFT07 had described how cascades of thoughts and behaviours
occurred upon being 'triggered', like 'chain reactions' leading from one to another in an
order or pattern perhaps influenced by the degrees to which the various concepts in
question had 'sunken in'.
On-going interaction operating on a number of levels is presented in this section as a
source of catalytic triggers to thinking. Interaction with others and the environment was
a 'trigger' specifically for the instances of on-the-job thinking that were clustered into
two of the three final super-ordinate themes dedicated towards thought activities; those
of  sensing  and  projecting,  emerging  alongside  conceptualising.  Sensing  included
thinking activities that employed general  concepts with the aim of making sense of
perceived  sensory  or  non-sensory  information  in  a  predominantly  reactive  manner,
while projecting included thinking activities that employed general concepts with the
aim  of  generating  imaginary  sensory  or  non-sensory  thoughts  in  a  predominantly
proactive or predictive manner. Thinking as a result of interaction was also experienced
linguistically by the participants while communicating verbally with other people, and
with themselves via another main super-ordinate theme that emerged among the final
eight; that of self-talk. This latter form of interaction is presented first in the following
sections. 
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4.4.1 Thinking while communicating
While  non-verbal  communication  was  prominent  throughout  the  transcripts,  verbal
communication with clients was the 'trigger'  to a significant amount of the thinking
described  by  PFTs.  The  participants  were  able  to  describe  trains  of  thought  and
realisations based on the straight-forward exchange of ideas arising from the very acts
of talking and listening. Some of the participants showed appreciation and commitment
to the idea of learning directly by communicating with others, and actively sought out
interactions they felt they could benefit from. PFT07 for instance described coming to a
realisation and being prompted to think about something new upon having his attention
drawn to it by a fellow PFT. 
“She said, 'Ah I see you're training girls now as well, I
see you're training women.' Because she was, 'Four years
I've seen you training men.' I didn't even realise this but
we spoke about it, I thought about it.” (PFT07)
PFT08 described the act of internalising or taking something “on board” when it was
directly  presented  by  someone  else,  in  this  case  an  observation  by  a  friend  that
validated the progress he had made in developing his interpersonal skills. 
“No it was like... she told me she prefers me now as I am,
rather than as I was, and I wasn't like, jumping around
about it, but I took it on board as a positive compliment.”
(PFT08)
Some PFTs  actively  sought  communication  and  the  solication  of  information  from
others  systematically  as  a  matter  of  routine.  PFT09  explained  how  she  would
deliberately request feedback from clients before each session, knowing that valuable
and useful information might be presented.  
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“Yes I like to have some feedback as well. How are they
feeling, whether they are happy with our programme. I
want to know their feedback. Even before I start a class
for example. I want to know for example if everyone is
OK, and I  go maybe 15 minutes before or  20 minutes
before and start speaking with them, I start telling them
whether they had any pains or not...” (PFT09)
PFT05 described a  similar  structured  and systematic  commitment  to  obtaining  new
information for his consideration directly from others, in this  case during the initial
consultation session. He described a set script of questions he used to guide himself
through this process, designed to elicit information on a “deep” and “emotional” level.  
“I go into much deeper questions like for example, 'What
is  affecting  your  life  today?  What  is  making  you  feel
weak, fatigued and sluggish? Have there ever been any
insults? Have you ever been through bullying? Do you
have medical conditions running in the family that you
are scared of experiencing?' That is when you meet the
client at a very emotional level.” (PFT05)
In terms  of  asking questions  and obtaining  information,  direct  communication  with
others appears to be a sound means of obtaining fresh, externally generated information
for  consideration  and  thought.  It  was  also  considered  significant  to  the  researcher,
therefore, that an even more prominent theme emerging from PFTs' accounts of their
thoughts,  more  so  than  communication  with  others,  was  communication  with
themselves, or self-talk.
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4.4.2 Self-talk
Self-talk,  where  actual  verbalised  conversation  with  another  person  was  replaced
instead by conversation directed internally with oneself, was prominent among the final
eight  super-ordinate  themes.  PFT04  described  a  relatively  seamless  continuation
between  these  two  forms  of  conversation,  from  interaction  with  someone  else,  to
interaction with himself, building on the externally-provided information by drawing
upon his own ideas and experiences via a bout of reflective self-talk. 
“Because I remember she told me not every client is the
same, they're going to come and be attending all the time,
and like, it's true, I started saying to myself, what was I
looking  for?  Was  I  looking  for  the  type  of  client  that
would be a regular, that would be attentive...” (PFT04)
 PFT11 expained how self-talk was a means of looking inside and understanding what
is going on inside one's head, a process guided by various consistent questions. 
“It means looking within to see what's going on in your
head.  Are  you  happy?  Are  you  content?  Those  are
questions  I've  always  been  asking  myself,  a  long  time
before this.” (PFT11)
PFT04 raised the  notion of  self-talk  through prayer,  whereby another  third-party  is
essentially introduced into the interactive relationship, to whom internal talk could be
directed, in this case a spiritual entity.
“I'm like, 'God...' I prayed so much. I said, 'God if you get
me out of this...' I told Him, 'I swear to you I'll never ever
do  this  again,  get  so  personal  with  the  client.'  And  I
swore, I swore, I said, 'God get me out of this... God get
me out of this...'” (PFT04)
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Incidentally,  PFT07  also  made  reference  to  the  notion  of  spirituality,  initially
associating it with self-awareness, although subsequently retracting the association. He
suggested that the ability to indulge in self-talk was a result of greater self-awareness.
The inability to engage in self-talk on the other hand was attributed to being rushed or
stressed, portrayed as a form of disconnection. 
“I believe everyone who is a bit more... you don't have to
be spiritual or whatever, you have to be just a bit more...
aware, pretty much. I believe everyone who is a bit more
aware has  this  internal  conversation going on. I  know
there are people who don't even... they rush so much that
they don't even stop and think about what happened to
them, about what happened, why it happened, where am I
going? I know there are so many people like this, very
primal, very rushed.” (PFT07)
The  notion  of  the  absence  of  self-talk  resulting  from  stress  or  being  rushed  was
incidentally corroborated by PFT09 in a later interview. She stated explicitly that being
rushed and busy prevented her from being able to spend time consciously thinking.
When  specifically  asked  if  she  ever  had  'internal  conversations'  with  herself,  she
confirmed her lack thereof, and immediately cited holding down two jobs as the main
reason. 
“...  Not that much, no. (Laughs) Really at the moment I
don't have time. (Laughs) No, no. I'm working a lot, with
two jobs. With manager and fitness, I'm working a lot at
the moment.” (PFT09)
PFT07 further explained that self-talk was an important part of the process of getting to
know oneself, and being or becoming more self-aware. He suggested that this was most
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likely  to  happen  during  times  when one  is  alone  and has  time  to  reflect.  He later
compared the self-statements arising from self-talk to a “guiding voice”.  
“Well...  through times and periods of my life when I've
been away on my own and when I haven't... when I really
had to abandon my social circle and go somewhere for a
period of time and do something, there have been periods
when I have spent quite a lot of time on my own. And at
these moments you become much more aware of yourself.
You become much more observant of others, and you...
since there is the absence of other people you become a
bit like Tom Hanks with... you know, what was the name
of the movie?”
 
“... It's a bit like a guiding voice. No matter how funny it
sounds it's a bit like a guiding voice.” (PFT07)
PFTs provided many examples of situations involving self-talk statements resembling a
'guiding  voice'  warning  against  various  dangers,  occurring  during  unfolding
emergencies or high-stakes situations. 
“Like, 'Hey, hold it, take a break, think.' You know, if you
say  certain  things  it  might  end  up  being  counter-
productive.” (PFT03)
“I was talking to myself, because I was thinking, 'Oh my
God she's dead, oh my God she's dead!'” (PFT06)
While the self-talk described by participants indeed featured such self-statements, the
majority of it tended to occur in the form of questions rather than statements. PFT06
described a bout of self-talk in the midst of an emergency situation consisting of a
series of self-questions occurring very quickly.
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“I  was  thinking,  'Oh  my  goodness  what's  happening?
What's going on?' I'm like,  'Why has she just  stopped?
How is she stopping and the treadmill is still moving? Oh
my goodness  she's  actually  collapsed...  she's  actually...
feinted...'” (PFT06)
PFT03 described another quick self-questioning sequence occuring during an episode
involving surprising behaviour and statements made by a client. 
“'Who is this person? Is she a lunatic telling me this in
front of these people?' That was my first thought. 'Is this
person for real? Coming to me talking about toilets?' You
know? That was the first thought process.” (PFT03)
When self-talk did not occur in spur-of-the-moment episodes involving some sense of
urgency, it featured in bouts of slower and more deliberative self-talk. PFT08 described
how his self-questioning sequences were typically built around the aim of evaluating
his day, based on what he could do better and what he should not have done. 
“...  It's  much  more  kind  of...  self-evaluation,  self-
evaluating myself...  the day that I've just gone through,
'What could I have done better? What should I have not
said?'” (PFT08)
PFT04 similarly described self-questioning sequences based on considering the facts,
determining fairness and correctness, and retrospectively evaluating alternative possible
reactions or behaviours. 
“So the reflection comes... I analyse the antecedent, the
start of it, and how it ended up, after I reflect, when I'm
reflecting. The start of it, what I did or what I've done or
what  I've  said,  and then I  go through it.  And I  say to
myself,  'But was I  fair? Was I  right? Did I do a good
thing?' And then I start analysing it. I start saying listen,
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'OK here is where I should have... she was right I should
have done this...'” PFT04
PFT05 reinforced the notion of scripted or structured self-questioning by explaining
how he would actually record the results of such 'internal conversations' in writing, for
future reference to continuously update and improve on the systems he employed.
“...  This type of system worked this type of system didn't
work because that type of client gave me that feedback,
also this client gave me that feedback or I was expecting
this reaction but I got a different reaction, so by time you
try  to  eliminate  what  doesn't  work  and you change  to
what works.” (PFT05)
Throughout the interviews and continuing recurrence of the notion of self-talk, given
that  questions  are  typically  asked by one  person to  another,  the researcher  became
increasingly interested in the origin of questions put to self, or rather, how participants
knew  what  to  ask  themselves.  PFT11  suggested  that  self-questions  arise  from  the
responsibility one holds for one's own happiness and well-being, and are shaped by the
various feelings one encounters throughout the day. 
“Well  I  believe  that  you are  responsible  for  your  own
happiness and your own well-being, and how things are
working out in your life, so those questions are coming
from that point of view, I guess. And how you go through
your day feeling. The things you get frustrated about, the
patterns that keep re-occurring.” (PFT11)
The  reference  to  'pattern  recognition'  and  its  influence  on  self-talk,  suggest  the
occurrence of internal interactions taking place between conceptual and feeling-based
thoughts  in  the  mind  in  a  similar  manner  that  permit  the  interactions  between
perceptions  and  preconceptions,  discussed  earlier  in  section  4.3.2.  The  interactions
188
appear to underpin a process occurring at a higher level of abstraction,  between the
subject and some conceived sense of self via the act of self-talk. In conjuction with the
external interactions taking place between the subject and the environment as well as
other people in the situational context, interactions across all levels appear to provide a
neat and seamless loop of continuous 'triggers' sustaining on-the-job thinking. 
Meanwhile, the explication of sensing and projecting as internal concept-interactions
specifically occurring on the micro level as indicated by participants' descriptions of
their on-the-job thinking, is presented in the following sections. 
4.4.3 Sensing
Among  the  final  eight,  this  superordinate  theme  emerged  alongside  two  others
dedicated to specific types of thinking activities. These were conceptualising, sensing,
and projecting.  While  conceptualising  included those thinking activities  involved in
creating,  updating  or  selecting  general  concepts  themselves,  sensing  and  projecting
were processes employing those concepts to satisy the requirements raised by on-going
interactions.  The  sensing  cluster  essentially  included  all  thinking  activities  that
employed general concepts with the aim of making sense of internally or externally
generated sensory or non-sensory perceptions in a predominantly reactive manner.
More  specifically,  annotations  comprising  this  cluster  included  thinking  activities
aimed primarily at understanding clients' reactions, thoughts, feelings, levels of ability,
wants, and needs. Sensing or reading the client was generally achieved at least initially
by  a  combination  of  verbal  communication,  and  simultaneous  observation  of  non-
verbal  cues and behaviours.  PFTs generally  agreed on the importance  of getting to
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know the client on a deep level before being able to select appropriate 'approaches' or
design effective exercise prescriptions for them. PFT04 and PFT05 both stressed the
importance  of  first  appointments  with  clients,  which  for  many fitness  professionals
traditionally consist of sit-down consultations where lifestyle, general health and fitness
are assessed, and wants and needs discussed.   
“That is why I need to feel the client when they come. I
need  to  feel  what  kind  of  client  this  person  is,  how
sensitive  they  are,  even  the  way  you  motivate  them...”
(PFT04)
“So the most exciting part, as ironic as it may sound, is to
get to know them at a very deep level,  because that is
when you can get the clients to direct themselves towards
where they want to be ... To know what is hurting them at
the moment like for example physical pain, mostly mental
pain,  and all  the stuff  they go through in life,  because
beneath those layers of fat  there is typically a story or
more  than  one  story  that  they  have  gone  through.”
(PFT05)
Getting to know the client  was typically an on-going process spanning well-beyond
initial  consultation  and  assessment.  Upon  being  asked  how  he  came  to  a  certain
conclusion about a particular client, PFT07 described his ability to do this by observing
their “actions and reactions.”
“You  never  know  what  is  happening  inside  a  persons
mind. Again I assume, it's a theory of mine. I get to that
conclusion from seeing people's reactions, so I get to that
conclusion  by  observing  their  reactions  and  their
actions.” (PFT07)
PFT05 explained in some depth, on at least one occasion, how he was able to get know
his  client  on  a  “deep”  level  by  observing  certain  visual  cues,  including  facial
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expressions and the appearance of the eyes. He used his perceptions of these cues for
the purpose of sensing the emotional state, confidence level, and determination of the
client. 
“The  way  she  changed,  the  way  she  got  so  emotional
really felt like there was a huge connection between her
emotions  and  her  expressions  for  example  her  facial
expressions. So that was a true gut feeling that even the
way her eyes looked, the way the facial expressions were,
(claps once) it was completely different, and I was like,
listen this girl is telling me... is expressing her pain.”
“Typically even the way clients walk in I already get to
sense  the  feeling  what  kind  of  people  they  are,  for
example their level of confidence, how much maybe, not
literally by just walking in but after a few minutes you
would soon realise if this person means that she really
needs to change or is just another consultation that she's
having...” (PFT05)
PFT08 similarly reported the ability to be able to see positivity on clients' faces, for the
purpose of assessing their enjoyment of the sessions he was delivering.
“If  I  see  they  enjoyed  the  session  and  enjoyed  the
programme, and I'd see positivity in their faces then it
would be, kind of, a plus for me... ” (PFT08)
PFT10 also specified which cues stood out for her in her observations of a particular
client she found challenging, nominating observations such as being short with words,
body language, and an “intense” look in the eyes. 
“Like when I ask him certain questions he wouldn't want
to tell me the answer, like he wants to hold back, like...
He never said it's none of your business but I'd kind of
191
get that sense, like... back off, when I didn't really ask any
intimate questions.”
“I guess it's just the way he looked, his eyes. He had a
real  stare,  like  a  really  intense  look.  Maybe  body
language as well, more than his eyes. ” (PFT10)
When asked to further elaborate on the specific visual cues they were using to draw the
various conclusions they cited about their clients, PFTs were indeed able to provide
some additional detail. PFT11 decribed how the sound of clients' breathing was a useful
cue in terms of what it actually sounded like, compared to what, in her opinion, it was
supposed to sound like, essentially matching perception with preconception.
“Because their breathing isn't going right. There's like,
unpleasant frustrating sounds sometimes, you know? The
breathing should be smooth.” (PFT11)
PFT10 showed similar examples of comparing client-performance-based perceptions to
preconceptions  of  what  is  considered  correct.  She  was  able  to  sense  the  level  of
difficulty  experienced  by  her  client  based  on  a  number  of  visual  cues,  including
incorrect  technique  and  body  position,  lack  of  smooth  movement,  and  excessive
sweating. 
“Because he couldn't  get right into the positions.  Even
just a simple squat he would... because he had a bit of a
hump, and he had issues in his knees and his ankles, he
couldn't bend properly, so any small movement would be
unfomfortable for him. I could tell obviously because it's
not smooth, so you can see it's uncomfortable. Maybe not
in pain but just not... it wouldn't be second nature to him
to do it, so anything he would be doing he's... even you
could see him sweating and like, really sruggling to do
it.” (PFT10)
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PFT12 similarly considered the way his client was “short” with his words as a sign he
was not feeling comfortable, simply because of preconceptions governing how much
people could normally be expected to say in certain contexts and situations.
“Their body language, yes, short... not that detailed, you
know? Lack of words... they just say yes or no, or let's try
it, maybe we'll do it, you know?” (PFT12)
PFT12 described how he would 'read'  clients  in  terms  of  sequences  of  behavioural
activities they should normally be able to carry out easily or “automatically.” Sensing
tension  was  thereby  possible  via  comparison  of  perceived  behaviour  with  the
preconceptions governing how one would appear when carrying out certain activities
confidently and competently.
“They will  be tense.  They  will  be tense...  they  will  for
example, make mistakes.... how do you say... they make
mistakes on what we do automatically, you know what I
mean?” (PFT12)
PFT06  showed  her  comparisons  of  perception  with  preconceptions  governing  what
someone medicated might be expected to look like, an image that for her must have
specifically involved someone not being able to open their eyes fully, as this was the
specific cue she highlighted upon concluding that her client must have been “heavily”
medicated. 
“She  was  quite  heavily  medicated  on  anti-depressants
and she really was just about coherent...”
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“But  literally  she  was  so  highly  medicated  that  she
couldn't... she could just about open her eyes... ” PFT06
Participants' descriptions also showed that carrying out sensing activities was possible
in relatively short periods of time, making them useful in emergency situations. In a
separate episode PFT06 was able to describe quite specifically, when pressed, which
visual cues had caused her to suspect that her client was disoriented.  
“Disoriented...  no  not  disoriented,  he  didn't  sound
disoriented,  but  he  acted  disoriented,  he  looked
disoriented... A bit dizzy looking... Becuase his eyes were
a little bit... going from one side to the other, just looking
around and taking... wider eyes...”
“He just looked a little bit, off-colour … So he was a little
bit white. Yes he went really pale.” (PFT06)
PFT11 showed internal interaction of concepts when sensing through her description of
her ability to effectively “read” clients via recognition of patterns of perceived body
language and speech. The ability  to sense effectively in this case would necessarily
depend on the availability and development of enough useful general concepts over
time. 
“You know, how you read people, in certain situations.
The longer you do something the more you can recognise
different patterns, different body language, and through
what  they  say  they  want,  you can  kind  of  figure  out.”
(PFT11)
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PFT12 also clearly stated his view that it was experience specifically that led to him
being able to sense a wider range of states in his clients. He also cited the ability to
effectively sense or 'read' clients as a useful and desirable ability for PFTs. 
“And there are some people who do not show, they do not
tell you. But from my experience I can tell that they are
shy, and I try to adapt the sessions.” (PFT12) 
4.4.4 Projecting
The final  super-ordinate  theme dedicated  towards  thinking  activities  included  those
based  on  projecting,  predicting,  imagining,  visualising,  or  otherwise  producing
perceived information, imagery, or thoughts that were not incoming from the external
environment, but rather generated internally. These thinking activities still occurred in
conjunction with, and based on, general concepts albeit in a predominantly proactive or
predictive  manner.  This  cluster  incorporated more specifically  those inter-subjective
themes  that  involved  instances  of  projecting,  visualising,  imagining,  simulating  or
predicting  images,  possibilities  or  scenarios,  and  any  essentially  mind-made  or
internally-generated perceptions. 
PFT11 defined empathy, for instance, precisely as the act of imagining or simulating
what another person might be feeling. She acknowledged however that the ability to do
this  depended  on  making  “connections”  with  one's  own  previous  concepts,  forged
through one's own similar experiences, showing that the projections must in some way
always depend and be built on readily available preconceptions. 
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“You can't  really  feel  anything that  you on some level
haven't  experienced  yourself  and  then  you  make  that
connection and empathy comes out of it. But even if there
is  things  that  you haven't  exactly  experienced  you can
still imagine what it would feel like if you were in that
situation.” (PFT11)
Instances  of  visualising  included  projecting  or  essentially  guessing  what  might  be
happening beyond the scope of one's own direct sensory experience. PFT04 described
how he imagined who might be in the company of the person to whom he was talking
on the phone, as well as what might be said by each person on the other end once the
phone  call  had  ended,  all  occurring  entirely  outside  his  own  sensory  range  of
experience.   
“What goes through my head I know for sure is that if
they are with their partner, if they are with their partner,
if this mobile rings, what is the partner going to say to
the person receiving the message, who messaged, at what
time, why? 'Oh it's just Dan he just messages at this time
he doesn't  know that  you have...'  you  know? That  still
goes through my head.” (PFT04)
Similarly PFT08 described his speculations about what might happen after a particular
incident would have come to an end, imagining what, if anything, might be said to his
superiors regarding the incident and his part in it. 
“I just thought, I think she's going to tell something to the
manager,  you  know  that  I  was  looking  at  her,  blah
blah...” (PFT08)
Visualising was also noted in the process of planning when participants described how
they would attempt to predict  possible outcomes in various situations.  Stressing the
visual  nature  of  such  thoughts,  PFT03  explained  how he  would  visualise  possible
196
resulting  scenarios  when  making  important  decisions  both  in  immediate  short-term
cases, as well as longer-term in the case of business decisions.
“I  picture the scenarios, visually,  if  I  would reply in a
certain way, if I act in a certain way, if I respond to a
stimulus in a certain way, what do I think will happen.”
“...  If I had to speak about the business, when I'm going
to invest in a studio, I'm going to think five or six years
ahead. So I think, yes, how much money am I going to
make next month, in the next year, what should I do in
that month and year to get a certain amount of money. If
I buy that studio what will happen if I don't manage, and
yes, basically those are the steps I think of in my mind.”
(PFT03)
Possible adverse scenarios could be visualised and predicted based on preconceived
memories of previous undesirable episodes. PFT06 explained how she would visualise
what might happen to a particular client who had previously feinted under her watch
should  she  push  him  too  hard  in  the  future.  The  visualised  thought  was  termed
specifically as a “flash” through her mind. 
“But every couple of sessions I would, right OK, today
I'm going to push you more. But then it flashed through
my mind yes OK I don't forget that when you do push
people, this might happen.” (PFT06)
PFT04  showed  how  vivid  projections  could  also  be  'triggered'  specifically  by
interactions  of a threatening nature.  Upon receiving the phone call  from his clients'
husband,  PFT04  described  visualisations  of  various  adverse  “imagined”  scenarios,
accentuated by the feeling of fear. 
“I mean I started imagining things like this guy is going
to come here, he's going to kill me, I'm going to find my
car all broken or I'm going to end up going to the gym
and he's going to do something to me at the gym, and I
kept on believing this, and this image kept on coming to
mind that  at  one  point  I'm going to  pay for  what  I've
done, for sure.” (PFT04)
Visualisations could also be generated and projected to span over extended periods of
time in the future. PFT05 described how he couldn't 'imagine' himself doing a paricular
type of work, simultaneously drawing on a projected concept of self together with the
associated feelings it might 'trigger'.  
“Then in my second year doing the national diploma in
IT (Information Technology) I was like, I don't imagine
myself  doing  this  any  longer,  it's  time  for  a  change.”
(PFT05)
Projecting also recurred in participants' accounts of their thoughts when they described
deliberataions about what they might do differently should a past situation repeat itself.
PFT03 described at least two incidents from his past in which he would have reacted
differently given what he currently knew.  
“Nowadays, being not in a stressful position, perhaps I
might understand that the reason he was lying to me was
perhaps  he  was  being  afraid  that  I'd  be  pissed  off  or
angry...” (PFT03)
“I would have said that's her character that's who she is.
You know I would have just took it in a funny manner and
then I would have told the management, and then from
there, whatever the manager decides, I'll see.” (PFT03)
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Upon discussing a forward or overly friendly comment from a female client in response
to which he had actually said nothing at the time, PFT08 deliberated what he might say
should the interaction repeat itself, specifically opting in this case for a humerous verbal
response. 
“I'll  say,  'Your  boyfriend's  doing  a  bad  job.'  (laughs)
Something like that, you know, just humour, just joking
about it. Hopefully it would be just humour. My intention
would be humour.” (PFT08)
PFTs also described a more systematic use of visualisation as a technique for managing
feelings or increasing motivation. PFT05 was able to explain a visualisation technique
he had used effectively in the past to manage strong feelings of anxiety, with some
degree of visual detail. 
“That's what I get, I get myself floating in water. I just
see it from the side like... I get it from the side...” (PFT05)
PFT09 explained how, for motivational purposes, she would superimpose a projected
image on top of the real one she saw in her reflection in the miror. The superimposition
would depict her according to how she would like to look in the future upon achieving
her personal fitness goals, specifically with additional muscle mass and less body fat. 
“When I  look  in  the  mirror  I  see  myself  more  leaner,
more muscle mass... I want that this comes to me. That I
want to achieve this.” (PFT09)
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4.4.5 Summary of theme three 
Concepts and thoughts were established in theme one as being 'triggered,' resulting in
'chain reactions' of thoughts and behaviours. theme two situates such triggers in an on-
going process of interaction between the person and others, the environment, one's own
self, as well as between the various concepts inside the person's mind. 
Thinking while communicating happened while talking with others as well as through
an 'internal conversation' with oneself. The ability to experience internal conversation
was associated with levels of self-awareness, attributing a lack thereof to being overly
rushed or stressed. 
When internal conversation occurred in the form of statements it was compared to a
'guiding voice' that was helpful to the participants. Internal coversation in the form of
questions was prominent and occurred in instances of quick thinking, as well as during
slower more deliberative 'internal conversations' which mostly occurred for the purpose
of self-evaluation or 'looking inside'. The development and origin of self-questions was
associated with memories and existing concepts.  
Interactions  were  seen  to  occur  on  an  internal  level  between  concepts,  on  an
intermediary level, still internally, between PFTs and an abstract concept of self, as well
as externally between PFTs and others or the environment providing a seamless flow of
'triggers' to on-the-job thinking.
Interaction  between the PFT and the client  was responsible  for the most prominent
thought activities arising from transcripts, which were sensing and projecting. Sensing
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was  predominantly  reactive  in  nature  and  generally  aimed  at  gaining  a  deeper
understanding of the person, often achieved by observing clients 'actions and reactions,'
non-verbal  cues,  or  any  aspect  of  their  behaviour  not  fitting  with  preconceived
expectations. The availability of concepts, therefore, was necessary for PFTs to be able
to sense effectively, which was considered a useful professional skill.  
Thought activities that produced internally-generated perceptions in a more proactive or
predictive manner occurred in cases of imagining what might be happening beyond the
scope of ones' immediate experience, visualising possible future outcomes, speculating
how one might  respond differently  should  a  past  situation  repeat  itself,  as  well  as
visualisating sensory-rich imagery for the purpose of managing feelings or increasing
self-motivation.  
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4.5 Theme four: Autonomy of on-the-job thinking
Certain aspects of PFTs' descriptions of their on-the-job thinking prompted, following
additional reflection on the part of the researcher throughout the data collection phase,
the inclusion of various prompts and probes throughout the course of the data-collection
period. Some of the objects  of these reflections  included the relationship between a
person  and  their  seemingly  abstract  concept  of  self,  the  origin  of  self-questions,
participants' difficulties in attempting to explain why they entertained various thoughts
or where they came from as well as the nature of, and degree to which, thoughts occur
outside the scope of conscious awareness, including during episodes of thinking that
could  typically  be  considered  explicit  or  deliberative.  The  prompts  and  probes
'triggered'  by  these  reflections  yielded  data  that  eventually  comprised  important
elements of the fourth and final main theme, expressed in this section. Given that tacit
learning in the context of on-the-job thinking was a prominent theme in the review of
literature, the notions of autonomy, awareness, and volition of thought were influential
in the early interpretive stance assumed by the researcher. 
4.5.1 On-the-job thinking independent of awareness 
In  one  of  her  emergency  incidents,  PFT06  described  an  impressive  sequence  of
cognitive  processes  occurring  automatically  and  independently  of  her  conscious
awareness spanning two similar incidents, years apart. 
“...  It was automatic... but learning from the first one it
was  automatic  not  just  an  arm,  [PFT06],  just  get  in
there! Get in there and hold him! He's going to fall, you
know?”
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“… So instead of just grabbing one arm I actually bear-
hugged him and stopped him from falling.” (PFT06)
Both incidents were similar, and involved a client losing consciousness. The speed at
which the incident occurred means that given the time available to act, it was unlikely
PFT06 deliberatively decided to carry out a “bear hug” instead of grabbing one arm as
she  had  done  in  the  previous  incident.  Despite  some  relatively  complex  cognitive
processing being required to match the unfolding experience with a prior memory, and
quickly deduce that bear-hugging would be a better response than grabbing one arm, as
well  as  the  creation  of  a  sense  of  urgency  and  internal  verbalisation  of  the  self-
statement  to,  “just  get  in  there...”,  the  underlying  thinking  in  question  happened
extremely rapidly and outside of her conscious awareness. She explicitly described her
decision as “automatic”. 
There was also a degree of autonomy during the first incident itself, where no prior
experience had as yet existed regarding possible reactions to a client suddenly losing
consciousness. She nevertheless explicitly stated how she had carried out the “quick
reaction” of grabbing the client's arm, “without thinking.”
“'She's  coming  back  she's  coming  back,  what's  she
doing?' And that was like just a quick reaction to grab
her arm... But that was a quick reaction just to grab her.
So I didn't think about that. ” (PFT06)
Just as conceptualising was previously presented in section 4.3.1 as an example of an
efficient thinking system, the ability to operate automatically without needing to engage
in excessive thinking also appeared to resemble an efficient  system. Indeed, PFT12
recognised the ability to carry out actions automatically that might otherwise require a
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degree of conscious deliberation, as useful and positively correlated with having “more
experience”.  
“There are situations  where you have to  adapt at  that
particular moment, and the more experience you have the
more  automatic  you're  going  to  be  how  to  face  the
situation.” (PFT12)
Cognitive processing at a level beyond conscious awareness was also noted in PFTs'
descriptions of their abilities to carry out a certain action or task without knowing how
they were able to do it. In the case of sensing, the outcomes of this particular type of
thinking activity often presented themselves to the participants as feelings about what
was being sensed, without them knowing exactly how the conclusions in question were
being drawn. This was plainly stated by PFT09, who in a case of sensing that her client
was shy, inferred an ability to draw such conclusions without being entirely aware how.
“I don't know how to explain it, but you can see someone
if he is shy or he is not confident enough even when he's
doing some training...” (PFT09)
PFTs had previously described their ability to sense clients by observing specifically
nominated visual  cues,  however these details  often required some probing from the
interviewer before they were divulged. Many of their descriptions were instead based
on  feeling something  to  be  the  case,  or  as  described by PFT10,  in  the  absence  of
knowing  the  underlying  processes  leading  to  the  drawing of  a  given conclusion,  a
“vibe”. 
“I kind of got the sense that he didn't want to be there,
you know what I mean? So I just kind of... I could think
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that the wife dragged him there so they train together,
that's the vibe I got off them.” (PFT10)
The  existence  of  unknown  underlying  thought  processes  occurring  in  a  domain
inaccessible  to  the  conscious  awareness  of  a  subject,  was  also  reinforced  by  the
apparent difficulty experienced by PFTs in accessing various thoughts on demand or
“out of the blue”.  Some of the participants  explained their  inclination  to  remember
things  only in  relevant  situations,  or by having them 'triggered'  by other  similar  or
related thoughts.  PFT07 quite clearly explained how certain memories  were “stored
somewhere,” but he could not always freely recall or think about them. Upon being
'triggered',  the  movement  of  such  memories  into  the  implied  field  of  conscious
awareness, and inferred transformation into perceptible thoughts, would be experienced
as a “click” in the mind. 
“I tend to forget things form the past even when you ask
me how long you've been doing this for, it's really hard
for me to give you a frame like I've been doing form April
2000,  it's  really  hard  so even past  experiences  I  don't
really...  I  store  them somewhere  and when we  start  a
conversation  about  a  certain  subject  or  certain  event,
then it triggers, it clicks, but I tend to really keep them,
you know, at... how should I explain, I don't really try to
remember them.” (PFT07)
The notion of memories and thoughts 'clicking' into one’s mind from some underlying
non-conscious  domain  to  a  conscious  one  as  a  result  of  contextual  or  conceptual
interactions,  suggests  that  'chain  reactions'  of  thoughts  span  both  domains,  with
segments originating, terminating or otherwise migrating in or out of an implied field of
conscious awareness. PFT12 illustrated how decisions were made automatically as a
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result  of  previous  existing  research  and  knowledge  at  some  point  'clicking'  into
awareness, thus presenting the PFT with a workable solution.  
“It  just  comes automatically  which exercises  I  need to
choose because I know what exercises target what muscle
group for example,  through research, through previous
education...” (PFT12)
The notion  of  an internal  and automatic  interaction  of  thoughts  taking place  across
implied conscious and non-conscious domains was discussed in some depth with the
participants particularly in the context of their experience of self-talk. PFT07 described
self-talk as a result of the “natural” mental processes that occurred throughout the day
in response to the various experiences he encountered, or things that “impressed” him.  
“They are part of my mental processes during the day.
Part of my, you know, part of the things I evaluate on my
own.  Part  of  my  internal  conversation,  they  happen.
Sometimes they just happen like something impressed me
or God knows on what level, and it comes back to me and
sometimes something really impressed me and I, 'OK let's
see what happened here, why did this happen?' And I try
to explain to myself... see if it's safe to go outside of the
cave or no... (laughs)” (PFT07)
While  PFT07 described the  tendency  of  things  to  make an 'impression,'  essentially
'triggering'  some  'chain  reaction'  eventually  leading  to  a  thought  'clicking'  into
conscious awareness, PFT12 similarly cited the trigger of “being stuck” as opposed to
something simply making an impression, as the 'trigger' to reflective self-questioning. 
“Sometimes  I  ask  myself  questions  when  I'm  stuck  at
something.  Because  when  you  don't  face  difficult
moments you just keep on going. You won't realise you
have to think deeper.” (PFT12)
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The various  occurrences  that  make  'impressions'  or  cause  people  to  become 'stuck'
throughout the course of their on-going interactions, are thereby portrayed as ‘triggers’
prompting ‘chain reactions’ of actions, reactions, thinking and learning. 
“Sometimes you don't plan it. Sometimes you're just there
doing  your  daily  work  and  you  hear  someone  talking
about something, like why they're lacking in motivation.
And you try to ask what.” (PFT12)
PFT10 also explained how the reflective process would arise naturally out of things that
had  happened,  which  in  her  particular  case  was  triggered  by  the  feeling  of
awkwardness.
“But if for example I just had that one session and then
I'm driving back home that's usually my time to reflect.
So on my way home I kind of reflect on it, thinking why
was this so awkward, or whatever. And kind of thinking...
you know you kind of replay it in your mind…”
“That's kind of my time to... when I'm driving is always
when the mind starts working... it's like my mind starts to
wander when I'm driving because I'm not really thinking
about anything... you're just, driving. So that's when my
mind  starts  to  wander,  so  it  could  wander  around
anything but if that's the situation I'm thinking about the
PT session that  just  happened...  I  guess I still  thinking
about what happened and why it felt awkward.” (PFT10)
Through  the  portrayal  of  thoughts  and  behaviours  as  natural  flowing  phenomena
impelled by various interactions, and the notion of the mind 'wandering' automatically,
the impression of thinking as an act occurring seemingly independently of volition is
thus revealed. 
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4.5.2 On-the-job thinking beyond volition
The  term  'mind-wandering'  characterises  a  natural  or  fluid  nature  to  participants'
reflections.  The  interviewer  duly  probed  this  notion  by  specifically  asking  the
participants if they employed a set repertoire or structured approach in their reflections.
PFT08 insisted that his reflections were unplanned, and happened “naturally”.
“Sometimes  they  just  come  to  me  naturally  and
sometimes I just kind of reflect and see what I could do
better, to improve. But no there's no set repertoire as you
said. Sometimes they just, you know... I think about them,
and sometimes you just... you know... they happen quite
naturally. I never sit down and say OK I'm going to think
about this day, I'm going to think about what would... it
just comes in naturally.” (PFT08)
PFT11 similarly depicted reflection as a fluid process, unplanned, and as something that
“happens naturally.” 
“It's definitely a more fluid process, yes. I don't sit down
and think right now I'm going to reflect, now I'm going to
see what's going on, and make things better or worse or
whatever. Yes, it happens naturally.” (PFT11)
Given that the reflections described by participants appeared to be largely unstructured,
while  including  bouts  of  self-talk  and  self-questioning,  the  interviewer  sought  to
establish how, in the absence of externally posed questions, the participants knew what
to ask themselves.  PFT11 offered some insight here,  eventually  pinning it  down to
“intuition” in the following excerpt.
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“Interviewer: Apart from your meditations would you say
that  you  are  quite  disciplined  with  your  thinking
sessions? Are they planned? 
PFT11: Not planned. I don't think they are planned. 
Interviewer: But there is structure to them? 
PFT11:  There  is  structure  in  the  sense  of  wanting  to
better myself  or better a situation and come up with a
solution. 
Interviewer: And how do you know what questions to ask
yourself?  How  do  you  know  which  questions  need
asking? 
PFT11: I don't know. Could it be intuition?”
When asked how she knew what to ask herself during bouts of self-questioning, PFT10
answered simply, “I don't. They just, do. I just think about it.” PFT07 further intimated
fluidity  of  thought  in  self-talk  by  explicitly  stating  that  most  people  cannot  tell
themselves what to think.
“It's like... you don't really tell yourself what to think of,
no it's very few people who tell themselves what to think
of, you know, and they can direct their...”
“Well... it's common sense.” (PFT07)
PFT10 likened the experience of some of her reflections to a “broken record,” replaying
in her mind, which changes only when it is replaced by something else that might act as
a trigger provided by the on-going interactions one experiences. 
“I  guess maybe it  just  keeps  replaying in  my mind, so
whatever it is. I mean I probably do the same with this
now. (laughs) This is the way it is for me. I don't know I
guess it's kind of like a broken record sometimes. It takes
a while until I move on to something else.” (PFT10)
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PFT06  explicitly  reinforced  the  notion  that  in  terms  of  how they  are  experienced,
reflections  happen  automatically,  that  they  somehow  start  and  continue  to  persist
beyond one's control or volition.
“I try to tell myself to stop over-analysing. It does happen
to  me  automatically.  I'll  over-analyse  a  friend,  a
conversation, why did I say this instead of saying that?”
(PFT06)
Just as feelings were seen to be experienced in terms of magnitude and persistance,
their  associated thoughts were also reported to as part of that persisting experience,
once  again  seemingly  occurring  beyond  the  scope  of  volition,  and  described  as
“playing” on one's mind. 
“I  must  have  been  thinking  about  it  all  afternoon.  It
played on my mind for days. Because I felt sorry for her
and I didn't want it to happen again.” (PFT06)
“It would play on my mind and try to make like,  make
sense of it all.” (PFT05)
In terms of volition or control, PFT08 discussed the notion of whether thoughts actually
needed  to  be  controlled  or  not.  He  explains  the  tendency  of  thoughts  to  happen
naturally as something positive in a healthy individual, and that internal conversation in
particular was an aspect of thinking that was useful and indeed valuable. 
“I don't really have to control it. I believe people who are
unhealthy  and have  mental  issues,  they  have  to  try  to
control it. I mean for me it's part of who I am, it's part of
a healthy human being, so I don't really have to control
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it,  it's...  it's  part  of  me  really,  and  there  have  been
situations when, there is no one to give me advice or to
tell me what and how. And there is this internal voice that
will  tell  me...  I  hope  I'm  not  sounding  crazy...  which
would tell me...  OK let's say in a situation...  'OK calm
down, wait a bit, you might not be right...' or 'Wait, let's
see what else there is, it might not be as you think it is...'
and it's really, for me not something I have to control. It
is part of me and I'm very proud and very happy that I
actually have this internal conversation.” (PFT07)
Faced with the notion that thoughts could be experienced beyond conscious control, the
issue  of  subjectivity  was  further  probed  by  the  interviewer.  PFT06  verbalised  the
quandary of lack of control through a simple comment she made about her reaction
during an emergency situation.  
“... But at that moment when I was going through it, and I
helped her and I got on the floor, something just takes
over...” (PFT06)
By suggesting that  something takes over, PFT06 essentially establishes herself as an
experiencing  but  not  volitional  subject.  In  his  discussion  of  memory  recall,  PFT07
outlines the notion of a “healthy brain,” citing it as the entity responsible for recalling
and generating thoughts. 
“Of course. I don't think about them on an everyday basis
but  they  reflect  on  what  you're  doing and  how you're
doing it.  And you recall  them as well,  it's  the way the
brain  functions.  If  the  brain  functions  properly,  yes.
Because it could be that you cannot recall them as well,
but if the brain functions properly, yes.” (PFT07)
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PFT05 reinforced the notion of the brain as an originator of thoughts independently of
the concept of one's conscious volitional self, when he referred to his experience of it
taking “the front seat” during various bouts or episodes of thinking. 
“So  basically,  I  don't  know  it's  maybe  because  sub-
consciously I take the decision that listen, doing exercise
for example doesn't involve a lot of thinking, so maybe
that is when the brain like takes the front seat and tries to
take me directions, et cetera et cetera.” (PFT05)
In addition to the ability of the brain to 'take the front seat' and take the felt conscious
self in various 'directions,' he later developed the notion further by describing how, in a
particular  situation,  the  brain  was capable  of  “rationalising”  that  studying could  be
afforded a low priority, allowing various other thoughts to “come in”.
“I  think  that  the  brain  rationalises  that  listen,  the
studying could take the back seat even thought it's still
only an hour I'm dedicating to the studies every day, and
that is when a lot of thoughts start to come in.” (PFT05)
PFT12 corroborated an apparent independence of the brain or mind when asked if he
allocated time to thinking and planning. He described the futility of attempting such an
exercise,  instead  reinforcing  the  fluid  and natural  nature  of  thoughts  to  arise  from
interactions and ‘chain reactions’.  
“I think it's useless you plan to try doing something when
it's not the right time. I prefer to leave it for when it's the
right time to do it, and I focus more. Sometimes you plan
like a half day for doing programmes, and you start but
your mind is not there. And one day out of the blue your
doing something  else  and a plan  just  comes  into  your
mind, or for example we're here, sitting here and we see
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something, or I hear something and it reminds me about
that scenario.” (PFT12)
The notion of thoughts as an automatic product of a 'healthy brain' being presented to a
conscious perceiving subject as an experience was evident in a description by PFT11
who commented further about the actual deep and subjective nature of such thoughts.
Upon being asked how various images were experienced during the process of choosing
exercises to include in a session, she engaged in a deep reflection about how indeed
these thoughts she knew she so regularly experienced actually presented themselves. 
“Like a picture that's in black and white... I think... I've
never  asked  myself  these  questions.  This  is  really
interesting because I have to think... are they really? And
how  do  I  think  about  them?  I  think  it's  just  pictures
coming to my mind as I go through the sequence, as you
build it.” (PFT11)
While she was aware of the product of such thinking in terms of its outcomes and her
ultimately knowing what exercises she should use, the extent or level of this awareness
came into question when the appearance of images she essentially ‘saw’ on an almost
daily basis was so challenging to describe, despite knowing exactly what such images
portrayed in terms of which exercise to choose. 
4.5.4 Summary of theme Four
Theme  four  explored  volition  or  wilful  causation  of  thoughts  attributable  to  a
consciously volitional person, and awareness or lack thereof of thinking by that person.
Participants  tended  to  attribute  aspects  of  their  behaviour  to  particular  third-person
concepts  of  self  when  this  was  arguably  not  strictly  necessary  for  a  first-person
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conscious  thinker  to  do.  Deeper  implications  of  subjectivity  of  thought  were  then
sought.  Notions of autonomy, awareness and volition of thought were,  therefore,  of
significant influence on the interpretive stance held by the researcher. 
PFTs engaged in behaviours requiring relatively complex cognitive processing which
sometimes  occurred  at  a  level  almost  entirely  independent  of  conscious  awareness,
quickly  and  efficiently  without  the  need  for  excessive  time  or  energy  invested  in
thinking  deliberatively.  They  were  also  able  to  carry  out  abilities  like  sensing  and
drawing conclusions about clients without knowing exactly how they did it. They were
similarly unable to recall certain memories 'out of the blue,' but rather indicated that
such thoughts 'came in' when needed or when prompted by the presentation of similar
or connected thoughts or memories.
Thoughts making the transition into conscious awareness were experienced as a 'click'
in the mind, seemingly representing the end result of a chain reaction of prior thoughts
on-going outside of conscious awareness, themselves triggered by on-going interactions
on various levels. Reflective self-talk was described as being triggered by things that
made an impression or by being 'stuck'. These acted as triggers to subsequent chain
reactions of thoughts, actions, and reactions. Reflections were described as fluid and
unstructured,  from the mind-wandering 'just happening,' somehow beyond control or
volition.  The  tendency  of  thoughts,  like  feelings,  to  occur  in  various  grades  of
magnitude or persistence, also suggested they occurred beyond conscious control, and
that control was not necessarily actually needed, since this was generally a productive
process when performed by a healthy brain. 
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In terms of subjectivity, PFTs accounts suggested themselves as perceivers of thoughts
rather  than  causers.  The  brain  was  nominated  as  the  entity  that  is  in  control,
independently of the concept of a conscious and volitional self. A healthy brain acts as
originator of thoughts which are presented to the consciously perceiving self. The exact
nature  of  the  experience  of  the  presentation  of  these  thoughts  was  challenging  to
describe, suggesting that awareness also takes place in grades of magnitude. 
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4.6 Initial eidetic description
Based on annotated  interpretations  of  meaning-rich  aspects  of  ten  interviews  about
participants’ experiences of on-the-job thinking, the intial stages of a reflective eidetic
analysis were carried out to begin reducing the data to its essence. Imaginative variation
was used to begin identifying and removing incidental  aspects, to encapsulate more
essential features in the four main themes, themselves constituting the basis of an initial
eidetic description.  
Concepts of self appeared to be of significant influence on participants’ thoughts and
behaviours. They constituted ready-to-use guides or blueprints for a variety of actions
and interactions in a range of situations and contexts. How participants saw themselves
as trainers and as people, or how they would like to see themselves, were captured in
these abstract conceptual types. It was interesting to note that participants often referred
to themselves as being particular “types” of persons as justification for various thoughts
and behaviours, comparing themselves to third (albeit conceptual) parties, as opposed
to conceptualising  their  thoughts  or  behaviours  on a  strictly  first-person basis.  This
tendency stood out as a noteworthy feature of participants’  on-the-job thinking, and
perhaps even more significant, was the apparent choice PFTs had in ‘following’ various
self-concepts, and their propensity for modification and development through learning.
Guiding concepts were also noted in a more generic sense, in the form of beliefs, ideas,
schools of thought, philosophies, or 'main ideas'. Additional concepts followed on from
the  main  ideas  like  'chain  reactions',  to  be  ‘followed’  in  a  range  of  contexts  and
situations, quickly and efficiently. Examples of learning outcomes resulting from the
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use of general concepts however, were sometimes questionable. Participants’ accounts
were  rich  in  descriptions  of  feelings  and  feeling  states,  which  also  appeared
significantly influential on thoughts and behaviours. Some participants were aware of
this  influence  and described various  strategies  for  managing negative  or  unpleasant
feelings.  Feelings  of  various  grades  of  magnitude  and persistence  were  not  merely
catalytic to thinking, but also appeared integral to it, accenting reasoning processes with
regard  to  the  compatibility  or  otherwise,  of  incoming  perceptions  with  existing
preconceptions, and promoting the 'sinking in' of various particular concepts.
‘Triggers’ to ‘chain reaction’ thinking were seen as being emergent from interaction on
various levels, externally between subject and others and the environment, or internally
between subject and own sense of self, as well as internally between existing concepts.
Verbal communication too, was an example of such interaction, taking place not only
externally with others, but also internally via frequently cited episodes of self-talk. The
origin of self-questions and self-statements made during such ‘internal conversation’
was attributed to the internal interactions of existing conceps. The experience of on-the-
job thinking was conceivable as the result of a seamless flow of 'triggers' originating
from interactions on these various internal and external levels. 
The  majority  of  thinking  processes  arising  from  interactions  with  others  and  the
environment were categorised broadly as sensing and projecting, both based on existing
concepts, which in themselves engendered a third category of thinking activities aimed
at their creation,  modification, or selection (conceptualising). Sensing and projecting
were based on the interactions between externally or internally generated perceptions,
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and existing preconceptions. Sensing and projecting, therefore, appeared to often occur
simultaneously. 
These and other complex cognitive processes were noted during the interviews, some of
which  occurred  quickly  and  autonomously  without  the  need  for  excessive  time  or
energy invested in thinking deliberatively. PFTs were also able to carry out abilities like
sensing and drawing conclusions about clients without knowing exactly how they did it.
They were similarly unable to recall certain memories 'out of the blue,' and described
how such thoughts 'came in' only when needed or when prompted by the presentation
of  similar  or  connected  thoughts  or  memories.  Thoughts  making the  transition  into
conscious awareness were experienced as a 'click' in the mind, seemingly representing
the  end result  of  a  chain  reaction  of  prior  thoughts  that  were on-going outside,  or
beneath  the  surface,  of  conscious  awareness,  themselves  triggered  by  on-going
interactions. 
Reflections  were  typically  described  as  fluid  and  unstructured,  a  result  of  mind-
wandering,  'just  happening',  seemingly  beyond  conscious  control  or  volition.  The
tendency of thoughts, like feelings, to be experienced in various grades of magnitude or
persistence,  portrayed  their  occurrence  as  increasingly  beyond  conscious  control.
Subjects  appeared,  therefore,  to  experience  rather  than  cause  such  thoughts.  And
finally, the experience of such thoughts in terms of their actual nature, or how they
presented themselves, exactly, was challenging to describe.
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Chapter five: Discussion
5.1 Preamble
Following De Lyon and Cushion’s assertion that formal learning channels had failed to
equip fitness professionals with sufficient or suitable knowledge for the “real world”
(2013, 1408), OJL was presented in chapter two as the main, or “most important”, way
professionals  learn  following the  cessation  of  formal  education  and training  (Eraut,
2004; Marsick et al., 2006; Melton et al., 2010; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013). Despite
its  apparent  importance,  however,  OJL  remains  poorly  understood  and  under-
researched (Eraut, 2004; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013). The specific tendency for OJL
to occur predominantly tacitly was considered,  following a review of two bodies of
literature on sector-specific research and more general theories of experiential learning,
as a primary cause for the prevention of continuing research in the field, and active
caution among researchers, educators, and trainers, against prioritising it as an on-going
process (Eraut, 2004; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013). The tacit-ness problem was further
reduced throughout the ensuing thesis to the more specific problem of tacit on-the-job
thinking,  and  the  phenomenological  perspective  invoked  as  a  viable  means  of  re-
conceptualising  it  as  a  phenomenon,  potentially  addressing  the  current  impasse  in
further studying OJL. Two main research questions were posited concerning first, the
essential nature of on-the-job thinking according to the subjective accounts of PFTs,
and second, how such insights might inform or otherwise facilitate or promote a revival
of research and development in the field of OJL. To address these questions, a research
design  was  presented  in  chapter  three,  based  on  a  general  qualitative  scientific
methodology, classical phenomenology, and phenomenological designs as implemented
in various modern research contexts. 
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Following the data collection phase, which was based on episodic phenomenological
interviews with ten PFTs, initial themes were constructed by articulating interpretive
annotations (Smith and Osborn, 2008) in the initial  stages of data analysis, that “go
beneath”  the  “immediate  experience”  (Aagard,  2017,  523),  as  opposed  to  purely
describing  meaning-rich  units  in  the  transcripts  (Giorgi  et  al.,  2016).  This  pivotal
methodological decision was made due to the unique requirements of the first research
question, since pursuit of the essential nature of on-the-job thinking would require a
probing of hidden or deeper aspects of PFTs’ descriptions, that  “leak out”, of which
participants themselves may not have necessarily been aware (Smith and Osborn, 2008,
53). In the previous chapter, a detailed exposition of the emergence of these annotations
and their resulting themes was carried out to ensure transparency, and to allow other
researchers to follow and critique the main interpretations and decisions made. Theme
development  at  this  early  stage  was  predominantly  influenced  by  modern
phenomenological methods, namely those emerging from the interpretive school (Smith
and Osborn, 2008), based on the researcher’s own position as a primary instrument of
analysis. The researcher’s own position was outlined and discussed in chapter three
(section 3.6.1) with a view to establishing context and background to the interpretations
and decisions made. The previous chapter culminated in an initial eidetic description of
the phenomenon of on-the-job thinking, according to the researcher’s interpretations of
PFTs’ accounts. 
In  this  chapter,  the  initial  eidetic  description  is  subjected  to  continuing  reflective
phenomenological analysis, in pursuit of a deep and final eidetic description of pure
essence  in  the  Husserlian  sense,  albeit  through  the  unavoidable  interpretive  veil
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acknowledged by both Husserl and Heidegger. The final description is finally given an
analogous quality in the tradition of Merleau-Ponty, as well as the descriptive vibrancy
and creativity associated with the interpretive phenomenological style espoused by Van
Manen (1996). 
The  final  eidetic  description  is  hereby  constructed (in  the  Heideggerian  sense)
throughout  the  following  chapter.  It  is  presented,  precisely,  as  a  phenomenological
description, and not as a model designed or intended to uncover or “search for causal
laws”  (Aagard,  2017,  524).  In  other  words,  it  is  presented  as  a  descriptive  and
“contestable” (Aagard, 2017, 524) construct of phenomenological thinking, rooted in
subjective  science,  and  not as  an  explanatory  or  predictive  construct  of  “natural
thinking”  (Husserl,  1973,  18),  rooted  in  objective  science.  The  analogous  and
metaphorical aspects of the final eidetic description are intended to non-experimentally
“clarify” rather than “quantify” (Salkind, 2003, 221), with an underlying aim to “endow
scientific operations with meaning” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 68), to the extent analogies
can indeed be considered “profitable” in advancing human understanding of complex
phenomena  in  the  natural  sciences  (Roediger,  1980,  231).  By  knowing  analogies,
according to Brentano, “everything becomes transparent, easier to grasp and to retain”
(1995, 75). 
The imagistic nature of the analogy developed throughout the course of the chapter is
intended,  in  accordance  with  Van  Manen’s  tradition  of  creative  phenomenological
description, to show rather than tell (2017, 788). The final eidetic description (together
with its  accompanying analogy)  is  thus  offered as  the  first  part  of  the researcher’s
unique contribution to knowledge, as a re-conceptualisation of on-the-job thinking in
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the context of OJL, based on the perspectives phenomenological inquiry is uniquely
positioned to uncover, with a view to prospectively yielding alternative and original
lines  of  further  inquiry  in  addressing  the  current  impasse  hampering  continuing
exploration  of  OJL.  The  prospective  contribution  of  the  final  description  is  then
discussed in more detail in chapter six. 
With respect to methodological rigour, as discussed in chapter three (section 3.5.3), a
commitment is maintained throughout the ensuing narrative, representing steps four and
five of the research method, towards “elaboration and maturation” (Morrow, 2005, 252)
of the key ideas, drawing on philosophical concepts, existing literature, and the words
of participants themselves. Question one is addressed first, elucidating the development
of the final eidetic description itself, followed by question two, with a discussion of the
relevance and applicability of such a description with respect to facilitating a revival of
research and development in the field of OJL. 
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5.2 The essential nature of on-the-job thinking in the context of learning
According to the researcher’s interpretations of PFTs’ accounts and their culmination in
a final set of main themes, the initial eidetic description of the phenomenon of on-the-
job thinking presented in conclusion of chapter four, can be further summarised and
articulated, in brief, as follows: 
Acts  of  on-the-job  thinking  were  described  as  ‘chain  reactions’
triggered by the seamless flow of interactions both internal (with
oneself) and external (with others and the environment), occurring
in  various  grades  of  magnitude  and  persistence,  based  on
‘following’ existing concepts or ‘main ideas’, and aimed primarily
at sensing and/or projecting. 
Upon closer evaluation, and subject to further phenomenological reflection, traces of
the  natural  attitude  were  considered  to  be clearly  evident  in  the  above description.
Further  to  the  methodological  discourse  in  chapter  three,  from  a  natural  thinking
perspective,  phenomena  in  the  world  must  be  conceived  as  quantifiable  objects,  or
objectified, so that objective science can proceed with methods based primarily on their
comparison and correlation. William James emphasised the very natural ability of the
mind to make  comparisons between objects  presented  to  it,  as  one of  its  strongest
faculties  (2017, 210),  and a firm basis  for  natural  thinking in the objective science
sense.  Philosophical thinking  on  the  other  hand,  according  to  Husserl,  is  based
primarily  not  on  comparison,  but  on  clarification of  phenomena  (1973,  15).  By
employing the phenomenological  attitude  of  epoché,  the reflecting  phenomenologist
must suspend all  judgements  resulting from, or based on, the methods and facts  of
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objective science (Husserl, 1960, 25). The initial eidetic description, therefore, was re-
evaluated  with  the  aim  of  further  clarification,  to  lessen  reliance  on  the  facts  or
assumptions associated with objective science, and address evident traces of the natural
attitude.
The learning process has been traditionally modelled by education scholars in terms of
objectified temporal phases like grasping and transforming (Kolb, 1984), or input and
output (Eraut,  2004). Such models depict  their  inherent thinking aspects in terms of
further delineated acts, like “fact-finding” (Lewin, 1952), “hypothesising”, “mentally
elaborating” (Dewey, 1910), “observing”, “conceptualising” (Kolb, 1984), “reflecting”
(Dewey, 1910; Kolb, 1984), “interpreting”,  and “examining” (Marsick and Watkins,
1990). In chapter two, such conceptualisations of thinking and learning were presented
as  partly  responsible  for  the  impasse  in  studying  OJL,  in  light  of  its  problematic
theoretical  foundations.  Existing  models  were  further  argued  to  be  teleological,  or
excessively outcome-based, populated by constructs defined by their relevance to the
desired outcome, rather than by the true essential nature of the thinking acts they are
meant  to  describe.  In  his  dissemination  of  thinking  in  action,  based  on  prevailing
theories of learning and cognition, Eraut (2004) concluded that processes in OJL must
be even more complex than previously thought, and hence remain poorly understood by
researchers  and  stakeholders.  Despite  a  commitment  towards  empirical  objective
science  in  his  work,  Vygotsky  was  similarly  critical  of  the  early  development  of
psychological methods and research strategies, on grounds of their reliance on the study
of “separate, isolated and abstracted processes” (1987, 41).
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In  the  absence  of  re-conceptualisation  and  clarification,  fundamental  concepts  in
theories pertaining to OJL have remained riddled with the type of “obscurities” Husserl
professed as the inevitable outcome of objective science (1960, 4). It has been argued in
this  thesis,  that  education  and learning  theory  (particularly  its  aspects  pertaining  to
OJL),  which  currently  draws  heavily  on  the  academic  disciplines  associated  with
cognitive  science,  stands  to  benefit  from  a  re-conceptualisation  of  its  theoretical
underpinnings with respect to its thinking aspects in particular. Use of the term thinking
as opposed to cognition, for instance, is, throughout this thesis, intended to highlight, at
least in part, such a prospective shift, towards basing education and learning theory on a
phenomenological  description  of  thinking,  rather  than  an  (objective)  scientific
explanation of cognition. 
The  initial  eidetic  description  articulated  above,  pending  further  phenomenological
analysis and critical reflection, most certainly does not, as yet, constitute a suitable re-
conceptualisation of on-the-job thinking. On the contrary, it can be interpreted, in parts,
as  a  validation  of  certain  aspects  of  existing  prevalent  models  rooted  in  cognitive
science and natural thinking. It is subject, therefore, to the very pitfalls associated with
objective  science  it  seeks  to  address.  For  any description  of  on-the-job  thinking  to
suitably represent a less problematic underpinning of theories pertaining to OJL, the
tendency  towards  objectification,  separation  and  isolation,  requires  due  restraint.
Through “imaginative variation”, which is considered to be a principal tool of eidetic
analysis (Aagard, 2017, 521; Giorgi et al., 2017, 182), or as termed by Husserl,  the
“uncovering” by “imagining all variations” (1960, 69), a vigorous and intensive attempt
was made at further reducing the initial eidetic description to its most essential features.
Any aspects of the description indicative of the natural attitude, or bearing resemblance
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to “conceptual ragbags” or convenient “placeholders” (Logie, 2016, 2094), that did not
cause the phenomenon of thinking to “collapse” upon their imaginative removal, could
be duly discarded (Giorgi, 2017, 178). The eidetic analyses and reflections undertaken
throughout  this  final  and most  vital  process,  are  presented  in  detail  throughout  the
remainder of this chapter, and contextualised with respect to the main research aims.
The initial eidetic description is considered, at this stage, as “data” of an increasingly
conceptual nature, and approached in an increasingly classical phenomenological style. 
5.2.1 Simultaneity of sensing and projecting
The particular feature of the initial  eidetic description most notably evocative of the
natural attitude, was the portrayal of on-the-job thinking as delineated acts, defined by
their aim to either sense or project. This was considered to be an objectification of on-
the-job thinking into singular acts, that,  in their  isolation and delineation from each
other, and from the wider phenomenon of OJL, appeared unnecessarily teleological. It
was, in any case, upon further evaluation, also deemed to be a relatively poor reflection
of  PFTs’  accounts,  which  in  fact  portrayed  a  more  fluid,  continuous  and
uncompartmentalised character to their thinking, the essence of which was certainly not
dependent  on  its  objectification  into  either  sensing  or  projecting,  or
grasping/transforming, or input/output for that matter. By suspending judgements based
on the facts of objective science, epoché reveals a more likely simultaneity between the
two seemingly antagonistic concepts of sensing and projecting. 
The projecting of meaning or judgements, appeared to arise synchronously through acts
of  sensing the  client.  For  instance,  sensing  that  a  client  was  uncooperative  or
challenging involved the simultaneous input of visual information about the client, and
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output of the immediate judgement itself, that the client was in fact uncooperative or
challenging. While sensing the client to be uncooperative or challenging appears at face
value to be a distinctive act of receiving input, it is just as much an act of inseparably
projecting quite tangible and immediate output in the form of thoughts and behaviours
of both a judgmental and cautious nature, as a direct and simultaneous consequence of
the specific cues received. PFT04 described how he would “feel” what kind of person a
client is, “how sensitive they are, even the way to motivate them”, within minutes of
them walking into the consultation room. Judgement of sensitivity and consideration of
motivational  strategies  here  occur  synchronously  through  the  described  acts  of
“feeling”  and  interpreting  the  client.  PFT10 and  PFT12  described  how they  would
make  instant  interpretations  of  clients  based  on  various  aspects  of  their  “body
language”, such that the sensing of visual cues from the client was inseparable from the
(projected) interpretations/judgements associated with, and therefore inseparable from,
those cues. The use of the terms sensing and projecting appear increasingly superfluous
upon closer evaluation of such examples, all originally categorised during the analysis
process, and therefore objectified, as acts of sensing.  
Even  thoughts  that  appeared  to  be  primarily  based  on  projecting,  and  were  duly
categorised and objectified as such, were similarly concurrent with apparent input. For
instance, PFT04 described some vivid mental projections involving images of being
killed,  or  having his car  damaged.  These projections  were a  result  of a  threatening
phone-call,  which  continued  to  play  on  his  mind  for  an  extended  period  of  time
following  its  occurrence.  The  constant  replay  of  the  episode  here  represents  the
essential  input  giving  rise  to  the  troubling  projections/output.  Several  PFTs  also
described the visualisation of alternative responses to situations they had experienced,
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should they be repeated. Whether the projection was a vivid visualisation or a relatively
simple judgement, it could always be tied to the sensing of either immediate or recalled
experience. 
In a similar fashion, to clarify this point, the sustained visible image of an object in a
mirror can be described as the result of a continuous and simultaneous sensing (input)
and projecting (output) of the objects and events in the world to which it attends. In
other words, the visible image portrayed on a reflective surface requires both the input
and  output  of  (light)  energy  combined,  as  a  confluence.  Indeed,  if  a  surface  only
performed a singular act of absorbing light (input without output), it would have to be
opaque  or  even  transparent,  but  not  reflective,  and  could  not  in  fact  be,  a  mirror.
Likewise if a surface only performed a singular act of radiating light (output without
input)  it  would have to be a  light  source,  like  an electronic  screen,  and could  not,
therefore, be a mirror either. The thoughts portrayed by a subject here are analogously
the result of a continuous and simultaneous sensing and projecting of objects and events
in the world, like the image portrayed by a mirror, for without either input or output,
they could not in fact be, thoughts. 
Chomsky posited the existence  of an “internal  structure” representing a “perceptual
model”,  mediating  input  and output  in  the context  of  learning,  via  an “interplay  of
innate factors, maturational processes, and organism-environment interactions” (2006,
150). A mirror, in this sense, is analogous to a  main internal structure, as posited by
Chomsky, as a repository of the general concepts mediating input and output, giving
rise to visible images (thoughts).  
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5.2.2 Centrality of general concepts
Further  evaluation  of  the  initial  eidetic  description  revealed  additional  aspects
unsatisfactorily  resonant  with  the  natural  attitude.  Thoughts  and  behaviours  were
described  by  PFTs  as  being  significantly  influenced  by  the  ‘following’  of  existing
concepts or ‘main ideas’. Conceptualising general concepts as units of knowledge is
reminiscent of a key theme in traditional cognitive science approaches. With regard to
their  formation,  James referred to a “sense of sameness” motivating and underlying
typical  acts  of  “conception”  (2017,  419).  Brentano  also  referred  to  this  sense  of
sameness  in his assertion that the ability to notice, or “be struck by”, phenomena, is
influenced by what has been noticed previously (1995, 35). We notice things that we
are  already  aware  of  more  so  than  something  new,  because  we  can  make  an
“association”  (1995,  51).  Marsick  et  al.  present  a  similar  account  of  general
conceptualisation, in their explanation of processes underlying tacit learning, in which
we  are  said  to  construct,  “mental,  emotional,  and  interpersonal  frameworks”,  for
“processing  experience  into  knowledge”.  Such  frameworks  are  then  “adjusted  or
reconstructed”, to accommodate new experiences that do not “fit old models” (2006,
796), and are differentiated via acts of “discrimination or association” (James, 2017). 
According  to  Kolb  and  Yeganeh  (2009,  11),  the  ability  to  generalise  (form  and
subsequently  use  general  concepts)  allowed  our  evolutionary  ancestors  to  predict
weather, seek medicine when ill, and teach accepted social norms of right and wrong to
their  offspring.  From a Darwinian evolutionary  perspective,  therefore,  the ability  of
hunter-gatherers to generalise from prior observations and predict promising locations
and times to forage or hunt, would have represented a distinctive survival advantage,
and modern humans must have indeed evolved, precisely, from those who were most
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able to think in this way. A related phenomenon known as  apophenia  is defined by
Hammoor and Walker  as,  “the very human capability  to  make meaning out  of  the
chaotic  data  of  the  world”,  or  in  short,  “pattern-recognition”  (2017,  44).  PFT11
explicitly  stated  that,  “the  longer  you  do  something  the  more  you  can  recognise
different  patterns.”  The  tendency  towards  such  efficient  categorisation  and
consolidation  of  recognised  patterns  into  general  concepts,  however,  further  to  the
emerging discourse on questionable learning outcomes initiated in the previous chapter,
is not always desirable.
Kolb  and  Yeganeh  further  asserted  that  the  tendency  to  generalise  can  result  in
“rumination, bigotry, fortune telling and stress” (2009, 11), and PFTs accounts indeed
corroborated  this  possibility  for  undesirable  implications  of  certain  generalisations.
PFT03,  for  instance,  had  drawn the  conclusion  following  a  difficult  situation  that,
“clients sometimes do things to get attention… or to get something for free.” While this
may sometimes be true, the situation itself, if experienced by other PFTs, or indeed by
PFT03 perhaps during another given time period, may have yielded altogether different
learning  outcomes.  According  to  Brentano,  predictive  theories  in  objective  science
predispose us to notice certain things and not others (1995, 48). During normal acts of
thinking  in  this  regard,  therefore,  what  is  noticed will  depend  largely  on  existing
general concepts, and might represent a biased, incomplete, or misinterpreted view of a
given  unfolding  situation  or  episode,  giving  rise,  in  turn,  to  questionable  learning
outcomes. In a similar example, PFT10 felt that one of her male clients was “looking
down”  on  her,  purely  on  account  of  her  being  female.  While  this  may  have  not
necessarily  been  the  case,  the  experience  actually  served  to  further  validate  this
possibly mistaken belief. Indeed, both Eraut (2004) and De Lyon and Cushion (2013)
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cite such questionable outcomes as reasons for urging caution in explicitly privileging
OJL as a process. Marsick et al. similarly asserted the risk that unexamined learning
may lead to the formation of “erroneous beliefs” (2006, 799).
Modern scholarly validation of the centrality of general concepts, and their resulting in
desirable  or indeed undesirable  outcomes,  continues  to  affirm Piaget’s  (1936) ideas
about  conceptual  schemata  representing  the  building  blocks  of  knowledge,  and
constituting  central  agents  of reasoning.  Through equilibration,  according to  Piaget,
schemata  are  either  used  or  changed  when  processing  incoming  information,  via
assimilation and accommodation respectively. Although criticised for originally basing
equilibration theory on suggestive observations rather than empirical evidence, from an
objective science perspective (Braine, 1962), Piaget’s ideas have sustained a lasting,
generative, and mutable presence in the field of cognitive psychology (Burman, 2016).
The  depiction  of  the  mind  as  an  information  processor,  as  implied  by  Piaget’s
equilibration,  is a key premise in cognitive psychology, and inherently based on the
assumptions that mental states and processes do exist, and can be studied (Haberlandt,
1997; Ashcraft, 2001). Information processing is indeed a key notion for understanding
how  we  construct,  modify,  and  otherwise  use  general  concepts,  and  according  to
Kretchmar  (2013),  has  constituted  a  significant  influence  on  modern  education  and
learning theory and its subsequent application in general educational practice. While
PFTs’ descriptions of their thinking, as reflected in the initial eidetic description, at first
appear to support traditional cognitivist approaches like Piaget’s equilibration theory,
epoché requires that assumptions arising from objective science (from which cognitivist
theories essentally arise), be suspended (Husserl, 1960, 25). 
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The cognitivist information-processing view of the mind is problematic inasmuch as it
permits the existence of the sort of substantial and considerably complex cognitive load
involved in the selection and use of thinking types, modalities or styles. In chapter two,
it  was  argued  that  it  is  precisely  this  line  of  reasoning  that  has  led  to  the  sort  of
insurmountable complexity identified by Eraut (2004) in discerning thinking in action,
and  to  the  inevitable  theoretical  impasse  hampering  further  study  of  OJL.  The
phenomenological perspective, to which epoché re-aligns us, at this stage, provides an
alternative view regarding the theoretical assumptions surrounding general concepts.
According  to  the  classical  phenomenologists  (Husserl,  1960;  Merleau-Ponty,  1962;
Heidegger,  1982),  thoughts  always  possess  a  subjective  and  interpretive  character.
Merleau-Ponty explicitly  cited  interpretation as  the basis of perception itself  (1962,
42).  To further develop the previous analogy, an image portrayed in and by a mirror
will  be determined by the topography of its  surface,  and is  liable  to become tinted
and/or skewed. This tinting/skewing effect, is analogous to the thoughts and behaviours
portrayed in and by a subject as wholly dependent on (or tinted and skewed by) existing
general concepts, accounting for the distinctively subjective and interpretive character
of  thinking.  Beard  and  Wilson  suggested  that  “genetic  make-up,  experiences  and
disposition play a significant role in making each experience we undergo unique to
ourselves”  (2015,  30),  constituting  the  “interplay  of  innate  factors”  described  by
Chomsky, represented by an “internal structure” (2006, 150), or the textured surface of
a  mirror.  Any  physiological  structures  responsible  for  the  reposition  of  existing
concepts as lasting impressions of objects in the world, are therefore analogous to the
topographical/textured features of the reflective surface of a mirror, in a similar way as,
for instance, the surface of a compact disc (CD) or digital versatile disc (DVD), through
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physical relief features and surface configuration, giving rise to perceptible phenomena
as  physical  repositories  of  audiovisual  data.  Maintaining  a  phenomenological
perspective and holding additional objective assumptions in abeyance, therefore, one
might consider a specific thought or behaviour in this view, to be what it is, without the
possibility  of  being anything else,  subject  of  course,  to  changes  being made to  the
physical correlates of general concepts (analogous to the textured surface configuration
of a mirror). 
PFT12 rather eloquently referred to ideas (existing concepts) as “echoes” in the mind.
Conceived as such, the interpretive veil  represented by a reactive textured reflective
surface that tints and skews resulting images, must contain lasting impressions shaped
by prior images, comparable to the reactivity of a re-writable photographic film. An
image (thought), in this view, is therefore wholly a result of an inseparable and essential
confluence  of  objects  in  the  world,  and  their  tinted/skewed  representations  as
concurrently impressed on, and reflected by, the surface of a mirror. The inevitable
tinting and skewing that follows, based on prior impressions, illustrates Heidegger’s
assertion that mental constructions or articulations are always interpretive,  “projecting
antecedently given being and its structures” (1982, 22). 
In the context of mathematical thinking, Schoefeld posited a compelling theory with
which he sought to explain how teachers think while solving problems in the classroom.
He claimed that if one could know enough about a teacher’s “knowledge, goals, and
beliefs”, one could explain (by building a cognitive model)  every decision he or she
makes (2012, 229). A thought as a predefined reflection of objects in the world that is
inevitably tinted and/or skewed by existing concepts in a very precise and uniquely
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subjective way, directs focus away from the task of having to understand the complex
mechanisms  by  which  subjects  must  “continually  choose”  (Kolb  et  al.,  1999,  3)
thinking types, modalities, or learning styles, as implied by experiential learning theory
(Kolb,  1984),  dual  process  theories  (Evans  and  Stanovich,  2013),  or  models  of
reflecting in action (Schön, 1983), that are essentially rooted in objective science. Focus
is  instead  redirected,  in  terms  of  the  mirror  analogy,  away  from  mechanisms  of
selection,  and  towards  the  exploration  of  those  deep  structures  giving  rise  to  the
formation and modification of general concepts,  or,  Chomsky’s  “interplay of innate
factors” (2006, 150). 
In his theses on language and thought, Chomsky posited the existence of a system of
“base  rules”,  mapping  such  “deep  internal  structures”  in  his  theory  of  generative
grammar (2006, 150). If general concepts are wholly influential to on-the-job thinking,
then the processes by which such general concepts are subject to change (formed and
subsequently modified), perhaps according to some form of implied fundamental base
rules (like Chomsky’s generative grammar), assumes crucial and central importance for
education  and  learning  theorists,  as  a  more  worthy  research  focus  than,  say,
understanding the complex mechanisms by which subjects must “continually choose”
(Kolb  et  al.,  1999,  3)  thinking modalities,  types,  and styles,  or  for  that  matter,  the
mechanisms  and  objectfied  pathways  along  which  information  is  assumed  to  pass
during thinking processes, as implied by the information-processing perspective. Any
phenomenological  description aimed at  discerning the essential  nature of on-the-job
thinking in the context of OJL, therefore, at the deep level of innate structures and their
implied interplay, must also account, via continuing use of epoché and suspension of
objective assumptions, for the nature of change itself.
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5.2.3 Learning as change
Piaget’s (1936) equilibration theory explains how information that cannot be processed
via assimilation using existing schemata (concepts), prompts accommodation, resulting
in  schemata  being  “adjusted  or  reconstructed”  (Marsick  et  al.,  2006,  796),  in  an
apparent form of deep innate interplay. Equilibration theory in turn engenders the need,
however, for objectifying and discerning yet deeper and ever more detailed accounts of
additional intermediary and/or underlying states and processes, as posited by Baddeley
(1990) and Tulving (1972), in the case of working or long-term memory respectively,
which indeed yield just such profoundly complex prospective information-processing
pathways.  This  view  however,  is  permeated  by  a  persistent  assumption  rooted  in
cognitive  science,  namely  the  notion  of  the  mind as  an  information-processor.  The
process  of  change  is  thereby  once  again  approached  using  assumptions  rooted  in
objective science, of which epoché urges due restraint. 
In  the  mirror  analogy,  a  specific  thought  was  portrayed  as  essentially  predefined,
without the possibility of being anything else pending physical change being affected to
actual physiological correlates of general concepts. A somewhat static view is implied
here, in what could be more succinctly described as, a thought being what it is and
nothing else, in that particular moment of time. William James, however, observed that
thinking had a distinctive ever-changing nature. Every repeated thought about a given
fact, though seemingly the same, is in fact, unique. He postulated that a perception in a
moment of time can never be identically  repeated or duplicated (2017, 212).  James
alludes here to the familiar experience of an ever-changing procession of moments, and
a corresponding stream of thinking, or “stream of consciousness” (2017, 165). The term
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stream implies  movement,  which  is  itself,  at  a  deeper  more  fundamental  level,
essentially, change. With regard to the important notion of change in the context of
OJL,  the  classical  phenomenologists  again  offer  some valuable  insight  towards  the
articulation of a more sound final eidetic description. Indeed, how subjects experience
change in the world has been a key theme in classical  phenomenological  works on
temporality (Husserl, 1960; 1964; Heidegger; 1962; 1982; Merleau-Ponty, 1962). 
A common-sense conceptualisation of time would typically involve the consideration of
an  objective  series  of  quantifiable  moments,  that  proceed  independently  of  human
consciousness, or even human existence. Human existence, in this view, would have to
correspond to specific time-lines along this grand series of moments. During a given
lifespan, a person’s consciousness appears to concord with its allocated sequence of
successive moments, via the continuous experience of a seemingly proceeding singular
slice of time representing the present moment. In the present moment, past moments
can be recalled  and future  moments  predicted,  or in  other  words,  it  can be said to
contain, as James described, the “echo of objects just passed,” and, “foretaste of those
just  to  arrive,”  cumulatively,  the  “germs  of  memory  and  expectation”  within  the
“stream”  of  consciousness  (2017,  555).  Further  evaluation  of  the  problem  of
temporality using the natural attitude and considering the facts derived from objective
science, however, sure enough, uncovers the type of “obscurities” in its fundamental
concepts  predicted  by  Husserl  (1960,  4).  Objectifying  an  evermore  precise  present
moment, for instance, is as challenging as objectifying an ever smaller precise point in
space, where the distinction of past and future become increasingly fuzzy, and the true
nature of  time and space fall  victim,  as  Newton’s gravity (Chomsky,  2006),  to  the
abandonment  of  the  discernment  of  essence,  in  favour  of  a  more  general  scientific
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attitude, or according to Brentano, measurement and correlation of objectified points on
what is essentially a unity, with no gaps anywhere (1995, 112).
Albert Einstein’s (1879-1955) theory of general relativity, for instance, portrays space
and time as a single fabric (space-time), constituting a block universe, challenging the
notion of a universal time-line, and provoking the inevitable consequence expressed by
the philosophical idea of  eternalism, in which all time (past, present and future) are
equally “real” (Landyman, 2007, 325).  The assertion of general relativity that time is
not  universal,  but  is  in  fact,  rather,  entirely  relative,  renders  the concept  of  unified
space-time not only obscure, but almost unfathomable to those unable to conceptualise
it at least in purely mathematical terms. Provided the tenets of eternalism are valid, then
from a phenomenological perspective, consciousness would have to somehow navigate
this singular block-universe structure, and create the experience of a passage of time in
which for all change to occur. 
Husserl  (1964)  acknowledged  that  a  privileged  now moment  indeed  appears  to
dominate  experience,  and  proceeded  with  the  conceptualisation  of  the  pure
intentionality (directedness) of consciousness as horizontal, incorporating simultaneous
qualities of primal impression, retention and pro-tention.  In other words, an intuited
primal impression of an intentional act can be accompanied by intuiting something that
is absent yet retained, as being before in the case of retention, or after in the case of pro-
tention. A sentence, according to Husserl, can only be perceived in its totality via an
awareness of the temporal order in which words are presented. Without an awareness of
what is before or after, a sentence is reduced to a meaningless group of jumbled words.
Without such temporal-order awareness, music could not be experienced, nor could any
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episodes  and  situations  in  a  spatio-temporal  world  for  that  matter.  Here  lies  the
distinction  defined  by  Englander  (2016,  4),  between  the  fundamental  aim  of
phenomenology as  opposed to  objective  science,  in  its  exploration  of the nature of
intentionality as opposed to causality. 
Phenomenology  seeks  to  explore  intentional  relationships  that  give  rise  to  a  pure
seeing, rather than to examine cause and effect relationships between events in which
objects in the world interact. Whatever the true and actual structure of the universe and
all  space,  time,  or  space-time  constituting  it,  the  experience  of  change  and  the
experience  of  a  passage  of  time  in  which  it  occurs,  appear  to  phenomenology  as
essentially one in the same experience. The scope of any phenomenological description
lies precisely in a discernment of the structures giving rise to the experiencing or pure
seeing of  phenomena  (in  this  case  temporal  change),  and not  in  an  explanation  of
objectified or assumed mechanisms operating in a world we cannot be sure exists in the
way natural  thinking portrays it,  like measuring Brentano’s (1995, 112) plurality  of
points on a line that  is  essentially  a unity.  In other words,  to explain the processes
governing change to concepts is to explain or predict mechanisms governing causality
across  successive  moments  of  objectified  time,  and  not  to  uncover  structures  of
intentionality that give rise to a pure seeing of the perceived results of such change by
subjects.  In  this  view,  mechanisms  governing  change  to  existing  concepts  are  less
relevant  to  phenomenological  investigation  than  mechanisms  governing  the
manifestation of change as a direct experience by subjects. 
An objective physical repository of concepts, is akin to, and indeed entirely reflective
of, objects in the world. If we cannot be sure about the true nature of objects in the
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world (block universe or otherwise), at least we can be sure that intentionality allows us
to somehow navigate  and attend to  them,  and manifest  itself  in  everyday temporal
conscious  experience.  According  to  Husserl’s  meditations  on  consciousness  and
cognition, if everything is doubtful, then the conscious, or  intentional, cognition that
makes that very judgement of doubt, is certain (1973, 23), and the “lifeworld” is thus
presented to it as a “phenomenon of being, instead of something that is” (1960, 19). 
If intentionality accounts for experience of all change, learning itself is something to be
experienced, and appears increasingly as an inherent or interwoven part of the fabric of
the objective universe. In this thesis, it has been argued that more valuable insights are
to be obtained at  this juncture,  specifically  in addressing the current impasse in the
further study of OJL, by investigating the nature of such experience, and uncovering the
intentional structures giving rise to it, in accordance with the main aims of classical
Husserlian phenomenology. The final eidetic description must, therefore, address how
change to general concepts, which is an essential feature of the phenomenon of on-the-
job thinking that  cannot  be imaginatively  removed,  is  experienced by subjects  as a
temporally-defined object in response to the first research question, and the significance
of this in response to the second. Before the temporal, and therefore changeable, nature
of on-the-job thinking can be fully described with respect to the research aims however,
several additional essential features must first be taken into account, and subjected to
deeper eidetic analysis before returning to this fascinating problem. 
5.2.4 Feelings and feeling states
In  their  discussion  on  whole-person  learning  theory,  Yorks  and  Kasl  posited  the
existence of a “strong bias” in English-speaking society for “subordinating feeling and
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emotion to rational,  propositional thought and discourse” (2002, 189). Regardless of
which is subordinated, Yorks and Kasl’s claim substantiates the apparent separation of
thinking and feeling as distinctive or isolated acts, at least in the context of English-
speaking  societies.  The  tendency  to  delineate  such  acts,  has  resulted  in  a  poor
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  thinking  and  feeling,  and  a  portrayal  of
rational thought as somehow devoid of feeling or emotion, and vice versa. Fetterman
and Robinson (2013) further reinforced this notion, by implying the antagonistic nature
in  which  the  “head”  and  the  “heart”  are  often  conceptualised,  in  their  study
investigating which of the two their participants tended to “follow” in various situations
and contexts. The head was designated by Fetterman and Robinson as “rational”, and
the heart  as “emotional”.  When specifically  asked to describe their  thoughts during
episodes or situations at work, however, PFTs often proceeded to describe feelings or
feelings states instead, showing that in terms of affective influence on thoughts and
behaviours during unfolding on-the-job episodes and situations, rational thinking and
emotional  feeling  were  both  relevant  factors,  and  perhaps  are  not  necessarily
antagonistic within the scope of direct (phenomenally conscious) experience.  
The traditional tendency to separate thinking (a mindful act) from feeling (a bodily act)
appears  to  mirror  the  classic  Cartesian  dualism  which  depicts  mind  and  body  as
ontologically  separate,  engendering  the  need for  some particular  space  in  the  body
where the  two distinctive  “substances” must  somehow meet  and interact.  Descartes
(1972) himself had postulated that this union occurred in the pineal gland located near
the centre of the brain. While neuroscience has long since disproved this hypothesis, the
considerable task of understanding the union between pure subjective experience and
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objective reality  remains a fundamental  problem in modern science,  indeed, as it  is
known, the “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). 
As  argued  in  chapter  three  (section  3.3.1),  however,  Husserl's  phenomenology
fundamentally  diverges  from  Cartesian  dualism,  and  presents  an  alternate  view.
Epoché, once again, calls for due restraint in unnecessarily objectifying, isolating, or
separating phenomena with a view to quantifying and correlating them in the tradition
of objective science. From a phenomenological perspective, therefore, epoché suspends
any need to separate thinking and feeling, and instead redirects focus on the subjective
experience of their apparent deep reciprocity in the context of OJL, as described by the
PFTs.  The  participants  described feelings  of  happiness,  enjoyment,  fear,  insecurity,
anxiety, embarrassment, trust, mistrust, comfort, and discomfort as triggers to various
thoughts and behaviours.  They also described feelings  of amusement  and confusion
respectively when situations or episodes either did, or did not, play out according to
their expectations. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, sensations have a “motor accompaniment” (1962, 243)
derived from, and rooted in,  structures of the physical  body, itself  an object  in the
world. Further to the arguments presented in chapter two (section 2.5.3), on the debate
in cognitive phenomenology regarding the experience of non-sensory thoughts,  it  is
generally less controversial to contend that feelings are rooted in the body, than it is to
propose a physiological basis for pure non-sensory cognition (Bayne and Montague,
2011). Research on feelings and feeling states commonly correlates them with neural
processes (Craig, 2002), the sort accounted for by Selye’s (1950) GAS theory, which
seeks to explain the metabolic and neural/endocrinal responses of organisms to external
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stressors in the environment. Considering incoming information as an environmental
stressor,  GAS theory  similarly  represents  a  potentially  simplified  explanation  of  an
“interplay of innate factors” (Chomsky, 2006, 150) associated with the  physiological
structural correlates of cognition, as similarly explained by Piaget’s (1936) cognitive
theory, if thinking and feeling are to be conceptualised as reciprocal. In his exposition
of  thinking  in  action,  Eraut  (2004)  also  acknowledged  an  emotional  dimension  to
decision-making, further corroborating a biochemical basis of thinking and decision-
making,  and similarly  substantiating  the notion of  reciprocity  between thinking and
feeling.  Indeed, for thinking to be based in, and have any affective influence on, the
world,  it  must  be  represented  by,  or  correlated  with,  some  sort  of  physiological
structure which, itself, is also an object in the world, and therefore subject to the same
explanations posited for any other physical process. 
PFTs  described  their  experience  of  various  thoughts  and  feelings  as  occurring  in
various  grades  of  magnitude  and  persistence,  adducing  the  role  of  physiological
regulation (as posited by GAS theory) according to the magnitude and persistence of
perceived stressors on the organism, in turn resulting in various degrees of intensity of
impression on implied conceptual data reposition structures. In other words, magnitude
of intensity in the experience of the activation (and simultaneous modification in the
case of their  storage on a malleable surface) of certain concepts,  concords with the
magnitude of biochemical sensory-based activity as explained in GAS theory. PFT04
described how following a threatening phone call from the husband of a female client,
he  experienced  “palpitations”,  and  remembered  the  feeling,  “as  if  it  were  today.”
PFT05  described  how  a  stressful  issue  had,  “literally  taken  over  [his]  life,”  for  a
“couple  of  months”.  According  to  GAS  theory,  magnitude  of  a  stressor  would
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represent, in the Darwinian sense, significance with respect to its implications on safety
or survival. Thoughts are thus portrayed by the participants as similarly connected, as
are basic sensory-based feelings or feeling states, with a sense of safety or survival. 
Elpidrou and Freeman succinctly defined feelings as ways in which our interactions
with the  world  are  “qualitatively  manifested  to  ourselves” (2014,  511).  The graded
quality of participants’ manifested qualitative experience of both thinking and feeling in
terms of magnitude,  concords with Baars and Franklin’s (2007) conceptualisation of
conscious  awareness  as  a  “graded  property”,  reducing  the  selectivity  of  conscious
awareness  simply  to  the  experiencing  of  various  grades  of  biochemically  accented
physiological activity, where the neural activities of higher magnitude represent those
of  which  one  is  “consciously”  aware.  This  view  of  consciousness  essentially
emphasises the notion of a biochemical basis of thought. In his attempts to determine
the  main  elements  of  consciousness,  Brentano  similarly  discussed  a  sensitivity  of
conscious awareness to spatial magnitudes and thresholds (1995, 64). Some spatial or
qualitative  factors  of  phenomena  are  either  too  small  to  be  noticed,  or  otherwise
represent  grades  of  magnitude  that  lie  outside  the  threshold  to  which  conscious
awareness  is  able  to  attend  (1995,  65).  In  this  regard,  visual,  auditory,  and  tactile
sensory  perception  all  concord  with  specific  finite  thresholds,  which  indeed,  vary
according to species, or even among humans themselves, subject to various disorders,
like autism, which is known to alter such sensory thresholds (Larsson et al., 2017). 
The depiction of thinking and feeling as fundamentally similar and interrelated, despite
being presented via concepts associated primarily with objective science, adds a crucial
emerging dimension to the final  phenomenological  eidetic  description.  Like feeling,
243
thinking is thus depicted as an object in the world. Further to the previous discourse on
change,  it  must  be  an  object  with  both  spatial  and  temporal  qualities,  based  on
physiological structural correlates of existing concepts in space, that are also subject to
constant change over time. The emphasis of phenomenological description is thereby
shifted to the intentional structures that give rise to the conscious experiencing of such
objects,  hereby  construed  precisely  as  objects  in  the  world,  and  their  subsequent
conscious manifestation as the experienced phenomenon of on-the-job thinking. On-
the-job  thinking has,  so far,  been described as  simultaneous  sensing  and projecting
through the  subjective  and interpretive  veil  of  existing  concepts.  Cumulatively,  the
world,  the  body,  physiological  correlates  of  existing  concepts,  the  biochemical
substances  responsible  for  affective  feeling  states,  and  any  temporally-defined
processes taking place therein, must form part of the fabric of the universe (whatever its
true  objective  structure),  to  which  the  intentionality  of  consciousness  (giving
experience a primal impression with simultaneous retention and pro-tention qualities),
duly  attends.  A discussion  of  consciousness  as  experience  of  objects  in  the  world,
meanwhile, represents another more difficult problem, should one consider the notion
of experiencing oneself, engendering further reflection on a key theme presented in the
initial eidetic description, namely, that of internal interaction. 
5.2.5 Internal interaction
The initial eidetic description, based on the four final main themes, cited interaction as
occurring  externally  between  subjects  and their  environments,  as  well  as  internally
between  subjects  and  their  own selves.  Greeno’s  (1997)  definition  of  the  situative
perspective to understanding thinking in educational psychology, which is considered
inclusive of both the behaviourist and cognitive paradigms, emphasises participation in
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communities of practice, individual sense-making, and the development of individual
identities. The situative perspective, therefore, posits  interaction as a main catalyst to
thinking, both externally (within communities of practice),  and internally (in acts of
sense-making  and  developing  identity).  Among  the  eight  superordinate  themes,
thinking arising  from self-talk  emerged as  particularly  prevalent  as  a  form of  such
internal interaction. In the field of performance enhancement and sports psychology,
self-talk, also known as inner speech, has been shown, experimentally, to have positive
effects on motivation and performance (Kahrović et al., 2014; Gregerson et al., 2017).
Indeed, Kahrović et al. (2017, 52) presented self-talk as one of the five fundamental
“pillars” of sports psychology. 
Wallace et al. (2017) similarly showed that participants undergoing a problem-based
thinking task (the “Tower of London task”,  designed to test  executive functioning),
while distracted by either verbal articulation of given words “out loud”, or foot-tapping
in  time  to  a  metronome,  performance  was  more  adversely  affected  by  the  former
measure, designed to inhibit inner speech, than it was by the latter. While Kahrović et
al. (2017, 51) defined self-talk or inner speech simply as, “having a conversation with
oneself”,  research  has  typically  focused less  on  defining  or  discerning  its  essential
nature,  and  primarily  on  investigating  its  effects  on  executive  functioning  and
performance. In other words, research on self-talk or inner speech has focused on how
to do it, and how it helps, more so than on why it occurs, what it actually is, or how it
might help in further understanding the wider phenomenon of thinking. Wallace et al.
(2017) based their work on the assumptions of Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934), providing
an important clue for the sourcing of additional insight on the essential nature of self-
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talk, or how and why it is conceptualised the way it is, at least in the context of modern
education and learning theory. 
Vygotsky described the relationship of thought to word as, “not a thing but a process, a
movement.”  (1987,  251).  He further  stated  that  the  nature  of  this  process  develops
through childhood, development that, incidentally, represented the main focus of his
work. Like Piaget’s seminal work on cognitive development in children, that yielded
valuable  insights  about  the  nature  of  cognition  in  the  context  of  cognitive  science
research,  Vygotsky’s  ideas  have  proven  similarly  influential  in  developmental
psychology and education theory.  As later similarly postulated by Chomsky (2006),
Vygotsky positioned the role of language as central in acts of thinking. Thoughts have
movement,  they “unfold” and “unify”, establishing “relationships between one thing
and  another”.  More  importantly,  they  are  not  “expressed”  as  much  as  they  are
“completed in the word” (1987, 252). In other words, thought is actively restructured as
it is transformed into speech. Vygotsky’s insights here concord with modern findings in
the  field  of  cognitive  science,  that  have  succeeded  in  demonstrating  the  malleable
nature of thoughts and memories. The retrieval and expression of memories place them
in a “labile” (Lee et al., 2017, 531) or changeable state, suggesting we don’t so much
recall as we do reconsolidate through acts of thinking. 
 
According to Vygotsky, a word relates not to a single object but to an entire “group or
class of objects”, as a “generalisation” (1987, 45). A “verbal act of thought” refers to
such  a  generalised  word  meaning,  and  essentially  differs  from a  thought  based  on
sensation  or  perception.  This  view supports  the  distinction  later  made by Baddeley
(1990) and Tulving (1972), in their contributions to working and long-term memory
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models, which clearly integrate the significance of language in thought. In the case of
working  and  long-term  memory  systems  respectively,  the  phonological  loop  and
declarative-semantic  memory  structures  have  a  distinctive  basis  in  language,  as
opposed to their non-linguistic counterparts (the visuospatial sketchpad and procedural
memory).  Chomsky  similarly  postulated  a  deep  reciprocity  between  language  and
thought by positing the study of language as a prospective avenue in future research
aiming to uncover the character of “mental processes and the structures they form and
manipulate” (2006, 58). In terms of the processes governing the use of such language-
based  memory  systems,  Vygotsky  suggested  that  while  external  speech  transforms
thought into word,  internal  speech works in the reverse direction,  from “without  to
within”, or as the “evaporation of speech in thought” (1987, 258). Here, the purpose of
internal  speech  is  differentiated  from  that  of  external  speech,  revealing  the  re-
consolidatory nature of thinking via inner speech, and supporting later assertions of the
importance  of  inner  speech  in  its  influence  on  performance  in  cognitive  problem-
solving tasks (Wallace et al., 2017). 
Vygotsky  further  accents  this  distinction  between  thinking  types  by  discussing  the
nature of written “speech”, which represents the opposite end of a spectrum to inner
speech, whereby thoughts are maximally “expanded”  (1987, 272). In other words, all
forms of linguistic expression interplay with thinking, with inner speech representing
the quickest and most abbreviated reconsolidation of generalised concepts or “word
meanings”, with verbal and written speech representing more expanded manifestations,
for the purpose of external  communication with others,  as opposed to with oneself.
Thinking as either internal or external interaction respectively, in this sense, is defined
by Vygotsky as, “intra-mental function”, and “inter-mental function” (1987, 259). For
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Vygotsky, all types of speech ultimately attend to word meanings or generalisations of
concepts,  and,  “what  is  contained simultaneously in thought unfolds sequentially  in
speech”. He uses the elegant analogy of thinking as a cloud that gushes a shower of
words (1987, 280). 
A fascinating aspect of Vygotsky’s ideas about language (and his resulting rain cloud
analogy), is his portrayal of the containment of content in thought as an object, and the
use of language as a sequential expression or dissemination of that content from the
object.  He thereby portrays the notion of a seemingly tangible  object-body of word
meanings  (content  itself  constituted  by  general  concepts).  A  general  concept-store
(object-body of word meanings), is therefore presented as a distinctive and spatially-
defined object in the world, and speech, which according to Vygotsky, is a form of
thinking, as a temporally-defined object tangentially related to the general concept-store
from which it “gushes”. The term  tangential is used here in the mathematical sense,
where constructing a graph consisting of X and Y axes permits the visualisation of
interaction  between  objectified  phenomena  that  exist  in  two  separate  planes  or
dimensions.  The temptation  to  revert  to  objective  science  conceptualisations  at  this
point, therefore, is once again palpable. 
The distinction between spatial and temporal dimensions remains a potent characteristic
of qualitative human experience, exceedingly difficult for natural thought to perceive in
any other way in a world that is qualitatively and unequivocally spatio-temporal. The
main  argument  here,  however,  from  the  phenomenological  perspective,  is  that
regardless of whether they are spatially or temporally defined, objects of perception are
nonetheless,  objects  in  the  world,  that  must  ultimately  be  attended  to  by  the
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intentionality  of  consciousness.  How a  subject comes  to  interact  with  such  objects
retains  focus,  congruent with the main aim of phenomenology,  on intentionality,  or
rather,  on the  notion  of  consciousness  and the  intentional  structures  that  permit  its
relatedness to the world. The articulation of a final eidetic description cannot proceed at
this  juncture,  nor  can  a  discernment  of  the  possibility  of  a  subject  interacting  with
herself,  without  some  discussion  on  the  difficult  and  substantial  problem  of
consciousness (of a subject) itself, further to the discourse in chapter three (in section
3.3.2), on the impossibility  of apparently any object other than consciousness being
able to relate directly to itself. 
5.2.6 Re-situating consciousness
Vygotsky explicitly stated that “thinking and speech are the key to understanding the
nature  of  human  consciousness”  (1987,  284).  The  conceptualisation  of  thinking  in
learning  theory  as  dependent  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  consciousness,  a
phenomenon  that  remains  poorly  understood,  was  cited  in  chapter  two  as  partly
responsible for the current impasse in studying OJL. Carruthers defines the traditional
“common-sense”  understanding  of  conscious  thought,  as  based  on  the  ability  to
experience  “mental  events  of  which  we  are  immediately  and  non-interpretationally
aware”  (2007,  199).  It  is  precisely  this  definition,  according  to  Carruthers,  that  is
responsible for the problematic distinction between conscious and unconscious thought
as  implied  by dual-process  theories  (Evans and Stanovich,  2013).  It  was  argued in
chapter  two, that  a  phenomenological  description  of on-the-job thinking might  help
address  this  difficulty,  and  the  first  research  question  was  framed  accordingly,  in
pursuit of a phenomenological description that might suitably underpin modern theories
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related  to  OJL,  and  potentially  constitute  part  of  its  clearer  and  less  problematic
theoretical foundation.   
The  developing  eidetic  description  based  on  PFTs’  descriptions  of  their  on-the-job
thinking, combined with the consideration of thinking and speech as a key to further
understanding consciousness, as suggested by Vygotsky (1987, 284), prompts a deeper
discussion of on-the-job thinking with respect to consciousness. Vygotsky stated that,
“consciousness  of  sensation  and  thinking  are  characterised  by  different  modes  of
reflecting reality” (1987, 284). Thinking and sensation are characterised here as modes
of reflecting  objective reality, or in other words, reflections of objects in the spatio-
temporal world. Brentano similarly differentiated specifically between three modes of
conscious  perception,  namely  consciousness  of  “place,  quality  and  temporal
determination” (1995, 98). While a singular object more familiarly perceived by the
senses as spatially defined exists in the world, so too does thinking, although due to its
process-based  nature,  exists  as  a  temporally defined  object.  Vygotsky  refers  to
consciousness as “consciousness of” the mode of thinking, as consciousness not in or
through thinking,  but  consciousness  of thinking.  Thinking,  just  like  the  wider
phenomenon of learning, is thus characterised as part of the fabric of the universe to
which the intentionality of consciousness attends, giving rise to everyday subjective and
interpretive experience. 
In thinking of any object in the world, according to Brentano, such an act of thinking
has that object as its  primary object,  and itself  as its  secondary object.  There is an
intentionality of consciousness, therefore, that is directed at both the primary object,
and the act of thinking itself (Brentano, 1995, 26). In other words, when we are aware
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that we are thinking of, say, a table, we are aware of the table, and we are aware that we
are  thinking.  To  consciously  and interpretively  experience  thoughts  of  any kind,  a
subject  would need what Carruthers refers to as a “mind-reading faculty”,  which is
sensitive to perceptual input like visual imagery and speech, including internal visual
imagery as well as one’s own inner speech (2007, 204). According to Carruthers, we
frequently employ this same mind-reading faculty in interpreting the thoughts of others.
If someone, for instance, asks for directions to a particular church, regardless of the
precise structure of the verbally-articulated question, we “see or hear” their thoughts as
wanting to know, or wondering, where the church is. Upon seeing someone inserting a
key into a door, we “see or hear” their thoughts as wanting to open the door. This same
faculty is, of course, also employed in interpreting our own thoughts. Likewise, if we
are engaged in manipulating luggage to fit into the boot of a car, we “see or hear” our
thoughts as  wondering how to fit the luggage in, and upon pushing the large suitcase
towards the back of the boot, we “see or  hear” our thoughts as deciding to push it so
(2017, 243).
Carruthers,  therefore,  argues  that,  “knowledge  of  one’s  own  thoughts  is  just  as
interpretive as is knowledge of the mental states of others” (2017, 232), and what’s
more, that neuroscience research indicates involvement of the same cortical networks in
knowledge of oneself,  and knowledge of others (2017, 233).  The fallibility  of self-
attribution shows that for the mind-reading system, while indeed having more access to
one’s own thoughts than the thoughts of others, this access is still  not direct (2007,
205).  If  it  were  in  fact  direct,  then  “self-deception”,  or  false  beliefs  about  oneself
(Baron,  2008,  71),  would  be  far  less  common  phenomena  than  they  actually  are.
According  to  Carruthers,  the  mind-reading  system contains  only  a  “limited,  highly
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simplified, model of its own operations”, accurate enough for “everyday purposes of
prediction and explanation” (2007, 211). He adds that the interpretive process is “swift
and  generally  reliable,  to  the  point  where  one  routinely  experiences  oneself  as
entertaining thoughts of various kinds” (2017, 248). PFT10, for instance, described how
she was able to sense that a particular client “didn’t want to be there”, although she was
unable to explain exactly how she knew or how her own thoughts had arrived at such a
conclusion, showing how her mind-reading faculty, at the time, had only limited access
to both her client’s thoughts, as well as her own.
The notion of experiencing oneself as entertaining thoughts, concords with Vygotsky’s
reference to “consciousness of sensation and thoughts” (1987, 284), as well as Husserl’s
view of intentionality as “relating to” (1973, 43) objects in the world, objects that must
also include temporal sequential thought-processes and the existing concepts implicated
therein.  Carruthers  adds  that  the  interpretive  knowledge  of  our  own  thoughts  is
“grounded in awareness of both our own overt  behaviour  and covert  sensory cues”
(2017,  229),  emphasising  context,  and  corroborating  also  the  interpretive  and
“constructive” aspect of this relatedness asserted by Heidegger (1982, 21).
This  view,  however,  does  not  concord  with  Vygotsky’s  argument  in  favour  of  the
existence of  affective mental processes (1987, 48). Vygotsky theorised that cognition
must account for a subject’s volition and conscious affective control over their own
thoughts and behaviours. PFT10’s comparison of her reflections to a “broken record”,
PFT06’s report of a particular thought “playing on (her) mind for days”, and PFT12’s
statement on the assumed origin of self-questions and statements, that “they just start
automatically”, however,  indicate  a  diminished  sense  of  control  over  the  thoughts
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described. They resonate increasingly with Carruthers’ notion of merely experiencing
oneself as entertaining various thoughts, rather than Vygotsky’s assertion that cognition
must account for affective volition, raising still deeper questions about conscious will
and control. 
Carruthers (2007) argues in favour of the  illusory nature of conscious affective will
through thought, and questions how we can be any more authoritative over our own
thoughts than we are over the thoughts of others, given that in both cases we appear to
be  able  to  experience  them  only  indirectly  and  interpretively.  This  results  in  the
seemingly profound implication that the role of the subject is essentially shifted from
one  of  causing thoughts  to  merely  experiencing them.  The  feeling  of  control  as  a
tangible  and compelling feature of the every day subjective experience of thinking,
according  to  Carruthers’  (2007)  narrative  on  the  illusion  of  conscious  will,  in  this
respect, indeed, appears increasingly illusory. Research in psychology has positively
correlated the “illusion of control” with non-depressed subjects, or in other words, the
feeling of a  lack of control has been positively correlated with depression (Alloy and
Abramson, 1979, cited in Baron, 2008, 191), showing how an illusion of conscious will
would be a justified and important characteristic of the overall qualitative experience of
thinking, at least from a Darwinian perspective.
The notion of consciousness  of thinking and sensation, thereby locates the spatially-
defined  body,  brain,  objects  in  the  world,  and  all  temporally-defined  intermediary
processes occurring therein, collectively as objects in the world, readily constituted and
available  for  subjective  experience  (through  intentionality).  To  experience  readily-
constituted thoughts without consciously causing them, suggests also that  all  of the
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stages  or  processes  involved in  their  formation,  must  also  have  happened not  only
beyond the scope of one’s conscious will, but also outside the scope of one’s conscious
awareness.  They are  thus  presented,  in  their  various  already-formed configurations,
ready for attendance by intentionality, giving rise to everyday subjective interpretive
experience, a view that would concord with the notion of intentionality attending to an
already-configured block-universe structure. A unified object of perception, appearing
as a whole, yet constituted by apparent parts,  is a central  idea in  Gestalt  theory,  as
originally posited by Max Wertheimer (1880-1943). The interpretation of the whole and
the interpretation of its apparent parts, according to Gestalt theory, must be mutually
concerted  (Guberman,  2017,  7-8)  in  the  context  of  subjective  experience.  Vision,
speech, music, and even apparent motion, are  objects of perception, while constituted
by objectified parts, are presented as whole phenomena to conscious experience. 
In  her  reflections  on  the  origin  of  self-statements  and  self-questions,  PFT11  cited
“intuition” or a “gut feeling”, influenced by “how things are working out in your life…
how you go through your day feeling”, alluding to the unconscious processes occuring
seemingly beneath the surface of one’s awareness throughout a given period of time,
only to eventually, in the words of PFT07, move into conscious awareness as a “click”
in the mind as wholly constituted thoughts presented to conscious experience. PFT12
described how various ideas often came to him “out of the blue”. Such unconscious
thinking, according to Carruthers, works “behind the scenes, generating and controlling
the  sensory-based  contents  that  figure  in  working  memory  and  the  stream  of
consciousness  itself”  (2017,  242),  as  constituted  objects.  The  “behind  the  scenes”
aspect of such processing also corroborates the phenomena of implicit memory (Reber,
1989) and blind sight (Weiskrantz, 2002), discussed previously in chapter two. PFT06
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described  her  experience  of  automatic  quick-thinking  upon  two  separate  occasions,
where clients with medical conditions lost consciousness (feinted) during her sessions.
On the second occasion, she described how she “bear-hugged” the client, as opposed to
having grabbed one arm,  as  she  had done on the  previous  occasion.  Despite  never
having deliberatively decided to do this, she described the different automatic reaction
in the second incident as having been a result of the first, even though any connection
between the two must have occurred entirely behind the scenes, and was only reported
during her interview in retrospect, or, interpretively. 
This discussion, at face value, appears to support the problematic notion of substantial
unconscious, as opposed to conscious, thinking, as implied by dual process theories
(Evans and Stanovich, 2013). In chapter two, dual process theories were cited as partly
responsible for the relegation of the study of OJL to methodological futility,  on the
premise that it occurs primarily in the second category, beyond our reach, or  tacitly.
From a phenomenological standpoint, however, the conceptualisation of thinking itself
as either conscious or unconscious, has already been called into question throughout
this  section.  According  to  Carruthers,  in  terms  of  traditional  conceptualisations  of
consciousness  based  on  thinking  of  which  we  are  “immediately  and  non-
interpretationally aware” (2007, 199), we are in fact not conscious of any of our non-
sensory thoughts whatsoever, and that all conscious thinking and reasoning requires a
“sensory-based format, involving imagery of one sort or another” (2017, 242).  
In this view, thinking is (phenomenologically) reduced to an action carried out in a
spatio-temporal world, involving objects and the objective processes mediating them
(which are continuous and on-going in living organisms), themselves existing internally
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and  externally  in  relation  to  the  experiencing  subject.  Consciousness  itself  can  be
understood, in this view, as intentionality attending to objects and their intermediary
processes, not as an object itself, or part of an object, but instead only as a pure seeing
of those objects. The phenomenal view of consciousness, indeed, defines it as a direct
seeing, a conscious experience that is always conscious, and not as an objective quality
of some objects and not others, as would be the case in designating a thought as either a
thing with a conscious quality, or a thing with an unconscious quality. 
Discussions on consciousness (which after all  is a poorly understood phenomenon),
tend  to  revolve  precisely  around where  it  is  positioned in  the  conceptualisation  of
thinking  and  learning  processes.  The  shifting  of  such  a  position  in  any
conceptualisation of thinking, appears to alter its description, in terms of how helpful or
“profitable”  as  an  analogy  or  metaphor  (Roediger,  1980,  231)  it  tends  to  be  in
facilitating the negotiation of given theoretical obstacles. In the case of this study, a
more fruitful re-conceptualisation of on-the-job thinking is sought to provoke a renewal
of efforts  in the exploration and deeper understanding of the wider phenomenon of
OJL, calling for a re-positioning of consciousness in the final eidetic description.
Carruthers’ view that  thoughts are always unconscious  (2007, 199),  accentuates their
essential nature as objects in the world, facilitating the view that the  experience that
navigates such a world of objects is, on the other hand,  always conscious. Stannard
likened experience of the block universe to a video recording, viewed on a frame by
frame basis (2010, 93). Tom Hatherley Pear (1886-1972) similarly compared memory
recall,  in  audio-visual  playback terms,  to  playing a  record on a  gramophone (Pear,
1922, cited  in  Roediger,  1980,  234).  If  thoughts are  objective  processes  in  a  block
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universe,  recorded on a record in the case of Pear’s analogy,  then consciousness is
analogous to a gramophone needle. In this view, conscious experience itself, which by
its very nature is always conscious, is achieved through the attendance of intentionality
to an objective world of things, people and interactions, or in other words, to a world of
objects,  subjects  (physically  constituted  also  as  objects)  and  any  scripted  and
temporally defined processes operating therein. 
The gramophone needle analogy, however, is somewhat misleading, for two reasons.
First, like the global workspace theory analogy of a spotlight shining on a stage that
only  illuminates  a  narrow  field  of  consciously  perceived  experience  (Baars  and
Franklin, 2007), the needle analogy appeals to the conceptualisation of the whole notion
of conscious experiencing as a spatially  defined phenomenon, with a smaller object
physically  navigating  a  larger  one.  In  its  attendance  to  the  spatio-temporal  world,
conscious experience actually takes on the more familiar characteristic of, as famously
described  by  William  James,  a  “stream of  consciousness”  (James,  2017,  165),
proceeding “frame by frame” (Stannard, 2010, 93), rendering it primarily  temporally,
rather than spatially defined. Second, the gramophone analogy is confusing because the
record must contain all the objects, subjects (physically constituted also as objects) and
any  temporally  defined  processes  operating  therein  that  constitute  the  world.  The
subject, in this analogy, is either positioned outside the system listening to the music,
experiencing the world (the record), through the intentionality of consciousness (the
gramophone needle), or, trapped inside the record along with all the other objects in the
world, thereby unable to hear (experience) the music. Either way, the analogy raises a
fundamental  problem concerning where  subjective conscious experience  is  precisely
located in the system. 
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The problem of the existence of an ontologically  distinct and pure subjectivity  was
itself  described  by  Chalmers  (1995)  as  the  “hard  problem”  of  consciousness,  in
comparison  to  relatively  easier  problems  that  can  be  theoretically  discerned  in
alternative  terms  by  using,  say,  information  processing  models.  By  Chalmers’
definition, therefore, how consciousness relates to OJL is considered a relatively easy
problem, because it does not require a resolution of the hard problem itself. In other
words,  any  phenomenological  description  of  on-the-job  thinking  in  the  context  of
learning would have to show how consciousness is involved, or where it is positioned
within,  the  description,  in  a  way  that  does  not  present  insurmountable  theoretical
problems,  and  not  what  consciousness  actually  is.  In  this  respect,  a  re-situating  of
consciousness within the phenomenon of on-the-job thinking, or more specifically its
re-situation outside, or separate from, the objects that constitute the world (so long as
they can be phenomenologically  conceptualised  as  objects),  appears  to  mitigate  the
insurmountability of the theoretical impasse represented by the tacit learning problem.
It  does,  however,  raise  some  additional  problems  requiring  yet  deeper  evaluation,
specifically, the problem raised here, of where, or indeed, what, the self actually is, in
the context of everyday OJL experiences.
 
5.2.7 Locating the self
The relatively simplistic view conjured by an initial survey of the gramophone needle
analogy described in the previous section, renders the subject as external to the world,
attending to it from the outside. If objects can only exist in the world, and not outside it,
then  precisely  locating  and  defining  the  subject thereby  becomes  a  challenging
problem, creating the sort of “infinite regress” portrayed by Dennett and Kinsbourne,
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suggestive  of  a  system  in  which  a  conscious  homunculus  (small  person)  must
somewhere reside as the ultimate perceiver and decision-maker (1992, 185). The world
of objects,  in this  sense,  must end somewhere,  without the possibility  of something
being positioned outside it. In the descriptions of PFTs, the prospective presence of a
homunculus  was  most  conspicuous  in  the  phenomenon  of  self-talk/inner  speech,
drawing attention once more to the problem of clearly discerning internal interaction,
and Vygotsky’s assertion of thinking and speech as the “key” to understanding the
nature  of  human  consciousness  (1987,  284).  In  this  section,  internal  interaction  is
subjected  to  more  intensive  reflections  with  a  view  to  addressing  the  homunculus
problem. 
Vygotsky  (1987)  defined  speech  as  the  completion  of  thought,  and  chartered  its
development in children via certain stages, initially as serving the purpose of simple
communication with others. During the egocentric phase of development, according to
Vygotsky, children typically exhibit instances of solitary verbalised speech, which as a
result  of  the  development  and  consolidation  of  abstract  conceptual  thought,  is
eventually silenced and directed inwards to form the type of inner speech exhibited by
adults. If speech originally develops as a means of communication, then, as an activity,
it presupposes, as does all communication, the existence of a sender and receiver, or
two separate entities. Whether speech occurs between subject and other, or subject and
subject, then who exactly are the parties to the subject-subject variety of speech? This
question  was  posited  to  the  participants  in  later  interviews  following  the  repeated
surfacing of self-talk as a phenomenon. Which is the ultimate perceiver, or in other
words, which is the real you?
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Locating or defining the real you or  homunculus was explicitly attempted during at
least one of the later interviews. PFT11, a Yoga instructor with a special interest in
Hinduism  and  mindfulness,  was  particularly  insightful  in  this  regard,  and  the
opportunity was duly taken to explore the area in more depth. She described self-talk
and self-reflection as connecting with a “deeper part” of herself. When probed further,
she described that deeper part of herself as her “soul”. When probed yet further, she
defined her soul as, “the energy that surrounds me”. When subsequently asked, “where
are you in this energy?”, she responded, “I haven’t defined that yet”. Of course the  idea
of there actually being a real you somewhere inside this energy in the first place, was a
specific construct imposed here by the interviewer, essentially leading the participant,
and diminishing the legitimacy of any further comments she made, since they would
not  be  wholly  representative  of  what  she would  have  originally  and fundamentally
wished to convey. At this juncture, however, PFT11 referred to a specific construct of
her own, evoking the idea of “reincarnation”, and an “everlasting energy”. When again
asked, “where are  you in this everlasting energy?” she responded, “I’m a part of that,
my spirit is”. The idea of the deeper part of self being a soul, itself part of a deeper
energy, or an “everlasting” energy, further comprised by a combination of many spirits,
would lead in turn to discerning, at an ever deepening level, the essential nature of such
spirits, and so on, a hefty pursuit strongly resembling an “infinite regress” (Dennett and
Kinsbourne, 1992, 185). 
The classical phenomenologists again provide some important insight in this regard. It
appeared far less problematic,  at  this  stage,  to  assume a phenomenological  position
based on Heidegger’s (1982) notion of being. Pure subjectivity, in this sense, is not an
experience  by a subject, but rather an interpretive experience (through an interplay of
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existing concepts as objects in the world) of being a subject. From the objective view,
the subject is an object (or an entire collection of complex physiological objects) among
other objects in the world. According to Husserl, the “life-world” (and therefore also
the  objects  that  appear  to  constitute  it),  is  a  “phenomenon  of  being,  instead  of
something that is” (1970, 13). From the purely subjective view, therefore, the subject is
nothing more than the experience of being a subject, that arises from the attendance of
consciousness to  a  confluence of  objects  in  the world.  Among those objects  in  the
world that are particularly influential on the very real experience of being a subject, or
being a  self,  are  among the most  prominent  of  all  concepts  referenced by PFTs as
influential to their thoughts and behaviours, the self-concepts. 
The self-concept has been defined in an abstract and conceptual way, as a “seemingly
intangible  construct”  (Rogers,  1961,  256),  constituted  by a “network of  interrelated
ideas” (Baumeister, 2005, 247) about oneself, made of meaning, symbols and language.
Rogers continued to state that the concept of self is, “much less frequently a perceived
object, and much more frequently something confidently felt in process” (1961, 153).
James similarly referred to the self-concept as a “multicomponent construct”,  that is
“felt”  in  any  given  moment  within  on-going  streams  of  thought  (2017,  362).  The
feltness of self  here concords with Heidegger’s notion of the experience of  being  a
subject. 
The type of person or professional a PFT saw themself as, was a prominent motivating
factor, as well as retrospective justification for decisions taken and courses of action
followed. PFTs generalised themselves as introverts,  perfectionists,  or the “type” of
person  or  professional  that  usually  reacts  in  a  certain  way,  or  carries  out  certain
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behaviours. They also cited alternative roles as being influential to the type of trainers
they were, for instance being both a “friend and a teacher” to the client (PFT10), or a
“coach,  good  listener,  good  speaker,  and  advisor”  (PFT04).  They  also  nominated
various traits as being part of their character, such as “taking things personally” upon
making a mistake (PFT04). Being a subject,  or more specifically,  being a particular
type of subject,  showed, from the participants’  point of view, the centrality  of self-
concepts as objects  in the world,  and their  propensity to be “felt  in progress”, as a
fundamental characteristic feature of pure subjective experience. 
Throughout this chapter so far, some of the researcher’s reflections resulting from an
deep eidetic analysis of the initial eidetic description, have been presented in the spirit
of  methodological  transparency.  In  the  next  section,  a  convergence  is  attempted,
whereby the results of all the reflections discussed so far, are consolidated with a view
to their development into a coherent final eidetic description, ultimately representative
of a less problematic depiction of the phenomenon of thinking in the context of OJL. 
5.2.8 Towards a final eidetic description
Sensing  and  projecting,  through  imaginative  variation,  were  conceptualised  as
simultaneous and inseparable in a way that did not cause the overall phenomenon of
thinking  to  collapse.  In  other  words,  separating  sensing  from  projecting  was  not
essential.  The notion  of  ‘following’  main  ideas  or  existing  concepts  as  a  volitional
action  was  also  challenged  and  imaginatively  removed,  based  on  the  premise  that
existing concepts shape, tint, or skew thoughts and behaviours into forms that, in any
singular temporally-defined moment, are what they are and could not be anything else.
Grades  of  magnitude  and  persistence  were  ascribed  directly  to  existing  concepts
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themselves, forged based on their significance to safety or survival in accordance with
biochemical processes. 
A further reduction can be made at this juncture, since, through the use of  epoché, one
might also question the necessity to delineate thinking from the very interactions in
which a subject is engaged that seemingly give rise to it.  Thinking acts in themselves
may be reduced to, or considered one in the same as, interactions both internal and
external to the subject, primarily as temporal processes mediating the interplay between
objects  in  the  world  (including  internally  and  physically  stored  concepts  and  the
external objects of which they are skewed or tinted impressions). Such interactions (that
are causal/sequential in nature) form part of the fabric of the universe (whatever its true
objective nature might be) to which the intentionality of consciousness attends, giving
rise  to  subjective  temporal  experience  (which  includes  experience  of  change).
Subjective experience was further clarified as a pure seeing, and not in terms of an
ultimate perceiving subject. Subjective experience was depicted as felt not by a subject,
but rather in itself as an experience (in the Heideggerian sense) of being a subject in the
world, as a confluence of objects and their tinted/skewed reflections in the general and
self concepts that are impressed on subjects as beings in the world. 
The  mirror  analogy  was  used  to  clarify  and  illustrate  some  of  these  ideas,  since
interpretive thoughts were portrayed as wholly dependent on existing general concepts
(including self-concepts), just as the tinted/skewed image portrayed in or by a mirror is
wholly  dependent  on  the  textured  reflective  surface  giving  rise  to  it.  The  analogy,
however, must incorporate the aspect of the initial eidetic description based on thinking
as both internal and external interaction, where internal refers to interaction of objects
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inside (or constituting) a subject, and external refers to interaction between objects both
inside  and  outside  a  subject,  or  as  termed  by  Chomsky,  “organism-environment
interactions”  (2006, 150).  Beard and Wilson defined experience,  in this  sense,  as a
“sense-making process of active engagement between the inner world of the person and
the outer world of the environment” (2015, 4). Brentano alluded to the notion of the self
as object/s in the world in his assertion that exploring the elements of consciousness,
“acquaints us with the objects of our own self” (1995, 78). In other words, the analogy
must  accommodate  a  means of  a mirror  system relating  to  itself,  as  well  as to  the
outside world,  in  a  way that  describes  the  very tangible  and familiar  nature of  the
experience of being a subject in the world, and without falling into an infinite regress
requiring the existence of a homunculus. It must be able to set itself and the concepts it
comprises, including self-concepts, in a pure seeing. In analogous terms, this may be
accommodated by conceptualising the addition of a second mirror positioned in front of
the first. A textured and malleable reflective surface could, in such a conceptualisation,
see or experience itself in the case of internal interaction,  as an object in the world
through  its  own tinted/skewed  interpretive  veil.  To  this  effect,  the  analogy  can  be
clarified and developed further. 
A descriptive  analogy  of  being  a  subject  with  a  capability  for  on-the-job  thinking,
therefore,  based  on a  mirror  with  a  textured  surface  representing  a  tinting/skewing
conceptual data repository, could be further clarified and described by imaginatively or
“creatively” (Van Manen, 1996) conceptualising a parallel dual-mirror system, as seen
in a typical interview/observation room set-up in the law-enforcement context. In such
a set-up,  adjacent  rooms are separated  by a  one-way (AKA semi-silvered  or  semi-
transparent)  mirror.  While  the  suspect  is  questioned  in  the  interview  room,  law
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enforcement or intelligence personnel typically monitor proceedings from the adjacent
observation room. The one-way mirror separating the two rooms will appear as a mirror
from the perspective of those inside the brightly-lit interview room, and as a transparent
window from the perspective of those inside the dimly-lit observation room. The one-
way mirror is semi-silvered, as opposed to fully-silvered, meaning that its appearance
as either a mirror or a window, depends entirely on the brightness of lighting conditions
either side of it. 
In  this  analogy,  the  (empty)  interview  room represents  the  internal  domain  of  the
subject, with the main textured mirror giving rise to a visible tinted/skewed image akin
to thoughts, positioned on the far-side wall directly opposite and parallel to the one-way
partitioning  mirror.  The  observation  room  here  represents  the  external  domain.  In
chapter six (section 6.2.4, illustration 2), a visual illustration of this set-up is presented. 
Cumulatively,  both  rooms are  objects  in  the  world.  Inside  the  interview room (the
subject), the standard lighting set-up (interview on-going), would permit the setting up
of concepts (including self-concepts) impressed upon the main mirror in a  seeing of
themselves via the two parallel mirrors, necessary for internal interaction to take place
as a temporally-bound process,  experienced repeatedly as change through successive
frame by frame moments of time. The setting up of its own concepts in a pure seeing,
accounts  for  the  consciousness  of thoughts,  through  the  same  unavoidable
tinted/skewed interpretive veil that renders all experience (of self or the world) wholly
interpretive  in  the  manner  espoused  by  Heidegger,  interpretive,  even  of  itself.  A
possibility  of  a  setting  up  of  concepts  themselves  in  a  pure  seeing,  similarly
corroborates the notion of  metacognition which has been defined as “thinking about
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thinking” (Cromley, 2000, 48; Kretchmar, 2013), or in other words, thinking as its own
object.  The abstract  notion of  infinite  regression here,  is  indistinguishable  from the
palpable  appearance  of  visual  infinity  one experiences  upon looking at  one  of  two
parallel mirrors. 
From the perspective of the subject, the shift between internal and external interaction
is represented by a shift in the lighting conditions of the observation room. An equally
brightly-lit observation room would permit the image (thoughts) portrayed in the main
mirror, to once again become a tinted/skewed representation of objects out in the world,
rather than a tinted/skewed representation of itself and its own concepts, essentially
removing the one-way partitioning mirror. A crucial aspect of the main mirror in this
analogy,  is  its  ability  as  a  concept-repository  to  reflect,  and  simultaneously  be
impressed upon by, objects out in the world. It is precisely the accumulation of such
impressions  that  constitute  the  tinting/skewing  interpretive  veil,  “projecting
antecedently given being and its structures” (Heidegger, 1982, 22). 
The interview-room analogy focuses on the perspective of the subject,  and seeks to
describe the simultaneity of sensing and projecting as they give rise to thinking (image
portrayal)  that  is  wholly  defined  by  the  confluence  of  existing  concepts  as
tinted/skewed (interpretive)  reflections of objects out in the world (in the observation
room), and the objects in the world themselves, during both internal as well as external
interaction.  The  parallel  mirror  configuration  presents  a  visual  representation  of
Brentano’s description of the intentionality of consciousness, and its tendency to relate
to objects in the world, as well as to itself. 
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“The  fact  that  there  is  no  consciousness  without  any  intentional
relation at all is as certain as the fact that, apart from the object upon
which is primarily directed, consciousness has, on the side, itself as
an object.  This is,  in an essential way, part of the nature of every
psychical act.” (Brentano, 1995, 26)
In his description of consciousness, which according to Chalmers “stubbornly resists”
(1995, 200) scientific explanation, Merleau-Ponty used field theory to conceptualise his
notion of a “phenomenal field”. Interactions between subject, body, and objects in the
phenomenal  field,  represent  the  phenomenon  of  consciousness  in  the  same was  as
interactions  between  objects  in  gravitational  or  magnetic  fields  represent  the
phenomena of gravity or magnetism, respectively (1962, 66). In doing so, Merleau-
Ponty  presented  clues  regarding  the  main  constituents  of  a  phenomenological
description  seeking  to  describe  phenomena  that  involve  the  problematic  notion  of
consciousness,  while  also  demonstrating  the  clarity  such  descriptions  are  able  to
provide in discerning complex phenomena that hinder the advancement  of scientific
progress. 
The interview-room analogy  thereby  seeks  to  illustrate  the  course  of  reflections  as
carried out  in  a phenomenological  analysis  of the findings  of this  study, explicated
throughout this chapter so far. It does so by means of a relatively simple visual analogy,
which retains focus on the fundamental phenomenological tenets related to the topic as
espoused by Merleau-Ponty, namely, interaction between subject, body, and objects as
a grand confluence of objects in the world, with conscious experience as an emerging
property, as a phenomenological illustration in the tradition of Adams and Van Manen,
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intended to serve as an “evocative example” (2017, 788). The final eidetic description,
in response to the first research question, further to the visual interview-room analogy,
may  hereby  be  summarised  and  articulated  as  follows,  and  forms  a  basis  for  the
remainder of the chapter that seeks to address the second research question,  and its
application or relevance in practice. 
Cumulatively,  the world, the body, physiological correlates of existing concepts, the
biochemical substances responsible for affective feeling states (as spatial objects), and
any processes taking place therein (as temporal objects), must form part of the fabric of
the  universe  (whatever  its  true  objective  structure),  to  which  intentionality  of
consciousness (giving experience a primal impression with simultaneous retention and
protention  qualities)  duly  interpretively  attends,  giving  rise  to  consciousness  of
thinking. The thinking process as a temporally experienced object is, more precisely,
the  process  of  interaction  taking  place  between  spatial  objects  internally  (objects
constituting a subject)  and externally (objects  constituting a subject as well as other
objects in the world). On-the-job thinking is hereby denoted as an object, to which the
intentionality of consciousness duly attends in the manner originally posited by Husserl,
as the constitution of subjective processes via attendance to “real natural objects in the
objective spatio-temporal world” (1960, 80), which include on-the-job thinking as a
natural object.  In the following sections, the relevance and practical applicablility of
this conceptualisation of the essential nature of on-the-job thinking in the context of
OJL is discussed. 
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5.3  Fostering  continuing  research  and  development  in  on-the-job
learning
In  this  chapter  so  far,  emphasis  has  been  made  on  the  first  research  question
specifically, based on an articulation of the essential nature of on-the-job thinking. At
this stage, attention is turned to the second question, which was based on the relevance
of such an articulation in practice.  Each main aspect of the final eidetic description
presented in the previous section, is approached throughout the ensuing narrative with
respect to its practical implications in the wider field of research and development in
OJL. 
5.3.1 Autonomy of on-the-job thinking: Practical implications
Some of the prominent themes emerging throughout the process of articulating the final
eidetic description, like the centrality of general and self concepts, or the influence of
feelings  and  feeling  states  on  thoughts  and  behaviours,  were  easier  to  construe  as
relevant  to  both  the  discernment  of  essence,  as  well  as  the  prospect  of  practical
application and facilitation of further research and development in OJL. In their post-
eidetic  analysis  status as essential  features,  they were relatively  easily  re-applied to
incidental  contexts.  Other,  more  abstract  or  philosophical,  aspects  of  the  final
description, however, such as those related to autonomy, awareness and volition, were
initially more elusive and problematic with regard to their implications on professional
practice.  The autonomous aspect of the experience of thinking, where the thinker is
deterministically  portrayed  less  as  causing,  than  they  are  as  merely  experiencing
thoughts, at face value appears to undermine the element of control or influence over
the process and direction of learning altogether,  rendering any debate by educators,
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trainers  and stakeholders  on  the  matter  of  promoting  and facilitating  new learning,
seemingly futile. Upon deeper evaluation, however, just the opposite appears to be true.
Marsick  et  al.  portrayed  informal  learning  as  integral  to  work  and  daily  routines,
“triggered by internal and external jolts” (2006, 798). Internal and external jolts, and
their resulting 'chain reactions’ of resulting thoughts, concord here with the notion of
thinking as internal and external interaction. Change to existing concepts and resulting
behaviours, affected through the process of thinking, therefore, must depend on agents
presented within such interactions, bestowing more, not less, importance on structured
interventions  or  initiatives  designed  to  enhance  OJL.  By  basing  interventions  or
initiatives on a phenomenological description that emphasises the non-volitional and
interaction-based  characteristics  of  learners’  propensity  to  undergo  OJL,  added
importance is in fact placed on the need to facilitate, mediate, or otherwise influence
interactions as they unfold continuously on both an internal and external basis, planting,
so to speak, the seeds of learning.
If the confluence of objects in the world and existing concepts comprise an influential
source of thoughts and behaviours in OJL situations and episodes, then the objects in
the world,  as  well  as  the existing  concepts  themselves  in  which  they are  reflected,
should be tailored towards the development of sound, as opposed to unsound, learning
outcomes. Such a tailoring, can only be affected via its presentation within, as integral
to, those interactions learners undergo, since the ingredients for learning must originate
somewhere. A mirror in this view cannot reflect something that is not placed in front of
it.  Pulte (2009, 11) made this  point in his  general critique of language,  stating that
words are reflections of experience (just as concepts ultimately reflect the world), but
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no amount of them could, upon delivery from a sender to a receiver, ever convey the
true meanings intended by the sender, if the receiver has never experienced anything
similar. 
In  PFT11’s  description  of  empathy,  she  similarly  specified  how  empathising  with
someone could only really be achieved by drawing on one’s own experiences that are
merely similar,  and not identical,  to that of the other person, and that a real or true
understanding or sharing of someone else’s feelings can never be complete.  Husserl
similarly asserted that a subject can never “break out of the circle of their own mental
processes” (1970, 16), emphasising how we are limited purely by what those mental
processes contain and divulge as reflections of objects in the world. OJL, in this sense,
can only result from experiences, of objects, placed in front of the learner.  Without
interventions as objects presented to the learner, the likelihood of entirely new ways of
seeing the world, are less likely to arise exclusively from internal  interaction alone,
since what is priorly given can only be considered, reorganised or manipulated in a
finite number of ways. 
According to the interview-room analogy, the moment general concepts are captured
by,  or  impressed  upon,  the  main  mirror,  they  form  impressions  and  become
tinting/skewing agents influencing what comes after. Cooper depicted the mind, in this
sense, as a builder of symbols where, “external phenomena are meaningless except as
the mind perceives them” (1993, 16).  Subsequent concepts can only be superimposed
upon, or added to, these prior impressions, and the capacity to drastically alter them
from the internal perspective alone, which can only consider what is already given, is
inherently limited pending exposure to more objects out in the world. So while this
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study focuses specifically on thinking, the final eidetic description actively challenges
the  validity  of  conceptualising  thinking  as  an  isolated  and  independent  process,  as
alluded to by Greeno (1997, 118), in chapter one in reference to  The Thinker seated
alone on a pedestal at the gates of hell. It does so by emphasising both internal and
external interaction, as a confluence. OJL initiatives as objects given to subjects via the
process of external  interaction (and subsequent  internal  interaction also),  could take
various practical forms, and are discussed in more detail in the next section. But first,
the  apparent  autonomy  of  on-the-job  thinking  may  be  considered  from an  another
perspective. 
The impasse in further studying OJL, identified in chapter two, was attributed primarily
to the tacit learning problem. It has been argued throughout this thesis, that the tacit-
ness  problem  has  itself  resulted,  in  turn,  from  problematic  conceptualisations  of
consciousness, influenced by dual-process theories rooted in cognitive science. A less
problematic depiction of thinking, based on descriptions arising from phenomenology,
as  opposed to  models  arising  from cognitive  science,  was posited  as  a  prospective
means of addressing the impasse, and facilitating a revival of research and development
in OJL. Throughout the development of such a phenomenological description, several
additional insights came to light, including the identification of the risks associated with
hidden,  and  essentially  uncontrollable,  learning  outcomes  arising  from  OJL,  as
discussed in chapter two. Based on the claim that OJL occurs predominantly tacitly,
with  tacit-ness  itself  attributed  to  problematic  conceptualisations  of  the  notion  of
consciousness, OJL outcomes are considered to be difficult to measure, let alone direct
or control. According to De Lyon and Cushion, hidden learning may lead to uncritical
acceptance of potentially ineffective or unsafe practices (2013, 1413). 
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The argument is hereby made, however, that the notion of control over thinking in the
context of learning, is not in fact limited to informal contexts like OJL, exclusively, and
cannot be used as justification in cautioning stakeholders against it specifically.  Eraut
(2004) argued that in traditional manifestations of formal (structured) learning, it is in
fact the work that is structured (with learning as its intended outcome), and not the
learning itself. In other words, whether one is in a classroom or an office, interactions
and  associated  thinking  are  prompted  by  tasks,  or  bouts  of  work.  However
systematically  work  tasks  are  structured,  in  both educational  and  work-based
environments, the learning itself is either an intended or unintended outcome, and can
be considered to remain distinctly  within the subjective domain of the individual  to
structure for herself. 
So, work, however it is defined, invariably involves interaction on some level, which,
according  to  the  final  eidetic  description,  in  turn  gives  rise  to  the  phenomenon  of
thinking, and such work, according to Eraut (2004), takes place in formal educational
environments as well as in workplaces. Learning outcomes arising from any form of
work,  whatever  environment  it  takes  place in,  and whatever  the intentions  of  those
structuring the environment or work tasks are (with learning either as an intended or
unintended  outcome),  it  can  be  argued,  are  always difficult  to  measure,  direct  or
control. 
It was then posited in chapter two, further to the experiments carried out by Di Stefano
et  al.  (2014) on the effects  of  conscious  deliberative  reflection,  that  however  much
conscious deliberative learning arises during a given task (regardless of whether such a
task is based primarily on thinking or doing according to traditional conceptualisations
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of learning from experience), one can never be sure how much unconscious learning is
also arising. For as long as learning arising from a problematic conceptualisation of
conscious awareness is cautioned against on the grounds of it being tacit, therefore, the
validity  of  discriminating  any  specific  form  of  learning  exclusively,  is  called  into
question. OJL has already been found to represent the majority of professional learning
following the cessation of formal education and training (Eraut, 2004; Melton et al.,
2010; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013), so choosing to discriminate it on the grounds of the
risk of questionable tacit learning outcomes, appears, by this reasoning, increasingly
counterproductive. 
Consider the existence of a potent general concept entrenched in a young vocational
college business student that to make money, one must take risks. Suppose the content
knowledge of a given module or unit on fire safety included knowing the appropriate
legislation  concerning  fire  safety  equipment,  the  costs  involved  in  acquiring  such
equipment, the procedures and implications of regular fire safety checks, and statistics
about  fire  safety  conformity.  While  the  learner  might  be  able  to  achieve  all  the
knowledge-based learning outcomes in a structured assessment by demonstrating her
knowledge about all of the above, she could still come away from the overall learning
experience, upon weighing up the costs of equipment, penalties, fines and the like, with
the opinion that it makes more business sense, in the particular type of business she
wishes  to  operate,  to  maximise  profit,  take a risk,  and avoid certain  expensive fire
safety  measures  or  equipment  altogether.  So  in  other  words,  while  structured
assessment  of  specific  learning  outcomes  might  confirm the  ability  of  a  learner  to
express a predefined range of fire-safety content knowledge, one can never be sure
what the actual learning outcomes are, in this case, knowing enough about fire safety to
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select an outcome that would save the most money, while actually sacrificing safety. In
the  latter  case,  the  actual learning  outcomes  would  actively  contradict  the  original
scope of the intended learning, and, for that matter, the officially and formally certified
learning  outcomes  recorded  on  her  transcript.  Consider  also  the  similarly  sinister
example, of a student exploiting administrative loopholes throughout a course to get
away with attending fewer lectures and performing less work than her peers. Despite
the learning outcomes indicated on her transcript, such a student might emerge with
highly questionable  actual learning outcomes about how she believes one might “get
ahead” in the “real world”. In other words, the essentially illusory nature of  control
over actual learning outcomes extends to all forms of learning, and does not represent a
sound justification  for  the  cautionary  approach taken  by researchers,  educators  and
trainers, to OJL exclusively. As a consequence, it is argued throughout the following
sections, that, the aim of stakeholders intent on promoting and facilitating OJL, or any
other form of learning for that matter, should be focused not on learning outcomes per
sé, but on the propensity for learners to engage in, from their  subjective viewpoint,
thinking that  is  conducive  with the  development  and organisation  of  sound general
concepts that lead, in turn, to sound learning outcomes.
Regarding the autonomous, non-volitional aspects of the final eidetic description of on-
the-job thinking,  therefore,  two main observations  are  hereby made.  First,  that  OJL
initiatives and interventions, whatever form they actually take in practice, are crucial in
influencing the formation of general and self-concepts in learners, as objects presented
via  external  interaction  to  thinking  subjects.  And  second,  that  such  initiatives  be
focused primarily on the formation of general concepts most likely (as tinting/skewing
agents), to lead to the formation of desirable learning outcomes, rather than exclusively
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on  attainment  of  predefined  objective  learning  outcomes,  which  may  in  fact  be
promoting counter-productive or otherwise indeterminate actual learning outcomes. 
5.3.2 Thinking as external interaction: Practical considerations
Beard  and  Wilson  defined  theories  of  experiential  learning  as,  “abstract
conceptualisations  of  how  thoughts and  external  objects relate  to  one  another  in  a
consistent manner” (2015, 27). In the previous section, in view of the centrality of the
relationship between thinking and external objects in experiential learning contexts, it
was argued, that what is given to a thinking subject via external interaction (and also
attended  to  by  subsequent  internal interaction)  is  crucial  to  on-going  learning,
substantiating  the  importance  of  structured  interventions  in  guiding  OJL.  Such
initiatives, construed as objects given to subjects via the process of external interaction,
could take  various  practical  forms.  Use of  the terms  interventions and/or  initiatives
throughout  the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  therefore,  connotes  various  possible
configurations, not necessarily limited to those already well-documented in research on
WBL and PBL, like work placements, apprenticeships, and communities of practice.
An  intervention  as  an  object  presented  through  external  interaction  could  simply
comprise information on the nature of OJL, and/or various practical methods for its
enhancement, internalised by the subject, retained, and used throughout the series of
OJL situations  and episodes  constituting  the overall  career  span,  without  additional
guidance or reinforcement.  In this  view, knowledge about  OJL would represent  the
kernel of fruitful learning experiences and outcomes, so long as on-going individual
commitment and self-motivation to learn exists. 
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In workplaces, where the emphasis is naturally focused primarily on actual work, rather
than on learning, the need to balance the two has been considered a persistent barrier to
workplace  learning  (Jedaar  et  al.,  2009,  478).  The  onus  is  thereby  placed  on  the
individual,  who  is  ultimately  expected  to  deliver,  without  the  need  for  continuing
organisational initiatives aimed at learning and development (Raelin, 1997). According
to  Marsick  et  al.,  employees  are  increasingly  expected  to  be “self-directed  in  their
learning”, to keep up with an ever-evolving “knowledge economy”, itself magnified by
“performance pressures” (2006, 794). Information, in this case, may be presented by
formal institutions or organisations in the form of courses, units or modules in any way
related  to  OJL,  be  they  educational  or  work-based,  or  obtained  from other  sources
associated more with informal learning channels, like publications, seminars, or various
online resources. 
In the absence of practical organisational constraints, on the other hand, interventions
could, indeed, also assume more on-going and structured forms, designed to guide and
facilitate learning, that are less dependent on individual commitment or self-motivation
to  learn.  Such on-going interventions  could  be  offered  by  a  range of  organisations
commited to the enhancement of OJL, including both education or work-based entities.
Constructivist  learning,  in  this  sense,  is  characterised  by  personal  discovery  and
problem-solving,  taking  place  in  a  “responsive  environment”  (Cooper,  1993,  16).
Instead of considering its predominantly problematic nature, as indeed it is portrayed in
the  sector-specific  literature,  OJL  may  therefore  instead  be  re-conceptualised  by
educators and trainers, as, for instance, a problem-solving and hands-on constructivist
learning environment, where they play a valued role in the implementation of structured
initiatives and interventions. According to Jedaar et al., “teachers and facilitators” are
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sometimes needed in work-based contexts to assist learners in recognising opportunities
and making the most of their resources (2009, 478), or providing “observable models”
of tacit skills for learners to “follow and imitate” (Raelin, 1997, 564). Raelin continued
to posit that “helpers” can be “critical”  in encouraging professionals to try out new
workplace behaviours (1997, 575).  The implications of the findings of this study are
discussed,  therefore,  throughout  the  rest  of  this  chapter,  in  the  scope  of  external
interaction, with a view to integration within any such singular or persisting variations
of structured interventions or initiatives, including those that are individually-sought or
organisationally-sponsored. 
5.3.3 General and self concepts: Practical implications
Further to Eraut's (2004) assertion that workplaces are rarely structured with learning in
mind, if sound learning is based on the formation of sound reflections of objects in the
world, then all objects in the world would need to be restructured with learning in mind,
with a view to their sound representation as concepts. The difficulties of restructuring
every aspect of a learners external environment, however, lend further credence to the
importance of the internal aspects of thinking, and sound concept formation as a sound
reflection of an otherwise unsound outside world. While the significant restructuring of
work  environments  might  indeed  promote  increasingly  sound  learning,  the
impracticality of such a collossal enterprise is palpable.  Sound reflections of  unsound
objects in the world meanwhile, are only possible, bearing in mind the interview-room
analogy, through the existence of concepts that have the capacity to mediate internal
interaction  (proceeding seamlessly  from external  interaction),  in  such a  way that  is
conducive with the formation of sound learning outcomes.  If on-the-job thinking and
learning is dependent on existing general and self concepts as tinting/skewing agents,
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then their enhancement with a view to sound OJL outcomes represents a compelling,
and, perhaps more practical and realistic enterprise than physically and organisationally
restructuring work environments for learning.
With a view to enhancing the formation of sound concepts, the impetus noted in the
literature towards the development of thinking/reflecting models and tools appears to
find justification here. Application of the scientific method to individual thinking, as
originally espoused by Dewey (1910), would, hypothetically, represent progress in the
form of sound learning outcomes, in much the same way as sound scientific theories
represent scientific progress for societies on a collective scale. While this point appears
to support the use of systematic  measures based on the formation of sound general
concepts through the development of scientific (Dewey, 1910), critical (Moon, 2008) or
reflective (Borton, 1970; Gibbs, 1988; Schön, 1991; Raelin, 1996) thinking as a skill
via the use of models and tools, they do not necessarily support the general impetus
noted  in  the  literature  towards  the  development  of  additional,  or  augmentation  of
existing, thinking/reflecting models and tools. 
As argued in chapter two, existing models and tools designed to guide thinking and
learning, lack conclusive evidence ascertaining their efficacy and usefulness in practice
(Staniforth  and Harland,  2006;  Noormohammadi,  2014),  and were criticised  on the
grounds that they reside on tenuous theoretical foundations pending the articulation of
more robust definitions of the thinking acts they seek to operationalise and enhance.
Marsick et al. stressed the importance that future research be based instead on finding
out  precisely what  works in  enhancing work-based learning (2006,  799),  creating  a
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heightened sense of urgency with regard to  validation as opposed to  proliferation of
theoretical constructs designed to enhance OJL.  
The development of additional models and tools, or their augmentation with additional
layers  of  abstraction  or  complexity,  would  only  compound  further  research  efforts
aimed  at  their  validation.  A  more  practical  contribution  towards  maximising  the
apparent benefits thinking models and tools may have in enhancing the formation of
general concepts conducive with sound learning outcomes,  by this, as well  as other
prospective  studies,  is  therefore  instead  considered  to  be  based  primarily  on  a
clarification and distillation of existing work. Brown highlighted the danger of learners
being  able  to  “acquire”  tools,  yet  remain  unable  to  actually  use  them  effectively.
Knowing yet  not  being  able  to  use a  tool,  effectively  renders  it  “decontextualised”
(1988, 10), highlighting an important limitation of such tools in the context of OJL,
since OJL in itself is typically, by its very nature, practical and contextualised. A tool
that  is  theoretical and  generic,  in  this  respect,  appears  increasingly  and  inherently
incompatible with the fundamental nature of OJL. Thinking and reflecting models and
tools are discussed, therefore, throughout the following sections, in consideration of the
final eidetic description and its main features, with the aim of clarification, distillation,
and eventual modification, as opposed to proliferation or augmentation. 
Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that for a science to be truly complete, the
systematic  study  of  subjectivity,  as  advocated  by  the  methods  of  phenomenology,
should underpin the study of objectivity, as advocated by the methods of positive or
natural  science.  An initial  consideration,  therefore,  with regard to the distillation of
thinking/reflecting tools, is that efforts designed to enhance scientific processes at the
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level  of  an  individual  learner’s  thinking  (as  originally  intended  by  Schön),  should
reflect this  wider scientific  scope.  In other words, an attitude based on epoché may
similarly be cultivated by learners. Scientific thinking, by this definition, would include
a consideration of alternative possibilities based on the suspension of the objectified
outcomes  of  traditional  scientific/critical  thinking.  A  sensitivity  to  description  and
clarification in addition to explanation,  prediction,  and correlation,  may enhance the
quality of OJL outcomes, supporting the representation of qualitative phenomenological
thinking in  traditional  thinking/reflecting  models  and tools.  On the  collective  scale,
sound scientific  methods lead to the formation of sound theories,  which themselves
result in sound descriptions (in the sense of phenomenology and a  complete science),
explanations  and  predictions  about  personal,  social,  and  natural  phenomena  in  the
world. On an individual level, the result of sound scientific thinking would be concepts
that are akin to sound theories, as opposed to “naive” theories based on “incomplete
thinking” (Baron, 2008, 17). 
In this  regard,  the notion of  threshold concepts assumes particular  relevance in any
effort to emphasise the formation of sound learning outcomes as a desirable capability
of on-the-job thinking, which, as argued previously (in section 5.3.1), are preferable to
emphasising the achievement of specific objective learning outcomes alone. Meyer and
Land define threshold concepts as those concepts that result in a “seeing (of) things in a
new way”. Comprehending a threshold concept shapes a “transformed internal view” of
objects in the world, and a change in how subjects “perceive, apprehend, or experience
particular phenomena” (2003, 1). Further to the analogous reflective surface of a mirror
as  a  tinting/skewing  agent  representative  of  existing  general  and  self  concepts,  the
definition of threshold concepts, in their capacity to alter thoughts just as the textured
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surface of a mirror alters the image it portrays, reinforces their significance with respect
to  the  final  eidetic  description  of  on-the-job  thinking,  and  thereby  warrant  further
discussion here.  
Meyer  and  Land  present  the  notions  of  complex  numbers in  mathematics,  or
opportunity  cost in  economics,  as  examples  of  threshold  concepts,  because  they
represent  a change in the way individuals  perceive problems in those subjects,  and
perhaps even wider problems outside the immediate scope of those subjects. Indeed,
certain threshold concepts may change an individuals entire world view. In a further
example  by  Meyers  and  Land  (2003,  4),  Newton’s  universal  laws  of  gravity  are
accepted  as  theory  on  a  collective  scientific  scale,  but  to  the  individual,  in  their
propensity to transform one’s understanding about the motion of objects that sometimes
contradict  everyday  intuitive,  yet  mistaken,  assumptions  (that  heavier  objects,  for
instance, fall faster than light objects, or that objects will eventually slow down without
the need for external  forces to  act  upon them),  essentially  establishes  the theory of
gravity, as a threshold concept. Upon grasping it, one can view previously intuitive (yet
mistaken)  assumptions  (like  those  outlined  above),  in  an  entirely  different  way.
Thinking/reflecting  models  and  tools,  therefore,  and  indeed  OJL  initiatives  and
interventions at large, can be conceptualised as means of enhancing thinking not so
much as a sound theory-building activity, but rather, for want of a more relevant term,
as an activity that results in the formation of sound threshold concepts. 
Apart from being transformative in their capacity to change one’s view, and integrative
in their capacity to span contexts beyond those in which they were acquired, threshold
concepts will often also be, according to Meyers and Land (2003, 4-5), irreversible. In
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other words, once the viewpoint has been changed, it is difficult, or even strange, to
attempt to see the world in the same way as one did prior to their comprehension, such
as, following comprehension of Newton's laws of gravity, that objects of different mass
fall to the ground at the same speed, or that in the absence of gravity and air resistance,
an object would continue to travel at the same speed through space indefinitely, unless
some external force eventually acts upon it. This precise notion, of an altered view of
the  world,  corroborates  the  particular  feature  of  the  final  eidetic  description  that
portrays  thinking  as  wholly  dependent  on  the  tinting/skewing,  interpretive  and
reflective (of objects in the world) veil, represented in the final analogy as the textured
surface of the main mirror. Thoughts, in this sense, were defined as being what they
are, without the possibility of being anything else, subject to physical changes to the
reflective  surface,  analogous  to  a  repository  of  existing  concepts,  incorporating,
according to Meyers and Land (2003), threshold concepts, and core concepts (concepts
that compliment threshold concepts but in themselves do not represent a transformed
view of the world). 
In his explanation of thinking from a mathematical perspective, Schoefeld (2012, 231-
232)  similarly  conceptualised  various  factors  influencing  typical  problem-solving
processes in teachers, including knowledge and beliefs, akin to core concepts, as well as
problem-solving strategies, also known as “heuristics” (Pólya, 1945, cited in Schoefeld,
2012,  231),  which  were  akin  to  threshold  concepts  in  their  capacity  to  change
perception  and  apprehension.  Effective  use  of  thinking  strategies  (or  threshold
concepts),  requires learners to be aware of their  own thoughts, enabled by concepts
setting  themselves  up  in  a  pure  seeing  (metacognition).  Cromley  (2000,  48)  and
Kretchmar (2013) both emphasised the importance metacognitive ability as a means of
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enhancing learning, and an important skill to be encouraged and nurtured in learners.
By setting up thinking as its own object, thinking strategies may be duly monitored by
thinking subjects  throughout  their  application.  In  the  absence  of  effectively  applied
“heuristic” thinking strategies, Baron warns against an increasingly likely susceptibility
to a range of cognitive biases (2008, 152), and an associated risk of forming “naive
theories”, resulting from “incomplete thinking” (2008, 17), resonant with the discourse
on undesirable learning outcomes. 
The notion of core and threshold concepts permit added clarification of the nature of
what  have,  until  now,  been  referred  to  in  this  thesis  simply  as,  existing  general
concepts. Among the most influential of existing general concepts to the thoughts and
behaviours of PFTs, according to the participants themselves, were those pertaining to
self. Discussion of self-concepts in the literature affirms their influence particularly on
the  motivation of adults to learn (Rogers, 1961; Knowles, 1984). Indeed, motivation
and self-direction feature as prominent themes in the wider field of research on adult
learning (Chinnasamy, 2013). According to the prevailing discourse, by incorporating
self-direction  into one’s self-concept,  an adult  will  typically  assume an approach to
learning that differs from that of a child. The findings in this study, meanwhile, support
a continuing discourse on self-concepts limited not only with regard to their influence
on motivation to learn among adults, but inclusive rather, of their more intrinsic, central
and affective nature in practical OJL situations and episodes, as influential blueprints or
guides to thoughts and behaviours. In this regard, the emphasis on self-concepts noted
in the accounts of PFTs, justifies the prospective development of dedicated initiatives
towards their  enhancement,  with a view to maximising desirable learning outcomes.
Any  discussion  on  the  enhancement  of  existing  general  concepts  with  a  view  to
284
maximising learning, therefore, stands to benefit from further consideration of, not only
threshold concepts or heuristic thinking strategies, but also, self-concepts. 
PFTs  described  concepts  of  self  that  could  have  been  based  on  any  number  of
assumptions,  positively  or  negatively  conceptualised  prior  events,  or  otherwise
irrational influences, and also expressed an element of choice or empowerment with
respect to adopting and modifying them. PFT12 discussed the notion of every person
having access to two versions of themselves, like internal “echoes”, from which they
must choose, in their determination of success or cowardice. PFT08 similarly described
his efforts  to  be more of  an extrovert,  as opposed to  his  prior  conceptualisation  of
himself as an introvert. PFTs also cited self-concepts to which they did not aspire, such
as the “sergeant” type (PFT04) of trainer, or the type of extrovert that exposes too much
private information (PFT08). 
In terms of thinking/reflective models and tools, therefore, professionals may benefit
from exercises, in the wider scope of general OJL interventions, aimed explicitly at the
construction  or  enhancement  of  positive,  fruitful,  and valid  self-concepts  conducive
with learning, development, and the attainment of personal and professional goals. How
PFTs saw themselves, how they would have liked, or not liked, to see themselves, the
role-models they cited, and the expectations they considered as integral to their role, all
represented facets of their self-concepts amenable to prospective re-conceptualisation in
structured interventions. 
In summary, it has been posited in this section, that efforts to modify or distill thinking/
reflective models and tools, or indeed OJL initiatives on a wider scale, should, first,
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incorporate methodology conducive with a complete conceptualisation of science, and
second, include a special  focus on the formation of sound  core,  threshold,  and  self
concepts, in their capacity to constitute agents of positive change in on-the-job thinking,
and any resulting learning outcomes.
5.3.4 Self-talk: Practical implications
In positing language-use as a form of thinking, Vygotsky (1987) affirms the importance
of  self-talk  in  the  context  of  on-the-job  thinking.  Further  to  the  need  for  distilling
existing thinking/reflecting models and tools, given their nature as typically based in
language-use,  the  notion  of  self-talk  assumes  added  significance.  In  chapter  two,
reflection models as espoused by Borton (1970) and Gibbs (1988), were discussed in
their capacity to guide reflective thought through deliberative bouts of self-talk based
on scripted questions. PFTs' accounts of bouts of self-talk (or inner speech), however,
duly  challenge  the  applicability  of  current  configurations  of  reflection  models  in
practice. 
Rather  than  a  structured  practice  to  be  carried  out  in  a  scheduled  and  deliberative
fashion, inner speech was portrayed by PFTs as a much more fluid, continuous, and
unplanned  phenomenon.  PFTs  depicted  their  bouts  of  reflective  self-talk  less  as
deliberatively initiated, and more as continuations or extensions of various situations
and episodes,  as  resulting  from external  interaction  with  others  or  the  environment
itself.  PFT08 and PFT11 both explicitly  stated  that  they  never  “sit  down” and tell
themselves  to  think  or  reflect,  describing  their  reflections  as  occurring  “naturally”.
While  some  PFTs  described  use  of  self-questions  which  were  apparently  quite
structured, the nature of their occurrence was primarily either spontaneous, or unfolding
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directly from prior events. PFT04 described a particularly self-critical reflective episode
based on self-talk, which was not initiated deliberatively, but rather triggered by, and
proceeded immediately upon, reading an email from a client. PFT10 similarly described
how her reflective bouts of self-talk would occur while driving from one session to the
next,  continuing  seamlessly  from  the  session  itself,  spurred  on  by  feelings  of
“awkwardness” when things did not go according to plan. PFT05 described how his
reflective bouts of self-talk would result from attempts at trying to “make sense” of the
things that “played” on his mind.
Carruthers stated that, “the movement from awareness of one’s own inner speech to the
propositional attitudes thereby manifested, is just as interpretive as is listening to the
speech of another person” (2017, 232), emphasising the spontaneous and non-volitional
aspects of its nature as a phenomenon. While knowing a carefully designed or scripted
repertoire of self-questions would appear to be a worthy pursuit, since their extraction
in practical contexts would be akin, according to Carruthers, to listening to the speech
of  another  person,  reflective  practice  as  a  structured  system  to  be  maintained
throughout a professionals’ career span, in a scheduled and deliberative fashion, did not
concord with PFTs’ accounts.
PFTs'  accounts  of  their  experiences  of  self-talk,  suggests  that  the  distillation  of
language-based thinking/reflecting models and tools designed to enhance the formation
of more sound core, threshold, and self concepts, take into account the fluid nature of
inner  speech,  and prospective  application  in  a  more  opportunistic  fashion.  In  other
words,  according to  the participants,  scripted questions were more likely to emerge
naturally  during  uninitiated  bouts  of  self-talk,  without  the  need  for  deliberative,
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structured,  and  scheduled  reflection  sessions.  Further  to  Carruthers'  (2017,  232)
assertion that awareness of inner speech resembles one's awareness of the speech of
another person, then provided memorised self-questions are rooted in existing general
(core)  concepts,  their  emergence  during  OJL episodes  and situations  constitutes  an
experience to be, as described by Rogers in his discussion on self-concepts specifically,
“confidently felt in process” (1961, 153), and not an isolated, separated, abstracted, or
even deliberatively-initated process. 
Further to Vygotsky’s notion that  thoughts are, “completed in the word” (1987, 252),
language-based reflection models are uniquely poised to make valid contributions to the
reconsolidation of existing general concepts, adding credence to the aim of enhancing
their applicability in practice.  Like all forms of interaction, as argued previously (in
section 5.3.1), scripted reflective self-questions as a basis for ensuing bouts of self-talk,
represent useful encoded “objects” for presentation in such interactions, be they internal
or external. Carruthers cited additional research in neuroscience, suggesting that motor
instructions in inner, as well as verbalised, speech, are created in the same way, issuing
a “forward model” of sensory consequences for a given speech act, where outgoing
signals to the muscles involved in verbalised speech are suppressed in the case of inner
speech (2017, 232),  higlighting language as a common demoninator  among various
ways  of  reconsolidating  general  concepts  (thinking).  Vygotsky  (1987)  presented  a
continuum of language use, including inner, verbalised, as well as “written” speech,
showing how practices based on the self-directed, spoken, as well as written word, like
self-talk,  interviews  or  focus  group  discussions,  and  journal  writing  or  written
communication with others such as those encouraged in “communities of practice” in
WBL contexts (Raelin, 1996; Jedaar et al., 2009), all represent worthy components of
288
prospective  OJL  interventions  that  facilitate  a  reconsolidation  of  existing  concepts
through language by any means. Raelin further posited that learners may find it difficult
to engage in fruitful reflection without the assistance of a partner or mentor (1997, 575),
emphasising  the  importance  of  enlisting  others  with  whom  to  communicate,  as  a
valuable means of enhancing OJL.
It has been argued in this section, therefore, that while self-talk constitutes a valuable
form of  thinking  in  the  context  of  OJL,  and a  prospective  means  of  implementing
processes  designed  to  enhance  formation  of  more  sound  core,  threshold  and  self
concepts, its use should take into account the more spontaneous or fluid nature of self-
talk as it actually occurs in practical contexts according to the participants in this study,
and  that  engagement  in  regular,  scheduled,  and  deliberative  bouts  of  self-talk
throughout the career  span, as implied  by traditional  thinking/reflecting  models  and
tools, may be an unrealistic goal. Furthermore, in its capacity to enhance on-the-job
thinking and associated learning outcomes, language-based thinking need not be limited
to spoken (to self or other) form alone, lending credence to prospective initiatives based
also on the written word.  
5.3.5 Feelings and feeling states: Practical implications
Further to the centrality of existing general concepts in the final eidetic description,
similarly influential to the thoughts and behaviours of PFTs, were feelings and feeling
states. Like general concepts, which have already been deemed worthy of interventions
aimed at their enhancment in terms of their influence on sound or unsound learning
outcomes,  affective  feelings  during  OJL  situations  and  episodes  were  similarly
prominent  in PFTs'  accounts  of their  on-the-job thinking.  Such feelings  and feeling
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states, however, may have been unjustified, irrational, or otherwise incompatible with
the development of sound learning outcomes, particularly when they were of a negative
nature. Jedaar et al. noted that mental anxiety, for instance, can have a “major negative
impact on learning performance in the workplace” (2009, 478). 
Just as PFTs showed evidence of a sense of empowerment to select or modify aspects
of their self-concepts, strategies for managing negative feelings were also noted in their
accounts. PFT05 described his clear use of visualisation techniques to manage negative
feelings, by likening his anxiety to a rainstorm. Instead of running outside and waving
his umbrella around, he explained how he would strive to remain calm, and simply wait
for the rain to pass, without getting wet. PFT10 described how she managed negative
feelings experienced prior to the delivery of a fitness class by writing down her session
plan and listening to music, to align her focus on the task at hand. The existence and
efficacy of established strategies for managing negative feelings, very much like those
used in psychotherapy, therefore, were already, to some extent, apparent to the PFTs. In
their  discussion  on  whole-person  learning  theory,  Marsick  et  al.  recognised  the
importance  of,  “integrating  feelings  and  emotions  into  the  cognitive  design  of  the
informal/incidental  learning  framework”  (2006,  797),  showing  that  strategies  for
managing feelings  and feeling states,  like those used in psychotherapuetic  contexts,
have an important prospective role to play in initiatives or interventions designed to
enhance OJL. 
Initiatives aimed at enhancing the formation of sound self-concepts, as well as those
aimed at managing feelings and feeling states, are further portrayed by Rogers (1961)
as mutually  beneficial, via  his  assertion that  congruence with one’s self-concepts  is
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crucial to the nature of feelings and emotional states experienced by subjects. PFTs’
descriptions support Roger’s observation concerning congruence, or incongruence, with
existing  self-concepts  as  determinate  to  resulting  feelings,  in  turn  influencing  the
outcomes of episodes and situations,  and the learning that  results.  PFT03 explicitly
described how a particular situation had put him in a position which “jeapordised” his
“image in the fitness centre”.  His feelings in this regard resonate with the notion of
defense mechanisms famously popularised by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), and further
developed by Anna Freud (1895-1982) (Freud, 1936), broadly defined by Prunas et al.
as, “unconscious mental processes that aim to protect an individual from conflicting
ideas  and  intolerable  affects”  (2017,  1).  Approaches  in  psychotherapy  have  been
broadly  categorised  as  behaviourist,  cognitive,  or  psychoanalytic  (Parker,  1999,  2).
While the works of Sigmund Freud are associated with the latter approach, some more
recent variations on behavioural and cognitive approaches, or even a combination of the
two,  like  cognitive  behavioural  therapy  (CBT),  may  constitute  valuable  tailored
components of structured OJL interventions. 
CBT,  for  instance,  posits  thoughts,  behaviours,  emotions  and  physiology  as
interrelating parts of a unified system. Curwen et al. presented the example of a TV
exploding, where  physiological changes via a surge of adrenaline in a subject would
cause a rapid change in  behaviour,  from, say,  sitting down in a relaxed fashion, to
surging for a fire blanket. This may be accompanied by feelings of anxiety and thoughts
pertaining  to  possible  outcomes  or  courses  of  event  that  might  follow  (2000,  18).
According  to  Curwen  et  al.,  these  changes  are  not  typically  brought  about  by  the
situation itself, but rather, by our reaction to it. CBT represents a systematic approach
to overcoming some of the difficulties associated with such reactions, by considering
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the underlying structures giving rise to them (2000, 20). Liou also presents a deeper
compatibility between psychotherapuetic approaches and OJL situations and episodes,
by highlighting the similarities between psychotherapy and “carefully-designed service-
learning  activities”  in  promoting  personal  growth  and  change,  emphasising  the
therapuetic  value  of  actual  work.  According  to  Liou,  both  activities  “help  people
become aware and get in touch with their emotional experiences” (2018, 84). In view of
the  affective  influence  of  feelings  and  feeling  states  on  the  formation  of  learning
outcomes following OJL situations and episodes, therefore, their management via the
use  of  methods  and  techniques  adapted  from  psychotherapy,  may  prove  a  worthy
component of initiatives and interventions in the OJL context. 
Throughout this chapter, the implications of abstract philosophical features of the final
eidetic  description,  like  awareness  and  volition,  were  discussed  with  a  view  to
ascertaining  their  relevance  in  real-world  OJL  contexts.  Additional  more  practical
factors, including the centrality of general concepts and their various qualities, such as
those rendering them essentially core, threshold or self-concepts, as well as the nature
of self-talk as described by PFTs, and the affective influence of feelings and feeling
states,  were  presented  as  prospective  aspects  of  structured  OJL  interventions  and
initiatives. In the next chapter,  elements of this discussion are parlayed into a more
succinct set of points and questions, designed to address the second research question in
particular, which was aimed at the promotion and facilitation of a revival of research
and development in OJL. It should be stressed at this juncture, that, notwithstanding the
discussion presented throughout the second part of this chapter, it is the final eidetic
description itself, that is to be considered the main contribution by this study towards
on-going  research  and  development  in  OJL,  because  it  is,  in  itself,  intended  as  a
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fundamental constituent of the theoretical foundations upon which academic inquiry in
the field rests. In other words, as argued in the first part of this chapter, it is intended to
provide an alternative view in the interpretation of research data on phenomena in any
way  related  to  on-the-job  thinking  and/or  the  wider  field  of  OJL.  This  point  is
elaborated  in  the  following  chapter,  and  similarly  parlayed  into  a  coherent  set  of
questions and prompts for future research. 
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Chapter six: Conclusion
6.1 Preamble
In this sixth and final chapter, a final recapitulation of the main arguments comprising
the thesis are presented, followed by a critical and reflective evaluation of how they
actually address the two main research questions. The ensuing evaluation considers the
work both in terms of content, and method. 
The final recapitulation summarises the thesis, and elaborates on various key features of
it. The analogy used to clarify the final eidetic description of the phenomenon of on-
the-job thinking, is also finally illustrated visually. The critique on content is based on
an evaluation of the implications of the findings, grounded in the original context in
which  the  study  was  conceived,  by  referring  back  to  some  of  the  early  problems
identified in chapters one and two. The aim here, is, following the deep reflective tone
developed throughout chapter five, to bring the original main aims of the thesis back
into focus, and draw a final conclusion to the work. 
The critique on method is centred around the themes of generalisability, methodological
coherence,  and  language-use,  followed  by  various  other  incidental  concerns.  The
discussion on method is, first, intended to clearly frame the scope of the findings, and
second, to entertain the prospect of repeating the study in the future, using an improved
research design. This chapter, and indeed, the entire thesis, is finally concluded with a
series  of  twenty  questions,  intended  as  prompts  towards  a  revival  of  research  and
development in OJL. 
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6.2 Final recapitulation
In chapter one, the development of initial and relatively indistinct interests into a more
coherent  research  topic,  was  described.  Reflections  on  the  nature  of  accrual  of
knowledge and abilities resulting from experience, made in the context of work in the
health and fitness sector, permitted the start of a review of literature, initially focused
on the acquisition of knowledge and skills by fitness professionals. 
6.2.1 Existing knowledge of on-the-job thinking in the context of OJL
Early  readings  around  the  topic,  based  on  the  sector-specific  literature,  were
encouraging,  since  they  substantiated  OJL  as  a  worthy  research  focus.  Informal
learning was cited as the main source of relevant and applicable knowledge for fitness
professionals, while existing formal learning mechanisms were deemed insufficient for
“real  world”  contexts  (De  Lyon  and  Cushion,  2013).  In  the  words  of  fitness
professionals and managers themselves, OJL was considered to be the “most important
way” to learn, following the cessation of formal education and training (Melton et al.,
2010; De Lyon and Cushion, 2013). Despite its apparent importance and initial promise
as  a  revelatory  topic,  however,  further  research  into  the  phenomenon  had  been
evidently impeded by a lack of universally agreed learning outcomes against which its
validity could be measured, and more pertinently, by the general tendency for OJL to
occur  predominantly  tacitly  and unpredictably  (Eraut,  2004;  De Lyon and Cushion,
2013). A gap in the literature was thereby noted, engendering the need for the sourcing
of additional bodies of literature outside the immediate scope of the health and fitness
sector, to discern the essential nature of OJL in any greater detail. 
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Di Stefano et al. (2014), meanwhile posited reflection (a form of thinking), as a means
of enhancing OJL, through its propensity to increase conscious explicit learning. While
conscious learning was shown to be increased using a simple form of reflection, any
corresponding  effects  on  unconscious  implicit  learning,  remained  indeterminate.
Indeed, a reasonable assumption was made, since implicit learning tends to constitute
the majority of learning in OJL contexts (De Lyon and Cushion, 2013), that an increase
in explicit (conscious) learning, as an activity in its own right, might very well also lead
to accompanying increases  in  the former,  leaving the tacit-ness  problem essentially
unresolved. Di Stefano et al.  (2014) did, nevertheless, serve to elevate  the status of
thinking with respect to its value as an essential component of the wider phenomenon
of OJL, as did Kolb (1984), in his juxtaposition of thinking and doing in the KELT
cycle, essentially apportioning equal value to simply thinking about an episode, and
actually being engaged in it. Despite its apparent reliance on thinking-based processes,
however, the KELT cycle did not offer suitably robust definitions of such processes, or
indeed  any  further  insight  about  their  essential  nature.  In  search  of  more  robust
definitions for the thinking-based terms used in KELT, its theoretical underpinnings
were more closely reviewed in a second body of appropriated literature,  which was
based on fundamental theories of learning and education. 
One  of  Kolb’s  three  nominated  proponents,  Dewey  (1910),  alluded  to  the  fleeting
nature of thinking, and proceeded to establish a persistent trend in later scholarly works,
by operationalising thinking into procedural outcome-based models and tools, designed
to enhance the efficacy and usefulness of thinking in terms of what it should be, rather
than what it actually is. It was argued in the latter parts of chapter two, that procedural
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models  and  tools  designed  to  operationalise  and  enhance  thinking  and  learning  as
abstracted and isolated processes, were insufficient for exploring the actual essential
nature of the thinking acts they described, based on their tendency to aggregate acts of
thinking into terms based on their  assumed prospective usefulness,  rather  than on a
rigorous understanding of their essential nature. 
The knowledge gap resulting from the hindrances preventing further study of OJL, and
its  inherent  thinking  aspects  (on  the  grounds  of  its  tacit-ness),  as  well  as  the
observations made by Eraut (2004), that on-the-job  thinking in action is riddled with
significant yet unacknowledged complexity, steered the research focus, at this juncture,
towards a third body of literature based predominantly on cognitive science. Here, the
problematic nature of tacit thinking was eventually reduced, more specifically, to the
poorly  understood nature  and role  of  consciousness  itself.  Dual  processing  theories
(Evans  and  Stanovich,  2013),  in  particular,  were  identified  as  a  central  theoretical
foundation influencing education and learning theories, and hence a primary source of
their problematic conceptualisation of learning in the relatively simplistic terms of it
being either conscious, or unconscious. The phenomenon of tacit learning could, in fact,
be traced directly  to theoretical  underpinnings rooted in the dual-process theoretical
depiction of type-one thinking, as tacit or unconscious.  
Following  a  deeper  review  of  cognitive  science  literature,  holistic  non-fragmented
approaches were found to more suitably promote a better understanding of thinking in
practical contexts (Osman, 2004; Carruthers, 2014), together with the conceptualisation
of consciousness as a graded property (Osman, 2004; Baars and Franklin, 2007), rather
297
than one that  is  simply absent  or  present.  From a perspective  rooted  in  continuing
professional development in the field of nursing, Ekebergh (2007) raised the important
argument  that  thinking  should  not  be  understood  objectively  as  a  cognitive  or
intellectual  activity  at  all,  but instead,  subjectively,  as an experienced phenomenon,
affirming  the  initial  intentions  of  Kolb  to  conceptualise  learning  (and  its  inherent
thinking-based  aspects),  as  a  human  experience  with  a  distinctly  personal  and
subjective nature (Kolb et al., 1999, 2). 
6.2.2 Towards a re-conceptualisation of on-the-job thinking
These insights rendered the subjective phenomenological approach, a propitious means
of  elucidating  the  essential  nature  of  on-the-job  thinking,  thereby  establishing  a
promising  philosophical  and  methodological  position  for  the  developing  thesis.  A
fourth and final body of literature dedicated to phenomenology, philosophy of mind,
and consciousness was discussed in the final part of chapter two, and further elaborated
from  a  philosophical  and  methodological  perspective  later  in  chapter  three.  The
phenomenological  approach  appeared  to  deter  reliance  on  dichotomies,  and  the
profusion of ambiguous terminology. Following the review of four bodies of literature,
a set of two research questions was articulated, namely;
1) According to the subjective experience of PFTs, what is the essential nature of
thinking in the context of on-the-job learning?
2) How might conceptualisations of thinking as a subjective experience contribute
to the advancement of research and development in OJL?
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To address these questions,  a five-step research method was developed following a
thorough review of phenomenology in chapter three, which included its classical, as
well  as  more  modern,  methodological  expressions.  As  argued  in  the  review  of
literature, traditional conceptualisations of the nature or essence of cognition appear to
have fallen  victim to  the  types  of  “obscurities”  Husserl  professed as  the  inevitable
consequences of objective science (1960, 4). Husserl’s phenomenology was, therefore,
considered  uniquely  poised  to  address  the  main  research  aims  of  the  study,  in  its
dedication towards a, “seeing, clarifying, and distinguishing (of) meanings” (1973, 46).
Some  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  phenomenology  were  duly  disseminated  in
chapter three, including its central orientation towards the exploration of intentionality
as opposed to causality (Englander, 2016, 4), defined as the act of relating to an object
as existent,  even if the object itself  is not.  The suspension of judgements about the
world as existent, in the way implied by traditional objective science, was presented as
the  fundamental  concept  of  epoché (the  phenomenological  attitude),  permitting  a
reduction to  the  pure  essence  of  inter-subjectively  communalised  phenomenal
experiences  in the world, that make themselves “objectively actual”  (Husserl,  1960,
107).
More modern applications of phenomenology were further reviewed with respect to
two prevailing schools of thought, namely the descriptive or “transcendental” approach
(Giorgi et al., 2017), attributed to the methods developed and employed by Edmund
Husserl,  and the interpretive  or  “hermeneutic”  approach (Smith  and Osborn,  2008),
attributed to the later work of Martin Heidegger. The argument was raised in chapter
three, crucial  as an assumption underlying the main methodological character of the
study, that both Husserl and Heidegger acknowledged an interpretive or  constructive
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element to phenomenological methodology. Husserl argued, that the “secure objectivity
science demands, can only be attained by  constructing basic  judgements of essence”
(1973, 55), a methodological observation corroborating Heidegger’s (1982, 21) notion
of  constructed narrative.  Since “assumptions drive methodological decisions” (Lopez
and  Willis,  2004,  726),  and  in  accordance  with Englander’s  recommendation  that
phenomenological  researchers  build  their  methodology  on  “solid  philosophical
grounds”  (2016,  2),  a  final  research  method  was  presented,  based  on  the  main
philosophical assumptions and principles discussed throughout chapter three. Drawing
on  the  ideas,  methods,  and  tools  of  classical  Husserlian  and  Heideggerian
phenomenology,  modern  descriptive  and  interpretive  phenomenological  techniques,
and a qualitative interpretation of a synthesised universal scientific method, the five-
step research method was presented as follows;
1) Experiencing via collection of data 
 Interviewing and transcribing
2) Organising via phenomenological reduction
 Reading, rereading, reflecting, and annotating 
3) Explicating via construction of an initial eidetic description
 Expressing themes, clustering, and articulating superordinate themes
4) Validating via destruction/eidetic analysis
 De-constructing main concepts, and differentiating incidental and essential
features 
5) Generalising via the final eidetic description
 Revealing the pure essence of the phenomenon
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6.2.3 Addressing the main research questions
A thorough description of activities carried out at steps two and three of the five-step
method were explicated in chapter four. In accordance with an on-going commitment to
rigour,  a  detailed  and  transparent  exposition  of  the  emergence  of  interpreted
annotations,  themes,  superordinate  themes,  and  final  main  themes  was  presented,
culminating in an initial eidetic description of the phenomenon of on-the-job thinking,
based on four  final  main  themes.  At  this  stage,  the  temptation  to  articulate  a  final
description  based  solely  on  an  inter-subjective  composite  narrative  of  participants’
accounts, reflected by the main final themes, was restrained, in favour of continuing
phenomenological reduction and eidetic analysis (step four). This crucial phase marked
a  transition  from  the  application  of  analysis  to  collected  data  (in  the  modern
phenomenological style), to analysis of a fundamental problem of a more conceptual
nature (in the classical phenomenological style), as constituted by the main final themes
and resulting initial eidetic description.
Steps four and five of the five-step method were subsequently explicated in depth in
chapter five. The de-construction of the main themes was presented in a manner that
clearly shows how continuing phenomenological reduction and eidetic analysis were
applied by the researcher, chartering a series of intensive philosophical reflections. In
what  essentially  constituted  a  largely  philosophical  enterprise,  the  thinking  of  the
researcher was laid bare at this stage, exposing a progression of “contestable” (Aagard,
2017, 524) ideas, on the grounds that their basis in, and emergence from, the original
data is transparently explicated throughout the previous chapters. To provide context
and background to the basis, and outcomes, of the reflections carried out, the personal
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position and reflexivity of the researcher was also discussed in some detail in chapter
three.
6.2.4 The essential nature of on-the-job thinking
Cumulatively,  the world, the body, physiological correlates of existing concepts, the
biochemical  substances  responsible  for  affective  feeling  states,  and  any  processes
taking place therein (as temporal rather spatial objects), were conceptualised as forming
part of the fabric of the universe (whatever its true objective structure), to which the
intentionality  of  consciousness  (giving  experience  a  primal  impression  with
simultaneous retention and pro-tention qualities), duly interpretively attends, giving rise
to  consciousness  of thinking.  It  was  not  considered  necessary,  or  essential,  for  the
thinking process as a temporally experienced object to be abstracted or conceptually
delineated from the process of interaction itself. In this sense, thinking was described as
inseparable  from,  or  essentially,  the  same  thing  as,  processes  of  interaction.  More
specifically,  the  experience  of  thinking  is,  in  fact,  according  to  the  final  eidetic
description, the experience of interaction itself, taking place between spatially defined
objects in the world, that are both internal and external to the subject. The confluence of
such  spatially-defined  objects,  cumulatively  constitutes  a  unity  that  tangentially
manifests in turn as a temporally-defined object, experienced familiarly as a “frame by
frame”  (Stannard,  2010,  93),  “stream  of  consciousness”  (James,  2017,  165).  The
possibility of confluence between spatially and temporally defined objects as a unity, is
resonant with current difficulties in objective science, to understand the structure of a
universe in which space and time, despite their palpable manifestation as distinctive and
separate, yet interrelated, qualities of human experience, are conceptualised as a unified
fabric (Landyman, 2007, 325).
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The interpretive attendance of the intentionality of consciousness to on-the-job thinking
as  an  object  in  the  world,  helped  shed  light  on  the  paradox  articulated  by  Eraut,
whereby  professionals  are  able  to,  “refer  to  codified  scientific  knowledge  in  clear
explicit terms, yet use that knowledge in ways that are largely tacit” (2004, 256). The
articulation or  use of knowledge (or existing concepts), in this case, proceeds during
on-going interactions both internal and external to the subject, resulting in the familiar
frame-by-frame stream of  conscious  subjective  experience.  In  other  words,  whether
articulating knowledge (reflecting existing concepts) or acting in situations or episodes
(also reflecting those same existing concepts), interactions proceed and do so regardless
of whether intentional consciousness attends to them or not, and the two activities are
essentially the same. 
To clarify this  point, according to the final eidetic  description,  consciousness in the
phenomenal sense accounts exclusively for the experience, not the cause, of on-the-job
thinking. The considerably complex task of locating cognitive or even physiological
structures responsible  for a  consciously aware and volitional  ultimate perceiver  and
decision-maker,  were  mitigated  by  the  imaginative  removal  of  Dennett  and
Kinsbourne’s “homunculus” (1992, 185), and application of Carruthers' (2007) thesis
on the illusory nature of conscious affective will.  The problematic  nature of Eraut's
paradox, is removed when one abstains from subscribing to the semantics implied by
traditional dual process theories in terms of the explicit-tacit dialectic.  The ability to
refer to  knowledge  in  clear  explicit  terms  (type  two  thinking,  according  to  dual
processing  theories),  telegraphs  the  assumed  presence  of  a  volitional  homunculus
somewhere inside the thinking system. Being able to later use that same knowledge also
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in ways that are largely tacit (type one thinking, according to dual processing theories)
is only a problem in light of the conspicuous presence of the homunculus, who is now,
inexplicably dormant, inactive, or unaware. In other words, if traditional definitions of
consciousness (as implied by dual process theories) are considered (definitions in which
the  paradox  is  indeed  rooted),  then  Carruthers'  (2007)  assertion  that  thoughts  are
always unconscious,  renders  both forms  of  thinking  cited  in  the  paradox  as
unconscious, so there is essentially no difference between them, and therefore, there is
no paradox. 
In the tradition of Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Van Manen (1996), descriptive vibrancy
and  creativity  was  sought  in  the  final  eidetic  description  via  development  of  the
interview-room analogy. It was stressed in chapter five, that analogous representation is
presented, precisely, as a phenomenological description, and not a model. It is rooted in
the phenomenological attitude characteristic of a science of subjectivity, and not in the
natural  attitude  characteristic  of a  science  of objectivity.  It  is  intended to “clarify”,
rather than “quantify” (Salkind, 2003, 221), on-the-job thinking in a way that might be
“profitable” in advancing human understanding of complex or obscure phenomena in
the natural sciences (Roediger, 1980, 231). The relevance of such an analogy thereby
seeks justification in light of the obscurities currently hampering further research and
development  in  OJL.  Through  analogous  or  metaphorical  expression,  according  to
Adams and Van Manen, phenomenology is uniquely equipped to show rather than tell
(2017, 788). 
In  the  interview-room  analogy  (set  in  a  law-enforcement  or  intelligence-gathering
context),  the  interview  room  is  the  internal  domain  of  the  subject,  with  a  main
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textured/tinted mirror (representing a repository of existing concepts), giving rise to a
visible tinted/skewed image (akin to thoughts),  positioned opposite  a one-way/semi-
transparent  partitioning  mirror,  separating  the  interview  room  from  the  adjacent
observation room (representing the external world). The basic set-up is shown below
(in illustration 2).
The standard lighting  set-up (interview in progress) would permit  the setting  up of
concepts  (including  self-concepts)  in  a  seeing of  themselves  (via  the  two  parallel
mirrors),  necessary for  internal  interaction  to take  place as  a temporally-bound and
interpretive process,  experienced repeatedly as change in a procession of successive
frame by frame moments of time.  Internal interaction thereby also accommodates the
notion of experience of self, as an experience not by a subject, but rather an interpretive
(Heideggerian) experience of  being a subject, as a “phenomenon of being, instead of
something that is” (Husserl, 1970, 13). Sartre similarly and succinctly asserted that to
be, and the  ability of consciousness to know itself, are one in the same thing (1989,
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Illustration 2: Visual set-up of the interview-room analogy
112).  The reflectivity  implied by the analogy essentially  alludes  to the fundamental
possibility of an object being able to relate to itself, never directly, but only indirectly.
It shows how, in a universe that, (according to our experience of it) contains both the
space and time in which for movement to occur, energy (light or sound energy, in the
case of a visual reflection or an echo of sound) is able to move from an object,  to
another, and back to itself, such that it can relate to itself. 
From the perspective of the subject, the shift between internal and external interaction
in the interview-room analogy is represented by a shift in the lighting conditions in the
observation  room.  A  more  brightly-lit  observation  room  would  permit  the  image
(thoughts)  portrayed  in  the  main  mirror  to  once  again  become  tinted/skewed
representations  of  external  objects  out  in  the  world (since  the one-way partitioning
mirror would lose its reflectivity and thereby become a transparent window), and no
longer  a  tinted/skewed  representation  of  itself.  This  analogy  is  focused  on  the
perspective of the subject, and seeks to describe the simultaneous nature of sensing and
projecting,  as they give rise to thinking that is wholly defined by the confluence of
existing concepts as tinted/skewed (interpretive) representations of objects in the world,
and the objects in the world themselves (of which the subject is a constitution). The
interview-room  analogy  is  presented  as  an  “evocative  example”  (Adams  and  Van
Manen, 2017, 788) of the nature of on-the-job thinking, encompassing both internal and
external interaction, and the main tenets of the final eidetic description. 
6.2.5 Contributions to the advancement of research and development in OJL
Raelin stressed that any model seeking to promote or facilitate learning in the specific
context  of  work,  should  integrate  “the  many  traditions  underlying  its  construction”
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(1996,  564).  In  the  second  part  of  chapter  five,  the  final  eidetic  description  was
presented as just such a prospective tradition, and some of its implications considered
with a view to their prospective contribution to a revival of research and development
in OJL. Further to Yorks and Kasl’s call for a phenomenologically-based perspective in
conceptualising  or  theorising the general  notion of  learning from experience  (2002,
189), the phenomenological description of on-the-job thinking posited in this study, is
presented, in the tradition of classical phenomenology, as prior to (Brentano, 1995, 8),
or  fundamental to  (1973,  46),  objective  science,  as  an  additional  perspective  to
potentially underpin modern education and learning theories pertaining to OJL, which
currently reside predominantly on foundations rooted in cognitive science. Following
the deep reflective  nature  of  the efforts  to  articulate  a  final  description  of  essence,
elucidated  throughout  the  first  part  of  chapter  five,  the  second  part  was  dedicated
towards the more practical and specific context in which the original research interests
were conceived.
The centrality of general concepts, as indicated by the final eidetic description, initially
appeared  to  corroborate  the  use  of  traditional  thinking  and  reflecting  tools,  in  the
tradition of Dewey (1910), to assist in effective creation, modification, and use of such
concepts. Existing tools, however, which lack conclusive evidence ascertaining their
efficacy and usefulness in practice (Staniforth and Harland, 2006; Noormohammadi,
2014), were criticised in chapter two for residing on tenuous theoretical foundations,
pending the  articulation  of  more  robust  definitions  of  the  phenomenon of  thinking.
Marsick et  al.  stressed that future research should be intervention-based, to find out
what  “actually  works”  in  enhancing  OJL  (2006,  799).  A  theoretical  distillation  of
existing tools was deemed warranted, which would facilitate efforts by researchers to
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validate any such tool/s as fit for purpose. Based on the essential nature of on-the-job
thinking,  as  depicted  in  the  final  eidetic  description,  it  was  argued,  that  a  working
thinking/reflecting tool used by PFTs should incorporate various specific features likely
to enhance its efficacy and usefulness. In this respect, the findings of this study posit
constituents  of  an initial  set  of  guidelines  and considerations  for  such a  distillation
process.
Alongside the notions of scientific, critical, lateral, or reflective thinking, it was argued
that  tools  should  incorporate  a  phenomenological  qualitative  aspect,  whereby
professionals are able to acknowledge the importance of subjective experience of the
world,  in addition to  the objects  and objective processes observable in it,  and on a
deeper level, to suspend judgments based on apparent objective facts, by questioning
their  fundamental  tenets.  Similarly,  the  notion  of  threshold  concepts  as  defined  by
Meyer and Land (2003), and their formation as a worthy feature of initiatives designed
to  enhance  on-the-job  thinking,  represented  a  similarly  engaging  criterion  for  the
distillation of models and tools. 
An  additional  suggestion  was  made,  that  thinking  and  reflecting  tools  should  be
designed for opportunistic, rather than deliberative, use. In accordance with the final
eidetic  description,  any attempt  to  enhance  on-the-job  thinking should  embrace  the
spontaneous and fluid nature of interaction described by the participants in practical
OJL contexts, and consider on-the-job thinking less as an abstracted or isolated activity,
removed  from  actions  themselves,  and  more  as  something  to  be  felt-in-progress.
Engagement in regular, scheduled, and deliberative bouts of reflection throughout the
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career  span,  as  implied  by  traditional  thinking/reflecting  models  and  tools,  was
portrayed, taking into account the more fluid nature of on-the-job thinking implied by
the participants, as an unrealistic goal.
The  development  of  a  “comprehensive  theory”  of  OJL  has  long  been  the  aim  of
researchers in the field of WBL (Raelin, 1996, 563), and further to Husserl’s assertion
that  phenomenology constitutes  the  type of  secure  objectivity  that  a  truly  complete
science  demands  (1973,  55),  any  comprehensive  theory  of  OJL,  including  any
interventions/initiatives  derivative  of  it,  should  incorporate  the  additional  features
uncovered by a phenomenological description of its essential nature. The centrality of
self-concepts,  and the  reciprocity  of  conceptualising  and feeling,  for  instance,  were
considered as just such additional main essential features. 
If self-concepts were akin to blueprints or guides to thoughts and behaviours during
episodes and situations, then interventions designed to promote the formation of sound
self-concepts  conducive,  in  turn,  with  sound  learning  outcomes,  were  presented  as
worthy foci for research and development in OJL. Similarly, considering the centrality
of  feelings  and  feeling  states  as  triggers  to  thoughts  and  behaviours,  interventions
designed to assist  professionals in understanding and managing their  feelings,  could
similarly be expected to enhance the prospective formation of sound learning outcomes.
Yorks and Kasl argued in favour of providing educators with guidance on how to work
with emotion and feeling in the context of adult education (2002, 190), with a deeper
compatibility between OJL and psychotherapy similarly corroborated by Liou (2018,
84).
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The centrality of language as an important feature of thinking in the reconsolidation of
existing concepts, gave credence not only to acts of inner-speech or self-talk, but also
verbalised and written forms of communication with others, incorporated into learners’
schedules  as  opportunities  for  interaction  on  various  levels  in  the  promotion  and
facilitation of on-the-job thinking. Acording to Marsick et al., workers do not typically
set out to, “accomplish particular ends through preplanned means,” but rather, “their
choices evolve from the interaction with others in the midst of work activities” (2006,
795). The notion of on-the-job thinking as interaction,  similarly supports the use of
interventions designed to enhance interactions with self, others, and the environment.
Beard and Wilson cited, in this sense, “active engagement” as a main fundamental tenet
of experiential learning (2015, 5)
The autonomy of thought, or the notion of subjects as experiencers of thought rather
than causers, consolidated the importance of OJL initiatives and interventions, whatever
form they actually assume in practice, as crucially influential to the formation of sound
general concepts. It was argued in the latter  part  of chapter five, that  initiatives be
based primarily on the formation of sound core,  threshold, and self concepts (in their
capacity  as  agents  of  positive  change  in  on-the-job  thinking)  most  likely  (as
tinting/skewing agents), to lead to the formation of desirable learning outcomes, rather
than exclusively on the attainment of predefined objective learning outcomes, which
may actually be promoting a tendency among learners, towards outcome-achievement
by any means.
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Initiatives and interventions designed to enhance OJL, in the health and fitness context,
might involve the consideration of workplaces as constructivist learning environments,
in  which  educators  and trainers  play a  valued role.  Jedaar  et  al.  acknowledged the
prospective role of “teachers and facilitators” in developing strategies to help learners
build  confidence  (2009,  478),  or  providing  “observable  models”  of  tacit  skills  for
learners  to  “follow  and  imitate”  (Raelin,  1997,  564).  In  the  absence  of  on-going
support,  the  active  enhancement  of  OJL  was  similarly  discussed  in  terms  of  self-
directed,  individually-sponsored  initiatives,  since  organisations  must  necessarily
balance learning with work commitments, and increasingly expect professionals to be
responsible  for their  own development  and competence (Raelin,  1996, Jedaar et  al.,
2009).
In this final recapitulation, some of the arguments comprising the essence of the thesis
were summarised, and various key insights punctuated or elaborated. At this stage, the
thesis moves beyond the discussion developed throughout chapter five, and towards a
grounding of the findings in the original context in which the study was conceived and
developed, namely, OJL by PFTs in the context of the health and fitness sector. In the
next section, the findings are appraised in terms of their relevance, and more closely
evaluated in light of the two main research questions. Some of the original research
problems identified through a review of four bodies of literature, aimed at uncovering
the fundamental  essence of on-the-job thinking,  are considered,  as the thesis  moves
towards  a  final  critical  and  reflective  analysis  of  the  work,  and  a  meaningful
conclusion. 
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6.3 Conclusions and implications
6.3.1 Final appraisal of the first research question
The first research question was concerned with a discernment of the essential nature of
thinking, in the context of OJL. It was conceived following the identification of a gap in
the  literature,  where  scholarly  work  aimed  at  clearly  defining  the  phenomenon  of
thinking, was lacking. It was argued in chapter two, that the missing work was, in fact,
necessary for future prospective advancement of research and development in OJL. The
review of literature continued to reveal a number of specific problems that, at least in
part,  were resonsible for, or had contributed to, the gap. In light of these problems,
several critical questions may now be asked of the findings which were discussed in
depth in  the previous  chapter.  Do the  findings  constitute  a  clear  description  of  the
phenomenon of thinking in a way that contributes to the current dearth in literature?
Does  the  description  define  what  thinking  actually  is,  rather  than  what  it  could  or
should be? Does it constitute a re-conceptualisation of on-the-job thinking likely to cast
new light  or  reveal  fresh  perspectives  on  existing  problems  in  understanding  OJL,
particularly  in  view of  the  tacit-ness  problem? Does  it  fall  victim to  unnecessarily
objectified concepts, or the use of convenient “placeholders” or “conceptual ragbags”
(Logie, 2016, 2094)? Does it ultimately offer anything of value in clarifying existing
definitions of those acts  of thinking cited in theories or models seeking to expound
thinking and learning processes?
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6.3.2 Clarity and simplicity
The final eidetic description, presented and discussed in depth in the previous chapter
(and most succinctly articulated later in section 6.2.4), was based on a number of main
themes emerging from an initial phenomenological analysis of PFTs accounts of their
on-the-job thinking, which included thinking as interaction,  the centrality  of general
concepts (including those pertaining to self) and feelings, and the problematic role of
conscious awareness and volition. Besides their articulation in a verbal description, the
themes  were also creatively  incorporated  into  a  visual  analogy (the  interview-room
analogy,  also  presented  visually  in  section  6.2.4),  for  further  clarification  and
simplification. In this sense, considered in terms of the development and provision of a
description and accompanying analogy as its principal outcome, the study addresses the
dearth in literature constituted by the lack of scholarly work attempting to discern and
clearly  define  what  it  means  to  think  in  on-the-job  contexts.  Further  studies  also
seeking,  exclusively,  to  define  and  clarify  this  phenomenon,  are  needed  before
stakeholders  in  education  and  learning  are  able  to  agree  on  a  common  working
conceptualisation of, what currently appears to be, an otherwise precarious or difficult
problem. 
6.3.3 Actuality versus potentiality
Emphasis  was  made,  throughout  the  study,  on  uncovering  the  actual and  essential
nature of the phenomenon of on-the-job thinking. Further to the clarity  cited in the
previous  section,  which  was  also  attributable  to  the  phenomenological  reduction
process itself, the notions of actuality and essence can be more closely appraised here.
Phenomenological  reduction  aims to  strip  away incidental  features,  and reveal  only
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those aspects of the phenomenon which are truly essential for the preservation of its
fundamental meaning. The process is “destructive” (Heidegger, 1982, 23), and aims at
dismantling the sort of objectified constructs and “conceptual ragbags” (Logie, 2016,
2094),  that  limit  our  understanding  of  complex  fundamental  concepts.  In  terms  of
essential  nature,  a  central  focus  of  the final  eidetic  description is  retained on what
thinking actually is, rather than what it could or should be, or in other words, on its
essences.  Essences  are  defined  here  as,  precisely,  those  qualities  that  make  the
phenemenon what it is, rather than something else. In chapter two, reference was made
to Aristotle's four causes, for some added philosophical context to this notion. The four
causes  idea  helps  shed  some  light  on  how  modern  theorists  philosophically
conceptualise objects, or in the context of OJL, how education and learning theorists,
specifically, conceptualise thinking. While the first three causes (material, efficient and
formal) primarily  refer to the constituents and inner workings of objects,  the fourth
(final) cause, is concerned mainly with function or purpose (Todd, 1976, 319). It was
argued in chapter two, that prevailing theories and models seeking to expound thinking
and learning processes, have been excessively concerned, in the tradition of Dewey
(1910),  with  the  final  cause,  and  that  a  discernment  of  essential  nature,  based
increasingly on the first three, is warranted. 
In  this  sense,  the  final  eidetic  description  is  considered  to  address  what  thinking
actually is, rather than what it should or could be, because of the focus it retains on
what it is made of and how it works (the first three causes), rather than what purposes it
exists to serve (the fourth/final cause). Aspects of the description that apparently,  at
face value, allude to learning outcomes (and therefore the fourth/final cause), are in fact
included in their capacity as clues about the inner-workings of the phenomenon. For
314
instance,  it  was  said that  general  and self-concepts,  as  well  as  feelings  and feeling
states, represent a significant influence on learning outcomes. The intended emphasis,
however, is not on learning outcomes as such, but rather on the centrality of concepts
and feelings as essential components of the phenomonon of thinking, without which it
could not, in fact, as a phenomenon, be considered as thinking at all.  
To  clarify  further,  learning  itself  was  portrayed  as  inseparable  from,  at  the  most
fundamental  and  phenomenologically  reduced  level,  change.  Change  affecting  the
physical objects regulating both concept-reposition and use, and feelings, proceeds in
the  causally  governed  realm  of  the  natural  spatio-temporally-experienced  universe,
which  includes  all  unfolding  events  and  interactions  between  objects  internal  and
external  to  subjects,  existing  within  its  fabric.  In  other  words,  the  physiological
mechanisms regulating change in existing concepts and feelings, are an essential part of
the  phenomenon  we  define  as  thinking,  without  which  it  could  not  be  defined  as
thinking  at  all,  but  rather,  would  have  to  be  something  else  entirely.  Without  the
constituent content of general concepts, for instance, either in the event of its outright
absence, or a total inability to access or recall it  (as might occur in cases of severe
dementia), then something that looks like on-the-job thinking, as it is defined by the
final eidetic description, could not in fact be, on-the-job thinking. In this respect, the
final eidetic description which is posited as a response to the first research question, is
dedicated to essence and actuality, not purpose or potentiality.  
6.3.4 Fresh perspectives on the tacit-ness problem
In terms of originality, the focus on essence, as well as the suggestion that on-the-job
thinking proceeds with interactions  between objects in the world (both internal  and
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external  in  relation  to  the  subject),  indepedently  of  the  volitional  control  of  some
ultimate perceiver, located somewhere inside each subject, diverges significantly from
the  traditional  assumptions  in  education  and  learning  theories  rooted  in  cognitive
science.  The  questionable  involvement  of  conscious  awareness  and  volition,  in
particular, constitutes an alternative, and perhaps even radical, perspective on some of
the problems associated with thinking in the context of learning, that are problematic
precisely  due  to  their  roots  in  traditional  conceptualisations  of  thinking  and
consciousness.  The  tacit-ness  problem,  for  instance,  which  was  identified  as  a
significant factor preventing further study of the nature of OJL, was, in light of renewed
discourse on the nature of consciousness itself, argued (in the previous chapter) to be
unsound  as  a  justification  for  cautioning  stakeholders  against  favouring  OJL  as  a
process,  for  two  reasons.  First,  according  to  traditional  conceptualisations  of
consciousness, thinking (and learning), is always unconscious (Carruthers, 2007, 199),
inasmuch as subjects are only indirectly and interpretively aware of their own thoughts,
a notion supported by the final eidetic description (and analogous portrayal of on-the-
job thinking). And second, if learning outcomes are cautioned against on the grounds of
them being  tacit,  then  all types  of  learning  (including  that  taking  place  in  formal
educational settings), would have to be approached with the same caution, since the
possibility of indeterminate amounts of unconscious learning emerging simultaneously
alongside any apparently conscious learning, would always remain an unquantifiable,
ever-present and unavoidable risk. 
Apart from setting all forms of learning on an even platform in terms of risk, the final
eidetic description offers fresh insight on the existing problem of the insurmountable
“complexity” (Eraut,  2004; Marsick et  al.,  2017),  that  is  associated with on-the-job
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thinking in action.  It  was argued, in the previous chapter,  that in the absence of an
ultimate volitional perceiver exerting conscious (in the traditional sense) control over
thinking and learning processes, the considerable challenge of having to explain the
mechanisms  by  which  learners  “continuously  choose”  (Kolb,  1999,  3)  learning
modalities, styles, and thinking types, is removed. 
6.3.5 Definitions of distinctive thinking acts 
The first research question was originally posited following the observation that despite
an  evident  juxtaposition  of  doing and  thinking in  models  seeking  to  expound  the
learning process, and a bestowal of comparative importance on the two, the terms used
to  describe  various  types  of  thinking  are  typically  unclear,  poorly  defined,  and
inconsistent with the theoretical foundations upon which they are based. What does it
mean, for instance, to “hypothesise” or “mentally elaborate” (Dewey, 1910)? How does
one  “reflectively  observe”,  or  “conceptualise”  (Kolb,  1984)?  What  about  acts  of
“interpreting” or “examining” (Marsick and Watkins, 1990)? Given that all these terms
have been cited as important parts of the learning process, how much do we really
know  about  the  activities  they  define,  and  how  robust  are  the  theoretical  tenets
underpinning them? If such terms are poorly defined, then how robust, for that matter,
is our understanding of the learning process itself, given that up to half of it is typically
acknowledged to be comprised, in addition to doing, by thinking?
Through its focus on thinking as interaction,  proceeding independently of conscious
awareness and volition, via mediation by general and self concepts, the final eidetic
description is  intended to provide clarity  and consistency in understanding common
thinking-based  terms,  by  drawing  on  themes  that  accommodate  their  intuited
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possibilities. In other words, in terms of thinking as a  reflecting of objects out in the
world,  via  the  tinting/skewing  veil  of  existing  concepts,  how  different  is,  say,
reflectively  observing to  interpreting or  examining? In terms of understanding what
thinking actually is, are they fundamentally different from each other in a way that
cannot be explained, on a more superficial or incidental level, by the mediating effects
of existing concepts according to the context of particular situations or episodes? How,
for that matter, does conceptualising differ from mentally elaborating in any way that is
not  directly  dependent  on  the  interactions  taking  place,  which  have  already  been
portrayed as inseparable from the phenomenon of on-the-job thinking itself? In other
words,  in light  of a  simplified phenomenological  description of the phenomenon of
thinking, further objectifying thinking acts into separate concepts in a way that adds
complexity to the overall phemeonenon of learning, and limits our understanding of it,
is  hereby  argued  to  be  unnecessary,  when  conceptualising  thinking  and  learning
processes in the context of research and development in OJL.  
6.3.6 Final appraisal of the second research question 
In  chapter  five,  prospective  implications  of  the  final  eidetic  description  (and
accompanying analogy) were discussed, and, while retaining a general commitment to
rigour, as outlined in chapter three (section 3.5.3), this discussion was carried out in a
manner  that  balanced  the  findings  and  emerging  insights,  with  alternative
interpretations, philosophical ideas, and existing literature. At this stage, some of the
insights gained during the data collection, analysis, and discussion phases collectively,
can be grounded in the original context of the study, to appraise the general relevance
of  the  study,  with  respect  to  the  second  research  question  specifically.  So,  in  the
context, of PFTs' OJL, what do the findings mean in practice? How might interventions
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and  initiatives  in  the  health  and  fitness  sector  be  influenced  by  the  final  eidetic
description, exactly, in the event of its resonance with stakeholders as a valid portrayal
of on-the-job thinking? Are such implications also relevant outside the context of the
health and fitness sector? Also, what are the broader more wider-reaching prospective
contributions of the findings, in a theoretical sense, if any?
The features of the final eidetic description related to thinking as interaction, and the
questionable  involvement  of  conscious  awareness  and  volition,  were  presented  as
justification for the validity and importance of OJL interventions and initiatives, on the
grounds that new insights have a limited capacity for generation via internal interaction
alone (thinking as an isolated activity),  but rather, that experiential  content must, at
some point, be presented to subjects, in a variety of forms, via external interaction with
others and the world. Such interaction may be promoted, facilitated, and/or influenced
by stakeholders in several ways. In the previous chapter, interventions and initiatives
were defined as inclusive of either individually or organisationally initiated/sponsored
efforts to promote, facilitate, or enhance OJL, on either a cross-sectional or longitudinal
basis,  ranging,  for  instance,  from an individual  professional  incidentally  reading or
hearing about some particular aspect of OJL on the one hand, to their engagement in,
say,  an  intensive  development  programme  involving  various  forms  of  tutelage,
mentorship,  on-going  support,  and/or  assessment  on  the  other.  In  the  context  of
practical considerations such as these, therefore, which aspects of the findings assume
particular significance for PFTs?
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6.3.7 Example of a concrete intervention
Craig and Eickhoff-Shemek (2009) presented a pilot project that was carried out at the
University  of  South  Florida,  as  a  fitting  example  of  an  organisationally-sponsored
structured OJL intervention for PFTs, that adds some realistic context to the ensuing
discussion. The project involved a mix of theory-based lectures and direct application
of knowledge and skills via sessions with clients. It was carried out over the course of a
semester,  as preparation for a full internship,  which would take place the following
semester. The project was based on a number of goals, including the development of
organisation,  communication,  time-management,  teaching,  and  fitness  assessment
skills,  as  well  as  self-confidence  in  prescribing  exercise  to  a  broad range of  client
populations (2009, 9). The personal training sessions with clients were followed by
guided (using a series of scripted questions), and documented personal reflections, as
well as group discussions. The entire project, which could hypothetically be replicated
by any vocational training provider in the sector by way of internship or placement
course components, or distinctive short courses in their own right, represents a useful
framework against which the inclusion of some of the additional specific features of the
final eidetic description might be evaluated, in this case, the centrality of self-concepts,
and feelings. 
The centrality of self concepts, for instance, would warrant the inclusion of exercises or
activities in such a programme wherein PFTs are encouraged to reflect on, and define,
how they they see themselves as trainers. By reflecting further on the origins of these
self-concepts,  where  they  came  from,  how  they  developed,  who  else  might  have
influenced them, a re-evaluation and reconsolidation of those self-concepts becomes
viable. Questions along the lines of, what sort of a trainer would you like to be, and
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why? What  would this  ideal  trainer  do in such and such a situation? What  do you
expect they might think about this or that? What are the similarities and differences
between you at work, right now, and this ideal type of trainer? How might you bridge
this  gap?  Where  PFTs  struggle  to  formulate  coherent  senses  of  their  ideal  selves,
alternative approaches might be attempted, such as, what sort of trainer would you most
definitely not like to be? At this crucial stage, tutors and peers alike would be able to
critically  discuss  these  types,  helping  to  facilitate  the  development  of  increasingly
sound concepts  of self,  and evaluate  some of the tenets  upon which they are built,
wherever question marks arise. Where the ideal type of trainer is identifiable, role-play
exercises or any activities that help the PFTs to clearly visualise, and identify with, their
reconsolidated  senses  of  themselves  could  be  carried  out.  In  Craig  and  Eickhoff-
Shemek's (2009) project, exercises and activities related to concepts of self would be
relevant both during the theoretical lecture-based phase, in preparation for the practical
sessions with clients,  as well as during the sessions themselves, and included in the
scripted questions for subsequent reflection and discussion.
In the previous chapter, in light of the centrality of feelings and feeling states in on-the-
job thinking and learning, modified psychotherapy techniques were discussed as worthy
components  of  initiatives  and  interventions  in  OJL.  Here,  scripted  questions  might
initially be used by tutors or peers, designed to encourage PFTs to talk about how they
felt during various situations or episodes in the past, or how they would feel during
given hypothetical  scenarios.  Upon identifying  recurring  and significant  feelings  in
specific situations and episodes, and the reasons underlying them, their appropriateness
in  the  context  of  sound  learning  and  professional  development,  may  be  evaluated.
Established  techniques  for  effective  management  of  feelings  might  also  represent
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valuable components of theory-based and post-practice reflection sessions. Counselling,
in its own right, carried out by professionals aware of the feeling-dimension of OJL,
regardless of frequency, might similarly constitute a valuable service by stakeholders
intent  on effective  on-going learning and development,  in  a sector that  is,  after  all,
considered rich in “emotional service labour” (Maguire, 2001). 
The ability  to  reconsolidate,  or at  least  make sense of,  concepts  or feelings,  would
naturally be enhanced by the products of a successful distillation of existing thinking
and reflecting  models  and tools  by future  researchers,  as  discussed in  the previous
chapter. Where professionals are able to ask searching, insightful questions, guided by
more  effective  tools  designed  for  opportunistic  rather  than  deliberative  use,  the
development of sound general concepts and the management of feelings and feeling
states conducive with effective on-going OJL, become more viable possibilities.  
6.3.8 Professional perspective
While Craig and Eickhoff-Shemek's (2009) project is considered here as an example of
an OJL intervention,  similar manifestations of revised OJL-related content would be
possible in the continuing professional development (CPD) context as short courses,
which,  in the European health  and fitness sector,  is  a  technical  requirement  for the
maintenance  of  membership  to  various  professional  organisations,  including  the
European and UK registers for exercise professionals (EREPS, 2018; REPs UK, 2018).
Similarly,  outside  the  formal  education  or  accreditation  contexts,  OJL interventions
incorporating aspects  of the final  eidetic  description might  also be organisationally-
sponsored in professional environments. Health clubs and personal training companies
with dedicated training managers, or general managers who have incorporated training
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and development as an important aspect of their role, might organise various initiatives
alonside on-going everyday work by their employees.  
In  terms  of  individually-sponsored  initiatives,  any  or  all  aspects  of  structured
interventions  may  be  modified  into  self-directed  programmes,  presented  to  PFTs
motivated  to  learn  and  develop,  via  online  or  other  forms  of  media,  including
publications, seminars, conferences, and the like. While the health and fitness sector is
used here to provide context for the applications discussed so far, it seems likely that
other sectors,  also based on close interpersonal  interaction with service-users, might
represent similarly conducive environments for updated OJL interventions. Research on
reflective practice, has traditionally emerged from the fields of healthcare, nursing and
midwifery  (Ekebergh,  2007;  Sian  Nicol  and  Dosser,  2016),  and  education
(Noormohammadi, 2014), showing an increased sensitivity in such professions towards
the importance  of  reflecting/thinking,  learning,  and any efforts  intended to  enhance
them. An element of cross-over is evident, based on both the importance of pedagogical
skills  (Craig  and Eickhoff-Shemek,  2009),  and tendency  towards  emotional  service
labour (Maguire, 2001), in the cases of teaching and nursing/midwifery respectively,
between the health care, education, and health and fitness sectors. 
6.3.9 Academic perspective 
Discussions on concrete  interventions  and specific  activities  or exercises  potentially
comprising  them,  admittedly  address  the  second  research  question  on  a  relatively
superficial level. The implications of a clear description of the phenomenon of thinking
in  the  context  of  OJL,  reflect  those  original  problems  identified  in  the  review  of
literature,  presented  as  the  main  catalysts  propelling  the  study  forwards.  In  short,
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attempts at uncovering the essential nature of the thinking activities cited in education
and learning models  and theories  through appropriation  of  existing  literature  alone,
were found to be insufficient, engendering the need for new research in the area. At this
stage,  the  relevance  of  the  findings  can  be  appraised  from  an  abstract/theoretical
perspective, in the context of the academic literature. The final eidetic description is
considered here, in terms of direct implications on existing prevailing theories, of which
KELT in particular, has been particularly influential.    
Kolb's  (1984) experiential  learning cycle  seeks to  model  the learning process using
nodes  based  on  both  doing (concrete  experience  and  active  experimentation)  and
thinking  (reflective observation and abstract conceptualisation). First, the final eidetic
description,  in  its  depiction  of  thinking  as  interaction,  challenges  the  separation  of
thinking and doing, on the grounds that thinking is not an isolated activity separated
from action. In other words,  doing cannot be carried out without various interactions
between  objects  internal  to  the  subject  (from  which  thinking  emerges  as  a
phenomenon), and  thinking cannot be carried out without reflecting objects and their
interactions in events, episodes and situations in the world, external to the subject. Also,
as a product of interaction, thinking can also be said to be, an action, an act, and so, is
ultimately,  a  form of  doing  in  itself.  Such  an  interpretation  emphasises  on-the-job
action, or doing and thinking simultaneously, as, simply, interaction between objects in
the world. On-the-job thinking, as a phonemenon, therefore, describes aspects common
to all four modalities in KELT.
Second,  and  further  to  the  notion  of  thinking  as  inseparable  from  interaction,  the
questionable role of volition also adds an interesting dimension to any discussion on the
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KELT model.  The  main  difference  between  the  modalities  of  being  engaged  in  a
concrete  experience  (doing),  or in active  experimentation (also doing),  according to
KELT, is that during the latter form of doing, the intent of the learner is, specifically, to
test new ideas and insights, while in the former, intent is inconsequential. Since active
experimentation (engagement  in action),  and being engaged in a conrete  experience
(also engagement in action) are essentially the same thing (doing), the distinguishing
characteristic, therefore, is volition, both in terms of whether the action is purposely
orchestrated in the first place, and whether the intent of the learner either is, or is not, to
test  new  ideas.  Removing  volition  from  the  equation,  essentially  strips  these  two
modalities  (concrete  experience  and  active  experimentation)  of  their  main
distinguishing characteristic.
The KELT thinking modalities of reflectively observing and abstractly conceptualising
suggest, according to the final eidetic description and accompanying interview-room
analogy, interaction taking place, first, as a reflection of objects external to the subject
out in the world (reflectively observing), and second, as interaction taking place as the
prior impressions of external objects become tinted/skewed reflections of themselves,
internally (abstract conceptualisation). These interactions, on all levels, proceed as on-
the-job thinking (and any changes to existing general concepts that may result), which,
according to the final eidetic description and accompanying interview-room analogy, is
inseparable from such interactions between objects in the world (including those both
internal and external to individual subjects) that are part of the fabric of the universe, to
which intentionality attends, giving rise to (phenomenally) conscious experience of self
and the world. In this respect, internal and external interaction, correspond with abstract
conceptualisation  and  reflective  observation,  however,  further  to  Eraut’s  (2004)
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philosophical  position  on  the  formal-informal  learning  dialectic,  these  should  be
considered  as  a  continuum,  and  not  necessarily  as  dialectically  opposed.  Various
expressions of the phenomenon, in this sense, could occur at certain points along it, as
indeed, was suggested by the interview-room analogy, where, if one were to think of a
dimmer switch, such a position was mediated by the intensity of lighting conditions
inside the observation room. 
Stripping away distinguishing features of the various KELT modalities, and avoiding
the temptation to objectify additional distinctive abstract constructs, collapses the cycle,
but only if the cycle is considered to be a sound explanation of the actual nature of
experiential learning. In the absence of clear descriptions of the phenomenon of on-the-
job thinking in the context of learning, such as that presented in this study, researchers
and  scholars  in  education  have  been  forced  to  turn  to  existing  models  to  explore
essence,  when  an  exposition  of  essence  is  not  necessarily  what  such  models  were
intended to achieve.   
Finally,  in  terms  of  deeper  implications,  the  simplified   and  phenomenologically
reduced depiction of thinking, and the notion that (phenomenally) conscious experience
emerges from it, as implied by the interview-room analogy, as, ultimately, little more
than the possibility  of an object  being able  to somehow “see” itself.  The idea that,
whether  one  considers  light  or  sound  energy  in  the  cases  of  visual  reflections  or
auditory  echoes  respectively,  it  is  the  interaction  between  an  object  and
reflections/echoes  of  itself  as  a  thing  among  other  things  in  the  world,  itself  a
phenomenon of movement (of light or sound energy in a spatio-temporally-experienced
world), ultimately makes all thinking and consciousness possible, is a fascinating one.
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Or in other words, the idea that thinking and consciousness can arise from, at some
deep  and  fundamental  level,  physiological  entities  being  able  to  echo  or  reflect
themselves, is an enticing idea clearly explicated by the deepest and most fundamental
level of phenomenological reduction reached, at least, in this particular study, at which
the final eidetic description and acommpanying interview-room analogy are set.  
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6.4 Study appraisal
Following an appraisal of the content and findings in the previous section, and some 
detailed discussions on rigour presented earlier in chapter three, the study can now also 
be critically evaluated from a methodological perspective. 
6.4.1 Sampling limitations
Based mainly on the use of small sample sizes, generalisability of findings is commonly
presented as a limitation in qualitative phenomenological studies (Dodds and Grajfoner,
2018;  Lancer  and  Eatough,  2018).  Considering  the  specific  context  of
phenomenological research, and the philosophical ideas underlining it,  however, this
assertion warrants some further  discussion.  Generalisability,  defined in the sense of
universal applicability of findings, as implied by Creswell’s (2014, 251) definition, is
primarily an assertion based on the quantitative, as opposed to qualitative, approach.
Sound judgements about the  quality of research aligned with the latter paradigm, are
subject  to  due  consideration  of  the  philosophical  assumptions  informing  given
qualitative studies. Further to the discussion on qualitative rigour presented in chapter
three  (section  3.5.3),  since  findings  in  given  qualitative  studies  are  typically
contextualised,  generalisability  is  not actually  an “expected attribute” (Leung,  2015,
326). Where context itself represents a key aspect of the underlying research aims, the
notion of generalisability, and its importance, becomes increasingly debatable.
Phenomenological  research aims at  an uncovering  “intentional  references” (Husserl,
1960,  79),  to  reveal  the  pure  essence  of  a  given  phenomenon.  Whether  the  given
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phenomenon is a fundamental conceptual problem, like temporality or consciousness in
the case of works in classical phenomenology, or the lived experience of subjects in a
particular  and  unique  context,  as  in  the  case  of  more  modern  phenomenological
research, results will exclusively concern the nature of the concepts or initial data to
which the phenomenological method is applied. The goal is typically a reduction to,
and description of,  pure essence,  and not the creation,  validation,  or indeed use,  of
explanatory  or  predictive  theories  seeking to  make claims  of  universally  applicable
scope,  outside  the boundaries  of the original  data.  In  other  words,  it  is  the task of
phenomenology to posit the prospective essence of the original phenomenological data,
to reduce it, to reveal, or make visible, its essential nature, and not to measure, test or
otherwise determine its applicability across a wider landscape. Applicability of results
in phenomenological research is instead considered in terms of resonance with readers.
What phenomenology is able to reveal, may, in the wider research context, very well
prompt the development of additional questions, assertions or hypotheses by readers.
Qualitative,  or  indeed  quantitative  methods  aimed  at  the  consideration  of  universal
applicability,  may subsequently be enlisted to further explore,  validate,  or otherwise
measure or test, in quantifiable terms, such questions, assertions or hypotheses in future
research, as researchers see fit. 
The  original  phenomenological  data  used  in  this  study were  interpretive  researcher
annotations of ten interview transcripts. The applied phenomenological reduction and
eidetic  analysis,  aimed  to  get  at  the  heart  of  the  data,  to  articulate  a  deep  eidetic
description  within  the  boundaries  of  the  ten  participants’  accounts,  stripping  such
accounts down to their most fundamental essence. This notion might be explained in a
more visual manner as, not a zooming out, to see the phenomenon in light of its place
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among other phenomena in the world either like it or unlike it, but rather, as a zooming
in, to see the phenomenon only in light of itself. 
In this regard, the method comprised two main phases. The first was based primarily on
modern phenomenological research methods in order to arrive at an inter-subjective
account  of  participants’  experiences  of  on-the-job  thinking.  While  many  modern
phenomenological  studies  based  on  questions  suitably  addressed  by  composite
summaries need not necessarily proceed further, a second phase was carried out, in the
style  of  classical  phenomenology.  Inspired  and  motivated  by  the  classical
phenomenological style of intensive philosophical reflection on fundamental problems,
given the problematic nature of the phenomenon in question (on-the-job thinking), a
further reduction and eidetic analysis of the initial eidetic description was carried out in
earnest. The resulting final eidetic description and analogy, as stressed in chapter five,
is  intended as  an explication  of  deep essence  within  the scope of  the  original  data
provided by the participants, with a view to addressing the current impasse hampering
further exploration of OJL resulting from obscurities in the philosophical underpinnings
and fundamental concepts of modern education and learning theories. 
The  final  narrative  is  intended  to  reveal  aspects  of  the  phenomenon  of  on-the-job
thinking, that achieve “resonance” (De Witt and Ploeg, 2006, 226) with readers, with a
view  to  prompting  and  inspiring  additional  questions  for  further  research  and
development  in  OJL by any additional  methodological  means.  The findings  of  this
study are, therefore, hereby framed within the limitations of contextual description, and
do not seek to make generalised or universally-applicable claims outside the scope of
330
the data yielding them. They aim, rather, at a deep essence that may, or may not, by all
means be shared with other  phenomena,  where such prospective  commonalities  are
merely suggested, considered, or discussed, but certainly not proven. The suggestions
for further research made later in this chapter, are posited, based entirely upon whether
or not the posited re-conceptualisation of on-the-job thinking articulated in the final
eidetic description, achieves due resonance. Resonance itself, or rather, a potential lack
thereof,  therefore,  constitutes  an  important  limitation  concerning  the  scope  of  this
study.
6.4.2 Methodological coherence
A  further  critique  of  qualitative  research,  and  a  commonly  cited  limitation  in
phenomenological studies in particular, is based on the claim of poor methodological
coherence.  Such  claims  are  generally  made,  based  on  a  comparison  of
phenomenological  methods,  with  the  otherwise  rigorously  validated  methods  and
statistical  tools  associated  with  the  quantitative  approach,  and  based  essentially  on
correlation  and  comparison  or  objective  criteria.  Judged  from  the  quantitative
perspective,  therefore,  the  lack  of  rigorous  and/or  standardised  methodological
guidelines or models governing data collection and analysis procedures in qualitative
studies, lend apparent credence to claims that phenomenological studies fail to meet
“scientific criteria” (Oliveri and Pravettoni, 2018, 264). 
The debate surrounding the nuances distinguishing, say, the descriptive and interpretive
schools, has led to some confusion among phenomenological researchers (Skea, 2016;
Aagard, 2017), whose studies consequently rest on apparently tenuous philosophical
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foundations,  and  are  thus  undermined.  Some confusion,  for  instance,  also  tends  to
revolve around whether phenomenology itself is indeed a philosophy, or a method (Shi,
2011,  4;  Skea,  2016,  1134).  Qualitative  research,  in  general,  has  been  similarly
criticised  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  not  based  on  one  single  unified  theoretical  or
methodological concept (Flick, 2002, 7). 
What  is  construed  as  methodological  incoherence  from  a  quantitative  perspective,
however, does not necessarily attenuate the academic or scientific integrity of a given
study, when assuming a perspective rooted in distinctly qualitative ideas. Considering
the range of contexts addressed by qualitative researchers, and the various diverse tools
appropriate  for  use  in  those  contexts,  a  degree  of  methodological  flexibility  and
adaptability is expected (Dawson, 2013, 119). In the absence of universal guidelines or
dedicated  “scientific  criteria”  (Oliveri  and  Pravettoni,  2018,  264),  qualitative
researchers  have  an  added  responsibility  to  clearly  discern  their  philosophical
orientation  or  “theoretical  lens”  (Creswell,  2014,  98),  in  relation  to  their  specific
research questions and phenomena of interest.  A valid critique of any given study in
this  respect,  therefore,  cannot  be  mounted  without  due  consideration  of  the  very
philosophical  assumptions  underpinning the researcher’s claims,  provided of course,
these are clearly elucidated. 
Regardless of perspective, meanwhile, any critique of phenomenological research based
exclusively on the assumption of uncertainty about  the status  of phenomenology as
either a  philosophy or a  method (Shi, 2011, 4; Skea, 2016, 1134), lacks validity, and
betrays  a  limited  understanding  of  phenomenological  concepts.  While  clarifying  its
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basis on the philosophical attitude, as opposed to the natural attitude, Husserl (1960)
clearly  depicts  phenomenology as  a  method,  establishes  the basic  tenets  of  a  more
specific and robust  phenomenological  attitude (epoché), and proceeds to demonstrate
its application, via a range of tools, in his investigations of fundamental problems like
consciousness and temporality. Heidegger (1982) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) similarly
refine and clearly demonstrate classical phenomenological methods in their work on
fundamental  problems.  While  publications  like  Brentano’s  (1995)  Descriptive
psychology,  Husserl’s  (1960)  Cartesian  meditations,  Heidegger’s  (1962)  Being  and
time,  Sartre’s  (1989)  Being  and  nothingness,  and  Merleau-Ponty’s (1962)
Phenomenology of perception, can be read as works of philosophy in their own rights,
exquisitely revelatory of the weighty subject matters with which they engage, they also
show, with often great clarity and rigour, the methods employed in reaching the deep
and profound insights they reveal. 
Perhaps a more valid methodological critique than that based on the philosophy-method
debate, rests on the descriptive-interpretive dialectic evident in the discourse on modern
phenomenological research techniques, which can be further elaborated here. Giorgi et
al. (2017), and Smith and Osborn (2008), have provided comprehensive guidelines for
researchers  carrying  out  descriptive  or  interpretive  phenomenological  studies,
respectively. Rather than enrich the field of phenomenological research with a more
diverse  range  of  tools  and  techniques  applicable  according  to  context  and  specific
research  questions  posed,  however,  the  existence  of  the  two  styles  has  resulted  in
challenges  mounted  by  proponents  on  either  side,  on  the  very  credibility  of  either
approach,  leading  to  some  confusion  (Skea,  2016).  As  a  result,  modern
phenomenological  researchers  face  the  additional  responsibility  of  discerning  their
333
position specifically in relation to the two prevailing styles, or in short, “pick a side”,
when, as argued in chapter three, this might not strictly be necessary. 
In this  study, the descriptive and interpretive approaches  were discussed,  in chapter
three,  with  a  particular  focus  on  their  impact  on  the  initial  stages  of  analysis.  A
fundamental characteristic of modern research is its focus on collected data, rather than
on initial problems of a more conceptual nature, as in the case of classical works of
phenomenology.  Modern  phenomenological  researchers  must  employ  particular
methods of collecting and initially processing such data, that are consistent with the
context,  and the research questions  being addressed.  Given that  the descriptive  and
interpretive approaches espouse unique ways of initially approaching the data, it is at
this juncture that modern phenomenological researchers are expected to clarify their
position in relation to the two styles. In this study, therefore, such positionality was
discussed in section 3.3.3, with regard to the initial  phases of the five-step research
method employed. Specific reference is intended here, towards the decision to proceed
with analyses of researcher annotations (the interpretive style), rather than researcher
descriptions of meaning-rich units (the descriptive style).
The five-step method was, overall, adapted to the context of the study and the specific
research questions posed, and comprised  various expressions of phenomenology, not
limited to the two modern schools, since a distinctly classical style was particularly
dominant throughout the final phases of the study. The idiosyncratic, tailored structure
of the five-step method, therefore, renders it susceptible to, from the perspective of a
dedicated and established set of predefined “scientific criteria” (Oliveri and Pravettoni,
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2018, 264), valid critique on the grounds of methodological coherence, inasmuch as it
is  not  priorly  established  or  predefined.  It  is  based  on  an  interpretation  of  the
fundamental  philosophical  tenets  of  phenomenology,  appropriated  from  a  range  of
sources, that is wholly influenced by researcher positionality and reflexivity, which is
discussed  in  depth  in  Annex  1.  Methodological  coherence,  in  any  modern
phenomenological  study,  in  this  sense,  appears  to  be  directly  proportional  to  the
transparency with which researchers are able to elucidate, and ultimately justify, their
methodological  decisions.  For  this  reason,  the  five-step  method,  together  with  the
philosophical  assumptions  underpinning  it,  are  presented  and  argued  in  depth,
throughout chapter three. The discourse on methodology explicated therein, is intended
to enable sound critique from fellow researchers, in the spirit of academic and scientific
integrity, rendering the process and outcomes of the study, wholly contestable.  
6.4.3 Language
With its emphasis on description, phenomenological research faces an added limitation
as a direct result of its central reliance on language. Pulte succinctly stated that, “no
amount of verbalisation makes clear to others that which is outside their experience and
have no eyes to see” (2009, 11). In the case of modern phenomenological research,
specifically,  description of experience is key, with researchers often seeking to clarify
phenomena in a way that makes them understandable to those who do not have direct
experience of, or “eyes to see”, it. Pulte argued that seeking refuge in word, draws us
away from the things themselves (2009, 11), challenging Husserl’s fundamental scope
of phenomenology as a means to “get at” the “things themselves” (1973, 1). If words
are,  as  Vygotsky  suggested,  “verbal  acts  of  thought”,  relating  to  “generalisations”
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(1987, 45) of meanings that essentially  differ at a fundamental level,  from thoughts
based on sensation or perception, then they must have a limited capacity to express the
complete  essence of experience,  which is  not always linguistic  in  nature.  Vygotsky
added that thoughts are not “expressed”, as much as they are “completed in the word”
(1987,  252),  making  them  “labile”  (Lee  et  al.,  2017,  531),  and  susceptible  to
reconsolidation each time they are articulated. 
In  this  view,  language  paradoxically  represents  an  obstacle  to  phenomenological
description despite being its main vehicle. According to Brentano, language creates a
“prejudice” that is detrimental to noticing, if it lacks a name for a certain fact (1995,
44). Subjects, therefore, are only able to describe things they have noticed. Descriptions
of essence are not only constructed by the researcher based on what is noticed, but are
also subject to misrepresentation of the original meanings they seek to explicate the
essence of. The re-consolidatory nature of thoughts in word are furthermore duplicately
subject  to  distortion,  both  in  their  articulation  by  the  participants,  and  later  by  the
researcher. 
Further compounding the fundamental limitations imposed by the use of language, was
the fact that many of the participants were bilingual. Further, higher, vocational and
much private education in Malta is conducted entirely in English. In her undergraduate
research at the University of Malta, however, Fenech (2014) found that despite Malta’s
official  status as a bilingual country, and high levels of competency in both spoken
Maltese and English (with a significant segment of the population also fluent in Italian),
the native language still tends to be dominant among locals. Maltese nationals typically
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reflect their bilingual status via frequent code-switching in daily speech, peppering their
spoken English with Maltese words and expressions, and vice-versa. 
Despite a tendency towards the Maltese language, Maltese nationals still  voluntarily
choose to speak English in certain contexts (as did the Maltese participants during their
interviews), due to any number of additional factors beyond the scope of this research
to  ascertain.  During  the  interviews,  the  few  Maltese  expressions  used  by  the
participants (as a result of their natural tendency towards code-switching), were duly
translated by the researcher during the transcription process. While all the participants
demonstrated  excellent  command  of  the  English  language,  and  were  all  entirely
comfortable conducting their interviews in English, it is worth noting that of the full
contingent of ten, all but one were bilingual. Only one of the participants was a British
national  who did  not  speak any additional  languages  (PFT06),  seven were Maltese
(PFT03, PFT04, PFT05, PFT08, PFT09, PFT10, and PFT12), who apart from Maltese
could all speak English fluently, including some who also spoke fluent Italian, one was
Bulgarian (PFT07), who apart from Bulgarian could speak English fluently, and also
Russian,  and one was Norwegian (PFT11),  who apart  from Norwegian could speak
English fluently. It is also worth noting that PFT07 and PFT11 who were Bulgarian and
Norwegian nationals respectively, had each also spent some time living and working in
England, before settling in Malta, where the research was carried out. 
The  nationalities  and  languages  spoken  by  each  of  the  participants  (and  their
bilingualism)  are  outlined  here,  because  such  additional  factors  may  have  been
influential  to  the  essences  noted  in  their  accounts  (which  were  naturally  language-
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based) during the early analysis stage. Costa et al. (2017), in this regard, explored what
has come to be known as the “foreign language effect”, on the executive functioning of
subjects  when  solving  problems  presented  in  their  second language.  Research  has
shown a difference in performance in cognitive tasks in bilingual subjects, who show a
tendency  towards  deliberative  non-intuitive  thinking,  when  problems  are  framed  in
their  second language,  according,  of course,  to interpretations  based in dual-process
theories. While the effects of bilingualism, or indeed any other aspects of language-use,
on the findings of this study are unclear, the phenomenon does represent an unknown
factor, potentially affecting the final eidetic description in ways that are challenging to
account for, and therefore worthy of mention here as a noteworthy limitation. 
6.4.4 Prospective modifications and improvements
Further  reflection,  not  necessarily  limited  to  those  points  discussed in  the  previous
section, revealed some additional methodological insights, which, should the study be
repeated,  would  need  addressing.  With  regard  to  sampling,  for  instance,  while  the
number of participants was not of particular concern, the amount of data that could be
sourced  from  each  was  the  more  pressing  issue.  Despite  the  time  constraints  and
recommendations discussed previously in chapter three (section 3.5.1), in the spirit of
additional depth and quality of the data, more time with each participant would have
been preferable. 
To  avoid  excessively  long  interviews,  however,  where  the  risk  of  leading  the
participants would only increase, given the elusive, and difficult to describe, nature of
the  phenomenon  under  investigation  in  the  first  place,  alternative  data-collection
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strategies  would need to  be considered.  But  first,  an additional  concern  permeating
much of the data-analysis phase of the study, due to the deeply subjective nature of
phenomenological analysis, was of additional concern at this late reflective stage. There
was a constant fear, throughout the phenomenological analysis process, and in concert
with  Brentano's  (1995)  ideas  on  how  we  notice some  things  and  not  others,  that
valuable, game-changing insights contained, at some level or in some shape or form,
within the participants' accounts, were somehow being consistently missed. 
In  light  of  both  these  issues,  therefore,  at  this  stage,  alternative  methodological
possibilities might be entertained, should the study be repeated in the future. First, an
ethnographic approach was considered, in the sense that, interviews would be based on
prior observations by the interviewer. In other words, the researcher, in this case, would
observe  professionals  at  work,  over  an  agreed  period  of  time,  throughout  their
engagement in actions, interactions, situations, and/or episodes. This would enable the
interviewer, based on the actions observed, to use simpler probes, such as, why did you
do/say that? What were you thinking at the time? What was your train of thought, if
any? How did you arrive at that decision?  This strategy might increase the depth and
quality of the data yielded, with additional context and opportunities to notice what is
interesting or significant. Further to the fear of failing to notice, cited earlier, additional
methodological  changes  might  include  the  recruitment  of  additional  researchers
throughout both the data collection and analysis phases. Provided both/all researchers
are well-versed and agreed on the  precise method to  be employed,  their  individual
interpretations of the same data would add richness to the findings, provide additional
insight, and increase the depth and breadth of what is noticed.
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6.5 Recommendations for future research
Based  on  some of  the  key  insights  surfacing  throughout  this  chapter  and  the  last,
several additional questions continue to emerge. Here, in this final section, some of
these questions are articulated in a manner that might inform future research, with a
view,  in  line  with  the  second  research  aim,  to  prompt  a  revival  in  research  and
development  in OJL. Some of the main findings are summarised in brief below, as
context for a series of twenty questions they are considered to raise. 
The final  eidetic  description of on-the-job thinking portrayed a relatively simplified
view of the phenomenon, with the complexities associated with volitional and affective
aspects of cognitive processing imaginatively removed. Instead of conceptualising the
thinking inherent to learning processes in terms of thoughts as objects with a conscious
quality, or thoughts as objects with an unconscious quality, thinking as a continuous
and on-going process experienced via its attendance by conscious awareness, positions
the  poorly  understood notion  of  consciousness  in  a  less  central,  and  therefore  less
problematic, location, so; 
1) What are the implications of reorienting learning theories from a reliance on
traditional cognitive theory, to a basis in a less problematic phenomenological
description? 
2) How might the description of on-the-job thinking as a reflection of itself,  as
illustrated in the interview-room analogy, provide an alternative framework for
the conceptualisation of data in other studies in any way related to thinking and
cognition? 
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Research on self-concepts and their relationship with learning has explored their effect
on motivation to learn in adults. In this study, self-concepts were depicted in a more
central and affective role, as influential guides or blueprints during unfolding on-the-job
episodes and situations, so;
3) To what extent do self-concepts actually influence thoughts and behaviours in
practical applied contexts? 
Similarly influential to unfolding OJL situations and episodes, according to the findings
in this study, were feelings and feeling states, so;
4) Which feelings and feeling states can be identified as particularly affective to
learning-rich situations and episodes, and to what degree? 
5) What is the origin, basis, and justification for such feelings and feeling states
affecting OJL situations and episodes?
6) What  is  the  link  between  such  feelings  and  feelings  states  and  the  specific
learning outcomes that result? 
7) How  might  prospective  interventions  assist  in  the  management  of  negative
feelings in educational and workplace contexts?
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8) How might approaches and techniques used in popular forms of psychotherapy
(like  CBT),  be  modified  and applied  in  the  context  of  OJL interventions  or
initiatives?
Based on the apparent centrality of general concepts described by PFTs, thinking and
reflecting  tools  based  on  the  construction  of  more  sound  core,  threshold  and  self
concepts, were deemed a worthy initiative for enhancing OJL outcomes, so;
9) How might  the process of distilling  existing thinking and reflecting tools be
carried out with a view to facilitating their eventual validation? 
10) Which specific guidelines might best facilitate such a distillation? 
11) How  might  the  notion  of  threshold  concepts  be  used  further  in  enhancing
thinking and reflecting tools in various OJL contexts? 
12) How might thinking and reflection tools be modified to accommodate both the
formation of sound concepts, and the fluid and continuous nature of on-the-job
thinking, to be felt in process, as opposed to being deliberatively attempted? 
It has also been argued in this thesis, that the risk of undesirable learning outcomes is
not exclusive to the OJL context. Given that OJL has already been considered the most
important  way professionals  learn (Eraut,  2004;  Melton,  et  al.,  2010;  De Lyon and
Cushion, 2013), the development of structured approaches to maximising it represent
an  enticing  research  focus.  Constructivist  learning,  for  instance,  was  at  least  one
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approach portrayed in the previous chapter as characterised by personal discovery and
problem-solving, taking place in a “responsive environment” (Cooper, 1993, 16), so;
13) Which tried and tested aspects of constructivist learning could be applied in the
practical context of OJL?
14) Which  other  tried  and  tested  approaches  in  the  more  rigorously  studied
domains of learning, not necessarily limited to constructivism, can be similarly
applied to the OJL context?
A re-conceptualisation of OJL as a constructivist learning environment also reveals the
prospective role educators and trainers might assume in promoting and facilitating OJL,
so; 
15) Based  on  a  deeper  understanding  of  thinking  in  the  context  of  OJL,  what
additional roles might educators and trainers assume in its on-going promotion
and facilitation?
16) In the absence of on-going support, how might educators and trainers in formal
preparatory  programmes  otherwise  prepare  professionals  for  on-going  OJL
throughout the career-span?
And finally, given the particular features of the final eidetic description raised in this
study, and the essential nature of on-the-job thinking, as well as the wider field of OJL,
elucidated therein;  
343
17) How might the interview-room analogy facilitate the discernment of more apt
definitions  of  the  thinking  terms  used  in  prevailing  education  and  learning
theories?
18) How might the interview-room analogy contribute towards the development of a
wider and more robust definition of OJL itself?
19) How might a “comprehensive theory” (Raelin,  1996, 563) of OJL otherwise
inform  the  creation  of  an  OJL  curriculum  as  part  of  formal  preparatory
education and training programmes?
20) How might a more comprehensive theory of OJL be incorporated into existing
formal education and work-based programmes and infrastructures?
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ANNEX 1
Disclosure of researcher positionality and reflexivity
In qualitative research, the position of the researcher introduces a range of “strategic,
ethical and personal issues” into the research process (Creswell, 2014, 237). Given the
interpretive nature of phenomenological analysis in particular, and the specific aspects
of the research method drawing on modern forms of  interpretive phenomenological
analysis (Smith and Osborn, 2008), the position of the researcher in this study was truly
central  to  the  findings  and  final  discussion.  Despite  a  continued  effort  to  bracket
existing  knowledge,  echoes  of  Heidegger’s  (1982)  assertion  that  articulations  of
phenomena  are  always  constructed,  and  are  inseparable  from  history  and  context,
necessarily pervade the narrative. Phenomenological reflection during the later eidetic
analysis  exclusively  represented  the  primary  instrument  for  articulating  the  final
description  of  essence.  It  is  recommended  in  qualitative  research,  that  where  the
researcher represents a primary instrument, an identification of personal values, biases
and assumptions should be outlined and clarified from the outset (Creswell, 2014, 256).
A discussion of these personal beliefs,  values and assumptions are therefore hereby
contextualised  in  relation  to  the  researcher’s  background.  Where  the  rest  of  the
dissertation is presented in third-person perspective, this segment, with respect to its
personal reflective nature, is articulated using the first-person point of view. 
Prior to teaching and lecturing in physical education and sport, my career in the health
and fitness  industry  had spanned  a  period  of  approximately  14  years.  During  this
period I worked in a number of health and fitness facilities in Malta and London as a
PFT with  clients  with  medical  conditions  or  specialised  wants/needs,  and  later  in
various supervisory and managerial positions, still related to personal fitness training.
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In these latter roles I was also involved in tutoring and assessing prospective fitness
instructors and personal trainers working towards private vocational qualifications. In
2011, I  settled permanently  in  Malta in  a full-time teaching position  as  a physical
education  teacher  in  a  state  primary  school,  representing  somewhat  of  a  career-
change. Further to my work commitments during these periods, I was a keen amateur
athlete, competing in the sport of olympic weightlifting, where I had the good fortune to
represent Malta in a number of international events, and to coach fellow weightlifters
and athletes. I considered my sport participation, coaching, and fitness industry roles
to have a strong crossover in terms of knowledge and expertise.  Upon taking up a
sports lecturing post at the Malta College of Arts, Science and Technology in 2012, my
personal involvement in sport and the health and fitness sector gradually declined as I
opted to pursue an increasingly academic-oriented pathway. My work at the College
has since been based on the preparation of PFTs, exercise for health specialists, sports
coaches,  and  physical  education  teachers.  During  my  lectures  and  tutorials,  I
frequently  cite  anecdotes  and  stories  from  my  past  experiences,  believing  them to
enrich students’ learning by adding context, practicality, and authenticity. Noticing this
tendency, it is evident that I tend to subjectively attribute a degree of value to my own
“body” of professional experience in the health and fitness sector. 
The  personal  fitness  training  sector,  specifically,  is  typically  highly  competitive,
inasmuch  as  professionals  tend  to  normally  work  on  a  freelance  basis,  and  earn
remuneration directly proportional to the number of clients they are able to recruit and
retain.  A well-known health  and fitness  club located  in  an affluent  area of  central
London frequented by “high-end” clientèle, where I spent approximately six months in
a supervisory role during the final stages of my career in the sector, was a particularly
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formative experience in the development of my later research interests. Between 20 and
30 highly-experienced PFTs of various nationalities paid hefty rental fees to operate in
the club at any given time, constantly jostling for clients in an extremely competitive
working environment. Some PFTs struggled to recruit clients and pay their monthly
rent, while others were almost constantly fully-booked and earning substantial salaries.
While working closely with the PFTs, observing and conversing with them on a daily
basis, the general skills, qualities, or any additional factors otherwise influencing their
success were extremely difficult to identify, fostering a deep bewilderment on my part.
Since I was already involved in PFT education and training, I quickly found that the
beliefs of newcomers to the sector about what it meant to be a good, successful, or even
simply a competent practitioner, were poorly equated with the concrete realities of the
working environments to which many of them aspired. 
I  became  increasingly  interested  in  knowing,  in  the  absence  of  easily-observable
commonalities between PFTs’ knowledge, skills, or attributes, any common underlying
mechanisms  influencing  their  professional  development.  Throughout  my  initial
readings around the topic of on-going learning in the sector-specific  literature,  the
tacit-ness problem was clearly evident as a research problem. An important reduction
was made at  this  juncture,  from the evident  problem of  tacit  learning,  to the more
specific problem of tacit thinking. Reflecting back on this critical decision concerning
the overall direction of the study, I have considered some of the influences shaping my
interpretations of the readings, and how my orientation towards the phenomenon of
thinking in particular as an operative factor worthy of further exploration, might have
been influenced in turn by prior underlying factors.  
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I recall  the concept of  reflective practice from my undergraduate studies as having
been of particular interest to me, which may have been a key influential factor in later
considering  the  way  professionals  think,  precisely,  as  a  worthy  research  focus.
Reflecting further on a prospective antecedent to my interest in reflective practice, I
recall the influence of my father throughout my childhood and adolescent years, which,
with  hindsight,  appears  significant  to  the  development  of  my current  position  as  a
researcher.  As  a  Maltese  national,  my  father  was  always  very  proud  of  the
achievements of the Maltese psychologist Edward De Bono and his ideas on lateral
thinking,  that  have  received  some  acclaim  internationally,  and  would  frequently
paraphrase him. In very early discussions with my father as a young child, I recall
realising that thinking is something that can be done in a number of different ways, and
just like one’s ability in sport (a special interest we shared), can be enhanced with
training  and  practice.  When  he  began  suffering  the  first  symptoms  of  early  onset
dementia, my family became collectively involved in searching and affecting various
practical means of slowing the progression, or at least mitigating the symptoms, of his
condition,  including  cognitive  strategies  to  enhance  memory in  the  performance of
daily  essential  tasks,  like  mnemonics,  flow-charts,  and  “brain-training”  games  of
various kinds. My interest in the way people think, therefore, and ways in which it can
potentially be enhanced, following some personal reflection on the matter, appears to
have been reinforced by some of these emotionally-rich experiences.
The information in this section has been presented in the context of the researcher not
as a detached objective observer, but as a central participant, integral and instrumental
to the study and resulting thesis. The points outlined are intended to cast light on the
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interpretive  elements  of  the  thesis,  given  the  highly  reflective  nature  of
phenomenological analysis. 
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ANNEX 2
Consent form
An interpretive phenomenological study of thinking by professionals engaged in work-based experiential 
learning episodes. 
I would like to thank you for considering making a contribution to this research. 
The interview you are being asked to participate in is part of a study aimed at exploring how professionals 'think'
surrounding formative learning experiences at work. It will last approximately one hour, and involve a discussion
based on and around the following general questions; 
 Can you share any significant experiences, situations or episodes arising throughout the course of your
work that are particularly memorable, and influenced you in some formative way? (These could include
any single episode or series of episodes from any time during your career, which the researcher will help
you to identify)
 If you had to list the thoughts and feelings you had during, after, or otherwise surrounding the experience/
s, what would they be? Please be as honest as possible. 
 What other factors may have influenced your thinking?
 What did you learn from this experience? How did it change the way you work?
The researcher  will  provide assistance throughout,  and probe accordingly until  the  required level  of  depth and
saturation is achieved. You are encouraged to elaborate and give as much detail as possible on whatever aspects of
your answers you deem important. You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time without giving a reason.
In this case, any data collected will not be used in the study. 
The  researcher  is  only  interested  in  understanding  your  thoughts  and  feelings  surrounding  valuable  learning
experiences, and will not divulge any information about you or your professional activities that is not absolutely
relevant to the purposes of the study. In any case your participation is treated in the strictest of confidentiality. Your
identity will be kept anonymous, and any details that may indirectly result in your identification will be omitted or
changed. There are no risks posed to yourself personally or professionally as a result of your participation in this
research study. 
The interview will be sound recorded and transcribed, and will not be shared with anybody apart from the research
supervisor,  Dr  Julian  Beckton.  If  you  are  uncomfortable  being  recorded,  you  may  request  that  the  recording
equipment be switched off at any time. The transcript will subsequently be forwarded to you for your verification
and approval before it is used. All data collected in written and digital form will meanwhile be held securely on file
and  password-protected  external  hard  drive  respectively,  under  lock  and  key  in  a  personal  office  safe.  Upon
completion of the study, you will be forwarded a summary report of the research findings. 
The final completed study will be submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree in educational research and development at the University of Lincoln in the UK. It will be used for research
purposes only, as authorised by the said university. If you have any questions or concerns whatsoever, please do not
hesitate to contact me. By signing below, you indicate that you have read and understood all of the above. 
Thank you once again for your consideration, time and attention thus far.
Kind Regards, 
Matthew Muscat
Participant Name and Signature:________________________________________
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ANNEX 3
Participant and interview summary descriptions
In the following sections, each of the participants are introduced to provide additional
background and context  to  their  insights,  including  details  about  their  qualification
level, area of expertise, and a very brief overview of the main points discussed in their
respective interviews, as well as some of the main emerging learning outcomes they
referenced. To the nearest year, the average age of the participants in the main sample
was 31, with a final average of eight years experience overall.
PFT03
A 31-year-old male, PFT03’s highest completed formal qualification was an EQF level-
four diploma in sport. At the time of his interview, he had nine years of experience in
the industry and was in his final year of an EQF level-six sports-related Bachelor's
degree. He cited his main area of expertise as the preparation of competitive athletes,
particularly those aiming to participate in physique or figure contests. 
PFT03 described a number of learning episodes including an altercation with a gym
member  resulting  from  accusations  of  a  private  nature  made  in  a  public  setting,
conflicts with management arising from opposing views on exercise prescription, and
challenging situations with clients who did not follow his advice or were unable to cope
with the demands of their exercise programmes. 
From these  episodes  and  additional  instances  arising  throughout  the  course  of  the
interview,  PFT03  explicitly  cited  several  learning  outcomes  including  pitfalls
associated  with mixing business matters  with personal  matters,  equal  importance  of
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being a good listener to being able to design effective exercise programmes, putting
good customer service before ones' own feelings or sense of right and wrong, thinking
things through instead of acting on impulse, considering the views of all parties to a
given situation or issue, and designing exercise programmes that incorporate both the
wants and needs of the client.
PFT04 
A 27-year-old male, PFT04 had seven years of experience in the industry at the time of
his interview, and with a sports-related Bachelor’s degree, the highest EQF level of
formal education across the sample group. His main area of expertise was “exercise
referrals”, involving exercise-prescription and/or supervision of higher-risk clients with
health  challenges,  typically  referred  from  other  competent  medical  and  health
professionals. 
PFT04 described a number of learning episodes including an alleged case of domestic
violence by a client seeking his support, instances of friends becoming clients or vice
versa, and the discontinuation of clients who were not able to sustain their  exercise
programmes. From these episodes as well as additional instances arising throughout the
course of the interview, PFT04 explicitly cited several learning outcomes including the
importance of adhering to scopes of practice, listening to clients with personal problems
without  explicitly  advising them, and considering the singular  individuality  of  each
client when planning approaches and programmes. 
PFT05
A 26-year-old male, PFT05 had six years of experience in the industry at the time of his
interview. His highest completed formal qualification was an EQF level-four diploma
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in sport, and was in the final year of an EQF level-six sports-related Bachelor's degree.
His main area of expertise was weight-loss and lifestyle change, and the provision of
holistic exercise and healthy eating programmes.
PFT05 described a  number of learning episodes  including reactions  of clients  to in
depth and personal questioning during their initial consultation appointments, and being
forced to refrain from carrying out various aspects of his role. Some of the directly cited
learning outcomes building meaningful and deep rapport with clients, remit and scope
of  practice  of  various  health-related  professions,  and  techniques  for  managing
overwhelming feelings of anxiety. 
It  was  interesting  to  note  that,  following  his  interview,  later  that  evening,  PFT05
communicated with the interviewer stating that he had, “Needed such a deep chat,” and
that through his participation he felt he had “gained more than he had given”. This was
considered extremely encouraging by the researcher regarding the scope of the study. 
PFT06
A  42-year-old  female,  PFT06  had  17  years  of  experience,  which  was  the  highest
amount in the sample group. Her highest level of formal education was EQF level-
three, including various vocational qualifications in gym and group fitness instruction.
In terms of expertise, PFT06 insisted she did not have any preferences for particular
populations or specialisations, and felt motivated and equipped to assist most clients,
whatever their goals.
PFT06  described  her  thinking  and  learning  predominantly  related  to  three  critical
incidents  with  two  specific  clients,  all  involving  medical  emergencies  and  loss  of
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consciousness. Through these accounts she was able to provide some unique insights
into  her  thinking  during  high-stakes  emergency  situations.  Some  of  the  learning
outcomes explicitly stated by PFT06 included the importance and purpose of full and
documented medical clearance from relevant competent medical professionals prior to
working  with  clients,  and  other  technical  precautions  associated  with  exercise
prescription and supervision in the case of clients with health challenges.  
PFT07
A 30-year-old male,  PFT07’s highest formal qualification was an (EQF) level-three
vocational fitness qualification. At the time of his interview he was working towards an
EQF level-four vocational diploma in personal training, and had ten years of practical
experience in the industry. In terms of expertise PFT07 admitted he preferred working
with male clients who had similar health and fitness goals to his own, while remaining
open to clients with any goals and from any population group.
PFT07  admitted  that  he  found it  difficult  to  recall  learning  episodes  upon request,
which represented an interesting point of discussion in itself. He began the interview by
narrating an incident he stressed was only recalled on account of its recency, and not
importance.  He  was  also  reluctant  to  clearly  define  distinctive  learning  outcomes,
instead  stressing  the  highly  fluid  and  flexible  nature  of  learning  as  a  process,  not
reducible  to  relatively  static  and  delineated  outcome-based  statements.  Being  an
expectant  father,  the  change  in  his  thinking  he  attributed  to  this  status  was  also
discussed,  particularly  with  regards  to  his  interactions  with  female  clients.  These
various  elements  transpired  to  prompt  an  astonishing  level  of  depth  in  PFT07’s
interview, the transcript of which (included in Annex 5), eventually provided several of
the key quotes and keywords presented in the final narrative.
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PFT08
A 26-year-old  male,  PFT08  had  seven  years  of  experience  in  the  personal  fitness
training  industry  at  the  time  of  his  interview.  His  highest  completed  formal
qualification was an EQF level-four diploma in sport. While he had begun reading an
EQF level-six Bachelor's degree in sports science, he had chosen to discontinue this,
and instead focus on launching his personal training career. He defined his expertise
according to the goals of the majority of his clients, which happened to be weight-loss.
He also specified that he enjoyed working with athletes. 
PFT08 described a number of candid episodes including some awkward and amusing
incidents with various female gym members and clients, as well as the challenges he
faced with a particular client who would question many of his decisions. The principal
learning  outcomes  cited  by  PFT08  were  based  on  the  development  of  effective
interpersonal skills,  particularly in terms of motivating the client. At a certain point,
PFT08 admitted that the nature of the questions, prompts and probes did not conform to
his prior expectations of the interview, indicating some mild discomfort with the level
of  depth  sought  by  the  interviewer.  He  nonetheless  retained  his  willingness  and
enthusiasm to continue.
PFT09
A 35-year-old female, PFT09’s highest completed formal qualification was an (EQF)
level-three vocational qualification in fitness instruction. At the time of her interview,
she was in  the process of completing  an EQF level-four vocational  qualification  in
personal training, and had accrued four years of experience in the industry. Based on
her interest in physique and figure competitions,  PFT09 cited muscle growth as her
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main area of interest, while her practical expertise lay predominantly in the provision of
group exercise sessions. 
PFT09  discussed  various  clients  who  had  impressed  her  with  their  determination,
including a client recovering from cancer, another diagnosed with fibromyalgia, as well
as an overweight client who had to overcome her shyness in order to commit to her
programme.  She  also  described  her  own  prior  struggles  with  alcoholism,  and  her
experiences with assisting clients afflicted with the same habit. PFT09 also discussed
misconceptions  among  female  clients  about  use  of  free-weights  and  their  fears  of
developing excessive bulk. Willpower and motivation were strong themes throughout
her interview, and the principal learning outcome explicitly cited by PFT09 was the
importance of acknowledging that absolutely anybody can participate in a more active
lifestyle, so long as they want to, and are motivated to do so.  
PFT10 
A  26-year-old  female,  PFT10  had  six  years  of  experience  in  the  personal  fitness
training  industry  at  the  time  of  the  interview,  with  a  strong  background  in  the
performing arts.  Her highest  completed  formal  qualification  was an EQF level-four
diploma in sport,  with additional  certification  in  movement  and dance-based fitness
activities. In terms of expertise, PFT10 stated that the majority of her clients aimed to
lose  weight.  Some  of  the  episodes  she  described  included  her  experiences  with  a
particularly challenging client, and her transition to operating in a renowned high-end
personal training studio. 
PFT10 was able to discuss her thoughts and feelings at a particularly substantial level of
depth, offering some valuable insights and contributions to the final narrative. The main
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learning  outcomes  explicitly  cited  by  PFT10  were  related  to  the  management  of
feelings, and the importance of resolving challenging situations as speedily as possible
so as to avoid persistent negative feelings that may otherwise result. PFT10 exhibited a
reluctance to end the interview, stating that she found the experience helpful in gaining
a deeper understanding of herself.
PFT11
A 39-year-old female, PFT11 was a yoga specialist with five years of experience as a
PFT.  Her  highest  completed  formal  qualification  was an  EQF level-four  vocational
qualification in personal training, with a strong background as a professional dancer
underpinning her career in fitness. PFT11 exhibited substantial knowledge and practical
experience  of  mindfulness,  which  was  based  on  her  yoga  practice.  These  unique
insights enabled her to share a detailed exposition of her thoughts.
Like  PFT07,  she  admitted  that  she  found it  difficult  to  recall  specific  episodes  on
request,  with  mindfulness  itself  representing  the  primary  point  of  departure  for  the
discussion. She later incidentally recalled what she considered to be a learning episode
based on her experiences of teaching during her pregnancy. Unable to demonstrate the
poses  herself,  PFT11  described  her  development  of  increased  sensitivity  and
communication  skills  during this  time,  competences  she also explicitly  cited  as  the
main learning outcomes. 
PFT12
A 23-year-old male, PFT12 was recruited as a replacement for an originally selected
participant  with  whom  interviews  were  repeatedly  postponed.  At  the  time  of  the
interview,  PFT12  had  four  years  of  experience  in  the  industry.  Nevertheless,  the
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insights gained from his interview later transpired to be quite substantial. Indeed, the
delays preceding this final interview afforded the interviewer time to reflect on some of
the themes already presented by the previous nine participants. This permitted the use
of  various  additional  prompts  and probes  to  which  PFT12 responded adeptly.  This
interview also yielded some key elements of the final narrative. 
In terms of  area of  expertise,  PFT12 cited body and lifestyle  transformation  as  his
specialisation, based on a background in bodybuilding and physique competition. While
his highest formal qualification was an EQF level-four diploma in sport, he was in the
process of contemplating reading an EQF level-six Bachelor's degree in exercise for
health or sport.   
The main episode initiating the interview involved the use of a particular motivational
strategy that could have back-fired, but later resulted in a high degree of success. The
principal learning outcomes cited by PFT12 were related to motivational skills and their
importance. Throughout the course of the interview he was able to provide compelling
insights regarding systems, thought processes, and his overall experience of thinking.
Following his interview, PFT12 stated that he had thoroughly enjoyed the interview,
and that he had never previously thought about some of the topics he had just discussed
in substantial depth.   
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ANNEX 4
Original interview schedule, prompts and probes
Can you describe, in as much detail as possible, any significant experiences,
situations  or  episodes  arising  throughout  the  course  of  your  work,  that  are
particularly memorable, and influenced you in some formative way?
Can you describe what you were thinking? What went on in your mind during this 
experience? 
What about afterwards?
What about before? Did you have any thoughts or feelings about the type of situation 
or client before this episode?
Were there any specific questions you asked yourself?
Was there a train of thought, and if so, can you describe it?
How did those thoughts present themselves to you? In what form? What did they look, 
hear, or feel like?
If you had to list the thoughts and feelings you had during and after the experience, 
what would they be? Please be as honest as possible.
Why did you act in that way?
Why did you think that? 
Why did you feel that way? 
What did you learn from this experience? How did the experience change the way you 
work?
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ANNEX 5
Sample interview transcript
An interpretive phenomenological study of thinking by professionals engaged in work-
based experiential learning episodes.
Interview PFT07
26th February 2017, 0830hrs - 1000hrs
Manuel Island, Gzira
Participant: IDENTITY WITHHELD (AA)
Interviewer: Matthew Muscat (MM)
- START OF TRANSCRIPT -
MM: How old are you?
AA: 30-years-old
MM: How many years have you been involved in personal training. 
AA; Six, at least, since I'm here (in Malta), and maybe about four years back home (in 
Bulgaria) 
MM: How would you describe your, career in personal training so far, in three to four 
minutes?
AA: I started as a part-time gym instructor and I used to do that as an addition to my 
actual job. I used to do it for just four or five hours per day. Helping around people in 
the gym, showing them the proper execution of exercises and helping the owner of the 
gym. Then pretty much when I started the first gym in Malta it was the same stuff as 
well, gym instructor part-time. Then I had few months, very short experience, in a 
personal training gym which was just personal training personal training, which I 
wasn't really happy with the way things were done there so it was a very short 
experience. Still it taught me about personal training, but I wasn't really happy 
with the philosophy of the company, and then since then I've been combining gym 
instructor and personal trainer as a full-time job. At the moment I'm quite happy with
the level I'm at. I've been learning from day one until today I've been learning 
more and more, and I'm quite happy and quite confident with the standard I have 
at this particular moment. Even with clientele I was telling my partner in life the 
other day, even with clientele I'm so happy with the level I have now, it took so many 
years to build it up, it's ironic that just in a few months time I'm planning to shift to a 
different career path. 
MM: Do you consider yourself to have any specialisation? Is there a particular type of 
client you like to work with?
AA: They've asked me as a matter of fact Thursday last week once of the gym 
instructors that I speak quite often to in the gym where I do most of my training. She 
said, “Ah I see you're training girls now as well, I see you're training women.” 
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Because she was, “Four years I've seen you training men.” I didn't even realise 
this but we spoke about it, I thought about it. 
I'm actually feeling more comfortable training men with similar goals to mine, 
similar body composition, similar even experience to mine. I guess it's just natural,
these who are closest to me, my goals and my way of training, these I find them the
easiest. 
In general I prefer, I've discovered this recently, I prefer training males. I'm much
more confident and I feel much more like I can really squeeze the most out of 
them, I can really push them to the limit. I know where is that limit while with 
females for me it's a little bit more of a guess. I tend to take it a little bit easier with 
females. Certainly females I mean there are females I've been training for years 
and years, I never take it easy on them any more but in general it takes a bit more 
of consideration and a bit more worrying from my side when I train a female. 
While with males I can really push and you know, let them get the most of it for the 
money they pay for the training. 
MM: How would you describe the role of a personal trainer? If someone asked you 
what you do for a living, what would you say?
AA: Well, different personal trainers see their role in the gym and see what their 
duties are in a different way, I've realised this. 
But the way I see myself, 
the main thing is, I teach people how to, or I try to teach people how to train and 
how to move, basic training principles, basic compound movements, how should 
they be executed properly, 
not in a way, “This is how you should squat! There is one way to do the squat!” 
(puts on bossy voice) but rather according to people's leverages and sizes and what
are the best ways to move and what are the safest ways to move. That's the main 
thing I see. Everything else for me just follows. Meaning, it's just in the background, 
just follows the main idea. If I teach them to follow basic principles, even when it 
comes even to nutrition and moving and training, everything else just fits in like a 
chain reaction. That's how I see it.
MM: I asked you to think of an episode from your past which you learned something 
from and you told me you did manage to think of something. So can you describe it to 
me?
AA: Yes of course. I tend to forget things form the past even when you ask me how 
long you've been doing this for, it's really hard for me to give you a frame like I've 
been doing form April 2000, it's really hard so even past experiences I don't really... 
I store them somewhere and when we start a conversation about a certain subject 
or certain event, then it triggers, it clicks, but I tend to really keep them, you 
know, at... how should I explain, I don't really try to remember them. 
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So the interesting story I could recall is something which just happened last week 
and it wasn't really a super interesting story, it's just something different, so I 
thought there might be something interesting in it for you. The situation was 
basically, I am training two girls at the age of 17. Very knowledgeable, very 
intelligent. Actually they gave me hope for the newer generation. Very intelligent, 
very driven. They had some experience in training before, one of them dances, does a 
lot of different types of dances and classes. The other does volleyball. They're quite, I 
won't really say athletic but they're quite coordinated, I mean they move, most of 
the movement are proper movements, they move properly. They don't lack 
coordination. And while training, I did super-sets for them, while one of them is doing 
one of the exercises which requires less of my attention, something simple like planks 
or leg presses, the other one is doing the complex compound lift, be it deadlifts or 
kettlebell swings, so I'm with the one who is doing the complicated lift and I'm you 
know, making sure that she is doing it properly. And while I'm, it was a kettle bell 
swing, one of the girls is swinging and I'm with her, I see one of the bodybuilders in 
the gym, one of the biggest and most, you know, with highest self-esteem guys in 
the gym, he goes and he starts chatting up with her, OK? And I didn't say anything
I actually found it funny. As soon as I went to swap, you know for both girls to 
change position, change exercises, he started like, trying to excuse himself, “No I'm 
trying to motivate her...” and stuff like this, I didn't really... usually in training I don't 
really... I try not to chat up with other people because it's a limited amount of time,
people pay for that amount of time, they don't pay for me to chat up with other 
people so I kind of really didn't want to extend the situation there. We swap. The 
other girl, so the one who was chatted to already, I'm swinging next to her, and the 
other girl goes doing leg press and someone else goes and starts chatting with her, 
and I'm like, I'm thinking to myself, “Oh my God!” 
Maybe in relation to me going to be a father of a girl not far from now, but I was 
like, “Oh My God these girls are here to train, and how hard it is on them to 
actually really do training and... OK they are with the trainer so I, you know I kind
of chase the guys away and I let them train and I let them concentrate. But 
imagine how hard it is on them to go to a gym as a normal gym member and really
learn how to do a proper training and do a proper training. I mean there are so 
many other things for them there, which is like... maybe again because I'm going to be 
the father of a girl I'm seeing things in a different... (laughs) 
MM: So you never thought about this before?
AA: No not really. I mean I never really... before I realised I'm going to be a father of
a girl, I never really thought so much of gender differences. 
I mean for me, really, people are people, really I never thought of that. 
And now I'm much more aware of this. Much more aware. And one of the girls I 
know her parents. They signed her to train with me because I know them, they've 
seen me training for years. And I'm like, Oh my God her parents have sent her 
here to train and you know, and how many other things are there... how many 
things that can take her mind off training are here? It's just insane, it's very very 
hard for them to stay on...
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MM: So that moment where you suddenly said, “Oh my God there are all these other 
things that they have to deal with...” When did that happen? When you saw the second 
guy talking to her?
AA: Well it was the second guy, because the first guy was a bit of a, you know a bit 
of a macho guy a bit of a, you know, a high self-esteem and show-off type of guy, 
and the first girl was much more... attractive than the second girl. 
So I figured, alright, I guess this is how... I guess this is normal for her, you know? 
I guess this is how it happens. 
But then when it happened to the second girl as well it was like... a different type 
of guy and it was a different type of girl, and I just figured... just as long as you're 
a girl... (laughs) there will be a guy in the gym trying to bug you while training, or 
a few guys in the gym... you know she's literally doing leg press, she's in the middle of 
her set, and they go and chat her up. I mean if someone did this to me it would really 
annoy me, while I'm doing my set, I mean... there are guys who have done this to 
me as well, even when I'm doing my exercise I move from one machine or one 
exercise to another and they keep on following me and talking to me and it's really
annoying. 
I, as a guy, and as the way I am, I tell them to bugger off, but how much more 
different and more intimidating it must be for a girl going as a normal gym for 
training knowing as little as she knows, trying to train and tighten certain areas, 
whatever, they always want to tighten the tummy, and... how much harder it must 
be on them to really stay on track and avoid all this... 
and even when they get advice for training and stuff, who gives you the advice and
if it's really worth following and how tough it is on them to really really train 
properly? 
MM: OK so you're saying a lot here and asking yourself a lot of questions here. Has 
this happened since that moment, have you continued to think about it?
AA: Well I guess I did up to a certain extent. I didn't really obsess myself with it, but I 
guess did actually think after that yes. I didn't make certain evaluation at the time, 
and then when I finished the training I went back to it and said, “Hmm, what 
happened here?”
MM: Why did you come back to it? Did you sit down and say OK now I'm going to 
think about it? Or did it come to you while you were driving home, or afterwards?
AA: I don't really know. It was part of both pretty much. It's like, you don't really tell 
yourself what to think of, no it's very few people who tell themselves what to think 
of, you know, and they can direct their...
MM: How do you know that?
AA: From a friend of mine, I've heard it... (laughs)
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Well, how do I know this... it's common sense.
MM: Is it?
AA: I believe it is. I believe it is... maybe I'm wrong.
MM: So before you said, “Maybe it's because I'm going to be a father...” Has that 
changed the way you see things? 
AA: Yes definitely.
MM: How do you think that happens? How is it affecting you?
AA: It's very easy to say you're perspective changes. Your idea and your point of view 
changes, and that's pretty much what happens. But then, what does this really mean? I 
believe you start seeing and evaluating things which you didn't really acknowledge
before, or you didn't really give much value to. I believe that's what it is. Because 
your point of view changes straight away, so you see things in a different way 
straight. I'm not sure if it makes sense. 
MM: So when you're training these two girls, are you thinking about how their parents 
must feel? Or are you seeing them and imagining them to be your daughter? How are 
you incorporating those ideas?
AA: The way I see them is, these girls are someone's daughter. That's how I see 
them, and it's like... I'm telling you again, they really really... maybe I'm being a bit 
over-protective about them and a bit over-concerned, because I really liked them 
straight away. Not physical, but how knowledgeable they are, how determined they 
are, how I got to know... I already knew about one of them quite a lot but I got to 
know about the other one as well, that she has a brother with Down's syndrome 
and I got to know about them quite a lot actually, and they impressed me, I really 
liked them, the impressed me in a really good way. They actually changed my idea 
of nowadays' 17 year-olds, that's how much they impressed me. 
MM: You say that they are knowledgeable and determined and that that's something 
good. Why is that something good for you inasmuch as you felt the need to over-protect
them due to it?
AA: I'm not saying I was over-protective I said I might have been. But maybe that's 
why I'm a bit more aware of seeing things happening to them. But these are big values
for me, not just when it comes to training and for you to really achieve your goal 
in training and for you to really progress in training and not spend four years or 
five years or whatever period of time in the gym wasting your time and not getting
actual improvement or results, for me this is a must if you want to improve and go 
somewhere, to be disciplined in what you're doing, to be determined, and to be 
knowledgeable. Nowadays we have no excuses about not getting...
MM: The fact that you value these things so highly, where do you think that came 
from?
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AA: Suppose everything comes from the childhood, according to... (laughs) some 
big names. But... I don't know... it's a mixture... it's how I'm brought up, what I 
have built up as values myself while growing up.
MM: And how do you think you built them up?
AA: Well, I always used to, from a very young age, as far as I can remember, I 
always used to observe a lot and try to learn a lot, meaning I wasn't always looking 
for a good example, someone I need to copy or follow, I mean there were these as well. 
But I used to learn a lot, I'm very happy I used to learn a lot from bad examples as 
well, meaning I see something, some type of behaviour or some act which I 
consider is not good or it's, you know, it's bad or harmful... and I try to avoid 
those. 
I see good examples and good behaviour and proper, if I can use the word, 
behaviour and I try to learn the method, the ways behind that behaviour... but... 
it's a mixture... how did I start valuing these? It's a mixture of what you've seen while
you were building up your values.
MM: And how do you know if something is good or bad?
AA: Yes, well. That's a good question. According to my own compass. 
MM: Your compass?
AA: Yes.
MM: Tell me about this compass. 
AA: Well I believe everyone has one of these. It's affected by, you know, the values
society has, the values the family has, if there was a family. It's affected by 
experiences. It's affected by social circles, and it's a bit like basal metabolic rate, 
right? A lot of trainers like to say, “We will speed up your metabolism...” as if 
metabolism is one thing. Metabolism and metabolic rate is a whole bloody … you 
know... it's not one thing, one creature, it's a combination of so many events and so
many processes, and this is pretty much it. The compass is not one thing it's not 
one object, it's a unification of so many processes.
MM: And this image of a compass, do you see it that way?
AA: No not really I just said it as a word. I don't really have an image of a compass.
MM: Why did you use the word compass then?
AA: I'm trying to get as close as what I need …
MM: Did you think about that now, or have you thought about it before, this idea of a 
compass?
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AA: Well it's a saying that we do use in my language (Bulgarian) and I'm trying to... 
I'm not sure if it's an actual...
MM: So it's like a “moral compass”?
AA: Yes. I'm not sure if it's an actual saying in English, but we do use it in 
Bulgarian and for me it makes a lot of sense.
MM: So you don't see the image of a compass but you do feel there is a general 
direction that these processes point us in...
AA: I don't see a general image of compass no, because as I told you it's not... a 
compass is just a word I use but it's not one object, it's... I don't really see it as one 
object no. I don't really see all those things as an image, because they are all different 
individual things which, together they point you in certain situations towards a certain 
…
MM: So when you carry out an act you are aware that some kind of compass took you 
there? So you do things that feel right because this compass took you there, without 
necessarily knowing all the processes that got you there?
AA: Well, yes because they are complicated processes. I might be aware of some of 
them, but I will never be aware of others. 
MM: Before you said that some big names say that many things can be related back to 
childhood. Is this an interest you have, this field of psychology?
AA: I do but it's not as it used to be. I used to be very very interested in the area. I'm 
still interested but with time I kind of shifted my focus instead of learning and 
reading about different opinions of different professionals and different theories, 
and just started knowing more from my personal observations and my personal 
experience. But I've always been interested in that area yes. 
MM: So in the case of personal experience you're using your compass and this sense of 
what is right and wrong...
AA: What's right and what's wrong yes but I don't really want to limit it in that 
sense because what is right for you is not necessarily wrong for me or right for me,
so I don't really... it's not like a limitation like I'm doing this because it's right, I 
mean it's not like a really narrow path where this is right and this is bad because 
of what mum told me or because of what society told me. It's more like with right 
and wrong yes, but with a bit more neutral view on it, I mean not like an 
emotional this is right and this is wrong. You have to wear this because this is 
right. No it's... I don't know, better and worse as opposed to right and wrong. 
MM: You mentioned it's not an emotional thing, so how do you see emotions? What are
emotions for you?
AA: Well, there aren't much of emotions in personal training. I mean, you're trying to 
stimulate the client, motivate the client, but there are emotions on that end but on 
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my end there aren't much emotions because I'm not there to get emotionally 
attached or whatever so... on the other hand yes there are emotions because there is 
hatred at times pointed towards the trainer... (laughs) swearing and stuff... and suffering
(laughs) So they have to deal with these emotions. At moments they reach training and 
they have to go above it the moments you show them a new movement, and you can see
straight away, “Oh no you want me to do kettlebell swings with 12kgs?! Until now I 
thought kettlebell swings were this small 4kg things at the gym...” So there are a lot of
emotions on the other end but if I really, “Oh OK it's heavy for you so don't do 
it...” If I really get emotional... there are moments when it's really for you, OK let's
decrease the weight but it's like, “OK you're afraid of it, OK leave it then, we'll 
never do this again. You don't feel comfortable? This we won't do it...”
MM: So you don't base your decisions on emotions so what do you base them on?
AA: Well, experience. I try to guess but then again, it's an educated guess and trying 
to judge them on performance and their abilities, on their advantages and 
disadvantages, on what they have to improve in no matter how basic it sounds, in 
posture, in movement. I base it on this, and with the goal we have already set in 
the beginning. My goal is to be more capable to move, to do more exercise. I don't 
want to be like, limited and restricted in my movement in my exercise so if this is your 
goal we will do toes to bar, we will do kettlebell swing, we will do front squat and we 
will do thrusters. If your goal is to lose weight I won't make you do thrusters 
necessarily, I might but I might not. I might get to it I might never get to it. It's 
according to their goal, it's according to their level and where they want to be. 
That's it. Emotions are for them to deal with and if I can help them with that, 
that's brilliant, but as far as I believe I'm far from emotional in my training. 
I mean I'm not really emotional in my own training. I'm happy when I improve 
and I'm really not happy when my performance declines but that's it, I know I 
keep on training and I know I'll get better and better. Not necessarily lifting 
heavier but I can keep on getting better and remain healthy so I'm not really 
emotionally involved in my own training let alone when I train someone, it's even 
less.  
MM: OK let's go back to the bodybuilder who was hassling your client. You said that 
he is one of the people with the highest self-esteem, macho, shows off. How do you 
know all these things? How did you come to this opinion about him?
AA: It's body language. It's even the way he expresses himself, the way he talks. 
MM: The words he uses? Or the tone he uses?
AA: All of it. It's verbal communication. 
MM: So you've spoken to him before?
AA: Yes, yes, I don't mind the guy, I just giving this as an observation. I do like the
guy, but I see him as the guy he is. I don't mind him, I mean I would actually be 
surprised if he didn't approach the client. 
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MM: So it's something you would have expected him to do?
AA: Definitely. Yes. It's not just an expectation because I've seen him approach 
other females at the gym, so I was pretty certain... I assumed in advance... 
although I don't like assuming, it's like again, an educated guess, you can put it as 
an educated guess that he would actually, yes, approach her at one stage or 
another. 
MM: So you weren't surprised as such, but the episode still stood out in your mind even
though you expected it?
AA: No I wasn't surprised. I wasn't annoyed. I expected it from his side. I don't want 
to say this because it's not really right, but I kind of figured him out in my mind. I 
mean you never know who is in front of you or against you, fully, but basically I 
had a drawing of him in my mind, I know what a creature I have in front of me. I 
believe what made me think about it is because I see the other side much more than 
before, the female side, and this is really related to me expecting a girl. I actually gave 
it so much attention because it made me think of the other side much more than I would
ever think before. Just a few months ago I never would have considered it, going so 
deep into how is the female feeling at the gym, honestly I went into so much depth 
because of changes in my own life that's what I think. 
MM: So having a daughter of your now causes you to give importance to what a 
woman but be feeling or thinking...
AA: I didn't really know about it. Even now when I see, you know, my partner going 
through pregnancy and everything it's... it's such a... it's a complicated thing. Until now 
I always took it for granted. And now I actually see the changes. I've had pre-natal 
and post-natal trainees before but I never saw it first-hand and it's like, yes, 
massive changes, physically and mentally they are massive changes, and that's the 
woman. Then there is the female growing up. I just started seeing a bit more the female
or the feminine side. And don't get me wrong when I say he is macho or something, 
I don't see it in a bad way. I need to be seen as a macho sometimes as well... 
(laughs) I don't see it as a bad thing. It's just the type of character that I see. It's 
not a good or a bad thing on it's own. In combination with other things it could be 
very good or very bad, for different purposes it could be very good or very bad. So 
don't tick it there as a... (laughs) I say it just as an observation. 
MM: You said that sometimes you want to be seen as a macho as well, can you tell me 
more about that?
AA: Not a particular situation but...
MM: Why do you want to be seen as macho?
AA: Not all the time. I mean it's not a standard in life, we're not at war, we're not 
in the woods... I say it very generally and the answer I'm going to give you is going to 
be very general as well. I don't know if it actually answers your question. In different 
situations you can be, and I believe you should be, much more gentle and much 
more understanding, and much more aware of people. And then in other 
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situations you have to be much more self-driven, and much more masculine, and 
much more... instead of evaluating others, suppressing others in a way, or 
overcoming others, or putting yourself first. And so this is what I call a bit more of
a macho generalised bahaviour. 
And different situations require a different response. It's not just black and white, 
you can't be, “Oh I want to be in contact with my feminine side...” Sometimes it's 
needed but sometimes it's needed to be more contact with your male and 
masculine side.
MM: When you say masculine, what image are you getting in your mind?
AA: More reliable as a male. More masculine, more reliable. More... laid back in a 
sense, not necessarily relaxed but, like... more observant, like with a brighter view 
on the situation, more capable to make a decision, more capable in a situation to 
evaluate as many factors as possible, more capable to react, fast and proper, and 
not really emotional. 
MM: Where do you think this definition came from?
AA: It's the society. The idea, you know. Where I come from males are quite 
dominant, and the society is a little bit different from society here. 
Here females I find them much more stronger character-wise and mentally even, I 
find them much stronger than back home. 
They have even bigger responses in the couple much more. The way I see it from 
my humble experience, it has a much bigger part for the female in the couple here,
when I observe the natives here. Back home the female has much smaller part in 
the couple. The male is much more dominant, so it is... I see that image of the 
society.
MM: So do you find yourself comparing things here to there?
AA: All the time. Not just here, but back home in general, I always did, that's one 
of the best ways to learn, comparing, comparing new to... I mean we've been doing
this for millions of years, comparing new to old, comparing something we know to 
something we don't know even this is how we approach people, it's not just a 
theory, it's proven, 
it's how we approach people. Why a lot of Western Europe are afraid of the 
refugees now? I know it's away from the subject but why are they afraid of them, 
why do they see them as a threat? Because it's something you don't know about, 
it's something you have a blurred image of and it's... you compare. 
You know your neighbour who is much closer to you, much similar to you, and 
you don't know this one who is different, who is in your eyes much less reliable, 
who is much less civilised in your eyes. We compare, we do compare all the time. 
388
I'm happy with my comparisons I believe they do me more good than harm. I 
compare a lot, people, training methods, training techniques, everything.
MM: How do these comparisons happen? Are they triggered by something or do you sit
down and say OK now I'm going to compare this with that and see what I can come up 
with?
AA: Both. They are part of my mental processes during the day. Part of my, you know, 
part of the things I evaluate on my own. Part of my internal conversation, they 
happen. Sometimes they just happen like something impressed me or God knows 
on what level, and it comes back to me and sometimes something really impressed 
me and I, “OK let's see what happened here, why did this happen?” And I try to 
explain to myself... see if it's safe to go outside of the cave or no... (laughs)
MM: Tell me about this internal conversation. Can you tell me about that?
AA: Well that's part of my compass now if you're going to... because you were 
very interested in my internal compass... it's part of it. That's one of the processes 
in it. 
MM: Can you tell me how an internal conversation normally goes?
AA: Well we don't argue usually if that's what you're trying to get out of me... (laughs) 
Well, that's very personal and I really hope you're not... that you really finding 
this interesting and you're not just asking me... it's very personal. 
I believe everyone who is a bit more... you don't have to be spiritual or whatever, 
you have to be just a bit more... aware, pretty much. I believe everyone who is a bit
more aware has this internal conversation going on. 
I know there are people who don't even... they rush so much that they don't even 
stop and think about what happened to them, about what happened, why it 
happened, where am I going? I know there are so many people like this, very 
primal, very rushed.
MM: So why do you do it and they don't? How did you develop this?
AA: For me it's important. For me it's part of being...
MM: Where did it come from? 
AA: I've had it from a very young age. It came from my childhood. Very young 
age. Evaluating people's behaviour, why they do this, why they are affecting other 
people in that way, you know stuff like this. From a very young age I've been 
observing adults.
MM: And why do you think there are other people who can't do this? What's the 
difference between them and you?
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AA: Well, again I assume. You never know what is happening inside a persons mind. 
Again I assume, it's a theory of mine. I get to that conclusion from seeing people's 
reactions, so I get to that conclusion by observing their reactions and their actions.
Where I come from it is very common to have... here people are a bit more distant. It's 
difficult to have a really open conversation with a relative or with a friend. Here it 
is a little bit... even with friends and relatives you're not that... it's very rare to 
have an open and honest conversation. I've heard this from people... people have 
shared this with me.
How do I know they don't actually have internal conversation? Because they have 
told me. I've gotten to know this from their own words. And on top of that I 
observe there reactions and actions, and I make my conclusions. 
MM: And this internal conversation, is there some kind of a system. Are there specific 
questions you ask yourself? Are there specific times when you sit down and say OK 
now I'm going to have an internal conversation now?
AA: No it's a bit like a guiding voice. No matter how funny it sounds it's a bit like a
guiding voice.
MM: So you just hear it sometimes?
AA: Yes sometimes I have a conversation with an intelligent voice in my head... 
(smiles)
MM: OK you're smiling again. You also smiled before when I asked you about the 
internal conversation and you replied, “well we don't argue with each other...” and you 
smiled, so what are you thinking there? And why did you feel the need to tell me that?
AA: (Laughs) Because there is a joke... you know, if you talk to yourself too often or to
much it's not a good sign, and people sometimes argue about it... it's not bad... but it's 
really bad when you start arguing with each other, and when you get angry with 
each other and don't talk to each other for days... (laughs) Then it's really bad... 
MM: Is this a Bulgarian joke?
AA: No it's kind of a “my” joke. And I joke with people about it. We have a kind of 
similar thing in Bulgaria and I have modified it myself.
MM: So do you have an idea that this kind of process could become unhealthy? Or 
dangerous?
AA: No there are conditions, and I'm certainly hoping I am far from this state. But there
are conditions where this is really... it's not a healthy process, no. There are people 
suffering from these conditions. 
MM: The way you use it you consider it to be healthy, but you have this idea that if you
do it too much then it's unhealthy?
AA: No it's not that if I do it too much, it's really... 
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MM: Can you tell me more about this distinction then, between healthy internal 
conversation and some sort of mental illness?
AA: OK, well... through times and periods of my life when I've been away on my 
own and when I haven't... when I really had to abandon my social circle and go 
somewhere for a period of time and do something, there have been periods when I 
have spent quite a lot of time on my own. And at these moments you become much
more aware of yourself. 
You become much more observant of others, and you... since there is the absence 
of other people you become a bit like Tom Hanks with... you know, what was the 
name of the movie?
MM: Castaway?
AA: Castaway exactly. 
MM: Wilson?
AA: Wilson yes, that's a different thing actually you point at an object to talk to, but he 
was talking to himself, he was talking to his mind as well. 
MM: Again you are smiling. Is there something wrong with that?
AA: No I love Wilson. I'm smiling because it's one of my favourite movies and in 
general I really like Tom Hanks as well. He's one of the few actors who speaks the 
Bulgarian language, and he has been quite a few time in Bulgaria as well, and I 
really like the guy and I really like his movies as well, so... that's why I'm smiling. 
It's a bit of emotion as well, forgive me. 
MM: So is there some kind of a line that you cross and then it becomes unhealthy?
AA: Yes definitely. 
MM: At what point does it become unhealthy?
AA: I have no idea I hope I will never get to know at what point it becomes 
unhealthy. 
MM: So how do you ensure you keep it healthy?
AA: I don't really have to control it. I believe people who are unhealthy and have 
mental issues, they have to try to control it. I mean for me it's part of who I am, 
it's part of a healthy human being, so I don't really have to control it, 
it's... it's part of me really, and there have been situations when, there is no one to 
give me advice or to tell me what and how. And there is this internal voice 
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that will tell me... I hope I'm not sounding crazy... which would tell me... OK let's 
say in a situation... “OK calm down, wait a bit, you might not be right...” or “Wait, 
let's see what else there is, it might not be as you think it is...” and it's really, for 
me not something I have to control. 
It is part of me and I'm very proud and very happy that I actually have this 
internal conversation. 
There have been times when I have been feeling down, or I've been feeling stressed
or overwhelmed, or I've passed through some difficulties in life like everyone in 
this world, and there have been moments when I have lost that internal 
connection, and I feel like something is missing. I feel like something is missing and
how do I know that I am composed? 
And how do I know that I am back to my senses, and how do I know that I have 
passed through a tough moment? How do I feel myself again after a tough 
episode? When I actually have that internal conversation, that internal peace, I 
can really call it internal peace.
MM: So it leaves when you're stressed?
AA: Yes, well... when I am stressed or overwhelmed. These are just few times in life 
that it happens. Either something that is changing your life for a long period of time
or something that is overwhelming you in the sense you cannot cope with. It could 
be job, it could be relationship, it could be just an issue which arose which is not 
going to affect you in the long term but it is quite demanding on you for this 
particular moment or time being, and it just over-stresses you and overwhelms 
you in a certain way. I cannot really explain it any better than this. 
MM: You said again, I hope you don't think I'm crazy. Why would that be a bad thing? 
Why do you care about that?
AA: (Laughs) It's not a healthy thing. I mean we are all more or less crazy, that is a 
fact. And in the world nowadays you have to be a little bit crazy otherwise other 
people will drive you mad, insane, that's for sure. But I don't think it's a bad thing. 
I'm very happy I have the self-belief that I'm a little bit old, I'm a little bit 
different from the mass, I know a lot of us have that thing and they think that they
are better than the average, I really believe that I am. I believe through the things 
that I've done in my life so far, I have proven it up to a certain extent as well. I 
believe. 
If you ask someone else maybe they won't agree with what I'm saying about 
myself, 
but I don't see it as a bad thing, I just see it as an unhealthy thing. For me being 
crazy, or being mad, is not a bad thing. Sometimes people you know, they look at 
autistic children and they think they are crazy and they are not 100% and 
sometimes autistic children are ingenuous, so I don't see it as a bad thing. 
MM: So why wouldn't you want me to think you're crazy then? 
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AA: I don't see it as a bad thing but I see it as an unhealthy thing. So I don't want to be 
unhealthy. I believe the best way to live your life is to stay close to nature, to be 
aware of your own body, to be aware of your own mental and physical health. I 
believe that is the best way to live your life. Because we just have a limited amount of
time, and by what you are doing, and how you are doing it, it really changes the quality 
of that limited amount of time you are going to live through. So if you are unhealthy, 
if you don't take care of your own mental and physical health, then you won't 
make the most of life in general. So I don't see it as a bad thing, I see it as an 
unhealthy thing, and another thing why I said I hope you don't think I am crazy is 
because, again I hope I am not out of subject but I am going into some quite personal 
and deep thoughts which, you know I hope I'm not scaring you in a way with those 
thoughts of mine. 
MM: Why do you think they would scare me?
AA: I don't know, I hope it won't because I don't see usually people talking and 
discussing such things in such depth. 
So everything that is out of the box and out of the ordinary tends to scare off a lot 
of people. I'm not saying it is going to scare you in particular, but it tends to scare 
the mass. So that's why I am saying it in advance. I wouldn't say it just to you, I'm 
saying it... well I wouldn't say all this to just anyone as well, but I would say it to 
whoever is in front of me I would say the same thing not just because you're there I 
hope you won't think I'm crazy, I would say it to anyone who is listening to what I'm 
saying in that direction. 
MM: You said something in the very beginning, you said you've got episodes in your 
past, but you don't think about them. You acknowledge that they are there, so even 
though you don't think about them do you think that they affect your behaviour and 
your decisions?
AA: Of course. I don't think about them on an everyday basis but they reflect on 
what you're doing and how you're doing it. And you recall them as well, it's the 
way the brain functions. 
MM: Recall them when you need them you mean?
AA: If the brain functions properly, yes. Because it could be that you cannot recall
them as well, but if the brain functions properly, yes. 
MM: If the brain is “healthy”?
AA: Yes. 
MM: OK so this episode that you did mention, with the two girls, what did you learn 
from that? And how will it change the way you work.
AA: I don't really know what I learned from it to tell you the truth. 
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I guess I can point out a few of the things I think I learned from it, and if you ask 
me two months later I might add something to that list, if you ask me five years 
later I might add something else to that list. 
MM: Referring to the same episode?
AA: Yes. 
MM: So you are thinking about what you might have learned right now. So you didn't 
consciously think before about what you learned from this episode? Is that correct?
AA: I believe yes. What I learned from this episode is mostly what we already 
spoke about. It's not something particular thought. It's my awareness of my 
female in the gym which has increased. I have become more aware of that, how the 
female is at the gym. I didn't really learn something particular like, “I have to...” or
“If I don't want them to be disturbed during training I have to programme the 
exercises close to each other so I stay next to both of them...” I mean I'm not ...
MM: So you learned something about yourself then?
AA: From that particular episode yes. Because I mean it's not bad for the training, it 
wasn't harmful or something, they're not there just to listen to my commands and 
just do what I tell them and in one hour cool down and stretch and go. They will 
be interacting with other people, they will learn their own things from interactions
with other people, they will go through their own experiences and lessons and 
stuff, but I didn't really think after that, I have to change this in my training, because 
that was not an issue. I mean, I am totally cool with this, I just made an 
observation.
MM: Do yo think it will change something though? Do you think it will affect the way 
you work in any way from now on?
AA: I don't think so no because it's not something I see as  bad thing. If it was a bad 
thing, like... I don't know...
MM: OK let's say one year from now you have a female client, who is similar sort of 
age to these girls, let's say she's quite attractive but you are thinking more about your 
daughter when you look at her, do you think that you will treat her differently as a 
client than the way you would have treated her, say, two years ago?
AA: I guess so yes. I guess I'll treat her even better. I guess in the future I will be even 
better as a person and I will be even better as a professional and I will treat her even 
better. 
MM: So you have learned from this episode in the sense that as a result of this episode 
you now know that you should be more understanding of certain types of female 
clients, who perhaps before you weren't quite so understanding of. So it probably would
come out even though you've just told me you can't really think what you've learned. 
Would you agree with this?
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AA: Well I guess I fully agree with it yes. I believe that's the situation, that's the case. I 
will let you know in two years time though if that is the case or no. But I believe 
yes. We are just guessing what it would be. In a perfect case scenario yes I will 
have learned from my experience and I would have built up and improved. But 
who knows what will be in two years time?
MM: So what could go wrong then?
AA: Everything can go wrong. 
MM: So you are saying you could have some bad experiences?
AA: Yes God knows everything can happen. But if it's a perfect case scenario, if it's 
a lab enclosed environment, yes that experience that I got now it did actually make
me more aware and more understanding of the female in the gym, and to lead to 
me being more understanding and more even careful towards towards a female in 
the gym of a certain age, yes. But God knows what it would be in two years. 
MM: So the only reason why it would change is if you learn other things?
AA: Suppose it will not change if it's up to me suppose it won't change in a bad way. 
But it's not only up to me. A lot of who I am and what I'm doing and how I'm doing 
is up to me but it's not all of it. 
- END OF TRANSCRIPT -
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ANNEX 6
Annotations, coding, theme development, and clustering for PFT07
a) Sample showing how noteworthy quotes were coded and developed into sub-themes 
using an open-source spreadsheet application (LibreOffice Calc):
b) The emerging clusters:
70205 Role of PT as teacher of exercise methods and techniques
70203 Awareness that different trainers see their role as a PT differently
70204 Awareness of own sense of identity and self in the role of a PT
70206 Sense of self as flexible and adaptive trainer rather than rigid
70207 Other aspects of role as secondary
70506 Sense of self as an obervant learner from a young age
70104 Natural tendency towards clients similar to self
71311 Sense of self as different and more able than the majority of people
270101 Acknowledging fulfilling different distinctive professional roles
271502 Assumption that one will be better in ones' role in the future
270203 Importance of having a primary goal or focus
70307 Recognising a change in thinking
70102 Satisfaction with the results of ongoing learning over the years
70601 Using an internal "compass" to decide if something is good or bad
271202 Awareness of own state of being stressed or overwhelmed
270401 Thinking about something, but only moderately
71103 Sensing what is happening in others' minds by observing actions and reactions
271002 Awareness of a need to evaluate certain things
270804 Reflecting influenced by ongoing events in own life
71401 Recognition that own and others view of own self may differ
70306 Experiencing a shift in perspective, seeing things in a different light and from different shoes
70408 Perspective shift resulting in new and deeper understanding
70806 Deeper understanding of females due to changes in own circumstances
70901 Deeper understanding of pregnant clients due to empathising with pregnant partner
70604 Awareness of some processes that guide thoughts, but not others
270601 Differentiating a concept from a mental image
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71201 Increased self-awareness as a result of being alone
270403 Notion that one can assume different perspectives in the same situation
270901 Realisation one has taken something for granted
270701 Awareness of a declining interest in a specific subject
71004 Satisfaction with own use of comparisons as a way of thinking
271602 Awareness that things can go wrong
70202 Recognition of own uncertainty when working with a specific client-group
71107 Humour about the idea of hearing voices
270703 Interpreting something in the context of own goals
71003 Results of comparison influence interaction, positively when similar, negatively when different
71002 Social interaction and assessment of others based on comparison
70801 Views of own training applied to view of clients' training
70802 Forming opinion of other based on body language and ways of verbal expression
70503 Being impressed by client upon knowing and understanding their stories
70501 Seeing people in terms of their relationships with other people
70309 Awareness of distractions other people must face
70803 Observation and opinion of other formed without influence from feelings
70805 Opinion and expectations of a person as a "drawing" of them in the mind
271404 Desire not to scare others
270702 Acknowledgment that clients must deal with certain emotions
270801 Evaluating others' verbal communication
270501 Sense of other as knowledgeable and determined
270301 Sensing other is making excuses
71202 Improved ability to observe others after having been alone
270202 Desire to give clients vlue for their money
271102 Acknowledgement that one can never know for sure what is happening in the mind of another
270103 Valid realisations triggered by communication with others
71104 Evaluation of different levels of depth in conversation among members of different cultures
271403 Awareness that a topic of conversation is personal and deep
71405 Indepth discussion as a rare occurrence
70304 Self-talk upon feeling surprised
71006 Self-talk as one of the processes of the compass
71007 Self-talk as a very personal and private process
71008 Self-talk as an ability arising from self-awareness
71101 Self-talk ad reflection not possible when busy and distracted
71102 Self-talk as a means of evaluating behaviour from a young age
71105 Knowledge of others' self-talk of lack of as a result of asking them
71106 Self-talk as a "guiding voice"
71301 Suspicion that self-talk could become unhealthy in excess
71302 Self-talk as a natural process not needing controlling
71303 Inner-voice as part of self, acting as other
71304 Concern of sounding crazy when talking about self-talk and inner voice
71305 Inner voice offering restraint and insight in times of need, not needing to be controlled
71306 Sense of comfort found in being able to self-talk
71307 Absence of self-talk as a sign of excessive stress
71309 Self-talk absent when stressed or overwhelmed
271003 Internal voice jokingly considered as other person
271101 Self-talk as an important and valued process
271201 Noticing self-talk in others
71308 Presence of inner voice a reassuring sign of good health
70405 Self-questioning after the episode
71505 Session as learning experience for client, beyond scope of what is controlled by PT
71506 Some learning doesn't result in change of practice, but in change of experience or perception
71601 Learning is fluid and can change, and cannot result in predicted behaviour
71602 Learning can only be closely defined in a "lab" environment, reality is more complex
71502 Lessons learned don't stay static, they evolve and change
71503 Lesson learned not a thought but an ability, in this case raised awareness
71504 Learning doesn't have to be defined as specific things to be done differently in the future
70701 Shift in preference towards learning from own observations
71407 Lessons are recalled by the brain when needed, don't need conscious recall
70507 Awareness of own ability to learn from bad examples as well as good
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71501 Inability to nominate exactly what was learned
71001 Importance of learning through making comparisons between times and places
70406 Reflection as unplanned, difficulty in telling oneself what to think
70407 Assuming that people cannot tell themselves what to think, and that this is common sense
70101 Leaving company as a result of conflicting philosophies
70301 Prior conceptualisations of others affecting analysis of ongoing situation
70310 Stereotyping men according to their behaviour
70313 Memorable situation as result of expectations being challenged, and new conceptualisations made
70902 Generalised "macho" behaviour as neither a good or bad thing
70903 Usefulness of "macho" behaviour
70303 Policy of avoiding communicating with people when on client's paid time
70308 Belief that people are all equal in perspective
70502 Recognition that care and protection of client is normal up to a certain point only
270402 Acknowledging a belief might be wrong
70509 Building values based on what you see
70909 Interplay between generalised behaviours in relationships across different cultures
70908 Differences in generalised gender behaviours in different cultures
271103 Acknowledgement that one can only assume or theorise
70201 Impression of better understanding of men than women
270602 Conceptualising a notion that is a composite of numerous processes
271001 Awareness of elements of normal daily mental processes
271601 Believing something to be the case
271402 Awareness of own mortality as a motivator to live fully
70312 Situation playing out as expected
271501 Somethings don't need to be changed if they are not "bad"
70302 Sense of amusement when predicted behaviours play out as expected
70210 Able to recall a recent episode as a result of it's deviation from the norm
70905 Importance of adopting and using generalised behaviours according to the situation
70906 Criteria of masculine behaviour type
70907 Ideas and generalised behaviours shaped by society
70602 Moral compass as a complex combination of processes including social influences
70603 Idea of moral compass inspired by a Bulgarian word
270204 Prior experience and knowledge of client affecting opinion of them
70702 Values based on better and worse rather than right and wrong
71310 Importance of "madness" in modern society
71402 Mental illness as unhealthy not "bad"
71403 Importance of awareness of physical and mental health
71404 Good health as essential to a fuller life
270902 Newfound empathy and appreciation for other gender
271401 Differentiating something bad from something unhealthy
71408 Brain will only recall when needed if it is healthy
70804 Context and opinion of others resulting in expectations formed by educated guess
70305 Reflecting about own reaction/thought and contextualising according to changing situations
70311 Level of attractiveness of person as a factor affecting context
70705 Decisions as "educated guesses" based on obervable contextual factors and goals
70706 Decisions made upon considering client factors, levels and goals, not emotions
70904 Different contexts and situations call for different generalised behaviours
270302 Realising other factors are affecting context, previously unnoticed
270903 Significance of character traits as different from others they are combined with, and context
270201 Increased and decreased ability to guess in different contexts with different client types
70404 Putting self in other's place even in similar related hypothetical situations
70704 Speculating about emotional experience of client, playing down that of PT
70508 Speculating the "method" behind particular behaviours
70212 Assessment of movement leading to speculation about background in sport or activity
70402 Imagining same experience happening to self and recalling episodes and associated feelings
70403 Assessing whether other is able to react in the same way as self in given situation
70401 Imagining self in other's position
270803 Speculating what might have caused a thought
70703 Emotions as less useful for PT, natural for client
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70211 Feeling of hope upon classifying clients as knowledgeabe and intelligent
270102 Feeling of happiness and satisfaction with ones level of competence
71406 Fear a common consequence of the rare or unknown
70504 Respect for self-discipline and being knowledgeable
71203 Displayed emotion as something to be apologised for
270802 Describing an emotional state by stipulating emotions that it is not, elimination
70209 Memories are recalled when triggered by conversation, not on request
70103 Realising upon being told by other
70208 Awareness of difficulty in recalling information on request
70505 Personal values a result of upbringing and own experiences and observations
71603 Development is not totally under one's control
271603 Future as beyond one's control
71005 Reflections and self-talk just happening naturally and others as a result of being impressed by 
something
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ANNEX 7
Sample sketch during reflective analysis of final themes
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